Will the Chandrayaan-2 moon landing be India’s biggest scientific achievement? - The Print, 6 September 2019

In today's Print, I write on India's Chandrayaan 2 mission in The Print's TalkPoint. What makes this mission historic is that India will be the first country to achieve a soft landing on the south pole of the moon. Choosing an unexplored area like the south pole of the moon for landing shows ISRO’s confidence.

For the full piece, click here.

Independent India has had a number of scientific achievements, including the Chandrayaan-1 mission, and it will be difficult to rank them because they are all equally impressive in the context of India’s development.

The Indian space programme itself has had impressive achievements like the successful launch of the SLV-3 in 1980. The recent anti-satellite (ASAT) test is also a significant achievement in the science and technology realm. India has had significant achievements in the nuclear realm too – the nuclear test in 1974 and the setting up of the fast-breeder test reactor. The Chandrayaan-2’s success will definitely earn the mission a place in this group of scientific and technological achievements.

Any landing on the lunar surface or indeed on any extra-terrestrial surface will be difficult, but landing on an unexplored area like the south pole of the moon much more so. It says a lot about the self-confidence of the ISRO and its leaders that they chose the south pole of the moon for their first attempt in extra-terrestrial soft landing. While we can all hope for Chandrayaan-2’s success, what has been achieved so far is remarkable for a country like India.

Chandrayaan 2 Moon Landing: The sign of a mature space mission - The Hindustan Times, 6 September 2019

In today's Hindustan Times, I write on India's Chandrayaan 2 mission. The fact that the Chandrayaan spacecraft will be landing on the south pole, a region that has been unexplored before makes it even more special. The fact that the exact spot for landing will be determined right before the landing makes it an extremely complex mission for India.

If all goes as planned, India’s Chandrayaan 2 will become the first Indian space craft to land on a non-terrestrial surface. Others such as the US, Soviet Union/ Russia and China have done human and rover landings on the Moon previously. India has previously undertaken orbital missions around the Moon and Mars, the Chandrayaan 1 and Mangalyaan respectively. The fact that the Chandrayaan spacecraft will be landing on the south pole, a region that has been unexplored before makes it even more special. Thefact that the exact spot for landing will be determined right before the landing makes it an extremely complex mission for India. Even China, which has built sophisticated space capabilities, made its first attempt to land on the near side of the Moon, although it did land on the far side of the lunar surface earlier this year.

For the full piece, click here.



While ISRO traditionally did not look at interplanetary or complex missions such as the Chandrayaan or Mangalyaan, this has become necessary as India’s space programme evolves into a more mature programme. This is also a reflection of the growing geopolitical competition that is now beginning to play out in space. The space competition that one saw during the Cold War had somewhat faded by the early 1980s, after both the US and Soviet Union demonstrated their own “firsts” in various accomplishments. In fact, the bragging rights also began to lose their value after a point of time because such endeavours were not seen as having much scientific or technological value-addition. But these have begun to make a comeback, except that the main actors are primarily in Asia with China leading in some of the endeavours, quickly followed by other players like India and Japan as well. There are also newer activities in outer space that is sparking the competition. For instance, space mining is beginning to gain a lot of interest in both the West and in Asia. Even the small city state, Luxembourg, is making significant investments in this regard. Asteroid mining, lunar mining and general advances in technology that aid in-situ resource utilization is pushing the countries to explore the practical value of space exploration.

There is also the security driven push to this competition. The US and Soviet Union were locked in major space competition for a couple of decades but the end of the Cold War had slowed down the pace to a large extent. The renewed space competition has China at the centre of it and Beijing has ambitions to catch up with both the US and Russia. But Beijing’s own actions have sparked major reactions in Asia and beyond. For instance, the first successful Chinese anti-satellite (ASAT) test in January 2007 sparked a new competition, pushing India to finally demonstrate its own capability earlier this year. This parallels other types of aggressive behaviour by China in its neighbourhood that has triggered new cooperation between those threatened by such actions and further competition with China. For instance, China’s behaviour has made the India-Japan strategic partnership a lot stronger in recent years, including in outer space. China’s actions have led to competition with the US, India and Japan, to a limited extent too. Because of the growing sophistication of China’s space programme, especially with regard to counter-space capabilities, other states have been driven to try and play catch-up with China. Of course, given the growing penetration of space for security and military purposes by all the major powers, India cannot afford to ignore these developments. China has marched ahead in many areas but India has to develop its own deterrent capabilities in space to remove some of the vulnerabilities that may persist in the bilateral and regional context. So, India will have to do a bit of catching-up with China for a while. While the Chandrayaan 2 mission may not have a direct social or economic benefit, demonstration of the growing sophistication of India’s space capabilities is much required for strengthening its credentials when it comes to debates about global governance of space. Moreover, highlighting India as a major space player makes it an attractive destination for launching satellites for a number of emerging players. All of these benefits and necessities makes India’s space ventures such as this worthwhile.

China extends terrestrial rivalries into orbit with new space race - The Nikkei Asian Review, 23 August 2019

On this Friday, I published a short essay on the emerging Asian space race in The Nikkei Asian Review. I believe that the emerging space dynamics especially in Asia will spur new competition as well as cooperation. For example, India and Japan unite over Beijing's moon landings and anti-satellite weapons and find new avenues to collaborate including in joint lunar missions in the future.

On September 7, India will attempt to land an unmanned mission on the moon. If it is successful, it will join China as the second Asian power that has landed on the lunar surface -- its efforts driven by China's achievements.

While such peaceful rivalry can spur countries to greater feats, unfortunately competition between Asian nations is now having more hostile effects: earlier in the year, India tested an antisatellite weapon, or ASAT, in space, trying to match a capability that China had demonstrated earlier.

These are two facets of the space race in Asia and it now looks like both will be determined by terrestrial power tussles more than anything else.

For the full essay, click here.



Asian powers have made significant advances in developing their capacities in outer space in the past couple of decades. China landed a rover on the far side of the moon earlier this year, an impressive feat that no other country has achieved, three years after landing on the near side.

While China has not officially commented on plans for a manned mission to the moon yet, many believe that will be the next step. In fact, Beijing has disclosed that its future lunar missions will set the foundation for a potential research base there.

Further, China's plans to construct and operate its own space station in low-earth orbit sometime around 2022 are impressive, but also add to space competition. By the time China's space station is established, it will probably be the only one operating. The current International Space Station is likely to wind up by 2024.

Similarly, India became the first Asian country to send an orbiter around Mars, called the Mangalyaan. ISRO, India's space agency, has an ambitious agenda, including a mission to study the sun in 2019-20, a second mission to Mars around 2022-23 and a Venus mission around 2023. Like China, India also plans manned space missions.

Japan, the other Asian power, has focused more on commercially viable projects but it has impressive achievements including a lunar orbiter mission in 2007 as well as the Hayabusa mission, the first time that a spacecraft landed on an asteroid and brought back samples.

While these achievements are commendable, there is a darker side; tense international relations in Asia are being felt in outer space.

In 2007, when China tested its ASAT weapon, it was the first such test since the 1980s. China's decision to demonstrate that capability meant that every power which had a reasonable level of dependence on outer space, not just military but also civilian, through such uses as GPS and telecommunication satellites, was now suddenly vulnerable.

Not surprisingly, the U.S. immediately followed with its own ASAT test the next year, and India began its own program. Now it appears that Japan may be on its way to developing an ASAT capability.

ASATs are only the visible element of this competition. There is also a less well known race to develop other capabilities that can damage the outer-space assets of potential adversaries. These include everything from cyber attacks to electronic warfare and spectrum interference, deliberate attempts to jam or otherwise impede radio signals.

The problem is of course a global one. But it is also specifically Asian because most of the key players are the rising powers in this region. Growing national wealth and technological capabilities have made these countries more dependent on space -- and hence more vulnerable.

The difficulty is exacerbated by the lack of international rules or norms. Existing treaties such as the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 have proved to be outdated and inadequate to meet these challenges. The problem is well recognized and there have been recent international efforts to address it, though these have gone nowhere.

The consequence is that deterrence appears to be the only real safeguard to protecting national assets in space. Simply put, the absence of strong rules and norms means countries must implicitly threaten retaliation by developing their aggressive capabilities.

This competition is spurring cooperation of a sort, however. China's enormous capacity means that no other Asian power can counter it alone. Just as this is encouraging new terrestrial alignments between India, Japan, Australia and others, it is also leading to cooperation in outer space by a number of countries, all whom have common concerns about China's capabilities and behavior in space.

Thus India and Japan, despite having highly nationalistic space programs, are cooperating more. In 2017, the two countries formally recognized the importance of deeper cooperation, and the space agencies of the two countries plan to conduct a joint lunar mission. More significantly, the two countries have just started a space security dialogue.

The first space race between the U.S. and the Soviet Union petered out without too much damage. With only two players in the game and a far simpler outer-space environment, management of that competition was relatively easy.

Asia may not be so lucky unless wiser counsel prevails. Asian powers have made significant advances and accomplished much they can be proud of, but unless they can either manage their terrestrial power politics or at least isolate outer space from those politics, it is likely that all of Asia could suffer.

India's strategy in space is changing. Here's why - The World Economic Forum, 14 August 2019

After a gap of more than a year, I wrote a short essay for The World Economic Forum. In this essay, I focused on India's geopolitical strategy in space.

Half a century after humans first walked on the Moon, space is still as much about scientific discovery as it is about strategic competition.

As was the case during the Cold War, outer space is an arena of terrestrial geopolitics. We can see this in the increased impetus for competition in various achievements in outer space, such as Moon landings, Mars exploration and, more directly, in the creation of space forces in various countries – France being the latest to announce it intends to establish a space command to improve defence capabilities.

For the full essay, click here.



Yet, despite outer space being once again a field of power competition, there are also some differences from the Cold War years. First, and most significantly, there are many more countries and actors involved: in Asia itself, China, Japan and India are major spacefaring nations, and smaller players such as South Korea, Australia and Singapore are developing their own space programmes.

Added to the increase in countries is the entry of the private sector into space. A key difference in the new geopolitics of space is that both terrestrial competition – and its reflection in outer space – is now along multiple axes, rather than just the single U.S.-Soviet one.

Today, there is increasing power competition in Asia, particularly between China and its neighbours - India, Japan and Australia. Some of this is also reflected in outer space. As a corollary, we are also beginning to see greater cooperation between some countries in outer space, including India and Japan, both of which are concerned about the rise of China.

India also cooperates in space with the US, Russia and France. Much of the competition India has on land, on the other hand, is with China. Therefore, India has negligible cooperation with China in space, and equally, little competition with the other space actors.

A competitive chain reaction that (sometimes) reaches space

What occurs in space can be the result of a geopolitical chain reaction. For instance, consider the US-China-India relationship: China often takes action because of its strategic competition with the United States.

This has an impact on India, forcing India to respond. But India’s response to China has an effect on Pakistan, which then responds to India. This cascade can be seen on land, and at times, in space. For example, China’s first successful anti-satellite (ASAT) test in January 2007 was to demonstrate a catch-up effort with the United States. But once China tested its ASAT in 2007, India had little choice but to develop its own ASAT because of the need of deterrence.

But in the space arena, the competitive cascade does not travel all the way to Pakistan because Pakistan’s space programme is underdeveloped. While Pakistan has expended considerable national wealth in keeping pace with India in its nuclear and missile capabilities, it has not done so with regard to outer space.

On the other hand, there might be a security incentive for Pakistan to demonstrate that it also has an ASAT capability.

Pakistan could also develop other counterspace capabilities, including cyber and electronic means to target India’s space assets. While this remains speculative so far, the history of India-Pakistan competition suggests that this remains a possibility.

Evolution of strategy

India had long maintained a rather doctrinaire approach toward space security, emphasising the peaceful uses of outer space and opposing the weaponization and militarization of space. Thus, India had opposed the US Strategic Defense Initiative programme and other efforts to build ballistic missile defences, let alone deploying ASAT systems. The reasons for such an approach was fairly clear: India did not house these capabilities.

But by the early 2000s, India’s position had begun to change as Pakistan began acquiring long-range missiles. India felt the need to build ballistic missile defences, leading New Delhi to take a sympathetic view of the George W. Bush administration’s decision to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty in late 2001. By the end of the decade, as India’s own capabilities increased, it was clear that India was becoming more discriminating in its attitude towards space security.

China’s ASAT test in 2007 helped advance India’s process of revaluating its space strategy. India realised that its growing investments in outer space - until then largely civilian in nature - were now under threat from China’s new security capabilities. India also started thinking more about how to manage outer space for security purposes. As a result, India established a space cell under its Integrated Defence Headquarters shortly after China’s ASAT test.

In April 2019, India established the Defence Space Agency (DSA) as an interim measure to command the military’s space capabilities. All of this meant that India had to have a much more nuanced position than a blanket approach that opposed any militarization or weaponization of outer space.

However, the consequences of unbridled militarization and the weaponization of outer space has negative implications for India. Therefore, while India is pursuing a strategy that satisfies its own security interests, it still wants some international control on the militarization and weaponization of outer space.

Mangalyaan Mission Plays Vital Role in New Delhi’s Development Plans, my OpEd on India's Mars mission published in yesterday's Global Times

Here's my OpEd on India's Mars mission published by Global Times (China) yesterday.

My core argument is that India's space program was not originally driven by big ambitions. As noted by Vikram Sarabhai, one of India's space pioneers, India did "not have the fantasy of competing with the economically advanced nations in the exploration of the moon or the planets or manned space-flight."

But this has changed. India is no longer as poor and backward as it was in the 1960s when Sarabhai spoke. The increasing intensity of international competition means that India needs to show off its abilities once in a while.

India successfully launched a Mars mission, the Mangalyaan, on November 5. The mission is a major demonstration of India's technological capabilities, and a reflection of the growing competition in the Asian space race.

At $73 million, this is one of the most cost-effective Mars missions. But the political and security considerations are also important. Being the first Asian country to conduct such a mission must also have been an important factor in India's calculations.

Despite being one of the most cost-effective missions yet, questions have been raised as to why India spends money on such efforts when it is faced with dire poverty and developmental issues at home.

There has been criticism, both in India and outside, about the waste of resources on spectacle while developmental needs remain unmet.

It is undoubtedly true that India has significant developmental challenges on which it needs to spend money and effort. Nevertheless, there are at least three important reasons for conducting such missions.

First, while India has poverty and developmental issues, it also has to develop its scientific and technological base. It would be foolish to suggest that India should ignore scientific and technological advances until all developmental issues are resolved.

High technology projects such as the moon mission in 2008 and now its Mars mission are important both for technology development as well as to motivate the scientific community and the general populace.

Space technology and assets are needed for everything from communications to weather forecasting. No nation, especially a developing one, can ignore such technologies. But such technologies and capacities cannot be developed without also developing India's space capabilities in general, which is why the Mangalyaan is important.

Space is a vital aspect of India's security. India does not live in a benign neighborhood and it has had to balance between its development and security needs. No major power can afford to ignore the importance of space technology for its military needs.

India has launched its first dedicated military satellite for the Indian navy, in recognition of the increasing geopolitical and military rivalry in the Indian Ocean. Staying in the space race is thus an important consideration for India because it affects other aspects of India's security.

There are increasing worries that space itself might become a direct security threat. The threat of the militarization of space is gaining greater momentum. And the idea of establishing an Indian aerospace command has been gaining greater traction.

Given its experience in the nuclear arms control area, India has to come to understand the importance of crossing a certain technological threshold if it wants to sit at the high table.

In the nuclear arena, India did not conduct an atomic test in the 1960s even though it had the capacity to do so and therefore found itself left out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and various other aspects of the NPT regime.

Today, world powers are debating a regime to regulate outer space activities. India cannot let itself be left out of any space regime as happened over nuclear weapons.

But in order to be heard in the discussions of any new rule-making effort, India needs to demonstrate its capabilities in space research and technology, something that the Mangalyaan amply did.