In my column for The Diplomat last week, I wrote on the Indian Foreign Secretary's visit to Russia. Recently, India’s Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale, the most senior bureaucrat in India’s foreign ministry, completed a visit to Russia. The visit shed light on the ongoing collaboration between the two countries and the opportunities and challenges for the relationship.
For the full essay, click here.
Unsurprisingly, official accounts of the visit focused on areas of collaboration, most of it already ongoing. The Russian embassy release said that the two countries examined “cooperation within the BRICS format, the current issues of the key multilateral export control regimes, including New Delhi’s application for NSG [Nuclear Suppliers Group] membership, other non-proliferation and arms control issues, as well as topical international issues of mutual interest.”
The evolving situation in Afghanistan too was covered by the two leaders. The foreign secretary is reported to have also met Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Morgulov for Foreign Office Consultations, where they “reviewed the implementation of the decisions of the 19th Annual Bilateral Summit” between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Vladimir Putin in 2018.
The two officials also discussed the upcoming high-level meetings, including India’s participation at the Eastern Economic Forum. Putin has reportedly invited India to participate in the Forum, which is to take place in Vladivostok in September this year.
Meanwhile, the Ministry of External Affairs press release on the visit characterized the meetings as “in-depth and productive, characteristic of the Special & Privileged Strategic Partnership between India and Russia.” The statement added, “The meetings resulted in enhanced mutual convergence and coordination of views on all major regional and international issues in the spirit of long standing and time-tested friendship between India and Russia.”
Despite the ongoing collaboration in these areas, the visit, and the official accounts of it, belie the mixed nature of actual ties. In fact, while India and Russia have had a long and warm relationship historically and Russia remains an important strategic partner (it is one of only two countries India has an annual bilateral summit with, the other being Japan), structural trends are pulling them in different directions.
Part of it has to do with perceptions on both sides. On India’s side, it can at times appear not to acknowledge the reality that Russia needs China far more than it needs India, and that its own diversification of partners in both the economic and security domains can also raise concerns in Moscow and complicate bilateral dealings. On Russia’s side, there is at times not enough of an appreciation for India’s strategic considerations, including its sensitivities toward China, as well as an acknowledgement that some of Moscow’s foreign policy activities can cause headaches in New Delhi.
But developments have also accelerated these perceptions as well. Russia’s adventurism abroad, including in Ukraine, China’s rise and its increasing convergence with Russia as it does so, rising U.S. competition with both Beijing and Moscow as it has gradually warmed to New Delhi, and upped conversation on the Indo-Pacific and the divergent approaches by India and Russia have all contributed to this.
Seen from this perspective, it is arguably even more important to have visits such as the one we saw from Gokhale, in order for both sides to understand each other. But at the same time, it is also critical to distinguish between the rhetoric that comes out of the visits and the reality of the relationship, especially when the gap between the two can seem to be growing wider in some senses.
Showing posts with label Russia-China Military Ties. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Russia-China Military Ties. Show all posts
Tuesday, April 16, 2019
Saturday, September 15, 2018
The Russia-China military exercise: Implications for Asian Military Balance - September 13, 2018
I write for the #ObserverResearchFoundation #Raisina Files on the ongoing #Russia-#China military exercise and the possible implications for Asian military balance.

Russia is hosting this week its largest war games, Vostok-2018. This is considered by the far the largest war games that Russia has held since the end of the Cold War. The Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu had said that Vostok-2018 (East-2018), scheduled to take place in Russia’s central and eastern military districts, will see the participation of almost 300,000 troops, over 1,000 military aircraft, two of Russia’s naval fleets, and all its airborne units. Shoigu also said that this “will be the biggest military exercise since 1981.” He added that “it will be unprecedented in terms of geographic scope and the strength of command and control centers and forces due to participate.” Justifying the Vostok-2018, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said that this is “essential” as it has to have the capability and capacity to defend itself under the prevailing international situation, which Moscow characterises as “often aggressive and unfriendly toward our country.” In addition to the Russian armed forces, Vostok-2018 will see the participation of the Chinese and Mongolian militaries. China said that it will send “about 3,200 troops, along with more than 900 pieces of weaponry and 30 fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters.” Russian analysts say that the Russia-China partnership is a “de facto military alliance, purposefully not codified to maintain ambiguity.”
More critically, the Russia-China military drills in September will demonstrate their growing closeness at a time when the US has referred to Russia and China as two “revisionist powers” that are “attempting to erode American security and prosperity.”
The strengthened strategic engagement between Russia and China especially in the defence and security sectors has important implications for the Asian military balance. To give only one example, India, one of Russia’s closest partners, will be increasingly worried about what Moscow’s growing closeness to Beijing will mean for the future of the India-Russia relationship.
For the full essay, click here.
For long, Russia has remained concerned about NATO’s eastward expansion and the military exercises are a way of possibly deterring any military action its close neighbourhood. The war games also come in the backdrop of the increasingly worsening political and strategic ties between Russia and the West, primarily driven by the Russia’s Crimea annexation in 2014. The accusations of the Russian election meddling in the US and Europe have not helped the situation. Since the Ukraine crisis, Russia has sought stronger strategic partnership with China. Speaking about the Chinese participation in Vostok-2018, the Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said that it is a sign of the expanded partnership between the two sides. Though China has come out and said that the war games are not targeted at any particular country, suspicions abound among the NATO states, especially those close to Russian borders. In a press statement, NATO’s acting Deputy spokesperson, Dylan White noted that they “fit into a pattern we have seen over some time: a more assertive Russia, significantly increasing its defence budget and its military presence.”
Since 2009, Russian has held periodic military exercises, usually every four years. However, since the Crimean annexation, NATO has been far more concerned about these war games. For instance, last year’s Zapad-2017 exercise covered a vast area from Belarus’ and Russia’s western borders up into the Arctic.. Although Moscow claimed only 12,000 troops took part in it, Western countries put the number at around 100,000. Similarly, Russia’s 15-day war games in the North Caucus region, bordering Georgia, also led to concerns in Georgia and other countries.
Russia has its own concerns about NATO exercises involving East European countries, many of which simulate defense against a Russian attack. Earlier this summer, 19 countries came together in the Sabre Strike exercise, which took place in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland and simulated a scenario of a Russian attack. In yet another show of strength among the western allies, 13 countries including the UK came together recently to conduct the Noble Partner exercises in Vaziani, outside Georgia’s capital Tbilisi. This is the fourth time that Georgia was hosting the Noble Partner exercise. Even though Georgia is not a NATO member, it contributes to the NATO Response Force and NATO has justified these exercises saying that there is a genuine Russia threat, especially for Eastern Europe member states. Russia on the other hand criticised these exercises saying that the US-led west is creating “Russophobia” and that these exercises could possibly bolster “militarist sentiments” and exacerbate the tensions.
The inevitability of these exercises by Russia and the NATO members (four non-NATO member countries – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Ukraine – also do take part in these exercises) are understandable given the state of hostile relations between the two sides. But these exercises also increase the possibilities of accidental conflict and aggravate the already-tense political relationships. But more critically, the Russia-China military drills in September will demonstrate their growing closeness at a time when the US has referred to Russia and China as two “revisionist powers” that are “attempting to erode American security and prosperity.” Though Russia continues to be somewhat suspicious and wary of China’s growing military might, the so-called tactical relationship between Moscow and Beijing seems to be becoming a lot more strategic. As some experts have pointed out, “while there is still a lot of distrust between Moscow and Beijing, Moscow sees no other choice but to work with China, especially as relations with the US remain unstable and Chinese financial support is needed to mitigate the effects of Western sanctions.” China has stated that its participation will consolidate “the China-Russia comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination, deepening pragmatic and friendly cooperation between the two armies, and further strengthening their ability to jointly deal with varied security threats, which are conducive to safeguarding regional peace and security.” Other experts have pointed out, Russia did not want China to get the wrong impression that these exercises were aimed at Beijing. Chinese military source were also reported to have said that they are looking forward to learning from Russia’s recent military experience in Syria as “The PLA is the only major military force that has no real battle experience and it is very eager to get its hands on some real lessons.”
The strengthened strategic engagement between Russia and China especially in the defence and security sectors has important implications for the Asian military balance. To give only one example, India, one of Russia’s closest partners, will be increasingly worried about what Moscow’s growing closeness to Beijing will mean for the future of the India-Russia relationship.

Russia is hosting this week its largest war games, Vostok-2018. This is considered by the far the largest war games that Russia has held since the end of the Cold War. The Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu had said that Vostok-2018 (East-2018), scheduled to take place in Russia’s central and eastern military districts, will see the participation of almost 300,000 troops, over 1,000 military aircraft, two of Russia’s naval fleets, and all its airborne units. Shoigu also said that this “will be the biggest military exercise since 1981.” He added that “it will be unprecedented in terms of geographic scope and the strength of command and control centers and forces due to participate.” Justifying the Vostok-2018, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said that this is “essential” as it has to have the capability and capacity to defend itself under the prevailing international situation, which Moscow characterises as “often aggressive and unfriendly toward our country.” In addition to the Russian armed forces, Vostok-2018 will see the participation of the Chinese and Mongolian militaries. China said that it will send “about 3,200 troops, along with more than 900 pieces of weaponry and 30 fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters.” Russian analysts say that the Russia-China partnership is a “de facto military alliance, purposefully not codified to maintain ambiguity.”
More critically, the Russia-China military drills in September will demonstrate their growing closeness at a time when the US has referred to Russia and China as two “revisionist powers” that are “attempting to erode American security and prosperity.”
The strengthened strategic engagement between Russia and China especially in the defence and security sectors has important implications for the Asian military balance. To give only one example, India, one of Russia’s closest partners, will be increasingly worried about what Moscow’s growing closeness to Beijing will mean for the future of the India-Russia relationship.
For the full essay, click here.
For long, Russia has remained concerned about NATO’s eastward expansion and the military exercises are a way of possibly deterring any military action its close neighbourhood. The war games also come in the backdrop of the increasingly worsening political and strategic ties between Russia and the West, primarily driven by the Russia’s Crimea annexation in 2014. The accusations of the Russian election meddling in the US and Europe have not helped the situation. Since the Ukraine crisis, Russia has sought stronger strategic partnership with China. Speaking about the Chinese participation in Vostok-2018, the Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said that it is a sign of the expanded partnership between the two sides. Though China has come out and said that the war games are not targeted at any particular country, suspicions abound among the NATO states, especially those close to Russian borders. In a press statement, NATO’s acting Deputy spokesperson, Dylan White noted that they “fit into a pattern we have seen over some time: a more assertive Russia, significantly increasing its defence budget and its military presence.”
Since 2009, Russian has held periodic military exercises, usually every four years. However, since the Crimean annexation, NATO has been far more concerned about these war games. For instance, last year’s Zapad-2017 exercise covered a vast area from Belarus’ and Russia’s western borders up into the Arctic.. Although Moscow claimed only 12,000 troops took part in it, Western countries put the number at around 100,000. Similarly, Russia’s 15-day war games in the North Caucus region, bordering Georgia, also led to concerns in Georgia and other countries.
Russia has its own concerns about NATO exercises involving East European countries, many of which simulate defense against a Russian attack. Earlier this summer, 19 countries came together in the Sabre Strike exercise, which took place in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland and simulated a scenario of a Russian attack. In yet another show of strength among the western allies, 13 countries including the UK came together recently to conduct the Noble Partner exercises in Vaziani, outside Georgia’s capital Tbilisi. This is the fourth time that Georgia was hosting the Noble Partner exercise. Even though Georgia is not a NATO member, it contributes to the NATO Response Force and NATO has justified these exercises saying that there is a genuine Russia threat, especially for Eastern Europe member states. Russia on the other hand criticised these exercises saying that the US-led west is creating “Russophobia” and that these exercises could possibly bolster “militarist sentiments” and exacerbate the tensions.
The inevitability of these exercises by Russia and the NATO members (four non-NATO member countries – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Ukraine – also do take part in these exercises) are understandable given the state of hostile relations between the two sides. But these exercises also increase the possibilities of accidental conflict and aggravate the already-tense political relationships. But more critically, the Russia-China military drills in September will demonstrate their growing closeness at a time when the US has referred to Russia and China as two “revisionist powers” that are “attempting to erode American security and prosperity.” Though Russia continues to be somewhat suspicious and wary of China’s growing military might, the so-called tactical relationship between Moscow and Beijing seems to be becoming a lot more strategic. As some experts have pointed out, “while there is still a lot of distrust between Moscow and Beijing, Moscow sees no other choice but to work with China, especially as relations with the US remain unstable and Chinese financial support is needed to mitigate the effects of Western sanctions.” China has stated that its participation will consolidate “the China-Russia comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination, deepening pragmatic and friendly cooperation between the two armies, and further strengthening their ability to jointly deal with varied security threats, which are conducive to safeguarding regional peace and security.” Other experts have pointed out, Russia did not want China to get the wrong impression that these exercises were aimed at Beijing. Chinese military source were also reported to have said that they are looking forward to learning from Russia’s recent military experience in Syria as “The PLA is the only major military force that has no real battle experience and it is very eager to get its hands on some real lessons.”
The strengthened strategic engagement between Russia and China especially in the defence and security sectors has important implications for the Asian military balance. To give only one example, India, one of Russia’s closest partners, will be increasingly worried about what Moscow’s growing closeness to Beijing will mean for the future of the India-Russia relationship.
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