2+2 Dialogue Will Further Cement India-Japan Strategic Relations - The Diplomat, 29 November 2019

Last week, I had a second piece published in The Diplomat, which focused on the 2+2 Dialogue between India and Japan that took place on 30 November. I argue that the dialogue has wider strategic implications beyond the bilateral relationship itself.

India and Japan are holding their inaugural 2+2 defense and foreign minister level dialogue on November 30, ahead of the annual summit meeting between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in December. While the dialogue will be heralded as yet another step that advances India-Japan bilateral relations, it also has broader implications as well.

For the full post, click here.



The decision to hold a ministerial level 2+2 dialogue was taken this summer during a telephone call between India’s new foreign minister, Dr. S. Jaishankar, and his Japanese counterpart, Taro Kono. The inaugural US-India 2+2 dialogue was held in September 2018.

The mechanism itself is quite significant. Japan is only the second country (after the United States) with which India has such a dialogue format. The India-Japan 2+2 dialogue is an endorsement of the special strategic partnership between New Delhi and Tokyo.

More broadly, the dialogue has been driven by the mutual desire to frame an Asia that is not dominated by a single country and to see the emergence of a multipolar Indo-Pacific that is free, open, and inclusive. India and Japan have both approached the emerging Asian strategic framework with that goal in mind and both want an inclusive approach in the region. Both see China’s approach in the region as being exclusivist. There is a clear clash between these two visions of the region.

The idea of such a 2+2 meeting was initiated during the summit meeting between Modi and Abe in Tokyo in October 2018. The joint statement following the summit meeting recognized the need for such a dialogue. This would be in addition to existing strategic dialogue formats such as the Annual Defense Ministerial Dialogue, Defense Policy Dialogue, the National Security Advisers’ Dialogue. Most recently, the India-Japan defense ministerial level dialogue held in September also acknowledged the importance of a 2+2 ministerial level strategic dialogue.

Similar, but lower level, India and Japan dialogues have gone on for close to a decade now. The two have had a 2+2 foreign and defense dialogue led by secretary level officers from 2010. This dialogue was established as per the Action Plan to Advance Security Cooperation agreed between the two countries in December 2009. Discussions on global commons including maritime, outer space, and cyber space have been key themes in this dialogue.

While peace, prosperity and stability in the Indo-Pacific will be key themes in the upcoming 2+2 ministerial level dialogue, Japan will also be making a big push to convince India to join the RCEP, the mega regional trade agreement of which Japan is a part. In discussions with me, Japanese analysts say that Tokyo wants India in RCEP to more effectively push back against China. But it remains unclear if India is willing to change its stance on the RCEP. This was discussed during the last Japan-India Foreign Minister’s Strategic Dialogue held in June this year.

With an eye on China, India and Japan are also trying to finalize the military logistics agreement called the acquisition and cross-servicing agreement (ACSA) at the 2+2 dialogue so that it can be signed during Abe’s visit to India in December. Such an agreement could expand the strategic reach and influence of both the militaries: Japan could gain access to Indian facilities in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and India could have access to Japan’s naval facility in Djibouti. India took more than a decade to finalize such an agreement with the United States, but now that it has been done once, New Delhi has found it less problematic to do others. It has now concluded such deals also with France and South Korea; talks for a similar deal with Australia are at an advanced stage.

Some of these themes were also mentioned at the 5th India-Japan 2+2 Dialogue held at the vice-ministerial level. The last such dialogue was held in June 2018 and was co-chaired by Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale and Defense Secretary Shri Sanjay Mitra on the Indian side and Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Takeo Mori and Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, Ro Manabe on the Japanese side. At that meeting, the two sides also discussed strategic infrastructure projects in third countries such as Sri Lanka as well as in India’s northeast (except in Arunachal Pradesh).

Defense relations between the Indian military and the Japanese Self Defense Forces are quite intense with all the different wings of the militaries engaged in joint exercises. These include the Dharma Guardian land exercise, the Shinyu Maitr air exercise, and the Japan-India Maritime Exercise. Areas that require further attention are defense trade and technology transfer.

One of the much-talked about cases is that of the sale of the ShinMaywa US-2 amphibious aircraft for the Indian Navy, but an agreement is yet to be concluded. India’s purchase of the aircraft could see enhancement of India’s capability mix in the context of the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) efforts, but it will also be a good addition to India’s recent maritime capability acquisitions including the P-8I maritime patrol aircraft and the potential acquisition of the Sea Guardian armed drone.

Incentivizing India to make progress on this acquisition, Japan has committed to manufacturing 30 percent of the aircraft in India and this could eventually help improve Indian defense manufacturing. Further, the two have established a working group to study the possibilities in Visual Simultaneous Localization and Mapping (SLAM) Based Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) Augmentation Technology for UGV/robotics.

Opportunities in the areas of technology collaboration is significant. Defense electronics is particularly important for India since New Delhi. India’s domestic defense electronic manufacturing segment is still at a nascent stage and it has to partner with its strategic partners in building a domestic capability base but also direct procurement of those capabilities in the interim.

Overall, the India-Japan ministerial level 2+2 strategic dialogue is an important initiative emphasizing the deep interest in both India and Japan to further strengthen their security and strategic engagements. The two countries have built a strong strategic partnership in the last decade. While China may have been a factor, building this relationship was easier because of the absence of any baggage, unlike, for instance, with the United States. But India and Japan also need to build a larger coalition if they are to balance China effectively.

What Does the New 2+2 Dialogue Mean for the India-Japan Relationship? - The Diplomat, 8 June 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I write on the recently announced 2+2 Dialogue between India and Japan and how this will further the relationship. I believe the new mechanism holds significance not only within bilateral ties, but for Indian foreign policy and the region more generally.

India and Japan have agreed to hold a two-plus-two dialogue between the defense and foreign ministers of the two countries. This will take place ahead of the summit-level meeting between Prime Ministers Narendra Modi and Shinzo Abe later in the year.

The decision is no doubt a significant one, both within India-Japan relations and Indian foreign policy more generally. So far, India had engaged in such a dialogue format at this level only with the United States, the inaugural edition of which was held in September last year. But India’s new foreign minister, Dr. S. Jaishankar, and his Japanese counterpart, Taro Kono, took the decision to set this new mechanism up during a recent telephone conversation.

The concept is by no means new – the idea of establishing a two-plus-two dialogue between India and Japan was visible during the summit meeting between Modi and Abe during the former’s visit to Tokyo in October 2018. The joint statement issued following the summit meeting said that the two leaders had reiterated their “desire to further deepen bilateral security and defense cooperation and institute [a] Foreign and Defense Ministerial Dialogue (2+2)” in addition to existing institutional arrangements including the Annual Defense Ministerial Dialogue, Defense Policy Dialogue, the National Security Advisers’ Dialogue.

For the full essay, click here.



The upcoming Foreign and Defense Ministerial Two-Plus-Two Dialogue reflects the growing special relationship between India and Japan, which is driven by a number of factors including the desire to create an Asian strategic framework that is free, fair, and inclusive. The call for such a framework has become louder against the backdrop of increasingly muscular behavior by China. The more confrontational China becomes, the more willing countries like India are to play the balance of power games in Asia and beyond.

Traditionally, India has resisted taking sides in great power competition. But that option is becoming increasingly difficult. New Delhi has been compelled to astutely choose its strategic partners in order to strengthen its strategic maneuverability.

The India-Japan strategic partnership goes back a number of years. The two countries began a two-plus-two dialogue at the level of foreign and defense secretaries (not ministers) almost a decade ago in 2010. This dialogue was mandated by the Action Plan to Advance Security Cooperation concluded between the two countries in December 2009. Key issues discussed under this format include maritime, cyber, and outer space security.

However, Japan’s engagement with India goes back much longer. As one recent report pointed out, Japan has played an important role in developing India’s infrastructure. India is one of the largest recipients of Japan’s Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) loans since 2003, even if trade and investment levels are still modest. But in an era of strategic uncertainties driven by shifting global and Asian power dynamics, India and Japan have felt the need to strengthen their defense and security linkages.

One of the primary objectives for both New Delhi and Tokyo is to prevent the rise of a unipolar Asia dominated by one single hegemonic power. It is this political objective that has been driving the relationship and the new two-plus-two dialogue will strengthen it further, especially the security relationship between New Delhi and Tokyo.

Some aspects of this offer much promise. One such facet is military exercises, with the first joint exercise between the armies and air forces of the two countries taking place last year. On the other hand, the defense trade relationship has not seen much traction as yet. The Japanese offer of the US-2 amphibious aircraft to India is just one case in point: despite much expectation, this deal appears dead. Japan is not a major arms exporter, and the Indian military services have little experience in buying Japanese equipment. In addition, India’s notoriously difficult arms procurement process is also likely to be a hindrance.

But Japan does have a technologically advanced arms industry and it is possible that India could tap into it in order to make up for its own weaknesses in critical areas. Another area where Japan could help is with submarines: India was reported to have been interested in buying Japanese submarines, though Tokyo did not appear keen. The two-plus-two dialogue could possibly give a political push to future arms sales.

Part of the reason for the growing strategic partnership between India and Japan is that it comes with no negative baggage in either country. In India, in particular, a security partnership with Japan carries none of the connotations or controversies that continue to dog a partnership with Washington. On the other hand, this partnership by itself will not suffice to achieve the kind of Asian balance that both sides desire.