Maldives Shock Election: China's Loss and India's Win? - September 28, 2018

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I write on the Maldives election results and what they mean for India. I argue that the results are not simply a loss for Beijing or a win for New Delhi. There may be some minor setbacks for China with the new leader, but the reality is that Male cannot cut China lose because of Beijing’s economic capacity to deliver what Male needs. For all the goodwill that India may enjoy in Maldives, New Delhi lacks the material capacity to offset China. India’s track record in establishing infrastructure and regional connectivity networks has not been the best, to put it mildly.





The results of Maldives’ presidential elections on Sunday came as a total surprise to most observers in the Maldives and outside. The Election Commission announced the victory of Ibrahim Mohamed Solih of the Maldivian Democratic Party, who secured 38,484 more votes than the incumbent president, Abdulla Yameen.

The head of the Election Commission stated that there were no election irregularities or complaints that could affect the results. President Yameen conceded defeat on Monday, clearing the path for President-elect Solih. Solih is the joint candidate of the opposition parties: the election saw the coming together of three opposition political parties – the Maldivian Democratic Party, Jumhooree Party, and the religious Adhaalath Party. The president-elect, considered an old-timer in politics, belongs to the Maldivian Democratic Party whereas his deputy, Faisal Naseem, a new face, comes from the Jumhooree Party.

Many newspaper headlines have drawn quick and not-so-correct reading on the impact of the election results. There have been exceptions of course, which called for caution. Still, most of the accounts suggested rather simplistically that the defeat of Yameen is bad news for China and good for India.

In fact, while there may be some minor setbacks for China with the new leader, the reality is that Male cannot cut China lose because of Beijing’s economic capacity to deliver what Male needs. For all the goodwill that India may enjoy in Maldives, New Delhi lacks the material capacity to offset China. India’s track record in establishing infrastructure and regional connectivity networks has not been the best, to put it mildly.

But, certainly, the sizeable anti-India sentiment that prevailed during Yameen’s presidency will be gone. The new government will be forced to do a fine balancing act between India and China, and the Solih Government will have to balance economic and strategic interests.

Nevertheless, China’s foreign ministry in a press briefing responded to a question on Maldives saying that it “congratulates the Maldives on the smooth holding of the presidential election and Mr. Solih on his election as the President. We respect the choice made by the people in the Maldives and hope that the Maldives can maintain stability and development. China and the Maldives enjoy traditional friendship.”

Yamen was seen as particularly close to China and also had a bit of an anti-India streak. During Yameen’s time in office, the China-Maldives economic and investment relations grew at a fast pace, and his tenure also saw the conclusion of free trade agreement between the two. Also, in February there were reports that talked about China’s plans to set up a joint ocean observation station in Makunudhoo, the westernmost atoll, which raised alarm bells in India.

However, a day after the initial reaction from China, Beijing did not shy away from lashing out at opposition leaders in Male, especially Nasheed for apparently “questioning the commercial viability of Chinese projects in the Maldives lacking in transparency and democratic procedures.” In a strongly worded reaction, China’s foreign ministry said, “Whether the cooperation between China and the Maldives can work out or bring benefits to the two countries is all up to what the two countries’ people say. It cannot be smeared by certain individuals.” “We will oppose if certain people harm China’s interests,” it added rather ominously.

Sunday’s election results have the potential to effect some changes internally and externally. Internally, five political prisoners have been released so far and more may be released in the coming days and weeks. Externally, the changes could be significant. Earlier in the year, the former foreign minister Ahmed Naseem reflected on Yameen’s ruling style, suggesting that it “is not just about democracy, it is about peace, security, and stability in the entire Indian Ocean neighborhood.”

To be sure, the new government in Male will want to renegotiate the projects that China is engaged in because, as MDP leader Nasheed said, many believe that “China has pulled his country into a “debt trap” and that a future opposition-led government would renegotiate Chinese loans.”

The current domestic political crisis began with Yameen’s decision to disregard the Maldivian Supreme Court’s ruling in February this year, which called the Government’s imprisonment of opposition leaders a “violation of the constitution and international law.” The court also ordered the government to release the nine opposition leaders including Nasheed. In response, Yameen declared a state of emergency that extended for a period of 45 days, during which he also had two judges, hundreds of activists and opposition leaders including former President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom arrested. Yameen lifted the emergency after 45 days on March 22.

Many opposition leaders, including Nasheed, claimed that Yameen lifted the emergency because by then he had consolidated power, including over judiciary and parliament. Nasheed and many opposition leaders have been in exile since the beginning of the crisis and is now set to return to Male.

India, which has traditionally played an influential role in Maldives, has been perplexed by the recent developments in the run-up to the elections. New Delhi had supported the government of President Gayoom, to the point of squashing an attempted coup against him in 1988 by sending Indian troops. But under Yameen, the country was slipping out of India’s orbit, supporting China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and moving closer to China.

While there may be some cancellations and renegotiations of China-funded projects by the newly elected government, China’s influence in Male is unlikely to reduce significantly because there is simply no one else to replace China. Though India may not like it, it does not have the capacity. Moreover, India’s credibility has been hit because New Delhi was unable or unwilling to do anything concrete despite the repeated pleas from the opposition parties. India has a hard job ahead in overcoming these difficulties.

India Is Still Losing to China in the Border Infrastructure War - The Diplomat, 21 September 2018

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I write on the state of the Sino-Indian border infrastructure. In "India Is Still Losing to China in the Border Infrastructure War," I argue that a year after the Doklam crisis, New Delhi faces the same old challenges in this realm.

It has been a year since India and China ended the 73-day border crisis in Doklam. And for all the focus on the crisis itself and its implications for Sino-Indian relations, it is worth recalling that along their border, Doklam is arguably an exception where the Indian military may be perceived to have a slight advantage over the Chinese military because of its slightly better infrastructure there.

Relatively speaking, however, the infrastructure on the rest of the border is quite appalling. Indeed, unless India accelerates the pace of the physical border infrastructure build-up, New Delhi will face serious difficulties in any future confrontation with China.

For the full article, click here.


The Indian vice chief of army staff, in his statement to the Indian parliament’s Standing Committee on Defense, voiced serious concerns on the lack of adequate allocation of funds for the Army for 2018-19. He pointed to the “large number of Chinese strategic roads and infrastructural development along the northern borders” and made a case for bigger resource allocation, given that the sanctioned budget for infrastructure development was running massively short.

The current state of affairs with regard to the border infrastructure is the result of a flawed policy that was in place for several decades. The political, civil bureaucracy, and military leadership in India believed that building infrastructure in the Sino-Indian border area would actually compromise India’s security because it would facilitate any Chinese invasion.

In a testament to this line of thinking, the former defense minister, A.K. Antony, while addressing a function of the Border Roads Organization (BRO) in 2010, stated that “Earlier, the thinking was that inaccessibility in far-flung areas would be a deterrent to the enemies.” Acknowledging that this was an “incorrect approach,” he added that the government is now taking a number of measures to upgrade roads, tunnels, and airfields in the border areas.

Similarly, the BRO director general, Lt. Gen. A.K. Nanda, too went on record to say that the poor infrastructure in the border areas is by design but that “our approach has changed and we are building it on our capacity, modern equipment, and workforce.”

This policy underwent a change in 2006 with the Cabinet Committee on Security, a key policymaking body on national security issues within the government, taking a decision to develop 73 strategic roads along the LAC.

But more than a decade later, there is very little evidence to show on the ground. This is surprising considering that the BJP government has stressed infrastructure building, especially along the Sino-Indian border.

Minister of State for Home Affairs Kiren Rijiju stated in the Parliament earlier this year that infrastructure development along the border is “taken up based on threat perception, availability of resources and various other factors like terrain, altitude etc.” Speaking about the state of the Sino-Indian border areas, the director general of the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), Krishna Chaudhary, said that 172 of the 176 new Border Out-Posts (BoPs) are now raised and that the work has picked up pace. He too acknowledged that India has been late in waking up to the border infrastructure requirement, but now “work has been ‘fast paced’ to build border roads in the states of Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh, that share their borders with China.”

Still, in the middle of the Doklam crisis, the minister of state for defense, Dr. Subhash Bhamre, while responding to a question in the Parliament, said that “73 Indo-China Border Roads along Northern Borders are approved for construction [back in 2006]. Out of this 27 roads have been completed and balance roads are planned for completion by December 2022.” The BRO, which is responsible for building strategic infrastructure in border areas, has missed several deadlines, raising questions about the BRO’s assurance about the 2022 deadline.

The minister went on to say that the delay in the construction of these projects is “due to delay in forest / wildlife / environment clearance, hard rock stretches, limited working season, delay in land acquisitions, difficulties in availability of construction material, and damage due to natural disasters such as flash flood.” Despite changes in governments, the excuses remain the same.

Reports suggest that incursions on the Sino-Indian may be coming down – there were reportedly about 500 transgressions in 2015, 350 in 2017, and around 200 up to July this year. Still, in addition to infrastructure problems, India also faces other difficulties For example, a multiplicity of agencies — the Army, the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), the Border Security Force (BSF) and the Assam Rifles– managing the border on the Indian side is an issue. This means that both the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) and the Ministry of Defense have jurisdiction and India is not particularly known for good coordination between different departments and ministries.

On China’s side of the border, on the other hand, a single unified commander for the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) forces is responsible for the border areas. It must also be noted that China has further strengthened the military command on the border by elevating the rank of the Military Command responsible for the border “by putting it under the jurisdiction of PLA ground forces.”

Though India’s infrastructure development is slow, this has not stopped Chinese media outlets such as Global Times from arguing that New Delhi is being provocative in building border posts and other infrastructure. But New Delhi has little choice but to continue pushing its border infrastructure, though there is little hope that it will very much faster.

Minding the Gaps in India’s Act East Policy - September 17, 2018

Earlier this week, I wrote for the Diplomat exploring the role of Southeast Asia in India's idea of the Indo-Pacific construct. In "Minding the Gaps in India’s Act East Policy," I argue that New Delhi’s approach to Southeast Asia within the wider Indo-Pacific region is strategically sound but has limits.



India’s approach to Southeast Asia has been lately shifting from one dominated by trade and development to one in which strategic considerations play an important complementary role. This has taken a new form, and is now called the “Act East” Policy, marking also an expansion to include other Indo-Pacific countries.

But there are some doubts about whether the ASEAN countries are entirely comfortable with the idea of the “Indo-Pacific.” Several ASEAN states have been lukewarm to the idea, worried about having to take sides between the United States and China. This raises questions about the viability of India’s new “ASEAN-centric” approach to the Indo-Pacific.

ASEAN’s weaknesses in managing China is becoming more evident every day. While its success in regional economic integration is undeniable, on more fractious political issues, ASEAN was always less effective. These divisions have become far deeper when it comes to China. It is not clear that ASEAN will be able to act in a united manner when it comes to the South China Sea or on matters relating to China.

Smaller ASEAN countries are still wary of inviting China’s wrath by an open embrace of the Indo-Pacific concept. This is, paradoxically, a consequence of ASEAN’s success in integrating economically with China, making it hard for these countries to break with Beijing. This is particularly so for smaller countries like Cambodia, though several bigger players like Malaysia and Singapore have been resistant as well. ASEAN, therefore, is a divided house.

For the full article, click here.



New Delhi has no good options to deal with this problem. It is probably this recognition that has led India to stress additional platforms like the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) which includes Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Bhutan, and Nepal.

There has also been some suggestion from experts that BIMSTEC could be expanded to include countries such as Indonesia. On the other hand, BIMSTEC has also so far been less than a grand success. Though India has recently attempted to revive BIMSTEC – partly to sideline the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which includes Pakistan – New Delhi’s efforts have sometimes fallen flat. An effort to expand the scope of BIMSTEC by conducting its first-ever military exercise saw two countries, Nepal and Thailand, refusing to join.

India and other countries are also stepping up efforts to chip away at one source of ASEAN’s dependence on China – infrastructural aid. India and Japan, along with the United States, have already started doing this. The private sector in India and Japan are also joining the United States under the Indo-Pacific Business Forum to promote infrastructure.

Such measures would provide real choices to countries in ASEAN and elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific that are otherwise stuck with China. India and its partners have had some success in pointing out the flaws in China’s model of infrastructure “aid,” which has at times led to debt traps that forced countries to give up valuable assets to China. This new form of neocolonialism is now well recognized. But without alternatives, the temptations of China’s checkbook diplomacy are hard to resist for many smaller countries. Thus, infrastructural assistance has to be an integral part of any strategy to counter China’s efforts in this direction.

The downside here is that India does not enjoy a very good track record in this regard. Despite the rhetoric of a strengthened outreach, the capacity to extend regional connectivity and infrastructure building has been insufficient. The Modi government too appears to have laid more emphasis in its official statements, with very little to show on the ground. The trilateral highway with Myanmar and Thailand is a case in point: though Thailand has completed its part of the highway, India has yet to do so on the Indian side of the border.

India’s poor track record in its infrastructure building in India’s Northeast is yet another indicator. If India cannot develop even its own connectivity with ASEAN, its pledges to help others in ASEAN with infrastructure are bound to sound hollow. India needs to do more to convert its rhetoric into reality.

India clearly wants to help ASEAN stand up to China because it is in New Delhi’s interest. But while there is little doubt about New Delhi’s desires, ASEAN countries are likely to look for actual deliveries rather than promises. India’s repeated assertion of ASEAN-centrality has so far not given ASEAN countries – especially the smaller ones – sufficient reason to hope that India can be an effective substitute for China. This will only deepen the existing divisions within ASEAN and make India’s ASEAN-centrality strategy that much more difficult to accomplish.

The Russia-China military exercise: Implications for Asian Military Balance - September 13, 2018

I write for the #ObserverResearchFoundation #Raisina Files on the ongoing #Russia-#China military exercise and the possible implications for Asian military balance.



Russia is hosting this week its largest war games, Vostok-2018. This is considered by the far the largest war games that Russia has held since the end of the Cold War. The Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu had said that Vostok-2018 (East-2018), scheduled to take place in Russia’s central and eastern military districts, will see the participation of almost 300,000 troops, over 1,000 military aircraft, two of Russia’s naval fleets, and all its airborne units. Shoigu also said that this “will be the biggest military exercise since 1981.” He added that “it will be unprecedented in terms of geographic scope and the strength of command and control centers and forces due to participate.” Justifying the Vostok-2018, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said that this is “essential” as it has to have the capability and capacity to defend itself under the prevailing international situation, which Moscow characterises as “often aggressive and unfriendly toward our country.” In addition to the Russian armed forces, Vostok-2018 will see the participation of the Chinese and Mongolian militaries. China said that it will send “about 3,200 troops, along with more than 900 pieces of weaponry and 30 fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters.” Russian analysts say that the Russia-China partnership is a “de facto military alliance, purposefully not codified to maintain ambiguity.”

More critically, the Russia-China military drills in September will demonstrate their growing closeness at a time when the US has referred to Russia and China as two “revisionist powers” that are “attempting to erode American security and prosperity.”

The strengthened strategic engagement between Russia and China especially in the defence and security sectors has important implications for the Asian military balance. To give only one example, India, one of Russia’s closest partners, will be increasingly worried about what Moscow’s growing closeness to Beijing will mean for the future of the India-Russia relationship.

For the full essay, click here.



For long, Russia has remained concerned about NATO’s eastward expansion and the military exercises are a way of possibly deterring any military action its close neighbourhood. The war games also come in the backdrop of the increasingly worsening political and strategic ties between Russia and the West, primarily driven by the Russia’s Crimea annexation in 2014. The accusations of the Russian election meddling in the US and Europe have not helped the situation. Since the Ukraine crisis, Russia has sought stronger strategic partnership with China. Speaking about the Chinese participation in Vostok-2018, the Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said that it is a sign of the expanded partnership between the two sides. Though China has come out and said that the war games are not targeted at any particular country, suspicions abound among the NATO states, especially those close to Russian borders. In a press statement, NATO’s acting Deputy spokesperson, Dylan White noted that they “fit into a pattern we have seen over some time: a more assertive Russia, significantly increasing its defence budget and its military presence.”

Since 2009, Russian has held periodic military exercises, usually every four years. However, since the Crimean annexation, NATO has been far more concerned about these war games. For instance, last year’s Zapad-2017 exercise covered a vast area from Belarus’ and Russia’s western borders up into the Arctic.. Although Moscow claimed only 12,000 troops took part in it, Western countries put the number at around 100,000. Similarly, Russia’s 15-day war games in the North Caucus region, bordering Georgia, also led to concerns in Georgia and other countries.

Russia has its own concerns about NATO exercises involving East European countries, many of which simulate defense against a Russian attack. Earlier this summer, 19 countries came together in the Sabre Strike exercise, which took place in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland and simulated a scenario of a Russian attack. In yet another show of strength among the western allies, 13 countries including the UK came together recently to conduct the Noble Partner exercises in Vaziani, outside Georgia’s capital Tbilisi. This is the fourth time that Georgia was hosting the Noble Partner exercise. Even though Georgia is not a NATO member, it contributes to the NATO Response Force and NATO has justified these exercises saying that there is a genuine Russia threat, especially for Eastern Europe member states. Russia on the other hand criticised these exercises saying that the US-led west is creating “Russophobia” and that these exercises could possibly bolster “militarist sentiments” and exacerbate the tensions.

The inevitability of these exercises by Russia and the NATO members (four non-NATO member countries – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Ukraine – also do take part in these exercises) are understandable given the state of hostile relations between the two sides. But these exercises also increase the possibilities of accidental conflict and aggravate the already-tense political relationships. But more critically, the Russia-China military drills in September will demonstrate their growing closeness at a time when the US has referred to Russia and China as two “revisionist powers” that are “attempting to erode American security and prosperity.” Though Russia continues to be somewhat suspicious and wary of China’s growing military might, the so-called tactical relationship between Moscow and Beijing seems to be becoming a lot more strategic. As some experts have pointed out, “while there is still a lot of distrust between Moscow and Beijing, Moscow sees no other choice but to work with China, especially as relations with the US remain unstable and Chinese financial support is needed to mitigate the effects of Western sanctions.” China has stated that its participation will consolidate “the China-Russia comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination, deepening pragmatic and friendly cooperation between the two armies, and further strengthening their ability to jointly deal with varied security threats, which are conducive to safeguarding regional peace and security.” Other experts have pointed out, Russia did not want China to get the wrong impression that these exercises were aimed at Beijing. Chinese military source were also reported to have said that they are looking forward to learning from Russia’s recent military experience in Syria as “The PLA is the only major military force that has no real battle experience and it is very eager to get its hands on some real lessons.”

The strengthened strategic engagement between Russia and China especially in the defence and security sectors has important implications for the Asian military balance. To give only one example, India, one of Russia’s closest partners, will be increasingly worried about what Moscow’s growing closeness to Beijing will mean for the future of the India-Russia relationship.

Why Nepal’s Access to China Ports Matters - September 14, 2018

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I looked at why Nepal's access to China's ports matters. The move deserves attention for its potentially wider significance.



In a surprise move last week, Nepal was granted access to Chinese land and sea ports, ending Kathmandu’s dependence on Indian ports. While the move is just one of several within the bilateral relationship, it nonetheless deserves attention for its potential wider significance.

In March 2016, Kathmandu and Beijing signed a Transit and Transport Agreement (TTA) that promised to provide Nepal access for third party trade through Chinese sea and land ports. The decision to implement the TTA was taken after the two sides signed a TTA protocol in a bilateral meeting in Kathmandu last week. Until now, Nepal had to engage in third party trade through the Indian port in Kolkata in West Bengal (Nepal has a similar access pact with Bangladesh as well).

For the full essay, click here.



The TTA protocol allows Nepal access and use of four Chinese sea ports – Tianjin, Shenzhen, Lianyungang, and Zhanjiang – and three dry ports – Lanzhou, Lhasa, and Xigatse. With the signing of the protocol, Rabi Shankar Sainju, Joint-Secretary at Nepal’s Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Supplies (MoICS) said, “Now we have access to additional ports as an alternative. They can be used in trading with the countries in east and north-east Asia.”

There are considerable infrastructure development issues to be resolved before these can be totally operational, but ending the dependency on India is seen as particularly a “joyful” moment in Kathmandu. India’s “unofficial” blockade in 2015 had a lot to do with Nepal’s open embrace of China since then. The blockade that led to serious hardships for ordinary Nepalese citizens has created large pockets of anti-Indian and correspondingly pro-China sentiments within Nepal.

Though this is a considerable setback for New Delhi, India has been attempting to play harder for Nepalese affections especially in terms of building up infrastructure for Nepal. India is currently in the process of constructing two railway lines and there are three additional lines being planned to beef up Nepal’s options. India is also refurbishing and upgrading four major custom checkpoints at Birgunj-Raxaul, Biratnagar-Jogbani, Bhairahawa-Sunauli and Nepalgunj-Rupediya in addition to expanding and renovating the road network in the Terai region of Nepal. In addition to Kolkata, India has also opened the port of Visakhapatinam to Nepal and there is a small amount of trade taking place through it. Between India and Nepal, there are reportedly 25 crossing points, two integrated checkpoints, and there are two additional checkpoints being developed now.

The latest TTP is one more iteration of the growing Nepal-China multifaceted relationship. And there are clearly strategic consequences to this growing relationship. One important impact of the Nepal-China TTA is that Nepal’s access to Chinese ports will be through six checkpoints at Rasuwa, Tatopani (Sindhupalchok), Korala (Mustang), Kimathanka (Sankhuwasabha), Yari (Humla), and Olangchung Gola (Taplejung). These and other road and railway projects between China and Nepal will allow China to potentially project power against India on a different section of the Sino-Indian boundary, and possibly even outflank Indian military forces at the border.

As a follow-up to an earlier assurance by China to support mega infrastructure projects in Nepal, Nepal’s Minister for Physical Infrastructure and Transport Ramesh Lekhak suggested to his Chinese counterpart that the connectivity projects should be speeded up since Nepal’s endorsement of the Belt and Road Initiative. A projected route includes connectivity from Kerung in China all the way to Kathmandu, Pokhara, and Lumbini. Lumbini is just about 100 kilometers from the Indian border state of Uttar Pradesh, making it uncomfortably close to the Indian capital.

The expanded and deepened Nepal-China relationship also restricts India’s own strategic space in its own backyard. The growing profile and role of China in South Asia is becoming more prominent, with Beijing making unprecedented penetration in other countries in the region such as Sri Lanka and Maldives. Despite caught up in a debt-trap diplomacy with China to the point of being forced to lease the Hambantota Port to China for 99 years, Sri Lanka does not appear to have learned any lessons: Colombo has gone back to China for more funds to address its next debt repayment cycle in 2019.

China’s successes leave other major powers in a bit of a quandary. While the United States, Japan, and India are all stepping up their efforts to warn poorer states of the dangers involved in seeking Chinese infrastructure funding, their incapacity or unwillingness to provide any credible alternative means China’s is the only real game in town.

The COMCASA Question in US-India Military Relations - September 4, 2018

For the Diplomat column last week, I focused on the COMCASA, one of the four foundational agreements that the US had sought India to sign. And it was signed at the inaugural India-US 2+2 Dialogue held in New Delhi last week.



The inaugural round of India-U.S. 2+2 Dialogue was held in New Delhi last week, a significant development reflective of the growing convergence of strategic interests between the world’s oldest and largest democracies. Minister of External Affairs minister Sushma Swaraj and Minister of Defense Nirmala Sitharaman hosted both Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Defense Secretary James Mattis on September 6, where a host of strategic issues were discussed.

One issue that was certainly going to dominate the discussions was the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA). With U.S.-India defense ties on an upward swing in recent years and the Trump administration looking to cultivate partners like New Delhi as it operationalizes the so-called free and open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy, there are reports suggesting that the two sides are moving closer to the signing of the agreement. And the two countries signed the agreement.

For the full essay, click here.



Before leaving office, U.S. President Obama categorized India as a “Major Defense Partner.” The Trump administration’s recent decision to give India the STA-1 status (Strategic Trade Authorization-1) is a clear acknowledgement of the growing synergy between India and the United States on the defense and security developments in the Indo-Pacific and beyond but also a recognition of India’s export control regimes being in line with global norms. So far, this status has been accorded only to the NATO countries and Australia, Japan and South Korea, a clear indication of India’s importance in the U.S. strategic calculus.

In an effort to elevate ongoing defense cooperation between India and the United States to a more meaningful level, the United States had sought to have India sign the last two of the four so-called foundational agreements – the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), the Logistics Supply Agreement (LSA) or what is now called the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), the Communication and Information Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) or what is now called the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) to suggest a more India-specific agreement, and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA).

India signed the GSOMIA in 2002 and the LEMOA in 2016. Ever since the signing of the LEMOA, COMCASA has been the focus. Simply put, COMCASA will allow for greater access to critical communication networks to enable better interoperability between the Indian and U.S. militaries. This will facilitate installation of high-end security gadgets on the many defense equipment and weapon systems that India is buying from the United States.

For instance, many defense platforms that India has bought from the United States are stripped-down versions without some of the more advanced electronic equipment. Security analysts have written about the case of the P-8I maritime aircraft that India has purchased for its Indian Navy which has none of the secure voice and data links – Data Link-11 and Data Link-16 which the other COMCASA-signed countries have been provided with. These data links are essential to have better interoperability through which a common tactical picture is developed between partner navies.

Absence of a COMCASA agreement, in the air platform context, would mean the absence of “precision Global Positioning System (GPS) gear, and state-of-the-art guidance” in some of systems that India is planning to buy. Analysts contend that signing the COMCASA becomes particularly important as India is set to buy the combat version of Sea Guardian drones from the United States.

It remains unclear if India and the United States have been able to iron out all their differences and are ready to sign the agreement at the 2+2 dialogue. Like the LEMOA, there have been heated debates on COMCASA too. There are analysts who argue that COMCASA will “facilitate vertical and horizontal penetration by the US of India’s most sensitive government and military communications grids, including the nuclear Strategic Forces Command – the reason why the armed services are against signing it.” Proponents of this line of view have further called the BJP government “naïve and gullible” to buy into U.S. assurances that the information gathered from Indian systems won’t be shared with other countries.

A few others have questioned the growing closeness between New Delhi and Washington, saying that signing these military agreements will essentially “foreclose India’s options.” While some of these analysts see certain tactical benefits to signing these military pacts, according to them, there are “many more negative geopolitical and strategic consequences to becoming America’s military ally in all but name.” Such analysts believe that the BJP government in New Delhi is moving forward with US ties without these being debated and altering the course of India’s “geostrategics and foreign policy.”

Concerns have also been raised as to how signing COMCASA will “enhance Russia’s fears of compromising its high-value platforms, such as the leased Akula-class nuclear-powered attack submarine and the Su-30MKI combat aircraft” and that it will cause trouble with Russia.

But other analysts have argued that in the absence of the COMCASA-agreement, platforms that India buys from the United States will be less capable. Others have also pointed out that COMCASA can facilitate cooperation on areas such as Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), which is critical for India considering China’s foray into Indian Ocean. Retired naval officials also write about the “operational imperative” for the Indian military.

Given the disadvantages of not having the COMCASA, there is little doubt that India will sign the agreement at some point. But in typical fashion, India will likely take its own time to make its decision, and some of the aforementioned concerns are likely to linger as well. That should not obscure the fact that for New Delhi, ultimately, signing the COMCASA agreement is really a matter of when rather than if.

More than just a buzzword: How can Asia’s democracies bring the Indo-Pacific to life? -

Earlier this week, I wrote a short essay on the Indo-Pacific for the Asia & the Pacific Policy Society's Policy Forum, Australian National University. I argue that even as more and more countries are buying in to the Indo-Pacific construct, they must overcome the problems of coordination and burden-sharing if the concept is to have strategic teeth.



For the full essay, click here.

The idea of the Indo-Pacific is not entirely new, although it has certainly received much more attention in recent years. And as the result of changing power dynamics in Asia and beyond, many more countries are becoming comfortable with the construct.

In one of its earliest articulations, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe promoted the Indo-Pacific concept when he addressed a joint session of the Indian Parliament in 2007. As he spoke about the confluence of the two seas, he said “The Pacific and the Indian Oceans are now bringing about a dynamic coupling as seas of freedom and of prosperity. A ‘broader Asia’ that broke away geographical boundaries is now beginning to take on a distinct form.”

Former Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, while addressing his East Asian counterparts at the India-ASEAN Commemorative Summit in 2012, noted that India seeks with them a future that is “inter-linked”, for which “a stable, secure and prosperous Indo-Pacific region is crucial.”

Similarly, former Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa called for a region-wide treaty to safeguard an Indo-Pacific “engine for global economic growth.”

Australia, in its 2013 Defence White Paper introduced the concept formally, becoming one of the first countries to officially adopt the term, which was only natural considering the two-ocean geography of the country.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi talked about the Indo-Pacific concept recently at the Shangri-La Dialogue. He said: “India’s vision for the Indo-Pacific region is a positive one … India does not see the Indo-Pacific region as a strategy or as a club of limited members. Nor as a grouping that seeks to dominate. And by no means do we consider it as directed against any country.”

Though the term has been around for a few years, there is still a lack of clarity about its meaning. It broadly refers to the idea of the Indian and Pacific oceans as a single geographical construct, as Abe mentioned in his speech. While there are economic and other linkages that can be attached to the Indo-Pacific concept, it is the political, strategic, and possibly military aspects that have gained greater prominence because of the underlying geopolitical tensions in the region.

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The idea of Indo-Pacific is that the Indian and Pacific oceans are increasingly a unified and shared strategic space. This implies that what happens in the Indian Ocean will impact on the Pacific Ocean.

Despite these differences, the number of countries embracing the term as a useful strategic idea has increased. Most recently, France reiterated the importance of the concept as its President Emmanuel Macron visited Australia. Using the term means acknowledging the strategic consequences of China’s rise and its muscular policies, and the general balancing strategy underway within Asia.

One of the reasons why India has embraced the term is because ‘Asia-Pacific’ is seen by many to exclude India, even though China’s rise affects everybody in the region. So, Indo-Pacific is a way for India to include itself in the Asia-Pacific, and for the Asia-Pacific to bring India into the mix. This is only natural. Given its geographical location above the Indian Ocean, India’s role cannot be ignored. A country with a vast coastline of 7,500 kilometres and 1,380 islands, more than two million square kilometres of Exclusive Economic Zone, and emerging blue water naval capabilities, will have an important role to play irrespective of geographical or definitional issues.

But it should also be noted that the Indo-Pacific plays out almost entirely as a maritime construct rather than a continental one.

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There are a couple of problems that need to be faced. While the Indo-Pacific concept has gained greater salience for larger powers, there is more reluctance on the part of smaller countries because they are understandably concerned about a negative reaction from China. China has taken due note of the concept’s growing popularity and it could turn out to be a lot more aggressive in countering it in the coming years.

Another problem that has to be resolved is how to combine the different concerns, even if they are all about China. Many Pacific powers (Japan, US, Australia, New Zealand) want to focus on countering China’s power in the Pacific and the South China Sea. But India is obviously concerned more about China’s expansion into the Indian Ocean. Thus, there are those who argue that India’s Indian Ocean focus and its capacity constraints to exercise any serious power projection will limit New Delhi’s role. In the Indo-Pacific it will be diplomatic, economic and rhetorical.

The question is how to bring about better coordination between these two sets of concerns. For proponents of the Indo-Pacific, there is a need to start focusing on some form of burden-sharing. Without it, coordinated action – and the goal of making the Indo-Pacific concept more than just a strategic buzzword – is going to be difficult.