Why the India-Sri Lanka-Maldives NSA-level Talks Matter - The Diplomat, 4 December 2020

In my first column for The Diplomat in December, I looked at the increasing strategic relevance of the India-Sri Lanka-Maldives NSA-level talks.  I argue that the nature of bilateral political relations in the Indian Ocean region has an impact on the quality of subregional engagements such as the NSA-level talks held in Colombo.  

Last week, Colombo hosted an India-Sri Lanka-Maldives trilateral maritime security dialogue. The meeting saw the revival of the national security advisor (NSA)-level dialogue among the three countries, which began almost a decade ago in 2011. That the meeting took place six years after the last edition in 2014 is significant. Both Sri Lanka and the Maldives are rcritical maritime neighbors to India in the Indian Ocean region and there have been continuous efforts by both India and China to win friends and favors in Colombo and Male.

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The NSA-level talks are also a demonstration of the Indian intent to push subregional diplomacy, which has been gaining traction in India’s foreign policy in the last few years. The Modi government has made efforts to engage in subregional diplomacy as a useful track following the near-complete halt in regional diplomacy in South Asia under the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). 

For the Colombo trilateral, the Indian side was represented by National Security Advisor Ajit Doval whereas the Maldives sent its defense minister, Mariya Didi, and Sri Lanka was represented by Defense Secretary Maj. Gen. (retd) Kamal Gunaratne. Mauritius and the Seychelles were also present virtually at the level of senior officials. With the goal of encouraging meaningful maritime cooperation in the Indian Ocean region, India, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives discussed a number of areas for possible collaboration such as maritime domain awareness (MDA), humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), joint military exercises, capacity building, maritime security threats, marine pollution, and maritime underwater heritage. The Heads of Delegations decided that they would meet periodically to maintain the momentum of the dialogue and to ensure timely execution of the decisions taken at the NSA-level meetings. According to the joint statement, a decision was also made to institute deputy NSA-level working group meetings biannually for cooperation at the operational level.  

So far, there have been several iterations of the trilateral meetings at the NSA-level. The first, hosted by the Maldives, was held in Male in 2011, following which Sri Lanka hosted the second edition. The third was held in New Delhi in 2014, which was attended also by Mauritius and the Seychelles as “guest countries.”   

Following the first trilateral meeting, the India-Maldives “DOSTI” joint coast guard exercise in 2012 added Sri Lanka and was held as a trilateral exercise. The India-Maldives DOSTI exercises have been going on since 1991 and are aimed at strengthening capabilities of the three partners in the area of search and rescue operations, combating piracy and armed robbery, damage control, and casualty evacuation at sea. India and Sri Lanka also have held bilateral naval exercises called SLINEX since 2005. The latest iteration, the eighth, was held off Trincomalee in Sri Lanka in October 2020. India’s official statement on the exercise noted that the synergistic approach developed by the two navies for “seamless coordination” was in evidence when the two navies came together in September 2020 to assist MT New Diamond, a Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC), that caught fire off the East Coast of Sri Lanka. 

While broader maritime security, anti-piracy, and HADR are important components of the growing India-Sri Lanka-Maldives strategic narrative, the real worry for India is growing Chinese activism in the Indian Ocean region. China’s efforts at cultivating the Indian Ocean littoral states have been a concern for New Delhi. In response, New Delhi has pursued many paths to build rapport with these neighbors, including bilateral, trilateral, and minilateral conversations in the region.  

While India is a resident Indian Ocean power and has its own advantages, there are capacity gaps in India’s ability to play a sustained or dominant role. Meanwhile, China has the economic and military wherewithal to expand its military presence in the Indian Ocean and has been developing serious inroads into the region through bases and other strategic networks. It is these that India is most concerned about and to which it is responding.  

While India is stepping up its efforts in naval modernization, these are capital intensive and time-consuming projects. The small budget allocations for the Indian Navy are not helpful either. Therefore, India has also entered into a series of partnerships with like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific, such as Australia, Japan, and the United States, to offset the growing Chinese influence as well as to enhance India’s own capabilities. The logistic agreements that India has signed with a number of countries — including the United States, Australia, France, South Korea, Singapore, and Japan — in recent years are a demonstration of the Indian intent to enhance the geographical reach of the Indian Navy, and also to strengthen the combined capability mix that is available to deal with China’s aggressive maneuvers in the Indian Ocean region. It is also an important tool for messaging both to its friends and foes.  

Meanwhile, even as India pursues a neighborhood first approach, it has also acknowledged the limitations of regional groupings such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which came to a grinding halt a few years ago. Modi had reached out to the SAARC nations when he came to office in 2014 but the bonhomie did not last long. Therefore, India has energized other regional groupings such as BIMSTEC and subregional arrangements such as the BBIN and India-Sri Lanka-Maldives trilateral. While the subregional initiatives have primarily focused on connectivity and similar issues, India is also exploring the possibility of engaging in subregional security cooperation.  

But subregional initiatives are not free from the state of bilateral relations with these countries. As K. Yhome explained in a recent essay, the nature and framework of bilateral political relations will have an impact on these subregional initiatives. The case of the NSA-level trilateral maritime dialogue between India, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives is a case in point. The talks were stalled from 2014 primarily because of India’s poor relations with Maldives under then-President Abdulla Yameen. India, as a big state, has to be mindful of the needs and aspirations of its much smaller neighbors and has to be able to adapt to meet their requirements. 

Rise of the Minilaterals: Examining the India-France-Australia Trilateral - The Diplomat, 17 September 2020

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I look at the rise of the minilaterals, wherein I examine the India-France-Australia Trilateral. The India-France-Australia trilateral is only the latest of the many minilaterals that are taking shape in the Indo-Pacific region.

Last week, India, France, and Australia held their first trilateral meeting. The senior officials’ meeting, held in a virtual setting, was co-chaired by Vardhan Shringla, India’s foreign secretary; François Delattre, secretary-general of the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs; and Frances Adamson, secretary of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT).

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The Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), in a statement, said that the trilateral meeting was an effort at strengthening cooperation among the three countries in the Indo-Pacific region. The statement also noted that the three countries plan to meet on an annual basis. Tweeting about the meeting, the MEA said, “We agreed to build convergences in our approach to the Indo-Pacific region and to explore ways to strengthen trilateral cooperation, particularly in the maritime domain.”

An Australian readout of the meeting was similar to the Indian statement, while the French readout was more explicit in emphasizing the importance of international law, peace, and security in the Indo-Pacific. The French statement said that the meeting “helped underscore the goal of guaranteeing peace, security and adherence to international law in the Indo-Pacific by drawing on the excellence of bilateral relations between France, India and Australia.” The French ambassador in India also tweeted, saying that “Together we will uphold our values and interests!”

While none of the readouts mention China per se, China is clearly the key reason for the emergence of this and a number of other minilaterals in the region. The India-France-Australia trilateral is only the latest of the many minilaterals that are taking shape in the Indo-Pacific region. India, which traditionally did not join these exclusive small groups, has shown greater interest and capacity in the last few years. There is also an India-Australia-Indonesia trilateral that is taking shape. In fact, Indian media reports note that India, Australia, and Indonesia are getting ready for two virtual meetings in the coming weeks between the foreign and defense ministries of the three countries in order to enhance broader regional strategic cooperation as well as maritime security in the Indo-Pacific region.

There is also the India-Japan-Australia trilateral, another significant group, which had its first meeting in 2015. There is already an India-U.S.-Japan trilateral. Since 2015, Japan has also participated with India and the United States in India’s Malabar series of naval exercises as a permanent partner.

Indeed, even the idea of the India-France-Australia trilateral is not new. The need for such initiatives has been discussed in track 2 and track 1.5 formats and experts and officials have long made the case for elevating these conversations to an official level. In 2018, Carnegie India, the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, and the National Security College of the Australian National University came together to explore the potential areas of cooperation as well as the extent of possibilities under such a framework. In an op-ed in May 2018, C. Raja Mohan, Rory Medcalf, and Bruno Tertrais (representing the three think tanks that had organized one such track 1.5 forum) detailed the “striking convergence of security interests, defense capabilities and maritime geography” that bring Delhi, Canberra, and Paris together. They argued that the three “respect a rules-based order informed by the sovereign equality of nations and the need to guard against coercion and interference, whether from states or from terrorism.” Thereafter, French President Emmanuel Macron during his visit to Australia spoke of “the Paris-Delhi-Canberra axis” that should be strengthened as “an established regional structure, reflecting an Indo-Pacific ‘geo-strategic reality in the making.’”

At the inaugural India-France-Australia trilateral, the three officials took stock of the prevailing and future economic and strategic challenges and possible ways of cooperation in addressing the challenges of COVID-19 and beyond. Maritime security and securing the marine global commons were particularly identified as important issues for trilateral and broader regional cooperation through regional institutions such as ASEAN, the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), and the Indian Ocean Commission. That India has concluded logistics agreements with both France and Australia brings their cooperation around maritime security issues a bit closer to reality.

According to the MEA, the three leaders also focused on trends, challenges, and priorities in regional and global multilateral institutions and discussed ways to review, strengthen, and reform multilateralism. This assumes particular importance in the context of the functioning of institutions such as the World Health Organization (WHO) especially in the initial weeks of the COVID-19 pandemic The fact that the WHO was influenced heavily by a single power, China, which some argue has resulted in the current global health crisis, will remain a constant reminder of the trends and challenges in multilateralism and multilateral institutions.

The India-France-Australia trilateral meeting was also a result of the deepening bilateral relations among the three countries across multiple sectors, and aimed at “synergizing their respective strengths to ensure a peaceful, secure, prosperous and rules-based Indo-Pacific Region.” In fact, this was part of a set of recommendations made by the Australian Senate Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Committee to “explore the India France Australia trilateral dialogue to enhance strategic cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.” Related issues such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, maritime domain awareness, the blue economy, and marine biodiversity were also discussed at the meeting. Given the increasing Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean and the South Pacific, one area that could gain greater attention from the three countries is maritime surveillance to monitor the Chinese naval activities in these waters. The three could work out some burden sharing in this regard to step up vigilance on these waters.

Commenting on the rationale for the India-France-Australia trilateral, Abhijnan Rej, The Diplomat’s security and defense editor, wrote that against the backdrop of “recent American unpredictability” U.S. allies in the region are looking to create “a more networked architecture involving a range of often-overlapping minilateral arrangements and consultative mechanisms.” Given this strategic rationale, the India-France-Australia trilateral is a natural fit for all three because of their stake in ensuring a free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific order. France, via its overseas territories, has 8,000 defense personnel, 1.5 million French citizens, and 93 percent of its maritime economic exclusive zone in the Indo-Pacific, making it a legitimate stakeholder, with huge stakes in the Indo-Pacific region.

The other important rationale for many of these trilaterals has to do with capacity issues. The Indo-Pacific region has several capable navies and yet their ability to match up to China on their own is questionable. The individual capacities of these countries have remained inadequate to protect their vital security interests, and therefore there is a stronger case to be made for these kinds of minilaterals.

Given these factors, this trilateral is likely here to stay. While the U.S. will remain an important source of support for these minilateral conversations in the Indo-Pacific, the fact that New Delhi, Paris, and Canberra can also discuss various strategic issues without Washington present in the room may also be appealing to these countries from time to time.