story by Ian Williams in the latest issue of Arms Control Today on India's efforts at enhancing its nuclear weapons...

Here's a story by Ian Williams in the latest issue of Arms Control Today on India's efforts at enhancing its nuclear weapons. The story quoted me as well where I argued that given the “changing security environment,” of Asia, it is “imperative that India makes advances in weapons and technology. Particularly, the Chinese ballistic missiles deployed near Tibet are a key motive for India’s ballistic missile ambitions.

For the full story, click here.

India is pushing to improve its nuclear counterstrike capabilities with a plan to finish development of its Agni-5 ballistic missile by 2015, according to Avinash Chander, India’s new head of defense research.

Chander, director-general of India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), told India’s Headlines Today on July 2 that he will reduce the time required to launch a retaliatory nuclear strike to “within minutes” by making the country’s ballistic missile forces “much more agile, fast reacting, and stable.” The DRDO is the main Indian government entity responsible for developing new, advanced military technologies.

Response time is the most critical factor for an effective nuclear second-strike capability, said Chander, who was appointed to his post in May. He previously served as the chief controller of the Agni ballistic missile program and is considered one of the main architects of the Agni-5.

The DRDO is preparing to conduct two more tests of the nuclear-capable Agni-5 this year, Chander said in a June 29 interview with The Times of India. The three-stage Agni-5 is solid fueled and can carry a 1,500-kilogram payload a distance of 5,000 kilometers, according to news reports. The Agni-5’s first and only test-flight, which took place in April 2012, was considered a success. (See ACT, May 2012.)

A range of 5,500 kilometers is generally considered the threshold between intermediate range and intercontinental ballistic missiles. A missile’s range can be extended by lightening its payload.

When asked in the June 29 interview about the feasibility of finishing the development of the Agni-5 within two years, Chander said that there is no longer a need to conduct a large number of trials because the DRDO now conducts “thousands” of flight tests through computer modeling and simulations. The actual flight tests, Chander said, “are just to validate what’s predicted in the simulations.”

Agni-5 Timeline Questioned

Tessy Thomas, the current head of the Agni-5 development program, echoed Chander’s comments at an engineering conference Aug. 2, saying that, after two or three more successful test-flights, the Agni-5 will be “ready for operational service by 2015.”

Deployment of the Agni-5 would give India the ability to strike targets almost anywhere in Chinese territory. India has an explicit no-first-use nuclear weapons policy, but will “respond with punitive retaliation” to a nuclear attack on Indian territory, according to its draft nuclear doctrine released in 1999. India’s two main strategic rivals, China and Pakistan, each have deployed ballistic missiles capable of reaching Indian territory.

Some analysts question whether the DRDO can finish development of the Agni-5 by 2015. Hans Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists, said in an Aug. 2 e-mail to Arms Control Today that he thinks two years is “too optimistic,” citing the technical problems that “can and tend to pop up on the road to full operational status.” Kristensen pointed out that even after its first successful test launch in 1999, the Agni-2 ballistic missile underwent 14 more years of testing before it finally was classified as “deployed” by U.S. intelligence earlier this year.

The DRDO “has often overpromised and underperformed” on past projects, said Michael Krepon, director of the Stimson Center’s South Asia program, in a July 16 e-mail to Arms Control Today.

Monika Chansoria, senior fellow at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies in New Delhi, said in an Aug. 21 e-mail to Arms Control Today that although she believes there will be an “operational version” of the Agni-5 in service by 2015, the missile will not be deployed in significant numbers until the end of that decade.

Chander said in the June 29 interview that India is developing more-flexible and more-resilient launch platforms for its ballistic missiles. One of the DRDO’s planned test flights for this year will involve firing the Agni-5 from a road-mobile launch truck, according to Chander. Road-mobile launchers are more agile and easily concealed than fixed-site or rail-mobile launch platforms, making them less vulnerable to a pre-emptive strike. Currently, India’s only deployed, solid-fueled, road-mobile ballistic missile is the single-stage Agni-1, with a range of 700 kilometers, according to a recent report from the U.S. National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC).

India successfully test-fired an Agni-2 ballistic missile from a road-mobile platform on Wheeler Island, according to an April 7 DRDO press release. However, the NASIC report said the solid-fueled Agni-2, which can carry a 1,000-kilogram payload a distance of 2,000 kilometers, is currently deployed only in rail-mobile mode.

In view of Asia’s “changing security environment,” it is “imperative that India makes advances in weapons and technology,” Rajeswari Rajagopalan, senior fellow at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi, said in an Aug. 22 e-mail to Arms Control Today. Rajagopalan specifically cited Chinese ballistic missiles deployed near Tibet as a key motive for India’s ballistic missile ambitions.

Advancing SLBM Capability

India also has been progressing toward a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) capability. (See ACT, September 2012.) In January, India conducted its third successful test-firing of the nuclear capable K-15 SLBM from an underwater pontoon, according to a DRDO press release. Sometimes referred to as Sagarika or B05, the missile has a maximum range of 700 kilometers and can carry up to a 700-kilogram payload, according to a 2012 article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. China, France, Russia, and the United States are the only other countries currently capable of producing SLBMs.

The K-15 is expected to be the main armament of the nuclear-powered INS Arihant, India’s first ballistic missile submarine. (See ACT, September 2009.) In development since the late 1980s, the Arihant’s nuclear propulsion reactor “achieved criticality” sometime in early August, according to an Aug. 10 press release from Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s office. The indigenously produced Arihant is now expected to undergo sea trials starting this year. In his statement, Singh described the success of the reactor as a “great stride” in India’s technological progress and said he looks forward to the submarine’s “early commissioning.”

India's Agni V test and China, my analysis on the missile test ...

Here's an analysis of mine on India's recent Agni test and China. While Agni V should not be seen as China-specific, India has had to pay attention to and factor Beijing's capabilities in its military modernisation. Capabilities that China builds to deal with the US can easily be turned against India. However, India does not have to assume that such conflict of interest with China is inevitable. India can reach out to China. It will be to the benefit of both countries to engage in periodic military CBMs. For the full article, click here

. India has just successfully tested the Agni V missile, a nuclear capable missile with a 5,000 km range. Dr. V.K. Saraswat, the head of the Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO), which built the missile, said soon after the test from the Integrated Test Range complex in Wheeler Island, Odisha, that "this launch has given a message to the entire world that India has the capability to design, develop, build and manufacture missiles of this class, and we are today a missile power." Defence Minister A K Antony described Agni test as a "major milestone." While the full technical data is being evaluated, DRDO scientists maintain that the mission objectives have been met. The various technical parameters, including engine, re-entry capabilities and guidance technology have been validated. With this test, India joins a small group of nations - US, Russia, China, France and UK - that have developed Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). While this test is seen as a game changer, another three or four years are needed to induct the missile into service. It will have to go through several more tests and user trials before it can be handed over to the services by 2014, Dr. Saraswat said. In real terms, this could take up to three or four years before the sufficient number can be produced and inducted into service. Having tested the missile, there are several important decisions to be taken before it reaches the stage of induction, including strategic doctrines, target definitions, number of missiles to be produced, etc. The government has to make these decisions before it becomes an instrument of capable, credible deterrence. As for the technical parameters, the Agni V is a three-stage, solid propellant MIRVed (Multiple Independently Targettable Re-entry Vehicle) missile with a range of 5,000 kilometers and can carry a nuclear warhead weighing over one tonne. The missile can cover most of Asia, parts of Africa and parts of Eastern Europe. India has in its inventory other Agni series missiles also - Agni I of 700 km range, Agni II of 2000 km range, Agni III and Agni IV of 2,500 km to more than 3,500 km range. The Agni V is seen as crucial for strengthening India's defence and deterrence capabilities. The missile has particular relevance to India in the context of advance military capabilities in its neighbourhood. Beijing has been upping the ante in the recent years in Tibet and surrounding areas. Advancements made by China in the Delingha missile facility is a case in point. The Delingha base is believed to be housing some nuclear missiles. PLA has also replaced the earlier liquid-fueled missiles with solid-fueled ones, reducing the launch time as well as making mobility much easier. Also Beijing's DF-4 ICBMs have been upgraded to fit them for the DF-21 (NATO code: CSS-5) series of ballistic missiles. There have also been reports about the possibility of the road mobile DF-31s (NATO code: CSS-9; Pentagon classification: CSS-10) and DF-31As (NATO code: CSS-9 Mod 2) being housed at the Delingha facility. These could additionally be equipped with penetration aids such as decoys and flares, making any countermeasures and warning systems more complicated or even ineffective. This base is particularly significant, given the proximity to India, able to target most of northern India. India does not enjoy a benign neighbourhood. While Delingha is of particular concern, China's increasing foray into the Indian Ocean, its overall military modernisation, rising military expenditure, non-transparent nature of its programmes and objectives are also of concern to India. Recent Chinese policy approaches also have been not reassuring to India. The unresolved boundary and territorial disputes, changing Chinese policy on Jammu & Kashmir, questioning India's territorial integrity, and building strategic links with India's neighbours such as Nepal create security concerns in India. China-Pakistan collaboration on a range of military capabilities also warrants Indian attention. Given these background developments, India has to be prepared for any eventuality. While Agni V should not be seen as China-specific, India has had to pay attention to and factor Beijing's capabilities in its military modernisation. While the official reaction to India's Agni test was fairly muted, China's Global Times, in an editorial, said, "India should not overestimate its strength. Even if it has missiles that could reach most parts of China, that does not mean it will gain anything from being arrogant during disputes with China. India should be clear that China's nuclear power is stronger and more reliable. For the foreseeable future, India would stand no chance in an overall arms race with China." The point to be emphasized and understood clearly by Indian decision-makers is that it is not and should not be in a competition with China on the military front but this is not to mean that India will stop being prepared in a defensive fashion while beefing up its deterrent measures. Agni V is a weapon of deterrence and hopefully will never have to be used. The Global Times editorial goes on to say that India and China should learn to co-exist with each other, if the two can not cooperate. It must also come to learn that India looks for an inclusive approach as it develops and extends its sphere of influence although one is not certain that this can be said of China. China has been rather uncomfortable with the fact that there are two or three rising powers in Asia simultaneously and these countries have to adopt cooperative frameworks if it is to be a stable and peaceful Asian century. Finally, the editorial notes that China does not devote as much time on India as India does towards China. The fact, however, is that as Beijing's military modernisation is geared more towards the United States, its capabilities are already at a much more sophisticated level. It will be naïve if India were to assume that those capabilities are purely US-centric and therefore, not be concerned about those capabilities and applications. Capabilities that China builds to deal with the US can easily be turned against India. However, India does not have to assume that such conflict of interest with China is inevitable. India can reach out to China. It will be to the benefit of both countries to engage in periodic military confidence-building measures (CBMs) as a means of mutual reassurance.

Chinese missile ambitions target India

This essay on Chinese missile reorganisation first appeared on the ORF website.

Though China constantly reiterates that its rise will be peaceful, Beijing’s actions on the ground suggest a different message. Several US and Russian analysts believe that China’s reorganisation of missile facilities in Delingha in July 2007 have repercussions for India, Russia, and may be some of the Central Asian states too.



According to Hans Kristensen, an analyst at the Federation of American Scientists, China has been busy reorganising its missile facilities near Delingha in the northern parts of central China. This site is believed to be one of China’s missile bases. Based on commercial satellite images available from Google Earth, Kristensen states that the images reveal that the previously used liquid-fuelled missiles deployed in this region have been replaced with newer solid-fuelled missiles.
According to his analysis, the launch sites for the older Dong Feng-4 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) underwent upgradation to fit them for the new DF-21 medium-range ballistic missiles. The DF-21 missiles have a range of approximately 1,330 miles (2,150 kilometres) and are capable of carrying a single warhead with a yield of 200 to 300 kilotons. It is believed that two versions of this missile are deployed and some could have been modified to carry conventional warhead. Kristensen points out that the latest US government’s annual report on China’s military power reported that the China might have 40-50 such missiles on 34-38 launchers, whereas the 2006 report put the number of these missiles at 19-50 on 34-38 launchers.
The DF-21 launch sites, at a height of 10,000 feet (3,000 metres), are located on the slopes of mountain range north of Delingha. Kristensen noted that these sites have been witnessing significant changes between late 2005 and late 2006. In late 2006, the southern site that used to be large missiles garage, with about 40 small buildings and more than half a dozen service trucks, underwent major change, with a single service truck visible on the launch pad and the access road that appeared to have been paved. The second launch site to the north also underwent major change and the operations too appear to have increased in the last year or so. Third, the northern primary launch site too has been upgraded between late 2005 and late 2006. Significant expansion took place with numerous buildings constructed, access roads paved and there is work in progress next to the underground facility. More significantly, there appears to be six 13-metre trucks on the launch pad. Although the satellite images were not a high resolution, Kristensen concluded that they are in all probability the six-axle transport erector launchers (TELs) in use with the DF-21 medium-range ballistic missile. He also noted a vague line across the trailer two-thirds toward the rear that resembled the position of the hydraulic pumps used to erect the missile canister to a vertical position.
Other analysts suggested that there is also the possibility that these missiles could be of a longer range DF-31 or the advanced version DF-31A, which has a range of approximately 12,000 km. This multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) has a capability to hold 3 warheads each capable of a 20-150 kiloton yield. These are also possibly equipped with penetration aids such as decoys and flares to complicate warning and missile defence efforts. These missiles that went through performance tests in 2003 and 2004, is expected to have initial operational capability by 2007. Both the DF-31s and DF-31As are road mobile and use solid propellant engines. Media reports quoting intelligence sources reported the presence of a Belarus MAZ7916 12-wheel mobile missile TEL at the DF-31 production facility in Nanyuan, Beijing in the 1990s. These are supposed to have better cross-country traveling capability than the current Hanyang TEL truck used by the DF-31.
The significance of this reorganisation is that placing medium-range ballistic missiles (which can hit target approximately 2500 kilometers away) in the site can put the entire northern India at risk, including New Delhi. The more serious consequence arises from the fact these are mobile platforms, which means these missiles can be launched from further down south at closer ranges targeting almost all of India. Interestingly, Kristensen points out that these medium-range ballistic missiles are also within the range of three main Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) sites on the other side of Mongolia – the SS-25 fields near Novosibirsk and Irkutsk, the SS-18 field near Uzhur and a Backfire bomber base in Belaya. However, it is very clear that the Chinese have not carried out the reorganisation to present a counterforce threat to Russian missile silos.
One also wonders about the logic behind such reorganisation. One may argue that the recent reorganisation was more of a routine nature. Also, as Kristensen points out, most of China’s ballistic missiles are mobile and the support units are devised in such a way to follow the launchers wherever they are transported to. The replacement of liquid-fuel with solid-fuel rockets also signifies the fact that they can be made ready for firing much faster, and this sends a signal to all the neighbours, be it India or Russia. Hence, what the Chinese may consider a routine exercise may send a wrong signal and have serious implications. If India and Russia are the likely targets, one has to see what the available capabilities are with these two countries. India has tested a number of intermediate-range missiles, including the Agni-3, capable of taking both Beijing and Shanghai, though these missiles are still not operational. Russian capability in this area is far superior to India’s or China’s. The critical issue is that as China modernizes its strategic forces, India must also step up its very slow missile development programme. There has been a debate about China’s military doctrines, in particular its no-first-use policy. China’s increasing capabilities may accelerate this debate.
These developments appear to be part of a larger pattern of aggressive military expansion, rising military expenditure, and a general opaqueness about China’s military programmes and ambitions. For example, SIPRI, an independent and well-respected Swedish think-tank, reported Chinese military expenditure, if calculated in PPP (purchasing power parity) terms, shows that Beijing spends almost US $ 200 bn every year. China is also one of the world top arms importers. China’s anti-satellite (ASAT) test in January 2007 is another indicator of its ambitions that go well beyond its borders.