India-Russia Defense Ties Amid COVID-19 - The Diplomat, 01 May 2020

In my last week's column for The Diplomat, I looked at the state of India-Russia defence ties, amid Covid-19 pandemic. I argue that despite kind words, cooperation, and defense ties, there are longer term difficulties in the India-Russia relationship that are unlikely to be easy to resolve.

The pandemic appears not to have had much impact on India-Russia relations. The relationship was showing signs of strain even before to the pandemic, mainly because both countries are drifting toward different sides in the emerging competition between the United States and China. India’s concerns about China’s behavior have made it inch closer to the U.S. and the Indo-Pacific coalition. While increasing tensions between Russia and the West appear to be driving Moscow toward a deeper partnership with Beijing. Neither side seems particularly happy with the effect of these tendencies on their bilateral relations and both have tried to insulate their ties from these larger movements. The India-Russia relationship continues to be dependent on some level of residual diplomatic empathy toward each other. Beyond this, the arms transfer relationship is the primary driver and despite the pandemic this aspect continues apace.

For the full essay, click here.



The S-400 long-range air defense system is the most visible recent indicator of the arms transfer relationship. There have been some concerns about possible delays, but Indian Ambassador to Russia Bala Venkatesh Varma stated that there will be no significant delays in the supply of the S-400s. India is buying five batteries of the S-400 system in a deal worth more than $5 billion despite the threat of U.S. sanctions. That India went ahead with the system regardless of the threat of sanctions is an indicator of both India’s desire to maintain this aspect of its relationship with Russia but also India’s vulnerability to Pakistan’s missile forces. The S-400 is claimed to have some level of anti-ballistic capability.

In addition, Russia recently offered India three more Kilo-class submarines. These refurbished Kilos will join the nine other Kilo-class submarines in the Indian Navy. This should be welcome because India has just 15 submarines, according to the latest Military Balance published by the IISS, against a projected requirement of 24. India’s declining submarine fleet has been a concern especially as the Chinese PLA Navy gets more active in the waters around India.

Last month, India decided to purchase an additional 400 T-90S battle tanks from Russia, according to reports. These will join the more than 1,000 T-90S that India already has, part of India’s 3,500-strong Main Battle Tank inventory. With the exception of the 100-plus Arjun tanks, everything else in the inventory are Russian T-72s or T-90Ss, which is an indicator of the close historical Indo-Russian military relations.

But the relationship has not been without its hiccups. India was originally part of the next generation Su-57 fighter program but pulled out of the deal because of dissatisfaction with the jet’s performance and manufacturing quality. This highlights a problem that the defense relationship has, which is that Russia is falling behind in terms of weapons technology. More than a decade after the United States started operationally flying fifth generation combat aircraft, Russia has not been able to develop jets with comparable performance. This could mean that India will increasingly have to look elsewhere if it wants weapons with performance capabilities comparable to the top of the line platforms in the world. India’s purchase of the French Rafale fighter is just one indicator of this trend.

As regards the direct effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the bilateral relationship, Indian Foreign Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar has maintained contact with his counterparts in Russia as recently as last week. In a tweet, he said that he discussed a number of issues including the upcoming BRICS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting as well as developments in Afghanistan and cooperation in dealing with the coronavirus pandemic. Although this was part of a series of discussions that the foreign minister had with various counterparts including U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, it does indicate that the relationship is maintaining force. The virus is spreading rapidly in Russia — even Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin confirmed that he tested positive for the virus. The Indian prime minister lost no time in wishing his counterpart an early recovery and good health.

Both sides have also helped each other deal with the effects of the pandemic. Russia expressed its gratitude for India’s decision to supply key drugs to fight the pandemic, HCQ and paracetamol. Russia’s main defense export agency, Rosoboronexport also donated $2 million to the Indian prime minister’s special fund for fighting the pandemic, called the PM Cares Fund. The pandemic has affected the training of four Indian Air Force pilots who have been selected for India’s first manned space flight and were undergoing astronaut training at the Yuri Gagarin Research and Test Cosmonaut Training Center. Nevertheless, training is likely to continue after the various lockdowns end.

But despite the kind words, emergency cooperation, and the defense relationship, there are longer term difficulties in the India-Russia relationship that are unlikely to be easy to resolve. The pandemic has accelerated the competition between China and the region and that is likely to eventually add stress to the India-Russia relationship.

What Does the Trump-Putin Summit Mean for India’s US-Russia Worry? - 19 July 2018

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I wrote on the Trump-Putin summit in Helsinki and what it means for New Delhi.

While some of America’s allies and partners were aghast at U.S. President Donald Trump’s performance during the recent Helsinki summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin, reaction in India was somewhat different. There was actually greater hope than dread leading up to the summit, and in its aftermath somewhat greater disappointment at the reaction in the United States to the summit than in Trump’s performance.



The reasons are not that difficult to understand. India’s traditional and continuing security relationship with Russia and its growing partnership with the United States meant that there was a desire in India that Russia and the United States would patch up their deteriorating ties. This troubled relationship was clearly putting Russia on the defensive and pushing Moscow to seek closer ties with China and even Pakistan, leading to consternation in New Delhi.

Much of this was obviously the result of Russia’s tensions in its relations with the West in general and the United States in particular. But that tension also meant that India had to balance its relationships with two of its closest security partners. This is not a place that India wants to be in, especially as it faces growing pressure from China.

Ideally, India would like to have both Russia and the United States in its corner to deal with China. After all, both of these countries are worried about China. China’s rise is threatening to push the United States out of the Indo-Pacific, while creating a powerful potential adversary on Russia’s eastern front. They should be natural partners with each other and with India, except that they appear unwilling to recognize their clear common interest sufficiently to bury their differences. The hope was that Trump and Putin might begin to reverse course.

For the full essay, click here.



This consideration shaped much of the response of Indian commentators, although there has been no official comment from the government. Prior to the meeting, the expectation was that “any thaw in U.S.-Russia relations would come as a relief.” Analysts were also concerned about the impact CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) would have if the U.S.-Russia relations did not improve.

Some also believe that the Trump-Putin meeting provides a window of opportunity “to establish clear lines of understanding” and seek an exemption for the Indian government to procure the S-400 air defense system from Russia. Others fear a much larger dynamic could be at play and that this could set in motion the dismantling of the Eurasian geopolitical order that the United States had built and nurtured for decades. Arguments were also made highlighting the stabilizing effects of improved U.S.-Russia ties for not just the two countries but for the broader global order as well.

Indian commentators were thus both excited and nervous about the Trump-Putin meeting. An overall improvement in relations between Washington and Moscow could possibly ease the strain in Indian diplomacy. On the other hand, worsening of the U.S.-Russia ties post-Helsinki meeting could have multiple adverse reactions. For one, it will make India’s choices in the defense and security realm quite challenging. Indian interest in buying the S-400s is just one instance. Even as India has diversified its defense procurement, its defense inventory is still Russia-dominated. Additionally, there are technologies and platforms that no other country is willing to part with to India as yet, at least in the immediate time frame and therefore India will continue to be dependent on Russia for a number of important technologies, as well as spare parts and the upkeep of its existing defense infrastructure.

But more importantly, further deterioration of Russia’s ties with the West and isolationism will drive Moscow further into the China’s arms, which will exacerbate the strategic challenges for India and restrict the choices for India. A close Russia-China strategic partnership also creates real worries in the security sector. For instance, the Russian sale of advanced weapon platforms to China such as the Su-35 and the Kilo-class submarines only serve to widen the disparity in the military balance between India and China.

Furthermore, while Russia continues its diplomatic support for India in various forums for now, this could also potentially change in the future. The Russian keenness to build political and military relations with Pakistan has also raised concern in New Delhi not as much for the scale of the relations (at least for the time being) as an indicator of how far away Russia has moved away from India. The fact that the emerging Moscow-Islamabad ties could be an afterthought of the strategic ties between Russia and China offers little comfort.

Tensions between Russia and the United States might make Moscow uncomfortable with the growing ties between India and the United States, even if this is not directed at Russia. But New Delhi also sees little choice, considering the challenge it faces from China. The harsh bipartisan domestic reaction in the United States to President Trump’s performance, and his back-peddling on some of his comments with President Putin, means that there is little hope that there will be much improvement in U.S.-Russia ties in the immediate future. So, New Delhi will likely have to continue to worry about any fallout that might affect India.