Can the New China-India Thaw Last? - October 19, 2018

Last week, I did my weekly column for The Diplomat on the state of the India-China relations and whether the current thaw is long lasting or not. In the "Can the New China-India Thaw Last?," I argue that despite India’s recent seeking of friendlier ties with Beijing, the future prospects for relations remain uncertain.

A year after Doklam, India appears to be intent on seeking friendlier ties with Beijing. Whether this is sustainable for the long-term, however, is unclear. Even as this process has unfolded, India continues to worry about China’s activities in the neighborhood and continues to build up its ties with other partners, though cautiously.



For the full essay, click here.



Since April, there have been a series of meetings between the top Indian and Chinese leaders, Narendra Modi and Xi Jinping. After the “informal” summit in Wuhan in April, the two met on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Qingdao in June and the BRICS leaders’ summit in Johannesburg in July.

At the Wuhan Summit, Modi and Xi agreed to the China-India Plus cooperation format to work in third countries such as Afghanistan. Thereafter, India’s Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale went on to develop an outline for a capacity-building project, which was announced on the sidelines of the SCO summit in Qingdao in June.

On October 15, India and China jointly began a training program for Afghan diplomats in New Delhi, a significant development. Chinese Ambassador to India Luo Zhaohui is reported to have said that the two countries should collaborate in other neighboring countries such as Iran, Nepal, and Myanmar. The 10 Afghan officers, on finishing the training at the Foreign Service Institute in India, will go to China for the second leg as part of the joint training program.

Though Afghanistan sent its diplomats for training under the program, the Afghan leadership is reportedly disappointed with India. Kabul is apparently of the view that because of India joining hands with China, there has been a downgrading of India’s assistance to Afghanistan to “smaller” projects as a way of assuaging Pakistan’s concerns. Reports indicate that “India had, in fact, conceded [to] China’s request to jointly implement a limited ‘capacity building’ project to opt for a smaller project in Afghanistan, possibly to assuage its ally Pakistan’s misgivings.”

India’s efforts to assuage China are not limited to Afghanistan alone. The two sides are slated to sign a bilateral internal security cooperation pact on October 22 during the visit of Zhao Kezhi, China’s minister of public security to India. Intelligence exchange, sharing of best practices, exchange programs, and cooperation in disaster mitigation are some of the areas the two sides intend to cooperate on under this agreement.

Quoting officials, reports suggest that this security cooperation arrangement could possibly lead to an agreement to exchange prisoners in each other’s countries. There are apparently 10 Indian prisoners is Chinese prisons and “an equal number of Chinese in Indian prisons as well,” according to the Financial Express. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi is scheduled to come to India in December to co-chair a meeting that focuses on people-to-people ties, a decision that was taken by Modi and Xi in the wake of the Doklam crisis.

While New Delhi tries to address Beijing’s concerns, there are questions about how long all this will last, given that there seems to be no letup in the expansion of China’s military and diplomatic presence in India’s periphery. For instance, just as India and China started their joint training program for Afghan diplomats, China was busy deploying PLA Navy submarines in the Indian Ocean after a gap of more than a year. It has been reported that China had sent a Type 039A Yuan class SSK diesel submarine and submarine rescue vessel, which were sighted in the Indian Ocean earlier this month. This is the first such PLA Navy mission in the Indian Ocean since the Doklam crisis.

How India will respond remains to be seen. India’s Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Sunil Lanba recently said that India was “working with all like-minded nations and we are in dialogue with China as well.”

Meanwhile, China is also continuing to demonstrate its interest in pushing into India’s sphere of influence in Bhutan. Even though Beijing has no formal diplomatic ties with Thimphu, it has been expanding its footprint in Bhutan for a while now. Reports suggest that China has increased the number of shipments into Bhutan in the past decade, everything from machinery to cement to electrical equipment to toys to the point where China is now “the third largest source of foreign products” to Bhutan.

As India seeks better ties with China, it is also continuing to build up its partnerships in the region. India-Japan maritime cooperation saw a boost with the re-starting of the exercise, JIMEX that concluded earlier this week. India also held the inaugural 2+2 Dialogue with the United States last month and signed the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA). India-Australia ties are also seeing some revival with a number of security dialogues and military exercises between the two sides.

On the other hand, in a demonstration of “strategic autonomy” from the United States, India has signed an agreement to purchase the S-400s anti-aircraft missiles from Russia and also plans to buy more oil from Iran from November, despite the threat of U.S. sanctions. Whether India can continue this high stakes strategic tightrope-walking remains to be seen.

Recent Xinjiang Riots: A Commentary

The riots that have rocked the southern Chinese province of Xinjiang may remind the Beijing political leadership yet again of the fragility of the Chinese state and that the threat of separatism and identity politics are alive and kicking. Unless Beijing takes steps to assimilate the Uighurs into the Chinese society and usher in economic and social development for them, the problem can linger and become a hotbed for violence and terrorism in China.



Background
While the Chinese leadership has maintained that Xinjiang does not pose any serious challenges, there is also hype about terrorist threat that stems from the Xinjiang Uighur movement. For instance, the Chinese Communist Party Politburo Standing Committee member in charge of security Luo Gan stated that the “overall situation in the region is satisfactory, but the police and security agencies should be prepared for dangers.” This is the case because China fears that the religious and ethno-nationalist movements in the Central Asian region could easily spread across the border to Xinjiang.

Xinjiang undoubtedly is an area of significant strategic importance to China, given that it borders eight nations in Central and South Asia. The region is an energy-rich area, and the third largest oil-producing region in the country. Proximity to the Central Asian nations provide China with abundant opportunities to promote border trade, tap oil and gas resources from Central Asia in addition to keeping US influence in Central Asia under check through various means, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).

The Uighurs numbering 130 million are one of the 55 officially designated minority groups in China. They are believed to be enjoying all the civil rights of full citizenship, beneficiaries of certain affirmative policies of the Central government, and enjoy less strict family planning regulations. Unlike the rest of China, the Uighur population are allowed to have two or three children. However, this group remains much poorer, less educated and are not well-represented in the Communist Party or government positions. It is an irony that Uighur top party leadership is under a Han Chinese. While some of the other minority groups -- Zhunag with a population of 16 million, Hui Muslims of 10 million, or the Lhoba with only 3,000 -- have also been treated not too fairly by the state and have had conflicts at a local level, they have not resulted in political or separatist movement status. This has been mainly on account of the Chinese policy of changing the demographic mix of the region by promoting Han migration to Xinjiang.

It might be pertinent to understand the background of the current Uighur movement. The Qing Dynasty gained control over East Turkestan (the current Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region) in the 19th century. But as central control weakened as a consequence of the Chinese civil war, the ethnic Uighurs sought to re-establish sovereignty over their homeland. They managed to establish themselves as Republic of East Turkestan for a brief period from 1945-49. However, after Mao’s victory in the civil war in 1949, the PLA troops re-entered Xinjiang and established complete control over Xinjiang. This was in fact the first wave of population shifts that took place in the region. Thereafter, the Chinese leadership began consolidation of the area by sending retired ethnic Han Chinese soldiers into Xinjiang to form new units called “Production and Construction” Corps (Bingtuan). The second wave of population shifts took place in the 1990s, due partly to the disintegration of Soviet Union and thereafter Beijing’s fear of instability creeping in the region. This time around, China fashioned major economic incentives to move Han population to Xinjiang. Beijing also undertook the “Big Development of the Northwest” that brought in nearly two million Han Chinese to Xinjiang. Although there was a surge in the economic sphere with massive subsidies, oil exploitation and rapid urbanization, Uighurs did not benefit from any of these and this created bitterness in the minds of the Uighurs.

The Beijing government has followed rather illiberal policies of pumping in Han Chinese into areas inhabited by migrants, whether it is in Tibet or in Xinjiang. Such policies implemented by Beijing have altered the population balance in a significant manner and has aggravated the situation. The area, which had a mere 6 to 7 per cent of Han population, is today 40 to 45 per cent Han. Fearful of marginalisation through such proactive measures by the Chinese government, Uighurs have become fiercer in their agitation against Chinese rule in Xinjiang. In 1996, the Chinese government decided to adopt a series of measures on the Uighurs termed as “Strike Hard” (Yan Da) campaign to re-establish firmly its control on Xinjiang.

Similarly, the local leadership of the Central leadership has taken measures that would further isolate the Uighur minority. For instance, in 2002, Xinjiang Party Secretary Wang Lequan declared that the Uighur language was “out of step with the 21st century,” and accordingly, the government started to shift the entire education system to Mandarin, replacing Uighur teachers with Han Chinese. The local officials went to the extent of organizing public burnings of Uighur books. Control over religion and religious practices too were implemented, including religious weddings, burials or pilgrimages to the tombs of local saints. Earlier in 2008, the government announced plans to demolish the city of Kashgar, one of the oldest cultural centre of the Uighur civilization. This move was to uproot 50,000 families from their traditional homeland to some new township.

While this is one side of the story, the other side relates to the reports of apparent linkages between some of the Uighur groups and terrorist organisations like Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Hizb-ul-Tahrir, Jamaat-i-Islami, Tableegi Jamaat, and such other groups that operate out of Central Asia. This has constrained American moves to pressurise the Chinese governments on human rights issues particularly after September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States. There have been however reports by human rights groups worldwide to suggest that the Chinese leadership is using the campaign against global terrorism as a way to crackdown and thereby curtail the Uighur movement.

Recent Violence
The recent violence started with a minor brawl between Uighurs and Han Chinese workers at a local factory in Shaoguan, Guangdong on June 25, 2009, leading to the deaths of two Uighurs. This in turn is believed to have set the trigger for the July 05 riots. Chinese leadership continues to argue that the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), an Uighur separatist group associated with Al Qaeda, is driving the hatred and fuelling the violence in Xinjiang. The leadership is also of the view that it is the ETIM leadership, located in Waziristan on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border that is responsible for a series of bombing in Xinjiang and elsewhere in China prior to the Beijing Olympics. For the first time, the government, through an article in People’s Daily, also blamed the United States, accusing that it financed the World Uygur Congress led by Ms. Rebiya Kadeer’s organization, and other organisations that advocate human rights and democracy for ethnic Uighurs in China.

The Beijing leadership has reacted to the violence rather aggressively, trying to crush the uprising and preventing any spread of it to other parts of the region. About 20,000 troops from nearby regions were brought into Urumqi after the violence began, forming cordons between ethnic Uighur neighborhoods and those dominated by Han Chinese. The government has also enforced severe restrictions on any religious and cultural expression including the Friday prayers by the Uipghur’s Muslim population. Further, China has interpreted any expression of dissent and anger as advocating separatism, thereby crushing it by repressive means. Advocating separatism is a crime under Chinese law that can be met with death penalty. The party chief of Urumqi, Li Zhi, did not mince words of their intentions when he said, “To those who have committed crimes with cruel means, we will execute them.”

China, in order to cash in international support and sympathy for the Xinjiang fiasco, implanted the Al Qaeda element and that China was fighting the Al Qaeda in the global war on terrorism. However, the manner in which the whole issue has been treated by China has invited Al Qaeda right into their borders. Following the death of nearly 200 people, Al Qaeda has issued warning to China, more particularly the Chinese abroad in Africa. Meanwhile, protesting against the killing of nearly 200 Uighur Muslims, thousands of Turks and Uighur expatriates took to demonstrations and burning Chinese flags and Chinese products. Unless China puts out a more nuanced response, the troubles in Xinjiang could spiral out of control.

China-SCO Military Exercise - A Show of the Chinese Military Might?

This essay on China-SCO military exercise originally appeared on the ORF website.

Russia and China, along with other member countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), are planning their anti-terror exercise, “Peace Mission 2009” in the summer of 2009 in northeastern China. Chinese defence minister Liang Guanglie made the announcement regarding the exercise after a successful meeting with the Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov in 2008. The Russian news agency, RIA Novosti, quoting Chinese Ministry of Defence, stated that Peace Mission 2009 is intended to move beyond the original goals of fighting terrorism, extremism and separatism to a larger objective of strengthening the “strategic partnership between Russia and China.” In fact, one news report quoting an SCO official stated that these exercises will not be under the SCO umbrella, but rather a bilateral exercise. While Beijing professes that these joint exercises are intended to fight against ‘the three evils’ -- terrorism, extremism and separatism -- in reality, it has been a display of the rising profile of Chinese PLA. Will the 2009 exercise be yet another display of its military prowess? If this exercise is a bilateral one, what are its implications for the region?



Peace Mission 2009 is the third in the series; the first being “Peace Mission 2005,” in Russia’s Far East and the eastern Chinese province of Shandong, with about 10,000 people, which created huge controversy as it was seen as a Chinese preparation for an invasion of Taiwan; and the second one being in August 2007, which came under close world scrutiny as it watched one of the most complex military exercises in Asia. The Chinese exercise with the SCO members was an occasion to display and demonstrate their ability for joint operations with other forces; their combined employment of land, naval and air forces along with amphibious units; and more importantly projection of their military power. Following the exercise in 2007, Chen Jianmin of the Academy of Military Sciences of the PLA noted that the exercise assumed significance for the Chinese and “sets a new record in the history of our armed forces in troop projection and will likewise be an unprecedented test and temper of the remote mobile ability of our armed forces, and for that matter, it is of extraordinary significance”.

If we take the 2007 exercise as the model, Peace Mission 2009 will also be an extraordinary event demonstrating highly sophisticated logistic structure and jointness of the various participant militaries. The exercise in 2007, which took place in Urumqi, capital of China’s Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Area, and at the range of the Russian Army’s 34th Motorised Rifle Division near Chebarkul town, in Russia’s Volga-Urals Military District, remained significant as it involved a 10,300 km-long trans-national journey. Major chunk of the forces were from Russia and China, with Kazakhstan and Tajikistan sending an airborne company each, and Uzbekistan sending an airborne platoon and staff officers. The exercise had a total of 6,500 personnel and 80 aircraft from China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Around 2,000 Russian, 1,700 Chinese forces, and several Russian logistical support units, also took part in the exercise. Aircraft deployed for the exercise include six Russian IL-76 transport planes, nine Sukhoi Su-25 Frogfoot ground-attack jets, 14 Mi-24 Hind helicopter gun ships and 18 Mi-8 Hip helicopters. From the Chinese side, there were six IL-76 aircraft, eight JH-7-A fighter bombers, 16 Z-9 armed helicopters, 16 JG-9-W and 16 Mi-17 Hip helicopters. It also employed tanks, while Russia and China provided artillery support in the form of eighteen 122-mm and 100-mm artillery systems. The display of weapons at that exercise demonstrated the military superiority that the group intends to achieve.

The logistical arrangements involved in the 2007 exercise deserve a special mention, given the large-scale mass transportation of troops and weapon systems. In addition to the rail transportation, there was the Chinese army aviation unit, including 16 Mi-17 transport helicopters, from Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, flying a distance of 2,700 kms to the drill venue. This was significant in the sense that China was able to test the capability of PLA aviation troops due to the long distance that it covered as also the complicated topographic and climatic conditions on the way and possible language difficulties with the ground forces in Russia. Chen commenting on this long-distance transportation noted that “the long distance and large-scale projection in organic units with heavy weapons to overseas would render the Chinese forces a hard-won opportunity to temper the remote mobile ability.” He added that these exercises would in addition to “honing the ground forces and testing the ability of railway transportation would also steel the remote delivery ability of the Air Force and the remote mobile ability of the Army Aviation troops.” The PLA Daily reported that according to sources, this was the first time for the PLA Air Force units to participate in multinational joint military exercise in a foreign country in organic units and in such a large scale, the first time to use new-type home-made weaponry and equipment to participate in actual-troops exercise, the first time to organize the air force units to do exercise by relying on airports, training sites and various support facilities of foreign troops and the first time to participate in the exercise in a foreign country to be watched by the heads of state of several countries.

While such an extensive military exercise has only further strengthened the western (and even Indian) belief of the Chinese military might, the Chinese offer a different argument that should be given its due. Major General Wang Haiyun, a former Chinese military attaché to Russia, did speak to the PLA Daily (PLA Daily, July 25, 2007) on the exercise, where he stated that it should be seen from two specific aspects that it demonstrates the resolve within the SCO, “in clamping down on the three evil forces of terrorism, separatism and extremism,” and secondly, to “generate positive influence on regional peace and stability, and make great contributions to anti-terrorism in the world.” Further, Officer Guo Wenhui of the PLA’s General Staff noted that “it is a practical way to improve the PLA’s capability to tackle terrorist threats.” It is estimated that the Chinese PLA has had 17 joint military exercises with the troops of several countries, including the US.

While the western projection of Chinese military threat is one facet, a more interesting aspect is the Chinese use of military diplomacy as a significant tool in the conduct of its foreign policy. Matsuda Yasuhiro of the Japan-based National Institute of Defense Studies (NIDS), has detailed the various facets to China’s military diplomacy, ranging from strategic level activities that include defence consultations and strategic dialogues; arms transfers, regional activities, including state to state military protocols, opening of military bases; participation in military exercises, professional military education exchanges, besides cooperation in non-traditional security areas, like sending armed forces to counter-terrorism exercises, UN Peacekeeping operations.

While China has maintained that these exercises or multinational cooperation are a step in the fight against terrorism, several countries, including India has concerns on its real intentions. It is very clear that these exercises are meant to do a power projection of the Chinese military might, in addition to its own experiment with several new weapon systems and as well as to experiment the inter-operability of forces from different countries as also to experiment the combined use of land, air, naval and amphibious units in a joint atmosphere. The exercises are also clearly meant to gather intelligence on the kind of forces in place (particularly in the case of India, Japan and the US), understanding their defence planning and thinking, learning how other Asian nations manage their military. The exercises are also indicative of the Chinese efforts in restraining the US influence in these countries, as also to counter/extinguish any “China threat theory” that might exist in any of these countries. Meanwhile, the Chinese want the world to believe that the Chinese military diplomacy is only to support the larger foreign, diplomatic, political, economic and security agenda set forth by the leadership of the Party/State, and not on a separate, independent agenda of its own.

Lastly, if the 2009 exercise is a demonstration of a further strengthened bilateral relations between Russia and China, it has serious ramifications for the region. One explanation for the partnership could be that as China grows stronger in military, economic and political terms, Russia wants to bring Beijing under its umbrella and ensure that it does not become an adversary in its neighbourhood. On the other hand, from an Indian perspective, a strong Sino-Russian partnership could be dangerous for India in more ways than one. Firstly, it will affect Indo-Russian defence ties. These ties will get diluted in a gradual manner if Russia is not careful about the balance between its ties with Beijing and Delhi. Second, how this partnership will affect outcomes in the United Nations, especially at the Security Council, needs to be seen. Moscow might be compelled to follow Chinese line at the UN, particularly on issues concerning India such as Kashmir. The strengthened partnership will affect decision-making in several international fora. Thirdly, strengthened defence ties will be part of this particularly close relationship and the technology and defence items that are transferred to China might find their way to Pakistan. In fact, there could potentially be Russian arms floating around in other neighbouring countries too, including Sri Lanka. Such developments on India’s neighbourhood may not be very palatable to India.