India-Russia Relations Face More Trouble - The Diplomat, 31 December 2020

In my last essay for the year, I wrote a short essay on India-Russia relations for The Diplomat.  The immediate context of course was the cancelled annual bilateral summit, a first in two decades. Was Covid-19 the reason or did the China factor influence the decision?  

India and Russia have gone through several ups and downs in their decades-old bilateral relationship. The two appear at present to be going through a tricky phase. The two-decade old India-Russia annual summit was cancelled for the first time. A news report in India suggested that the postponement was the result of “severe reservations on New Delhi joining the Indo-Pacific initiative and Quad.” India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) spokesperson responded by saying, “The India-Russia Annual Summit did not take place in 2020 because of the COVID pandemic. This was a mutually agreed decision between the two Governments. Any imputation otherwise is false and misleading. Spreading false stories on important relationships is particularly irresponsible.” The Russian side also responded with a statement saying that it is in “close touch” with its counterparts in India to finalize new dates for the summit, “postponed due to epidemiological reasons.” 

But such denials are unlikely to entirely remove speculation about the state of bilateral relations, especially considering that India has taken part in a large number of bilateral and multilateral talks virtually, even if the pandemic has prevented physical meetings.  

For the full essay, click here.  

Moreover, overall speculation about difficulties in the relationship is not exactly new.  There has been a lot of it, especially because of comments from senior Russian officials, such as Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, on India’s Quad and Indo-Pacific policy. Russian officials have repeatedly criticized the idea of the Indo-Pacific and the Quad, arguing that it is meant to contain China. Lavrov publicly stated so at the annual Raisina Dialogue in New Delhi in January 2020. More recently, Lavrov returned to the theme, saying at the general meeting of the Russian International Affairs Council in Moscow on December 8 that “India is currently an object of the Western countries’ persistent, aggressive and devious policy as they are trying to engage it in anti-China games by promoting Indo-Pacific strategies, the so-called ‘Quad’ while at the same time the West is attempting to undermine our close partnership and privileged relations with India.”

Indian officials and public commentators are increasingly miffed at this lack of sensitivity to Indian concerns about China, especially coming after China’s intrusion in Ladakh this year, which led to a bloody clash and Indian casualties. Even the normally cautious Indian foreign ministry was forced to respond, with the MEA spokesperson stating that India has always had an independent foreign policy based on its own national interests, that India’s Indo-Pacific approach was not directed at any particular country, and that India stands for a free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific. He also added, for good measure, that “India’s relationship with each country is independent of its relations with third countries. We hope that this is well understood and appreciated by all our partners.” 

All of this is coming at a time when the India-China relationship is in one of its worst phases. India’s External Affairs Minister Dr. S Jaishankar while speaking at an Australian think tank, the Lowy Institute, commented that India and China are “at the most difficult phase of our relationship” in the last three or four decades and that the relations between the two were “very significantly damaged” over the past year.  

These damages are unlikely to be undone easily. It took several decades to rebuild relations after the 1962 Sino-Indian border war, but the progress made since 1988 has been entirely lost with the current Galwan clash, provoked by China in an effort to unilaterally change the status quo on the border.   

Russian comments have led to some criticism in India of Moscow’s position and are increasingly eroding public support that the relationship always had. But there are contrarian voices too. In fact, Rahul Gandhi, leader of India’s main opposition party, the Indian National Congress, criticized the government’s decision to cancel the annual summit with Russia in a tweet saying, “Russia is a very important friend of India. Damaging our traditional relationships is short-sighted and dangerous for our future.” It should be noted, of course, that it was the Congress-led UPA government that joined the Quad the first time, back in 2007. It was the same UPA government that has also strengthened the strategic partnership with the United States, including by signing the U.S.-India civil nuclear deal.  

While Russia’s dependence on China is understandable considering its worsening relations with the West, Moscow cannot expect India to ignore its national security concerns regarding China. And as I have written previously, a China-India crisis invariably puts Russia in a tight spot, with difficult choices between India, a traditional partner and also a lucrative defense market, and its newfound but mighty partner, China. For India, it will be increasingly difficult to see China as a partner. Finding common ground and partnering with a neighbor that has aggressively pursued a salami slicing strategy at India’s expense will be difficult. In order to build appropriate diplomatic and defense response against its aggressive eastern neighbor, India will need to partner with like-minded states that have also borne the brunt of Chinese aggressive behavior.  Moscow will either have to understand this reality or risk further hurting its ties with India.  

India-Vietnam Virtual Summit Strengthens Partnership - The Diplomat, 28 December 2020

In my latest column for The Diplomat, I looked at the recently-concluded India-Vietnam virtual summit meeting and how the strategic necessity of dealing with an aggressive China brings India and Vietnam closer together.  

Earlier last week, India and Vietnam held a virtual summit between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Vietnamese counterpart Nguyen Xuan Phuc. India and Vietnam have held a number of meetings and consultations this year leading up to the summit.

For the full post, click here.  

Modi, during his remarks at the summit, lauded Vietnam’s important role in India’s Act East Policy and as an “important partner of our Indo-Pacific Vision.” He highlighted the “long-term and strategic view” of the India-Vietnam relationship and the breadth and depth of their bilateral ties. He also underlined the importance of their shared purpose of “peace, stability and prosperity” for the Indo-Pacific region.

The two leaders also signed a joint vision document, “India-Vietnam Joint Vision for Peace, Prosperity and People.” The document is meant to drive the future of the India-Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, based on their “deep-rooted historical and cultural bonds, shared values and interests, and mutual strategic trust and understanding between the two countries.” The two countries also signed a “Plan of Action for period 2021-2023 for further implementation of Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” in order to strengthen their bilateral partnership with a clear agenda for the next two years, as well as seven other agreements that cover a number of important areas of cooperation including defense, nuclear safety and radiation protection, petro-chemicals, clean energy, and U.N. peacekeeping.

The fact that India and Vietnam have been at the receiving end of the China’s aggressive behavior in the South China Sea and on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) has made the partnership even stronger. Given China’s aggressive behavior in South China Sea, which has remained a significant challenge for Vietnam, the joint vision document devoted attention to it. The very first paragraph of their “joint vision” highlighted a “shared commitment to international law” and agreement to “work towards achieving a peaceful, stable, secure, free, open, inclusive and rules-based region.”

With this strategic factor in mind, the focus on defense cooperation was inevitable. The joint statement laid emphasis on the implementation of the high speed guard boat (HSGB) manufacturing project with the Vietnam Border Guard Command. The project is being implemented through a $100 million defense line of credit already extended by India to Vietnam. The project, according to the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) would involve also “handing over of one completed HSGB to Vietnam; launch of two HSGBs manufactured in India; and keel-laying of seven HSGBs to be manufactured in Vietnam.”

The joint vision document from the summit also recognized the importance of enhanced bilateral defense partnership in the context of the changing geopolitical and geoeconomic environment in the region and beyond. The document highlighted how a strengthened defense and security collaboration between India and Vietnam could be “an important factor of stability in the Indo-Pacific region.” To this end, the two sides agreed to augment military-to-military exchanges, training, and capacity building engagements between the two militaries including the coast guard. India and Vietnam also agreed to step up defense industry partnerships, taking advantage of the Indian credit lines already extended to Vietnam. More importantly, the two countries also decided to formalize their partnership by further institutionalizing defense exchanges through a number of programs including mutual logistics support, regular ship visits, joint exercises, and exchanges in military science and technology. The document also identified the decision to work through institutionalized dialogue structures in dealing with traditional and non-traditional security threats in some of the technology domains such as outer space and cyber space as well as a range of threats such as health security, natural disasters, terrorism, and transnational crimes through strengthened legal cooperation.  

This iteration comes against the backdrop of Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh’s bilateral meeting with his Vietnamese counterpart General Ngo Xuan Lich in November, which emphasized defense collaboration as “a key pillar of Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” between the two countries. In addition to defense industry collaboration, the two sides concluded an “Implementing Arrangement for cooperation in the field of Hydrography between National Hydrographic Office, India and Vietnam Hydrographic Office” at the earlier virtual defense ministers meeting. The sharing of hydrographic data will help in developing navigational charts by both countries. The two countries also agreed to produce an institutionalized framework agreement for industry collaboration soon. India also agreed to step up the scope and level of training extended to Vietnam military personnel in the Indian defense training institutions.

Vietnam has remained interested in the acquisition of a range of weapons and platforms from India, including the Akash air defense system and the Brahmos supersonic cruise missiles. These two systems have been on the India-Vietnam defense trade agenda for a long time but have not materialized yet. The possible sale of Brahmos systems to Vietnam was initially problematic from a Russian perspective, but those issues have reportedly been resolved.

While there has been historically strong strategic affinity between India and Vietnam, these bonds have become stronger, driven by the strategic necessity of dealing with an aggressive China that has been questioning the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both countries.

Countering Chinese assertiveness: India’s changing posture in the Indian Ocean - Indo-Pacific Analysis Brief, Perth USAsia Centre, 4 December 2020

In my third Analysis Brief as an Indo-Pacific Fellow at the Perth USAsia Centre, I looked at India's changing Indian Ocean strategy in order to address China's growing footprint in the region.  

Note: The paper contains endnotes, which I have not been able to incorporate here.  So, please check out the main page of the article, the link for which is given here.  

Major Takeaways are: 

→ The Indian Ocean region is becoming increasingly contested as Chinese presence expands. In recognising the threat posed by China, India has shifted its perceptions and priorities in the region. 

→ A large concern is the security of sea lines of communication in the Indian Ocean, which many Asian countries use as a trade corridor. 

→ China has demonstrated an objective to become a key player in the region with increased presence and activities, including in India’s Economic Exclusion Zone. 

→ India has become more active in protecting its interests in the region by calling for cooperation with external powers and enhancing its capabilities in the Indian Ocean to overcome capacity constraints. 

→ Cooperation between like-minded powers in the region is challenging due to divergences in individual perspectives, approaches and outlooks. Closer coordination is needed between these powers to build greater synergy. 

The Indian Ocean is once again at the centre of major geopolitical competition. China’s growing footprint and influence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has made the contest for power and control in the region between China and the US and its partners significant. The Indian Ocean sea lines of communication (SLOCs) are important for many Asian countries because it is both an energy and trade corridor, making these countries sensitive to any vulnerabilities. Now, undersea cables add to these vulnerabilities.1 

India has long been wary of power-plays in the Indian Ocean but finds itself with few options today but to participate in securing a free and open Indo-Pacific. 

In the process, India appears to be willing to reconsider some of its old concerns about external actors in the Indian Ocean. On the other hand, there are also some questions about the terms of engagement between India and its partners about the focus of their common efforts. Resolving these could lead to greater synergy and easier cooperation. 

For the full brief, click here.  

Growing Chinese presence is cause for concern

India’s stakes in the IOR are obvious, despite India’s lack of attention to the maritime front. From a security perspective, since independence, India has not faced any significant maritime threat. Much of the Indian maritime security focus was in terms of the relatively minor naval threat from Pakistan and non-traditional threats including piracy and terrorism. While these concerns remain, they have been overtaken by worries about China as an emerging IOR power, with a growing footprint in the region. 

Darshana Baruah argues that China’s growing Indian Ocean presence is not just about contesting India’s strategic role in the IOR, but it is part of a determined agenda to “emerge as a key player in the IOR” which feeds into “China’s larger objective of becoming a global maritime power2 .” The PLA Navy’s growing strength means that it is shaping up to be a formidable force to reckon with. This is complemented by China’s growing maritime ties with countries in the IOR and increasing naval presence in the region. 

India has multiple concerns about China in the Indian Ocean. One, already alive, is Chinese activities in India’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Speaking earlier this year, Indian Navy Chief Admiral Karambir Singh said that both Chinese research vessels and fishing boats have been seen in Indian Ocean, including in the Indian EEZ. 

This is a long brief but I concluded the Brief with the following thoughts.  

Australia’s participation at the 2020 Malabar naval exercises is a clear recognition of India’s changing attitude towards foreign navies in the Indian Ocean. It is a step towards fulfilling Modi’s call for cooperation with like-minded strategic partners, fuelled by India’s changing posture towards China. 

It is also an indication of the increasing synergistic approach among the major Indo-Pacific powers – Australia, India, Japan and the United States. The expanded Malabar exercises demonstrate the common strategic endeavour among the four to develop cogent responses to the many security challenges in the Indo-Pacific including China. The naval exercises could go a long way in creating greater confidence and interoperability among the four navies, which will be key in ensuring a stable, secure and prosperous Indo-Pacific. 

But cooperation with such partners will also require some common terms of understanding, most basically of the relationship between the ‘Indian’ and ‘Pacific’ components of the IndoPacific. Even though the concept of Indo-Pacific has gained greater traction over the last couple of years, there have been differences in the understanding of what constitutes the Indo-Pacific. 

The geographical limits of the Indo-Pacific in particular has been a topic of considerable debate. India, Japan and France have similar perceptions that the term ‘Indo-Pacific’ covers the area from the eastern shores of Africa to the west coast of America. Others, especially the US, appear more focused on the Pacific component. The Pacific powers, including Japan, the US, Australia, and New Zealand, appear to be more focused on countering China’s power in the Pacific and South China Sea, whereas Indian worries have been around China’s expansion into the Indian Ocean. There clearly needs to be better coordination between these two sets of concerns. Only when there is better coordination between these two sets of focus areas would it be possible to consider burden-sharing between the partners. 

Hopefully, a clearer enunciation of India’s Indian Ocean strategy will also translate into efforts for coordination between India and its partners in dealing with maritime challenges, especially those posed by China. 

There is a precedent for cooperation, though, at a smaller scale: India has worked with others to cooperate in anti-piracy operations. These, of course, included China also. Cooperating to deal with the security challenge posed by China in the Indo-Pacific will be at an entirely different scale and seriousness. This would require a sustained dialogue involving the different partners to evolve some sort of division of labour and burden sharing in order to effectively monitor China’s naval activities in all theatres of the Indo-Pacific. This could lead to arrangements in which India bears a greater burden in the Indian Ocean, while others bear a similar burden in the eastern waters. Other minilaterals in the Indo-Pacific are exploring such options of burden sharing in order to address capacity gaps – the India-France-Australia trilateral is a case in point. 

There is little doubt that China’s growing naval capacity affects all Indo-Pacific powers. New Delhi appears to recognise the difficulties involved and thus appears more keen to cooperate with other maritime powers in maintaining security in the Indian Ocean region. This is a good first step to greater Indo-Pacific cooperation, but further coordination is clearly needed.

Contradictions Grow Amid Another BRICS Summit - The Diplomat, 19 November 2020

In an earlier column for The Diplomat in November, I wrote on the 2020 BRICS Summit and the contradictions therein.  I argued that the group has always been diverse in terms of economic, political, and security interests.  The question, therefore, is it anything more than an ineffective talkshop?  

BRICS, the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa grouping, met virtually on November 17 for its 12th summit meeting. Prior to the meeting, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) released a statement saying that the meeting would discuss intra-BRICS cooperation around counterterrorism, energy, trade, health, and ways to mitigate the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. Each of the five leaders stressed various aspects of cooperation in the face of the pandemic and the resultant economic slowdown. 

For the full post, click here.  

Chinese President Xi Jinping talked about “global epidemiological security” and said that “the BRICS countries firmly believe in the primacy of international law” and considered the World Health Organization to be the leading institution in addressing the pandemic. He added that once the pandemic is taken care of, focus must shift to economic recovery. Here, he argued “China can once again lead the way.” Citing how China’s “economy already bounced back from its low point earlier this year,” he said, “its new development paradigm of dual circulation where domestic and international circulation mutually reinforce one another will help stimulate the global economy” as well as “repair the damage done by some countries’ protectionist policies.” He concluded by saying that there will be “hiccups along the way” but “the trust-based relations between the BRICS countries could serve as a very stabilizing factor during this unprecedented transition in global political and economic affairs as the world begins to embrace new models.”  

Xi’s statements on the primacy of international law and trust-based relations within BRICS are bound to be taken with more than a little skepticism given China’s punitive economic actions against many of its neighbors and even partners further away. Such statements from China are not new. At the BRICS Foreign Ministers meeting last week, Wang Yi, China’s foreign minister, said that the BRICS countries should come together in addressing the challenges of the pandemic and global economic recovery, and foster multilateralism and seek “political settlement of hot-spot issues.” 

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi also spoke about the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the reform process that has been initiated by his government to get the economy back on track. Modi highlighted the need for reform of multilateral institutions such as the IMF, WHO and WTO, but his particular emphasis was on terrorism, which he characterized as “the biggest problem today.” Modi said that the group must ensure that “countries that support and help terrorists are also held to account.”  

It is doubtful that the other members of BRICS necessarily share India’s view of the terrorism problem, but that is not the sole difficulty. The BRICS summit is also taking place at a time when India and China have squared off at their border, a temporary line called the Line of Actual Control (LAC). BRICS, as a multilateral platform, cannot address bilateral issues and hence, it was, understandably, not expected to address that particular issue. And given that the summit was held virtually, the possibility of informal bilateral meeting on the sidelines of the summit was nonexistent.  

The group itself has always been diverse in terms of economic, political, and security interests. These have only grown over the last two decades as Abhijnan Rej highlighted recently. China has emerged as the world’s second largest economy, while Brazil, Russia, and South Africa are nowhere near the indicators that brought them into the grouping initially.  

Politically, too, the group is diverse, with few common political interests other than singing the song of multilateralism. Even that rhetoric may not hold for long given the yawning gap between China’s rhetoric of multilateralism and its unilateral aggressive behavior on the ground.  

China and Russia have an anti-American political goal for the grouping, which sits very uneasily with Indian interests, considering India has invested significantly in building and nurturing its bilateral ties with the United States as well as engaging in strategic minilaterals such as the Quad and various trilaterals in the Indo-Pacific.  

That India works with China in the BRICS format, when the aim of India’s Quad and other such minilaterals are to restrict and restrain China’s aggressive and bullying behavior, adds to the growing array of contradictions. Certainly, BRICS cannot be a military and security grouping given the significant differences between each of the players, most notably between India, China, and Russia. The success of groupings such as BRICS will depend on the health of bilateral ties among those within the group. India-China relations in the backdrop of the Galwan conflict do not suggest that all is well on the bilateral front or even in the regional context.  

India’s aim in engaging with BRICS may be an effort to demonstrate that it retains strategic autonomy and that it engages with all major powers irrespective of these incongruences. In this respect, it may serve a limited domestic political agenda. But as contradictions keep piling up, questions about the future of BRICS as anything other than an ineffective talkshop are bound to grow.  

India and France Partner for Expedition to Venus - The Diplomat, 8 October 2020

In this post, I look at the India-France space collaboration, looking at a niche area of Venus exploration.  This is an article I did for The Diplomat in October.  I argue that India has long valued France’s partnership on issues ranging from defense and space exploration to civil nuclear power generation.  

After the success of its first interplanetary mission to Mars in September 2014, India has now set its eyes on a mission to Venus. The Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO), India’s civilian space agency, will be undertaking the mission in 2025. According to reports, France has agreed to be part of the mission, the first time a French payload will be carried on an Indian space exploration mission. The French space agency, Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales (CNES), is reported to have confirmed this in a statement last week, saying that it “will coordinate and prepare the French contribution.” ISRO’s Venus instrument, VIRAL (Venus Infrared Atmospheric Gases Linker) has been co-developed by Russian and French agencies. 

For the full post, click here.  

Last week’s announcement appears to be a follow-up to the March 2018 India-France Joint Vision for Space Cooperation, which identified Mars and Venus as possible areas of future cooperation. The statement said the ISRO and CNES would work together in exploring the solar system and beyond, including joint work on the autonomous navigation of rovers on the Moon, Mars and other planets; aero-braking technologies for planetary exploration; modelling of the atmospheres of Mars and Venus;  and inflatable systems for the exploration of Venus.

In November 2018, ISRO issued an “Announcement of Opportunity (AO) to international science community for Space-Based Experiments to Study Venus,” seeking international proposals for science payloads for its Venus mission. The AO provided the details of the Indian payloads on the Venus mission which include an S-band synthetic aperture radar (SAR), advanced radar for topside Ionosphere and subsurface sounding, ultraviolet (UV) imaging spectroscopy telescope, thermal camera, cloud monitoring camera, Venus atmospheric spectropolarimeter, airglow photometer, radio occultation experiment, Ionospheric electron temperature analyzer, mass spectrometer and a plasma wave detector. ISRO stated that the satellite will weigh around 100 kilograms with about 500 watts of power. 

Though other countries have conducted missions to Venus, there is still a lot of exploration left to do. According to the ISRO, the Indian interest in pursuing the Venus mission is to gain greater understanding of surface/subsurface features and resurfacing processes; atmospheric chemistry, dynamics and compositional variations; and interaction with solar radiation/solar wind on Venus. Venus is generally considered uninhabitable “due to its volatile and acidic clouds,” but recent discovery of phosphine is an indicator of possible microbial life on the planet. 

The recently announced partnership between India and France on the Venus mission comes against the backdrop of a long-standing and robust cooperation between the ISRO and CNES. India has long valued France as an important strategic partner and the two nations are engaged in many other sectors, including civil nuclear power and defense. France has cooperated with and aided the Indian space program since the 1960s. In March 2018, during the visit of the French President Emmanuel Macron to India, the two countries signed the India-France Joint Vision for Space Cooperation, identifying nine specific areas of cooperation including space situational awareness (SSA), high-resolution earth observation, satellite navigation, and space transportation systems. The two nations also pledged to work together to maintain space as a safe, secure and sustainable domain. In the context of Indian and French interest in maritime security in the Indo-Pacific region, SSA and high resolution earth observation satellites could also mean the two countries will likely pursue maritime domain awareness (MDA). 

ISRO and CNES are also working together on India’s first crewed space mission, Gaganyaan, scheduled for launch in 2022. The mission was announced by Jean-Yves Le Gall, president of CNES, on the sidelines of the 2018 Bengaluru Space Expo organized by the Confederation of Indian Industry and Antrix, the commercial arm of ISRO. France has reportedly agreed to train Indian flight surgeons, essentially Indian Air Force doctors working on aviation medicine and those responsible for the astronauts’ health before, during and after the space mission. These doctors are to undergo a critical two-week period of training. 

All this is made possible because of India’s and, in particular, ISRO’s comfort in doing business with France. This comes from the fact that France enjoys great confidence as a reliable partner of India. The fact that the two countries share a common strategic vision for the Indo-Pacific region only helps to cement their partnership further. India has traditionally had a well-recognized aversion to the concept of “alliance” in international politics, but Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi overcame this when he referred to France as an ally during a speech  in Paris, when he said that for him “infra” meant something other than short-hand for infrastructure: “I would like to say that for me it is IN+FRA, which means the alliance between India and France.” France’s recent steps in supporting what India considers its core interests, such as the Indian position on Jammu and Kashmir at the United Nations Security Council, are a testament to the close strategic partnership between India and France. The fact that France, unlike the United States, has no negative baggage in Indian perceptions from the Cold War period helps. Moreover, Paris stood alone in supporting India’s decision to go nuclear in 1998, unlike other partners like Australia and Japan, which further reinforces Indian confidence in France as a long-term, reliable partner. 

Australia-Japan-India Trilateral Sets Sights on Supply Chain Resilience - The Diplomat, 2 October 2020

In my first article for The Diplomat in October, I looked at the Australia-Japan-India trilateral which has its eyes on supply chain resilience as the first concrete agenda driving their cooperation.  I argue that China's assertive behaviour is the glue that holds the trilateral together.  

Recently, the trade ministers of Australia, Japan and India agreed to develop a supply chain resilience program for the Indo-Pacific region. The announcement, which followed a video conference between Australia’s Simon Birmingham, Japan’s Kajiyama Hiroshi and India’s Piyush Goyal in in early September, came amid a growing recognition in all three nations of the dangers of excessive economic reliance on China. While the details of the initiative remain sketchy, the three countries have tasked their respective bureaucracies with looking for ways to develop an initiative that would strengthen alternate supply chains in an effort to counter China’s control of the trade of essential supplies. The initiative is being planned for launch next year. It is meant to be an inclusive initiative and the three countries are looking to extend it into Southeast Asia.

For the full post, click here.  

The idea of the Australia-Japan-India (AJI) trilateral is not itself new. The three countries had their first trilateral dialogue in June 2015. The meeting saw the participation of then Indian Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar, Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Akitaka Saiki and Peter Varghese, the secretary of Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Predictably, a dominant theme in the discussions was maritime security and freedom of navigation, which continues to be the case five years later. In fact, the three nations’ shared concerns on the maritime front have only increased due to China’s recent assertive behavior in the region. While the Indo-Pacific region has an alphabet soup of minilaterals and formal arrangements, the AJI trilateral appears to be one of the strongest, despite some challenges. A recent report on the trilateral by the Perth USAsia Centre highlights the potentials of the trilateral, as well as some of the challenges that still persist. Nevertheless, the decision to form a trilateral supply chain initiative is an indicator of the actionable agenda that could be pursued by the AJI in the coming years.

China’s behavior has provided the glue that binds the trilateral together. For all the rhetoric about its peaceful rise, China’s behavior since the beginning of 2020 has antagonized many. China’s actions have forced the AJI trilateral to acknowledge the danger of economic over-dependence on China. As such, supply chain diversification and resilience has become an important issue for all three countries. Commenting on the initiative, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has stated the need to reshape global supply chains “based on trust and stability.”

Reducing dependence on China is not going to be easy for India in the short term. At the same time, difficulties with China have reached a point where opinion is shifting in New Delhi. Indian elite opinionmakers have made it amply clear that India will need to bite the bullet, even if it means going through some hard times. India is still not considering complete economic decoupling, of course, but a significant reduction in terms of its reliance on China. Because India exports mostly primary commodities, China can easily replace India, but it is going to be difficult for India to overcome its dependence on China  This is not a challenge unique to India, but it forces India and other countries to consider together what steps to take to diversify their economies away from a heavy reliance on China.

India would also like to take advantage of the general interest that many countries have in moving their manufacturing out of China, but this is easier said than done. For instance, even though many industries leaving China may want to come to India – and though India may be even keener to attract them – India still faces many challenges, including problems of land acquisition, outdated labor laws, an uncertain tax regime and growing domestic conflicts, to name just a few. In contrast, Vietnam is emerging as a major destination for businesses leaving China.  

Discussing these measures together with like-minded partners may help in setting up alternatives to these nations’ economic dependence on China  Each country in the AJI trilateral recognizes that alone, they are no match for China’s economic power. Alone, each is much more vulnerable because of their dependence. But together, they might be able to find some solutions. Whether this will work is yet to be seen, but a beginning is being made.

Another area that is high on the agenda for the AJI is maritime security and ensuring freedom of the seas in the Indo-Pacific. This is not all about navies and formal security collaboration, but will also involve the important notion of “norm entrepreneurship,” as identified in the Perth USAsia Report. The trilateral will thus try to promote respect for international law, and a free, open, rules-based and inclusive Indo-Pacific. The hope is that eventually the three nations can think in terms of doing joint military exercises or even coordinated patrols in the Indo-Pacific. India has resisted such steps for a long time, but China’s aggressive actions on the borders and elsewhere are likely to make New Delhi more amenable to considering bolder steps.

Rise of the Minilaterals: Examining the India-France-Australia Trilateral - The Diplomat, 17 September 2020

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I look at the rise of the minilaterals, wherein I examine the India-France-Australia Trilateral. The India-France-Australia trilateral is only the latest of the many minilaterals that are taking shape in the Indo-Pacific region.

Last week, India, France, and Australia held their first trilateral meeting. The senior officials’ meeting, held in a virtual setting, was co-chaired by Vardhan Shringla, India’s foreign secretary; François Delattre, secretary-general of the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs; and Frances Adamson, secretary of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT).

For the full post, click here.

The Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), in a statement, said that the trilateral meeting was an effort at strengthening cooperation among the three countries in the Indo-Pacific region. The statement also noted that the three countries plan to meet on an annual basis. Tweeting about the meeting, the MEA said, “We agreed to build convergences in our approach to the Indo-Pacific region and to explore ways to strengthen trilateral cooperation, particularly in the maritime domain.”

An Australian readout of the meeting was similar to the Indian statement, while the French readout was more explicit in emphasizing the importance of international law, peace, and security in the Indo-Pacific. The French statement said that the meeting “helped underscore the goal of guaranteeing peace, security and adherence to international law in the Indo-Pacific by drawing on the excellence of bilateral relations between France, India and Australia.” The French ambassador in India also tweeted, saying that “Together we will uphold our values and interests!”

While none of the readouts mention China per se, China is clearly the key reason for the emergence of this and a number of other minilaterals in the region. The India-France-Australia trilateral is only the latest of the many minilaterals that are taking shape in the Indo-Pacific region. India, which traditionally did not join these exclusive small groups, has shown greater interest and capacity in the last few years. There is also an India-Australia-Indonesia trilateral that is taking shape. In fact, Indian media reports note that India, Australia, and Indonesia are getting ready for two virtual meetings in the coming weeks between the foreign and defense ministries of the three countries in order to enhance broader regional strategic cooperation as well as maritime security in the Indo-Pacific region.

There is also the India-Japan-Australia trilateral, another significant group, which had its first meeting in 2015. There is already an India-U.S.-Japan trilateral. Since 2015, Japan has also participated with India and the United States in India’s Malabar series of naval exercises as a permanent partner.

Indeed, even the idea of the India-France-Australia trilateral is not new. The need for such initiatives has been discussed in track 2 and track 1.5 formats and experts and officials have long made the case for elevating these conversations to an official level. In 2018, Carnegie India, the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, and the National Security College of the Australian National University came together to explore the potential areas of cooperation as well as the extent of possibilities under such a framework. In an op-ed in May 2018, C. Raja Mohan, Rory Medcalf, and Bruno Tertrais (representing the three think tanks that had organized one such track 1.5 forum) detailed the “striking convergence of security interests, defense capabilities and maritime geography” that bring Delhi, Canberra, and Paris together. They argued that the three “respect a rules-based order informed by the sovereign equality of nations and the need to guard against coercion and interference, whether from states or from terrorism.” Thereafter, French President Emmanuel Macron during his visit to Australia spoke of “the Paris-Delhi-Canberra axis” that should be strengthened as “an established regional structure, reflecting an Indo-Pacific ‘geo-strategic reality in the making.’”

At the inaugural India-France-Australia trilateral, the three officials took stock of the prevailing and future economic and strategic challenges and possible ways of cooperation in addressing the challenges of COVID-19 and beyond. Maritime security and securing the marine global commons were particularly identified as important issues for trilateral and broader regional cooperation through regional institutions such as ASEAN, the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), and the Indian Ocean Commission. That India has concluded logistics agreements with both France and Australia brings their cooperation around maritime security issues a bit closer to reality.

According to the MEA, the three leaders also focused on trends, challenges, and priorities in regional and global multilateral institutions and discussed ways to review, strengthen, and reform multilateralism. This assumes particular importance in the context of the functioning of institutions such as the World Health Organization (WHO) especially in the initial weeks of the COVID-19 pandemic The fact that the WHO was influenced heavily by a single power, China, which some argue has resulted in the current global health crisis, will remain a constant reminder of the trends and challenges in multilateralism and multilateral institutions.

The India-France-Australia trilateral meeting was also a result of the deepening bilateral relations among the three countries across multiple sectors, and aimed at “synergizing their respective strengths to ensure a peaceful, secure, prosperous and rules-based Indo-Pacific Region.” In fact, this was part of a set of recommendations made by the Australian Senate Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Committee to “explore the India France Australia trilateral dialogue to enhance strategic cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.” Related issues such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, maritime domain awareness, the blue economy, and marine biodiversity were also discussed at the meeting. Given the increasing Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean and the South Pacific, one area that could gain greater attention from the three countries is maritime surveillance to monitor the Chinese naval activities in these waters. The three could work out some burden sharing in this regard to step up vigilance on these waters.

Commenting on the rationale for the India-France-Australia trilateral, Abhijnan Rej, The Diplomat’s security and defense editor, wrote that against the backdrop of “recent American unpredictability” U.S. allies in the region are looking to create “a more networked architecture involving a range of often-overlapping minilateral arrangements and consultative mechanisms.” Given this strategic rationale, the India-France-Australia trilateral is a natural fit for all three because of their stake in ensuring a free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific order. France, via its overseas territories, has 8,000 defense personnel, 1.5 million French citizens, and 93 percent of its maritime economic exclusive zone in the Indo-Pacific, making it a legitimate stakeholder, with huge stakes in the Indo-Pacific region.

The other important rationale for many of these trilaterals has to do with capacity issues. The Indo-Pacific region has several capable navies and yet their ability to match up to China on their own is questionable. The individual capacities of these countries have remained inadequate to protect their vital security interests, and therefore there is a stronger case to be made for these kinds of minilaterals.

Given these factors, this trilateral is likely here to stay. While the U.S. will remain an important source of support for these minilateral conversations in the Indo-Pacific, the fact that New Delhi, Paris, and Canberra can also discuss various strategic issues without Washington present in the room may also be appealing to these countries from time to time.

How China Strengthens the Quad - The Diplomat, 4 September 2020

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I wrote on the future of the Quad, looking at the challenges to the group because of Abe's sudden resigning and a possible political change in the US following the November elections. Despite some minor headwinds, I argue that Chinese belligerence further strengthens the motivation for Australia, India, Japan, and the United States to keep the Quad together.

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or the Quad has regained strength in the face of an aggressive China. The foreign ministers of the four countries – Australia, India, Japan, and the United States – are scheduled to meet in Delhi for a face-to-face meeting in late September. That New Delhi is playing host to the Quad ministerial meeting amid the COVOD-19 pandemic is particularly noteworthy. The countries are reacting to increased bullying by China. The grouping has gained greater traction since early 2020 because of Beijing’s role in the COVID-19 pandemic and the manner in which it has attempted to hijack multilateral institutions, such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). The four countries are also concerned about global supply chain problems, recognizing the vulnerability of their dependence on China. The upcoming in-person foreign ministers meeting appears, at the least, aimed at sending a strong message to China about the resoluteness of the Quad.

For the full essay, click here.

That said, the Quad does face some minor headwinds, which are likely to be easily overcome, due to political changes in both Japan and the United States.

Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s sudden resignation was a blow to the Quad because Abe was one of the major proponents of this minilateral initiative, even if his departure does not shift Japan’s policy. Under Abe’s leadership, Japan had become a driving force for the Quad. His strategic vision and determined leadership in the face of China’s belligerent behavior will be missed by Japan’s Quad partners. Although Abe was not successful in changing Japan’s pacifist constitution, he has been instrumental in bringing important changes to Tokyo’s approach to regional and global security.

For New Delhi, Abe was a reliable pillar of support. Takenori Horimoto says that the big push for Japan to build closer relations with India happened in 2004-05 because of anti-Japan protests taking place in China, leading Tokyo to reduce the risks to its investments by moving to other countries. Thus, although India-Japan ties had been gaining momentum even before Abe came into office, the Abe-Modi dynamic helped a great deal. It led to strengthened military and security ties, including military exercises across all the branches of the military, and a civil nuclear agreement. With Abe leaving office, it remains to be seen how bilateral India-Japan relations as well as Japan’s broader strategic engagement in the Indo-Pacific will play out with a new leader in office.

Second, the coming presidential elections in the United States in November also raises some concerns about a possible change in leadership. While Joe Biden and the Democrats are not against the Quad or the free and open Indo-Pacific strategy, a change in the political powers that be could introduce short-term policy turbulence. It will take a few months for a new administration to settle into office before addressing some of the political and strategic issues in the Indo-Pacific region. That said, China’s aggressive behavior will invariably draw any administration’s attention. A Biden administration may differ from the Trump administration more in terms of style and rhetoric than actual policy when it comes to China. Indeed, the two parties are competing over who is harsher on China.

Set against these small challenges is China’s behavior, which serves to promote the Quad. India and Australia, the other two Quad parties, have recently faces even greater aggression from Beijing.

Since early May, China has crossed into Indian territory and engaged in violent clashes, including the one at Galwan in June that resulting in the deaths of 20 Indians and an unknown number of Chinese troops. Since then, there have been several military and diplomatic discussions between India and China, but with no progress. Over the past few days, there has been further activity, with India reportedly occupying areas south of the south bank of Pangong Tso (Lake); the military talks that followed, as usual, have been inconclusive. China claimed that India violated the consensus and crossed the Line of Actual Control (LAC). In India, both the foreign ministry and army put out statements blaming China. The expectation appears to be that the border confrontation will escalate further. India, for good measure, has also banned another 118 Chinese apps.

Similarly, Australia has been under strident Chinese attack almost from the beginning of 2020. China has been using coercive trade practices to target Australia for asking for an independent investigation into the origin of the novel coronavirus. In the latest move, China targeted Australian barley in response to Prime Minister Scott Morrison’s announcement of a new Australian legislation that would “tear up” the Belt and Road Initiative agreements with the state of Victoria that run into billions of dollars. A few days earlier, China targeted Australian beef exports. Prior to this, it was the Australian wine that was banned by China. But Jeffrey Wilson of the Perth USAsia Centre says it is not that the Chinese government cares about wine, beef, or barley, but “the real game is to create societal splits that pressure the Government to change foreign policy toward China.”

China’s crude attempts to put pressure on other countries have met with increasingly stiff resistance, of which the Quad is a clear manifestation. In India, there have even been suggestions for the Quad to assume a military role. Thus, whatever minor headwinds the Quad faces are likely to be easily overcome by the rapidly changing attitudes in the region because of China’s unrelenting pressure on others.

India-Japan Defense Ties to Get a Boost With Modi-Abe Virtual Summit - The Diplomat, 20 August 2020

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I looked at the upcoming virtual summit meeting between India and Japan. I argue that despite some disappointments on both sides, the India-Japan relationship looks set to further deepen in the face of an aggressive China.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Japanese counterpart Shinzo Abe will meet for a virtual summit in September. This will be Modi’s second virtual summit this year, after one with the Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison in June. According to Indian media reports, citing India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), the two sides are expected to sign an important military logistics agreement, the Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA). While this remains an important milestone moment for New Delhi and Tokyo, it also remains key for both countries to take stock of what has been accomplished so far.

For the full essay, click here.



India and Japan missed their planned 2019 summit because of protests against the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) in Guwahati, in the northeastern Indian state of Assam, where the meeting was supposed to be held. Although the Modi government was reportedly keen to shift the meeting venue to Delhi, the Japanese side insisted that the focus of the 2019 summit was on Japanese investment in India’s Northeast infrastructure development and therefore, as a Japanese diplomat said, “The venue is the message.” Since then, India and Japan have been trying to reschedule the summit, but the COVID-19 pandemic further delayed their plans.

The current summit meeting comes against the backdrop of Chinese aggression against both countries, along the Sino-Indian border and the East China Sea. The Abe government is reportedly also keen to explore the possibility of shifting some Japanese manufacturing to India as part of its efforts to shift such operations out of China. This is part of a concerted effort of several countries to shift their manufacturing out of China in order to reduce their dependency on Beijing. The two leaders are also reportedly working to strengthen the Quad agenda in this regard.

The ACSA should also boost the geographical reach and influence of both countries’ militaries. India has so far signed such logistics agreement with the United States, South Korea, and Australia. Such logistics agreements are meant to simplify the processes involved in using each other’s facilities. It took India more than a decade to sign the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) with the U.S. on account of several misperceptions, but since its signing in 2016 it has become easier for India to negotiate such deals with other countries. Probably to maintain some semblance of balance, India is negotiating a similar agreement with Russia. The Russian agreement is named differently, the Agreement on Reciprocal Logistics Support (ARLS).

The India-Japan ACSA got a big push during the last summit in Japan in October 2018. India’s MEA in a statement at the time said, “The two leaders welcomed the joint exercise between each of the three services and the commencement of negotiations on the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA), which will enhance the strategic depth of bilateral security and defense cooperation.” The inaugural 2+2 dialogue, the India-Japan Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting, also noted “the significant progress” made in the negotiations of ACSA and their desire “for early conclusion of the negotiations” which would “further contribute to enhancing defense cooperation between the two sides.”

The India-Japan ACSA would provide the two militaries with access to each other’s military facilities for repair and replenishment of provisions as well as overall improve the scope and sophistication of military-to-military cooperation. In fact, the India-Japan ACSA is reported to be broader in scope, encompassing overall defense cooperation between the two countries, with logistics as one important leg in the expanding defense partnership. Japan could get access to India’s key naval bases, including in the Andaman and Nicobar islands, close to the Malacca Straits, a key international sea lane. The agreement will also enhance India’s own operational reach, most specifically for the Indian Navy. India could gain access to Japanese bases such as in Djibouti. Some of the agenda items for broader India-Japan defense cooperation could include stepping up defense trade and technology cooperation under existing mechanisms, such as the Joint Working Group on Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation (JWG-DETC). There is already cooperative research work being done on areas such as unmanned ground vehicle (UGV)/robotics under this framework, but it could be expanded to an entire range of existing and emerging technologies.

It is also possible that Japan would like to see more discussion on the Japanese-built US-2 amphibious aircraft, which India has been soft-pedaling for a while now. Capacity-building for better maritime security and maritime domain awareness (MDA) are also high on the agenda for India and Japan. Establishment of the Information Fusion Center – Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) by India in December 2018 has been deemed an important step in this regard and Japan will have a liaison officer at the IFC-IOR. Other Indo-Pacific powers such as Australia, France, and the United States will also have their officers at this center.

While ACSA and the defense agenda are forward-looking in furthering cooperation between India and Japan, there are also some difficulties in the relationship. Japan seems to have been considerably disappointed with the Indian decision to walk out of the regional trading agreement, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). The fact that Abe was not even informed before New Delhi made the announcement appears to have been a jolt to the Abe administration. Japan was counting on India to be a powerful player within the RCEP to push back on China’s aggressive economic agenda. Tokyo is also possibly disappointed about the lack of enthusiasm in New Delhi about pursuing the defense trade agenda, with the US-2 being a case in point. On the other hand, although India was keen on considering the Soryu-class submarine, Japan has been somewhat cautious, and indeed has not bid for India’s submarine contract.

Nevertheless, Japan has remained a steadfast partner to India. For instance, after the Galwan Valley clash in mid-June, the Japanese ambassador to India strongly supported India, tweeting that “Japan opposes any unilateral attempts to change the status quo.” This suggests that the pressure from China will continue to strengthen India-Japan ties, despite some disappointments on both sides.

Towards A Quad-Plus Arrangement? - Perth USAsia Centre, 21 April 2020

As I mentioned in previous blog, along with my regular work at the Observer Research Foundation as a Distinguished Fellow and head of the Nuclear and Space Policy Initiative, I am also a Non-Resident Indo-Pacific Fellow at the Perth USAsia Centre for a period of 9 months starting in April. As part of this, I will be doing a series of papers, video blogs and webinars. The first of my papers is this: Towards a Quad-Plus Arrangement? which came out in the third week of April (I have been late in updating my blog).

It is probably too early to sense the shape of the post-COVID world. But there are some early hints of how international partnerships might be shaped by the crisis. Recently, senior officials of the four “Quad” countries (Australia, India, Japan and the
United States) teleconferenced about how to respond to the pandemic.

Quad meetings are no longer unusual. But this one was special because it included three additional Indo-Pacific powers:NewZealand, South Korea and Vietnam. The call, reportedly initiated by the US Deputy Secretary of State Steve Beigun, was intended to exchange notes on how these powers were tackling the COVID-19 pandemic.

But it also raises a broader question: Is this is a sign of possible expansion of the Quad mechanism, and how might such an expansion be feasible?

For the full essay, click here.



I concluded the essay with the following thoughts. Efforts to coordinate responses to COVID-19 by the Quad-Plus countries may be a means to expand the original formulation at a pace that would be comfortable to potential new members and without eliciting a Chinese rebuke. It would be hypocritical for China to oppose countries collaborating on COVID-19 when it has itself made precisely such calls. But such cooperation
also sets the stage for further Quad dialogue on other problems these countries face, potentially including security problems.

Indeed, a Quad-Plus expansion makes sense for a number of reasons. One is the common security concern these countries share regarding China’s behaviours. Each have faced Chinese pressure plays in recent years, and harbor concerns regarding China’s military and political expansion into areas they consider their ‘neighbourhood’. Additionally, none are in a position to effectively challenge China on a bilateral basis,
making minilateral cooperation with likeminded partners a better approach.

Together, these factors provide a pragmatic path to greater security cooperation via a Quad-Plus arrangement in future years. Expanding the Quad is not going to be easy, and will bring with it challenges of divergent concerns and burdensharing problems. But there is clearly an impetus for Quad expansion that will begin to find expression in coming months.

Professional update: Non-Resident Indo-Pacific Fellow at the Perth USAsia Centre - April-December 2020

On the professional front, there is an update I would like to share - I am a Non-Resident Indo-Pacific Fellow with the Perth USAsia Centre from April to December this year. As part of this, I will be contributing essays on the Indo-Pacific developments, doing webinars and blogs including video ones. It is an exciting time to be doing work on the Indo-Pacific. As they say, there is never a dull moment in the Indo-Pacific. Here, you will find all the five Indo-Pacific Fellows at the Centre - one each from Australia, India, Indonesia, Japan and Vietnam.

As part of this Fellowship, I published my first Analysis Brief, examining the possibilities of a Quad-Plus arrangement. You can click here for the publication. I also did a public event with the Perth USAsia Centre on the Quad-Plus arrangement. Here is the video link for the discussions.

Amid COVID–19, India’s Modi and Australia’s Morrison Plan Virtual Prime Ministerial Summit - The Diplomat, 07 May 2020

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I wrote about Prime Minister Modi's upcoming virtual summit with Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison. The Indian and Australian leaders are expected to “meet” virtually soon. There’s no shortage of important topics to cover, especially related to China.

In a first, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is planning to host a virtual bilateral “summit” meeting with Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison. While the date for the meeting has not been announced, an Indian news report said that it will be soon. The Australian prime minister was initially scheduled to travel to India in January, but that had to be postponed due to the bushfires in Australia. The two leaders had been looking toward scheduling an in-person meeting in May, but that does not appear feasible under the current circumstances as much of the region is reeling under the stress of containing the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, there is excitement on both sides about the prospects of their meeting and New Delhi and Canberra are likely to conclude the much-awaited Mutual Logistics Sharing Pact (as well as other agreements covering science and technology and public administration).

While recent Indo-Pacific developments, including China’s muscle flexing in the South China Sea, may likely be on the agenda, it will be interesting to see how India positions itself on such issues.

For the full essay, click here.



Australia is going through one of the worst phases in its contemporary relations with China. In an opinion piece in The Conversation, Tony Walker from La Trobe University wrote that Australia-China relations are “fractured,” calling it “the worst moment in Sino-Australian relations since Gough Whitlam normalised ties on his election in December 1972.” Australia’s call for an independent investigation into the origins of the pandemic has not been well-received by China, to put it mildly. China, in response, unleashed its “wolf warrior” diplomats to lambast the Australian political leadership by threatening economic penalties. In a direct threat, China’s ambassador to Australia, Cheng Jingye, warned that Canberra asking for an independent probe “could spark a Chinese consumer boycott of students and tourists visiting Australia, as well as sales of popular agricultural exports like beef and wine.”

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang also commented:

at such a critical juncture [pandemic], it is highly irresponsible to resort to politically motivated suspicion and accusation. We advise the Australian side to put aside ideological bias and political games, focus on the welfare of the Australian people and global public health security, follow the international community’s collective will for cooperation, and contribute to the global cooperation in fighting the virus, instead of doing things to the contrary.

But Australia is not the only target of China’s economic coercion and trade threats, which have angered many countries. In fact, the Morrison government has found significant support for its call for an independent inquiry into the pandemic’s origins.

On the South China Sea as well, tension has been picking up and Australia is involved. The Chinese Haiyang Dizhi 8 survey ship was operating in the Malaysian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), around 325 kms away from the Malaysian coast starting around April 20. Following this, in a show of support, Australian ships joined three U.S. warships operating close to where the Chinese vessel was suspected to be undertaking oil exploration operations. The Australian Department of Defense in a statement said, “During the passage exercises, the ships honed interoperability between Australian and U.S. navies, including replenishment-at-sea, aviation operations, maritime manoeuvres and communications drills.”

China’s survey ships were operating close to where Malaysia’s Petronas state oil company was already engaged in exploratory drilling. Harassment by China is not new. Even the recent events are a culmination of developments that have been going on since December, according to Asia Maritime Transparency International. Even amid the current stand-off, China claimed that Haiyang Dizhi 8 was only conducting its normal activities. Meanwhile, Malaysian Foreign Minister Hishammuddin Hussein has come out with grim warnings that while “international law guarantees the freedom of navigation, the presence of warships and vessels in the South China Sea has the potential to increase tensions that in turn may result in miscalculations which may affect peace, security and stability in the region.”

India has not responded to either China’s trespassing into the Malaysian EEZ or the Chinese sinking of a Vietnamese fishing vessel last month. Both incidents have increased concerns about China’s behavior in the region.

The Modi-Morrison meeting agenda is not clear but the Indian government will likely be under some pressure to address at least some of these difficult issues. India will be expected to take a stand especially as it moves to take over as the Chairman of the WHO Executive Board. Australia will seek greater support from India to push for a clearer understanding of the role of the WHO in the early stages of the pandemic. India should take this opportunity to build a larger coalition of like-minded states such as the Quad-Plus grouping including New Zealand, South Korea and Vietnam to develop a coordinated actionable agenda to bring about better reforms and accountability within the WHO. More importantly, at a bilateral level, the Morrison government will expect a strong show of support for Australia in the face of China’s bullying behavior.

The Modi-Morrison summit could also possibly cover the recent developments in the South China Sea. China’s continuing harassment of small and big neighbors alike, including Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia is reaching a peak and could call for concerted action among the key southeast Asian players. As a key Indo-Pacific and Quad player, India could be expected to take a clear stand and gradually ready itself to play a more active operational role. The U.S.-Australian joint patrols were impressive and important for the southeast Asian countries which were at the receiving end of China’s harassment. As the Quad enhances its role, India may be asked to take part in activities like joint and coordinated patrols with others such as Australia.