It Is Time for Space Governance Talks - The Diplomat, 21 May 2020

In my column for The Diplomat last week, I looked at the urgent need for space governance talks. I argue that the window of opportunity for such talks is shrinking, and delay could see space emerge as an active domain for conflict.

Recent developments in outer space activities point to the urgent need to get global space governance talks back on track. Japan’s launch of a new defense space unit within the Air Self-Defense Force, Russia’s ASAT test last month, and the announcement by France of its new defense space strategy are indicators of rapidly change space security dynamics. The absence of successful multilateral discussions could accentuate security concerns and force states to rely on deterrence in space as a state policy, with negative consequences for all. While this is yet to happen, there are signs of states beginning to act as if they are not left with any choice but to develop deterrence strategies for space. It is also to be noted that the window of opportunity for states to engage in talks is already quite small and any delay holds out the possibility that outer space could emerge as an active domain for conflict.

For the full essay, click here.



This week, Japan launched a new defense space unit, the Space Operations Squadron, to track space debris and suspicious satellites in an effort to prevent satellite collisions. The squadron will be part of the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF), and will be based in the ASDF’s Fuchu base in Tokyo. It is initially planned to be a small unit with 20 personnel, to be gradually increased to around 100. Despite the small size, experts suggest that the establishment of the new unit is a recognition of Japan’s greater reliance on space As noted in the December 2018 National Defense Program Guidelines, the newly-formed division is meant “To ensure superiority in use of space at all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies.” But given the contested and competitive nature of space including deployment and use of counter-space capabilities, the guidelines also seek to “to strengthen capabilities including mission assurance capability and capability to disrupt opponent’s command, control, communications and information.” Reports suggest that the new unit will also be engaged in Japan’s satellite-based navigation and communication for the troops in the field. Japanese Defense Minister Taro Kono said that the new squadron will collaborate with the United States, especially the U.S. Space Command that was set up last year. On the domestic front, the squadron will cooperate with the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) with the goal of establishing a space monitoring system by 2023. Japan plans to launch its own space surveillance satellite by 2026. Meanwhile, in August 2019, Japan announced plans to develop a satellite interceptor by the mid-2020s in order to have the option to counter attack satellites if Japanese assets in space are targeted. There will be a formal decision on it by the end of March 2021. This development rises again from Japan’s concerns about how certain countries could use counter-space capabilities to disrupt, disable or destroy satellite networks.

Japan’s move comes against the backdrop of increasing space security competition among the major space powers. There are also growing concerns in Japan about security threats from China and Russia, which have been developing counter-space capabilities to interfere, deny, disable or even destroy satellites. China’s development of a robotic arm and ASAT missile capabilities has been referred to in this context in Japanese writings. Similarly, Russia’s multiple anti-satellite tests remain a concern. Even though Japan has maintained a peaceful space program, there are compelling security factors that are beginning to impact Tokyo’s future space orientation. This is also in line with the National Defense Program Guidelines of December 2018, which seek to augment Japan’s military capabilities as far as outer space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum are concerned. The guidelines for FY19 and beyond noted that “rapid expansion in the use of new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum is poised to fundamentally change the existing paradigm of national security.”

Similarly, France undertook some significant changes to its space policy, driven by what it sees as developments “threatening our freedom of access and action in space.” Accordingly, France in July 2019 introduced certain institutional changes, with national space governance being reviewed and placed within a Space Command, which remains under the Air Force. India, too, has been making gradual changes to its approach toward space. Even as it continues reiterating that it is for peaceful use of space, there are significant changes on the ground including its anti-satellite (ASAT) test in March 2019. India’s main concern in the space domain, as in many other areas, comes from China. China’s ASAT test in January 2007 led to new domestic debates on how India must protect its own assets. The debate included whether India should have a demonstrated capability or not. Certainly, India wanted to avoid what happened in the nuclear domain, where non-testing left it outside the emerging nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Meanwhile, Russia conducted an ASAT test just last month, which received prompt attention from the strategic and national security communities in major capitals. While the test of the Russian Nudol interceptor did not create any cloud of orbital debris, it did raise concerns since it can destroy satellites in low earth orbit. Gen. John W. “Jay” Raymond, USSPACECOM commander and U.S. Space Force Chief of Space Operations said on Twitter: “Russia’s DA-ASAT test, capable of destroying #sats in Low Earth Orbit, is an example of growing threats to U.S. & Allied #Space systems. U.S. is ready, committed to #deter aggression & #defend the Nation & our Allies from hostile acts in space.”

The renewed Russian interest in developing and testing ASAT and co-orbital ASATs will continue to create more tensions and frictions among the major space players. The range of Russia’s counter-space capabilities is impressive and alarming. As far as its low Earth orbit (LEO) direct ascent capabilities are concerned, they have already crossed the R&D phase and moved to the testing phase whereas direct ascent in MEO/GEO (medium Earth orbit/geostationary Earth orbit) are believed to be in the R&D stage. Similarly, LEO co-orbital capabilities have crossed R&D and is in the testing stages. They have some significant capability on the electronic warfare means and space situational awareness.

There is clearly a spurt in activities as far as space and national security dynamics are concerned. The return to ASAT testing to the establishment of specialized military space units such as China’s PLA Strategic Support Force and the U.S. Space Force are a demonstration of the deteriorating space security environment. Development of counter-space capabilities is not new but states are showing greater willingness to develop and test such capabilities. In the absence of effective multilateral discussions, it is difficult to halt these disruptive and destabilizing trends. All of this indicates that there is a new normal emerging with regard to outer space activities. Prof. Chris Newman of Northumbria University in a presentation recently argued that a “normative behaviour is emerging and ASAT tests are a part of that normative framework.”

Unfortunately, a new treaty-like mechanism is hard to come by for a number of different reasons. The most significant challenge is the lack of political will and the inability to develop consensus among major space powers. Equally challenging are definitional issues and the dual-use nature of outer space which makes it difficult to frame appropriate rules. Finding a middle ground between legally-binding and voluntary measures is the only possible pathway in the immediate future.

India's strategy in space is changing. Here's why - The World Economic Forum, 14 August 2019

After a gap of more than a year, I wrote a short essay for The World Economic Forum. In this essay, I focused on India's geopolitical strategy in space.

Half a century after humans first walked on the Moon, space is still as much about scientific discovery as it is about strategic competition.

As was the case during the Cold War, outer space is an arena of terrestrial geopolitics. We can see this in the increased impetus for competition in various achievements in outer space, such as Moon landings, Mars exploration and, more directly, in the creation of space forces in various countries – France being the latest to announce it intends to establish a space command to improve defence capabilities.

For the full essay, click here.



Yet, despite outer space being once again a field of power competition, there are also some differences from the Cold War years. First, and most significantly, there are many more countries and actors involved: in Asia itself, China, Japan and India are major spacefaring nations, and smaller players such as South Korea, Australia and Singapore are developing their own space programmes.

Added to the increase in countries is the entry of the private sector into space. A key difference in the new geopolitics of space is that both terrestrial competition – and its reflection in outer space – is now along multiple axes, rather than just the single U.S.-Soviet one.

Today, there is increasing power competition in Asia, particularly between China and its neighbours - India, Japan and Australia. Some of this is also reflected in outer space. As a corollary, we are also beginning to see greater cooperation between some countries in outer space, including India and Japan, both of which are concerned about the rise of China.

India also cooperates in space with the US, Russia and France. Much of the competition India has on land, on the other hand, is with China. Therefore, India has negligible cooperation with China in space, and equally, little competition with the other space actors.

A competitive chain reaction that (sometimes) reaches space

What occurs in space can be the result of a geopolitical chain reaction. For instance, consider the US-China-India relationship: China often takes action because of its strategic competition with the United States.

This has an impact on India, forcing India to respond. But India’s response to China has an effect on Pakistan, which then responds to India. This cascade can be seen on land, and at times, in space. For example, China’s first successful anti-satellite (ASAT) test in January 2007 was to demonstrate a catch-up effort with the United States. But once China tested its ASAT in 2007, India had little choice but to develop its own ASAT because of the need of deterrence.

But in the space arena, the competitive cascade does not travel all the way to Pakistan because Pakistan’s space programme is underdeveloped. While Pakistan has expended considerable national wealth in keeping pace with India in its nuclear and missile capabilities, it has not done so with regard to outer space.

On the other hand, there might be a security incentive for Pakistan to demonstrate that it also has an ASAT capability.

Pakistan could also develop other counterspace capabilities, including cyber and electronic means to target India’s space assets. While this remains speculative so far, the history of India-Pakistan competition suggests that this remains a possibility.

Evolution of strategy

India had long maintained a rather doctrinaire approach toward space security, emphasising the peaceful uses of outer space and opposing the weaponization and militarization of space. Thus, India had opposed the US Strategic Defense Initiative programme and other efforts to build ballistic missile defences, let alone deploying ASAT systems. The reasons for such an approach was fairly clear: India did not house these capabilities.

But by the early 2000s, India’s position had begun to change as Pakistan began acquiring long-range missiles. India felt the need to build ballistic missile defences, leading New Delhi to take a sympathetic view of the George W. Bush administration’s decision to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty in late 2001. By the end of the decade, as India’s own capabilities increased, it was clear that India was becoming more discriminating in its attitude towards space security.

China’s ASAT test in 2007 helped advance India’s process of revaluating its space strategy. India realised that its growing investments in outer space - until then largely civilian in nature - were now under threat from China’s new security capabilities. India also started thinking more about how to manage outer space for security purposes. As a result, India established a space cell under its Integrated Defence Headquarters shortly after China’s ASAT test.

In April 2019, India established the Defence Space Agency (DSA) as an interim measure to command the military’s space capabilities. All of this meant that India had to have a much more nuanced position than a blanket approach that opposed any militarization or weaponization of outer space.

However, the consequences of unbridled militarization and the weaponization of outer space has negative implications for India. Therefore, while India is pursuing a strategy that satisfies its own security interests, it still wants some international control on the militarization and weaponization of outer space.

Managing New Actors in the Space Domain - The Diplomat, June 29, 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I looked at the new actors in outer space and what it means for the global governance and space sustainability issues. I argue new entrants in the Indo-Pacific offer both opportunities and challenges for the outer space realm.

New actors in space is a tricky idea to define. Is it determined by the number of years a player has been in the space business, or something more nuanced? If one is talking about industry and the commercial sector, it is relatively easy to categorize and identify who is a new actor in space. But when it comes to states, what determines who is a new space actor is slightly more problematic.

Surely, those emerging states that are pursuing space programs can be called new actors in space. Nevertheless, one must push the envelope further to look at who the traditional players are, and these are the United States, Russia, and Europe. Therefore, even countries like India and China and others who have pursued space programs for a few decades now can be called new actors in space. This is the case because one is beginning to see new facets of their space programs which are affecting space security and sustainability dynamics.

For the full post, click here.



But the space domain is changing. It is not just the presence of new start-up companies that are altering the space landscape, but there are any number of new state actors that are pursuing space programs for a number of different functions and utilities. This has been possible because there has been certain amount of democratization of space with access to space becoming a lot more affordable. Costs are coming down, technological hurdles are lower, and new space collaboration and partnerships driven by geopolitical goals are introducing new players in space. These make it possible for a growing number of actors to pursue space programs. Many states in Africa, Latin America, and particularly Asia are pursuing space programs for a variety of different utilities including for national security applications.

Entry of new actors in space bring both opportunities and challenges. On the opportunity side, space has become more accessible to a large number of states due to innovation in technology and dilution of certain global export control regulations. The development benefits alone of this are huge. There is a great opportunity here, for both private sector and for others, to collaborate with these new actors because they are looking for efficient, cheap, flexible solutions (such as in communications, or in weather forecasting or in remote-sensing applications for land use etc) rather than simply prestige projects.

New private actors bring new energy, new ideas, possibly a more efficient way of doing things. Of course, when private corporations get involved, some part of the social needs that governments focus on can be lost, obviously, since private actors are less likely to focus on development issues or on non-profit ventures. Even here, though, we need to acknowledge the general contribution made by these new entities in terms of the technologies they develop, which will have a broader impact, and make space more accessible.

Also, it is important to see what kind of partnerships can be fostered to make space accessible to all. Partnerships between private sector and national programs will be a good burden-sharing arrangement. This kind of public-private sector partnership has worked in the Western context with a lot more ease, but in the Asian context, it has not been easy. We see a bit of it, but established government space agencies tend to be suspicious of new private actors, such as in India. Another problem might be the kind of areas that private sector is involved, whether there are only areas servicing expensive, well-heeled customers (such as space tourism) or whether they are also looking at things that benefit smaller, poorer countries.

The entry of new actors in space has brought certain risks as well. One major risk is related to the impact on norms of behavior. With more actors in space, there has been a dilution of some of the existing norms and the new players appear to be less willing to play by rules developed by others. For instance, the norm of not testing anti-satellite (ASAT) missiles that prevailed for decades appear to be weakening. More importantly, the norm of not interfering in each other’s space assets appear to be getting diluted even further with the growth in cyber and electronic warfare in outer space.

The established players who have shaped these norms appear less likely to break those norms as compared to new players who are less bound by them. Newer players possibly assume that these norms are a way of restricting their growth and therefore they are less likely to play by them. Additionally, the spread of technology and geopolitical competition have aided this dilution of norms.

Therefore, as new players emerge in space, one of the critical areas to focus on is to strengthen the rules of the road, in a number of different ways. These could include establishing or reinforcing norms of responsible behavior, developing TCBMs and codes of conduct. These are the required first steps before establishing legal mechanisms because of the political difficulties that have come in the way of making new legal frameworks for outer space.

Rule-making was an easier exercise when there were fewer actors, obviously. Today, with close to 80 actors including non-state and new actors in space, finding an agreement and developing consensus has become a significant challenge. Finding an avenue to bring in the commercial voice is also important but traditional venues such as the Conference on Disarmament (CD), where space security and arms control issues are debated, are opposed to the introduction of commercial players as a stakeholder in their debates. This is not to suggest that commercial perspectives cannot be brought in through governments. But involving commercial players as independent actors in CD-like venues is not likely to happen in the near future.

Clearly, politics in outer space is getting complicated. It needs far more concerted attention than it has received. It may not be too late yet, but time is running out.

India’s Space Program: The Commercial Domain - The Diplomat, May 10, 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I write on the Indian space programme, focusing on the commercial aspects of it. The establishment of a new private institution has spotlighted New Delhi's ongoing efforts to build out the commercial aspect of its space programme.

In the beginning of March this year, the Indian Cabinet cleared the establishment of a private institution, the Newspace India Limited (NSIL), under the Department of Space. While the development may not have received as much international attention as some of the other space- and defense-focused developments in India, it bears careful watching as it is in line with New Delhi’s ongoing efforts to build out the commercial aspect of its space program.

India’s focus on the commercial aspect of its space program in general and moves such as the establishment of NSIL are not entirely new or surprising. This follows from the Narendra Modi government’s plan to make space a major industry focus under the government’s Vision 2030 announced in this year’s interim budget. The 10-point agenda in Vision 2030 included making India “the launchpad of the world and placing an Indian astronaut in space by 2022.”

For the full essay, click here.



With respect to NSIL itself, the new entity has been set up with a paid-up capital of around $1 million. NSIL will function under the directorship of Radhakrishnan Durairaj and Suma Devaki Ram, who have been Indian Space Research Association (ISRO) directors of launch services and operations respectively. They also serve on the management team of Antrix.

The new institution is the second commercial arm of the ISRO after the Antrix Corporation, which was set up in 1992 primarily to facilitate ISRO’s commercial launch of foreign satellites. The major goal for the NSIL will be to facilitate the transfer of ISRO technologies to private industries as well as aid in marketing space-based products and spin-off technologies.

Reports citing official documents suggest that in order to facilitate transfer of technology, NSIL will take license from ISRO before sub-licensing them to the commercial players. The technology transfer envisaged through the NSIL will include India’s small satellite program, the small satellite launch vehicle (SSLV) program and the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV). This would mean that services including launching of satellites can be undertaken by private entities once the license is procured by the NSIL.

Speaking to Times of India, Dr. Sivan, head of the ISRO, said that the NSIL will essentially become the connecting link for ISRO with commercial players to aid in technology transfer for a fee. As he put it: “We wanted a mechanism to transfer the technologies of our new projects like SSLV and even lithium-ion cells. With this company, ISRO will be able to smoothly transfer these technologies after charging fees. Once companies start mass production of small satellites and launchers, ISRO will be charging them for using its launch services.” In another interview, he had stated that he expected a demand for 2-3 SSLV rockets per month.

A January 2019 notice on the ISRO website had already shortlisted ten domestic industries for the technology transfer with regard to lithium-ion cell technology. The ISRO had already decided to transfer the PSLV rocket to the private sector more than a decade ago, though this has not yet been accomplished. The NSIL can possibly help do this quicker. On the regulatory aspects, the ISRO Chairman added that a separate “space law” is being readied, which will soon be with the Indian cabinet for its approval. It will manage all aspects of the regulation of space ventures and will “also have provisions related to the accountability of manufacturers for its space components.”

The ISRO has a proven track record in launching small satellites with the success of the PSLV. The development of the SSLV will give India a further boost in this segment. SSLV will offer an even more cost-effective option than the existing PSLV. The Chairman and Managing Director of Antrix, Rakesh Sasibhushan has said that with the SSLV, they expect to hit “a much lower cost than the PSLV” and that they were “also looking at a large increase in our revenues.” Besides the cost factor, the SSLV can also be assembled in 3-4 days as against the 40 days for a normal size rocket (Other reports suggest 15 days to assemble the SSLV).

The first test flight of SSLV is scheduled for July-August this year. ISRO has plans to launch two defense satellites of 120 kg each during the first test slight itself. The SSLVs will carry payloads between 300-500 kgs to Low Earth Orbit, thus eyeing a specific market that has not been tapped into much as yet.

ISRO’s approach to privatization and commercial engagements has come a long way, driven by the need to stay competitive at a time when there are fast emerging competitors including China and foreign commercial players who have been eyeing the global commercial space. The competition is likely to be stiff, especially in the small satellite segment given the global trend to break the big satellite constellation into smaller ones. Small satellites offer many advantages, the cost to manufacture and launch being a major consideration. ISRO’s opening to bring commercial entities into India’s space trajectory is likely to have several spin-off benefits, including for national security purposes.