Managing the AfPak Challenge in US-India Relations - The Diplomat, 9 August 2019

In my column for The Diplomat last week, I wrote on the AfPak challenge in US-India relations and both sides need to carefully manage this issue to avoid damaging the wider relationship, especially as it has other longer term strategic challenges to confront in the broader Asian strategic context.

Indo-U.S. relations have been running into rough weather recently. Trade problems, India’s decision to buy S-400 missiles from Russia, and differences over Iran have all taken a toll. Both sides are gamely working to ensure that these don’t do lasting damage, but a new issue – disagreements over the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and its consequences – now threatens to overload the agenda and potentially do serious damage, especially to their common interests in the Indo-Pacific.

It is not clear that their differences over AfPak can be entirely resolved but both sides can take efforts to limit the fallout from these disagreements before it is too late. This does require though that both New Delhi and Washington understand each other’s compulsions in AfPak and recognize that their common interests in the Indo-Pacific are more important.

For the full essay, click here.



After almost two decades of fighting to keep the Taliban out, Washington is understandably exhausted. There is little hope that that the United States can win the war and even lesser hope that it can strengthen Afghan government forces sufficiently that they can contain the Taliban without American assistance. So, the choice the United States faces is to stay on for the foreseeable future or try and cut a deal with the Taliban to withdraw with a modicum of grace.

Added to this is President Trump’s domestic compulsion. Americans are weary of the war, and have been for some time. Barack Obama promised to get the United States out of Afghanistan but was unable to do so. President Trump, who came to power complaining of the costs of the United States’ over-commitments abroad is even more motivated. With the election campaign beginning, and the election itself fifteen months away, he appears intent on succeeding where his predecessor failed.

The key problem is that it is unlikely that the United States can withdraw from Afghanistan without Pakistan’s support and cooperation. Though the Taliban in Afghanistan is a diverse and a somewhat less than unified force, it does appear clear that Pakistan has sufficient control over them to ensure that no negotiations can take place without the good offices of Islamabad. Trump has been critical of Pakistani behavior in the past, and Washington in general, is well aware of the history of Pakistani duplicity.

Moreover, the Taliban’s commitments that they will not allow Afghanistan to be used for terrorist activities against the United States and the West is a laughable proposition. Once the United States withdraws, there is little that Washington can do to ensure that a Taliban government will live up to the promises they make. Nevertheless, these commitments are a useful fiction that provides cover for Washington to blame that they have withdrawn honorably.

If the United States’ imperative is understandable, so is India’s. If the Taliban come back to power in Afghanistan, there is little doubt that Islamabad will be able to use Afghan territory to, once again, base anti-India terrorists there. With India demonstrating that it now has the political willingness to strike terror camps in Pakistan, Pakistan’s incentive for exploiting Afghan territory is even greater.

Though India’s interests in preventing a Taliban takeover is clear, its options are limited. India appears to have done little to build up any specific source of support of proxies within Afghanistan, to give India any voice in the negotiations for the U.S. withdrawal. What this means is that while the Taliban might give at least some paper guarantee to the United States about non-use of its territory for international terrorism purposes, India cannot even expect that. New Delhi would prefer that the U.S. forces stay on in Afghanistan but that is not likely. And nobody gives much heed to India’s mantras like “Afghan-led, Afghan-owned” process.

A key question is how the disagreement between the United States and India on Afghanistan and Pakistan’s role in it can be managed. Washington and President Trump personally are not likely to look at any Indian efforts to slow down or sabotage the U.S. withdrawal very kindly. Equally, New Delhi is likely to be more than a bit peeved if the United States facilitates Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan, especially with Pakistan’s assistance. Thus, there is little doubt that when it comes to the AfPak, the Indian and American interests are directly contradictory.

What is worrying is the possibility that these disagreements will bleed into other areas and affect cooperation in critical areas, especially the Indo-Pacific. Though there are disagreements between India and the United States on how to balance China in the Indo-Pacific, these are relatively minor. But unhappiness over AfPak can raise issues of dependability about the other in both capitals. There are already increasing concerns in Washington about whether the United States was wise to bet on India; and in New Delhi, concerns about American dependability have never been far from the surface. It remains to be seen whether there is sufficient maturity on both sides to continue cooperating on one area while they have significant differences in another.

Imran Khan Goes to Washington: What’s on the Agenda for US-Pakistan Security Relations? - The Diplomat, 19 July 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I wrote on Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan's visit to the United States by looking closely at some of the security-related agenda items for the upcoming development and how they could impact bilateral security relations.

Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan is set for his maiden visit to the United States in the next few days. The trip will include a stop at the White House as well. Reports indicate that the delegation will comprise of officials such as the foreign minister, Shah Mehmood Qureshi, the trade and investment adviser, Razzak Dawood, finance adviser Hafeez Pasha, and security officials including the army chief, General Qamar Javed Bajwa, the ISI chief, Faiz Hameed, and the head of the ISPR Major General Asif Ghafoor.

As with these sorts of the visits, the composition of the delegation gives a sense of the potential agenda, particularly on the security side. This will likely include Afghanistan as well as trying to reset the “acrimonious relationship” between Washington and Islamabad which has been playing out of late.

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Afghanistan is likely to be a key issue of discussion during Imran Khan’s meetings in the United States, including with President Donald Trump and members of the U.S. Congress. The Pakistani Foreign Office in a statement highlighted “Pakistan’s commitment to peace and stability and the importance of constructive engagement to promote a political solution in Afghanistan.” Foreign Minister Qureshi is reported to have said recently at an interaction that Pakistan “has been facilitating the U.S.-Taliban talks in good faith, underscoring that it remains a shared responsibility.”

With the election campaign picking up pace in the United States, President Trump also has a strong incentive to push for an Afghanistan solution. Ending one of America’s longest military engagements would make Trump look good. Despite being critical of Obama’s handling of Afghanistan, Trump in fact increased the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan. That, however, has had little impact on the war.

The U.S. effort to find a peaceful exit is not going to be easy. The Taliban demand for complete U.S. military withdrawal is one big stumbling block. Washington has been trying to get Islamabad to put pressure on the Taliban to show some flexibility.

Just a few days ago, Pakistan scored a major diplomatic victory, getting an invitation from the United States, Russia and China to help craft a long-term solution to the Afghanistan problem. The request to Pakistan to join the Afghan peace talks came after the third round of U.S.-China-Russia consultations on Afghanistan in Beijing on July 10-11. India, its regional nemesis, has been pushed to the sidelines.

Though India had made significant investments to the tune of more than $2 billion in Afghanistan – constructing one of the largest hospitals for women and children, schools, the Salma Dam (called the Afghan-India Friendship Dam) and the new parliament building – no one seems particularly interested in New Delhi’s views on the situation in Afghanistan.

During the recent visit of the U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, India’s National Security Adviser Ajit Doval is reported to have aired Indian concerns, but to no avail. India maintains that Afghanistan’s election schedule should be unaffected even if the peace process is on. India was also at odds with both Russia and the U.S. special envoy, Zalmay Khalilzad, on the idea of an interim government in Afghanistan.

Terrorism is another major issue on the agenda. As in the past, Pakistan has arrested a high-profile terrorist – Hafiz Saeed, the mastermind behind the 2008 Mumbai attack – before the premier’s visit to the United States. Such arrests have usually been inconsequential. But Islamabad would like to milk it as much as possible, and hope that the United States will reinstating some of the Coalition Support Funds that were suspended by the Trump Administration.

Recall that in the beginning of 2018, Trump asserted in a tweet that the United States has “foolishly given Pakistan more than 33 billion dollars in aid over the last 15 years and they have given us nothing but lies & deceit.” He went on to add that Pakistan is providing safe haven to the very terrorists that the United States is fighting against in Afghanistan. Actions have since followed. The United States held back a total of $800 million from Pakistan last year.

Imran Khan will make every effort to convince the United States of Islamabad’s sincerity in the fight against global terror. Given that the United States needs to accommodate Pakistan in order to find a face-saving exit from Afghanistan, he might get lucky.

Pakistan would also like to turn a page on the bad relations with the United States. Imran Khan has been in office for almost a full year, but this is his first visit to the United States, a reflection of this bad relationship. The current difficulties in U.S.-India relations may also encourage Islamabad to think it can gain some sympathy in Washington.

Pakistani security analysts claim that there is also another concern for Islamabad – “a growing disenchantment with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.” Reports indicate a deep skepticism within Pakistan about the CPEC, which is seen as “on the verge of dying.” This is not to suggest that Pakistan will give up on its all-weather friendship with China but Pakistan would like other options than just Beijing.

It is too early to say how successful Khan’s visit will be, and we will have to assess things once the trip has concluded. But there are clearly incentives on both sides to improve the relationship, and broader strategic shifts could provide the room for them to do so at least to some degree.