Where Would India Fit in a Missile Defense Partnership in the Indo-Pacific? - 24 January 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I examined India's evolving missile defense choices and partnerships. This was done in the backdrop of the US Missile Defense Review (MDR) which identified as a partner in the Indo-Pacific. In this piece, "Where Would India Fit in a Missile Defense Partnership in the Indo-Pacific?," I analyse as to how India was compelled to appreciate the utility of missile defense to what the different options for India are, whether it should be an indigenous system or something that is developed in partnership with other countries such as the US.

Last week, U.S. President Donald Trump announced the 2019 Missile Defense Review (MDR), outlining the rapidly evolving threats and the U.S. measures and capabilities that are required to protect the homeland, bases abroad and U.S. allies and partners around the world. The document, the latest among a series of strategy documents released under the Trump administration, bears noting in terms of what it means for India and the wider Indo-Pacific.

The Indo-Pacific factors significantly in the MDR. There is a mention of threats such as North Korea, Iran, Russia, and China, the advancements in missile defense and anti-satellite (ASAT) advancements in a few countries that could negatively impact the United States, and references to the importance of working with U.S. allies and partners including Japan, South Korea, Australia, and India.

The references to these like-minded states in particular bears noting. Both Japan and South Korea are already working with the United States in developing their respective missile defense shields which are also “increasingly interoperable” with U.S. systems. Australia also plays an important role in strengthening the regional missile defense cooperation through a trilateral engagement with the United States and Japan. Where does India fit into this emerging missile defense partnership in the Indo-Pacific?

For the full essay, click here.



India is no stranger to this conversation: It has been trying to manage growing missile threats in its neighborhood for about two decades now. China-Pakistan collaboration in this regard has been a significant driver in pushing New Delhi in developing certain limited missile defense capabilities. In the early 1990s, proliferation of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles such as the M-9 and M-11 from China to Pakistan pushed India to explore missile defense options. India had learned to live with China’s inventory of long-range missiles, but Pakistan was always a more prominent and unpredictable rival for India, and thus India has felt compelled to respond with greater swiftness.

India’s missile defense options included both indigenously developing missile defense technology as well as procuring it from the outside. At the time, this effort represented a major shift in India’s policy on missile defenses: India had vociferously criticized the U.S. “Star Wars” missile defense programs of the 1980s. A changing missile threat perception along with a strategic reorientation toward the U.S. enabled these policy shifts in India.

In recognition of this fact, the MDR makes a pointed reference to the “advanced and diverse range of ballistic and cruise missile capabilities in South Asia.” The review further notes that this is a potential area of cooperation between India and the United States especially given the convergence of strategic interests between the two sides and sees this as “a natural outgrowth of India’s status as a Major Defense Partner and key element of our Indo-Pacific Strategy.”

There is certainly some indication of a greater weight being placed on India in Washington’s calculations about how it deals with U.S. alliances and partnerships in the region. To take just one example, the United States had, just a few months ago, granted India a “Strategic Trade Authorisation-1 (STA-1)” status, that was previously given only to Japan and South Korea in Asia. But in reality, though India has a growing interest in missile defenses, whether it will be able to partner with the United States is open to question.

For instance, interestingly, this comes in the backdrop of India’s decision to buy the Russian S-400 air defense system for $5 billion. The Indian decision to proceed with the S-400 systems is indicative of the scale of the missile threats in India’s neighborhood. But it also means it is unclear whether India will look to the United States for BMD systems: a U.S. and Russian defense system could be complicated in terms of interoperability, though some analysts argue that it is a sensible option to have different radars and different encryption systems to deal with an array of threats.

Another problem is that India’s DRDO is already developing its own two-tiered BMD system. In addition, at the lower end, India is purchasing the U.S.-Norwegian NASAMS-2 system, as well as the Indo-Israel MRSAM (a land version of the Barak-8 naval system). Given all this, whether or not there is space for further operational cooperation with the United States within the Indian ballistic missile defense architecture remains to be seen.

If Space is ‘the Province of Mankind’, Who Owns its Resources? - ORF Occasional Paper, January 2019

My first substantial publication for the year is on space mining, examining the legal angles to this emerging issue. Senjuti Mallick and I have co-authored an ORF Occasional Paper titled, "If Space is ‘the Province of Mankind’, Who Owns its Resources?: An Examination of the Potential of Space Mining and its Legal Implications," where we analyse the rationale for extraterrestrial mining, as well as the efforts and responses of various countries—i.e, USA, Luxembourg, Russia, China and India. In examining the legal and governance basis for States and commercial players, this paper appreciates the economic benefits of space mining but argues against the national legislations legalising extraterrestrial appropriation of resources due to inconsistency with international treaties and customary international law. It further argues that the concept of “common heritage of mankind” is defeated in the light of such legal frameworks. The paper ponders the global governance challenges brought about by space mining activities and suggests legal, policy and global frameworks for realising the benefits of commercial mining without creating disparity between nations and disrupting dynamics of the world economy.

INTRODUCTION
June 2018 marked the golden jubilee of the first United Nations (UN) Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, held in
Vienna in 1968. It also marked 51 years of the Outer Space Treaty (OST) of 1967. Today, what was once fodder for cosmological science fiction
has become reality, owing to outer-space innovations that have happened in the last half a century. Unlike the lunar missions of the past,
contemporary explorations are led mostly by private-sector entities eager to capitalise on the potential of extracting resources in outer space.
How plausible is extraterrestrial mining—is it a long-term proposition or more of a fantasy? And what challenges are facing those engaged in
space mining?

Soon after a bill was signed increasing the 2018 budget for NASA (the US’ National Aeronautics and Space Administration), Senator Ted Cruz said, “I’ll make a prediction right now—the first trillionaire will be made in space.” The question is, however, how those trillionaires will make their riches from space. Both Peter Diamandis (founder of the Google Lunar XPrize competition) and Neil deGrasse Tyson (US astrophysicist) suggest that the financial returns are to be made from mining/ asteroids.

Indeed, the economic imperative for space mining is evident and analysts predict that these extraction activities could translate to a multibillion-dollar industry. NASA estimates, for example, that the value of asteroids out there could be in the vicinity of US$700 quintillion – that amount is roughly equivalent to US$95 billion for each of us here on Earth. Another major attraction for the prospective extraterrestrial mining companies is the availability of precious minerals in abundance on the Moon, on Mars and the asteroids (among them—lithium, cobalt,
nickel, copper, zinc, niobium, molybdenum, lanthanum, europium, tungsten, and gold). After all, these metals and mineral resources have
grown scarce on Earth, and both governments and commercial actors are pushing to look to celestial bodies for resources.

This paper examines the legal and governance basis for States and commercial players to undertake space mining activities. It does not,
however, cover the technical aspects of space mining; that is a separate field by itself. The first section discusses the rationale for different stakeholders in undertaking extraterrestrial mining. So far, the countries most eager and making the most active preparations for space mining are the US and—surprisingly, as it has not been typically a spacefaring nation—Luxembourg. This section will detail these efforts as well as those of other countries planning to follow the path being paved by these two. The second section then examines the legal basis for space mining, covering provisions of national and international law. The subsequent section looks at the global policy discourse responses from other governments to proposals and preparations for space mining, primarily Russia and China. The paper concludes by summarising the global
governance challenges that are brought about by space mining activities.

For the full paper, please click here.



Type rest of the post here

The Case for Outer Space Cooperation in South Asia - 18 January 2018

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I published a piece making a case for outer space cooperation in South Asia. The piece, "The Case for Outer Space Cooperation in South Asia," I argue that while the need for cooperation is clear, realizing such cooperation will mean addressing several key challenges, including those among the established space powers in the region.

Space technology has great potential to help social and economic development, especially in parts of the developing world such as South Asia. Yet, South Asia has not fully exploited the space domain for several reasons. Availability of resources and lack of visionary leadership in the region are important factors, but so are international insecurity and conflict. While there are limitations in dealing with the former set of issues, it is possible to suggest some ways to deal with the latter set.

In particular, confidence building measures (CBMs) can help promote space development in South Asia. This has been a theme of many workshops and seminars in the last couple of years. The author has participated in several such engagements where representatives of some of the smaller countries in the region have shown pronounced interest in international collaboration in developing outer space assets and technologies for meeting developmental challenges. But these countries also feel they are caught in the accelerating competition between India and China, which spills over into this domain too.




There is little doubt about the demand side: South Asia is a region with uneven development and serious social, economic, and developmental challenges. Space technology capabilities are also unevenly spread with China and India as established space players in the region but with more new entrants in the field. Countries like Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and the Maldives have a clear requirement for space capabilities for a number of different utilities such as dealing with natural disasters and communication. The region has remained prone to many weather-related calamities on a fairly frequent basis, making disaster warning and mitigation important drivers for pursuing an outer space agenda.

Strengthening connectivity, communication, and broadband internet across rural and remote areas of the region too should be strong imperatives. India and China can offer significant assistance to these new entrants. But at the same time, smaller countries worry about being dragged into the Sino-Indian competition if they collaborate with one side or the other.

Another factor to keep in mind is the poverty of existing rules and norms for outer space. Treaties such as the Outer Space Treaty (OST) are increasingly inadequate to deal with the rapidly developing space sector. This has resulted in a growing debate about how to strengthen space norms and rules to ensure safe and sustainable use of outer space for future generations.

But in developing new rules, care must be taken to ensure that, without restricting legitimate cooperation between states in outer space, there are adequate safeguards to prevent completely unregulated outer space cooperation that could lead to greater insecurities for some or all. Among the smaller countries, Sri Lanka has taken active interest in the past and in going forward with such efforts.

More international cooperation and coordination is definitely needed. In the Indo-Pacific region, there are two major regional space cooperation initiatives, one each under Japan’s and China’s leadership. Most South Asian countries are members of the Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum (APRSAF) that is governed by Japan. Pakistan and Bangladesh are members of both the APRSAF and Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO), the Chinese initiative in the region.

Yet, the big lacuna is that these two initiatives do not collaborate in any manner whatsoever. The limited resources of the many new space players could be more judiciously used if there were a means to get the two initiatives to work together. For example, there could be joint initiatives in the area of manufacturing and launching satellites for the purpose of providing advance weather-related disaster warning.

More significantly, space cooperation at the regional level has to focus on more basic needs. Regional powers can join hands in providing sounding rockets, to start with, and weather satellites, for instance. Areas such as disaster warning and mitigation are ideal candidates for cooperation within the South and Southeast Asian regions.

But there is also potential for cooperation at the higher end of the spectrum. Strengthening cooperation in Space Situational Awareness (SSA) and enhancing SSA coverage in the southern hemisphere can be an important aspect of cooperation among the more capable space powers in the region. India, China, and Japan have their own limited capabilities to monitor the space environment. Combining the efforts of these three large spacefaring powers in Asia would be greatly beneficial. And if the bigger space players in Asia could find ways to cooperate, it would provide incentives to smaller states as well.

How Long Can India’s China Juggle Last? - 16 January 2018

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I looked at the changing dynamics in India-China relations. In this piece, "How Long Can India’s China Juggle Last?," I argue that while New Delhi continues to walk a fine balance, its ability to sustain this approach remains to be seen.

India’s China policy is going through a bit of a strange time. Since the Wuhan Summit in April 2018 the two countries have been making great efforts to demonstrate that all is well in their relationship and that both sides expect the relationship to warm up further in the coming years. On the other hand, there is little indication that India’s concern about China’s military and political pressure is declining. It is unclear how long India can stay on these diverging tracts.

For the full essay, click here.



At the diplomatic level, New Delhi has been doing its best to keep the smile on its face. As an indicator of this, the number of diplomatic engagements between the two sides has been in the spotlight and has seen officials convey words of warmth to reaffirm the state of ties. In late December in particular, in addition to official bilateral exchanges, there was also an India-China High-Level Media Forum as well as an India-China Think Tank Forum.

Addressing the Media Forum, India’s External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj called Wang Yi, the foreign minister of China, “my close friend and my brother” before going onto emphasize the need for people-to-people, cultural, and educational exchanges. She noted the “Wuhan Spirit,” thanked China for the “concrete steps” taken by the “Chinese side” to find a solution to the increasing trade deficit, and listed the various multilateral forums where India and China are cooperating. A day earlier, in a message to the Think Tank Forum, she noted the “civilizational bonds” between the two countries and highlighted the expectations that India and China will lead Asia and usher in a new Asian century.

As important as what was said was also what was left unsaid. Hosting the newly elected prime minister of Bhutan, Lotay Tshering on his inaugural state visit, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi waxed eloquent about Indo-Bhutanese relations and Indian assistance as a “trusted partner and friend in the development of Bhutan” with space science becoming a “new dimension” in India-Bhutan relations. Despite the fact that months-long Doklam confrontation had taken place on Bhutanese territory, there was little indication of any international issue and certainly not China in his speech.

While these issues are almost certain to have come up during the discussions, India’s reluctance to raise them publicly fits with much of the public signaling by India on other issues as well. For example, in a speech at the recently concluded Raisina Dialogue, Swaraj outlined the critical challenges that confront India as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and climate change. Again, there wasn’t even a hint of the potentially more serious challenges that India is facing on the international front.

On the other hand, India’s concerns about China’s inroads especially in the maritime domain continue to grow. Speaking at the same Raisina Dialogue, Indian Navy Chief Admiral Sunil Lanba stated that there are six to eight Chinese navy warships in the northern part of Indian Ocean at any given point of time, putting one quantitative metric down around India’s rising concerns about Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean. He also supported the Quad idea, stating that it stood for inclusive, free, rules-based order. He predicted that the Quad — a grouping consisting of India, Australia, Japan, and the United States — will grow with time. Considering India’s official reluctance on the Quad question, especially its military component, this was undoubtedly a surprising statement.

Lamba particularly noted the presence of Chinese submarines in the area, wondering about their use in supposed Chinese anti-piracy operations. He is not alone; the Indian Navy’s worries about Chinese submarines are growing. It is about to award Cochin Shipyards a contract for building eight new anti-submarine corvettes. The Navy also just inaugurated the Information Fusion Center, based in Gurugram in the National Capital Region, to coordinate maritime intelligence with multiple countries. India has also just opened a new airbase, INS Kohasa, on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, which host India’s only triservice command center and are located at a critical spot close to Indonesia and the Malacca Straits.

There is little doubt that New Delhi is doing its best to calm the tensions in its relations with China, but there is also little doubt that the pressure on India is growing. Whether these two can be reconciled remains to be seen.

Will India’s Trump Fears Ease With the New US Asia Reassurance Initiative Act? - 5 January 2018

In this week's column, Will India’s Trump Fears Ease With the New US Asia Reassurance Initiative Act?, I wrote on the US Asia Reassurance Initiative Act and whether the Act will address some of India's concerns. New Delhi will be hoping that Congress can continue to rein in Trump’s worst instincts.

For the full article, click here.



On December 31, U.S. President Donald Trump signed the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA), which promises to bring back fresh focus to American priorities in the Indo-Pacific. The Act assumes particular importance in the context of China’s expanding and aggressive footprint across Asia, Africa, Europe, and Oceania and the responses by the United States as well as its allies, partners, and friends in the region.

India for one has three specific areas of concern that it would want the United States to address. Within South Asia, there are two: India is worried about the prospect of American withdrawal from Afghanistan as well as about the inroads that China is making in India’s neighborhood. A third concern is more broadly the challenge that China poses to India, both militarily and politically. So, New Delhi is likely to judge this Act on how it will address these three challenges.

India will be happy to have been accorded special importance under the Act, which reiterates India’s significance in the U.S. strategy in the region. The Act notes India as a Major Defense Partner, a “unique” status for India, which would ease defense trade and sharing of technology, including “license-free access to a wide range of dual-use technologies” as well as promote greater coordination on security policies and strategies and increased military-to-military engagements. Of course, in practical terms, this doesn’t change very much. Nevertheless, the symbolic element is always important while dealing with New Delhi.

Of course, the congressional action comes immediately after Trump’s decision to withdraw U.S. troops from Afghanistan. Whether the congressional action will slow down or alter American withdrawal remains to be seen. Trump is reportedly considering changes to his approach to Syria, including slowing down a reduced presence. On the other hand, he also dismissed the Indian contribution to Afghanistan as nothing more than a library. Given India’s sensitivity to developments in Afghanistan, New Delhi will be very interested in whether the U.S. Congress can moderate Trump’s instinct to withdraw.

A second regional issue is China’s expansion in India’s neighborhood. China’s enormous wealth and its remarkable capacity for infrastructure building has made it an attractive partner for India’s neighbors, despite the threat of being sucked into a Chinese debt trap. Beyond this, the comfort of having an extraregional great power as a counter to the regional hegemon was probably an equally important factor. India’s limited capacity to provide an alternative has been an issue. The Act does talk about countering China’s coercive economic policies, but New Delhi would be interested in seeing whether this will provide any help to India’s neighbors in escaping China’s debt grasp.

A third issue is whether this Act will reassure India in its direct confrontation with China. Like other powers in Asia, India has also sought a more accommodative policy toward China over the last year. Change of leadership in the Indian foreign ministry was one factor, with Vijay Gokhale replacing S. Jaishankar in January 2018. Jaishankar was known to be an advocate of closer U.S.-India relations while Gokhale appears to be a much more traditional Indian Foreign Service officer who prefers equidistance from both the United States and China.

But more than personality factors were at play in India’s pursuit of closer ties with China. Though the Indian military stood fast in the 2017 Doklam crisis, the Indian military’s overall preparedness is rather poor. Indian military budgets are lower than they have been in decades and corruption scandals and bureaucratic incompetence have delayed necessary acquisitions. Another issue is domestic politics. India is set to hold national elections in 2019, and there are suspicions that the Modi government did not want to be diverted by a confrontation in the Himalayas.

Though these factors were important, underlying all these is a certain lack of confidence in America’s commitment to India and Asia. In that sense, this congressional action is potentially positive in providing greater reassurance, even though a lot will also depend on whether the Trump administration follows up on it or not.

India, like other American partners in Asia, has had concerns about Washington’s commitment to the region. This Act is not likely to remove those concerns. But to the extent that it endorses a consensus opinion within the U.S. Congress and also expresses the broad bipartisan consensus in Washington, it is likely to be welcomed in New Delhi.

Why India Fears Trump’s Emerging Afghanistan Approach - 28 December 2018

In my latest column for The Diplomat, "Why India Fears Trump’s Emerging Afghanistan Approach," I write on the US troop withdrawal from Afghanistan and what it could mean for Indian security. I argue that a weaker American presence would only compound New Delhi’s existing Afghan conundrum.

Last week, U.S. President Donald Trump decided to pull out about 7,000 American troops from Afghanistan. The decision to slash the number of troops by half appears to have been taken by Trump against the advice of his own senior administration officials, and this has provoked varied reactions in the region and in the United States.

For India, however, there is little question that this surprising decision puts it in a tough position of having to manage any potential fallout while having few viable policy options to deal with the emerging situation in Afghanistan. It is no surprise that commentators in New Delhi have almost uniformly expressed concerns about the consequences of the decision for India.

For the full essay, click here.



India’s policy has been to suggest an “Afghan-led, Afghan-owned and Afghan-controlled,” process with participation of the Afghan government. The gist of this appears to be that India wants to leave Pakistan out of the process. But it has become increasingly concerned about the central role that all key players are giving to Pakistan. In reality, most of the other stakeholders have simply ignored India’s views and have been engaged in finding a solution with the inclusion of Taliban and its sponsors in Pakistan. Oddly enough, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi, for the first time acknowledged that India has a stake in Afghanistan and that Indian cooperation is necessary for the peace process in the country.

A clear effect of India’s stand has been to isolate India in the multiple ongoing negotiations for ending the war. As an editorial in an Indian newspaper, The Hindustan Times, noted, “the American withdrawal comes at a time when its [India] views on Afghanistan are at a significant variance with other traditional regional partners like Russia and Iran.” In fact, the U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation, Zalmay Khalilzad, had twice skipped New Delhi when he had visited the region to hold talks on Afghan reconciliation. Even India’s long-standing ally, Russia, has ignored India’s objections to negotiating with the Taliban, and invited the Taliban to the second round of talks in Moscow in early November (India swallowed its pride and did send two former foreign service officials to the Moscow talks).

Of course, India has not been entirely forgotten in the Afghanistan conversation. For instance, India can take some comfort from the fact that Ambassador Khalilzad will be stopping over in India over his next swing through the region in January, while the Russian Special Envoy, Zamir Kabulob, also visited New Delhi last week for bilateral India-Russia discussions on Afghanistan. Nonetheless, all in all, it is clear that despite the fact that India has contributed a huge amount of economic assistance to Afghanistan and the supposed-support for India among the Afghan masses, New Delhi has found itself without much viable options in discussions about the future of Afghanistan.

India’s problem of being increasingly marginalized in discussions involving a wider range of regional players is only compounded by the fear of the potential consequences of American troop pullout. The first concern is about which forces will be withdrawn. As a former senior Indian foreign service officer wrote in a recent column in an Indian newspaper, The Asian Age, “if the air assistance component is kept intact and only trainers leave, then perhaps the effect may be gradual.” This point was also reiterated by “people in the know in New Delhi” presumably government officials, who also stated that whether the troops being pulled back would be those “involved in counter-terrorism or those advising Afghan combat troops or both.”

A second issue mentioned by these so-called “people in the know” is the time frame for the withdrawal, whether they leave before the upcoming Afghan elections or after. But the Indian concerns are not just about what happens in Afghanistan but also the effects of that in the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir. A former senior police official from the state pointed out that “the US pulling out troops from Afghanistan will have implications in the Kashmir Valley as terrorist outfits there may feel emboldened.” It is also clear that Indian commentators are increasingly rethinking the earlier hostility towards the Taliban. As one noted, “India can’t remain oblivious to the ground realities in Afghanistan by maintaining a hostile attitude towards Taliban.”

There is little doubt that New Delhi is becoming increasingly anxious about the state of the Afghan peace process and particularly about Trump’s sudden decision to withdraw forces. But at the same time, India also finds itself without very many good options about how to proceed. If the United States does go ahead with a significant withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan, India’s troubles will undoubtedly deepen.

India’s Big Defense Acquisition Challenge - December 22, 2018

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I wrote on India’s big defense acquisition challenge. I argue that occasional concerns about corrupt defense deals are merely the symptoms of broader structural issues that need to be addressed.

Accusations about corruption in defense deals are once again roiling in Indian politics. This time, the charges pertain to India’s decision to purchase 36 Rafale fighter jets from France. Questions have been raised about why the deal was abruptly changed from 126 fighter jets, many of which would have built under license in India, to just 36, which are being bought as fly-aways.

Irrespective of the veracity of the charges, it is clear that opposition parties will use the issue in the upcoming general elections in mid-2019. The case illustrates the broken nature of India’s defense acquisition process, but even more importantly, it demonstrates that the Indian political system and governing institutional mechanisms have not come up with a way to adjudicate these issues outside of the political arena. The consequence is that Indian defense acquisitions are likely to continue to suffer for the foreseeable future.

The immediate consequence will be felt by the Indian Air Force (IAF). The IAF has a sanctioned strength of 42 squadrons but it is currently down by a quarter at just about 31 squadrons. Even of these 31, almost half of the aircraft are of the 1960s and 1970s vintage, such as the MiG-21s, MiG-27s, and Jaguars.



The IAF was planning to replace these under the MMRCA (Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft) program, which featured competition between fighter planes from several countries, with Rafale emerging as the ultimate winner. Negotiations for the acquisition of the Rafale, however, proved to be difficult and the Congress-led UPA government, which initiated the deal, was replaced before the deal could be concluded.

But in 2015, Prime Minister Narendra Modi changed the deal and decided to purchase 36 jets outright. Questions were raised about the sudden change but more recently, opposition parties have charged that the new deal and particularly its offset clause favors business interests, who are alleged to be close to the ruling BJP and specifically Modi. While the deal itself is going through, it still leaves the IAF with a huge shortfall. The IAF has restarted the process for buying another 110 fighter planes, which would see a re-run of the MMRCA competition with the same planes once again competing for more-or-less the same deal.

More importantly, the travails of the MMRCA deal highlight once again the politically fraught nature of large defense acquisitions in India. The charges of corruption in defense deals are not new. There have been accusations of corruption in previous defense deals also including the Bofors artillery gun, coffins bought for soldiers during the Kargil War, and the purchase of Augusta Westland VVIP choppers.

While none of these accusations have been decided by the courts in India, the political and bureaucratic effects on India have been far more damaging. Fear of accusations has slowed Indian defense procurement to a crawl as illustrated by the nearly two-decade long MMRCA case.

Part of the response to these problems has been to write very elaborate rules for acquisition, with the hope being that such rules will eliminate any element of discretion because any exercise of discretion could potentially be challenged as being motivated by ulterior reasons. But other than complicating the process, these rules really haven’t helped smooth the path of defense acquisition. Bureaucrats are increasingly worried about having their name attached to any such deals because they could later be called to answer questions if the deals run into problems at the political level. Thus, they would rather postpone making decisions, leaving the choice to their successors rather than risk being caught up in political games.

An important part of the problem is also the inadequacy of Indian police agencies and Indian courts. These cases are usually handled by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), but the CBI has a very poor record of being an effective or independent police agency. It is usually seen as acting on the whims of the government in power, changing its positions on criminal and corruption cases when its political masters change. Even the Supreme Court (SC) has criticized the CBI, calling it a caged parrot.

Even more importantly, the CBI’s investigative capacity is also clearly wanting. Even in cases where political masters are presumably interested in letting the CBI move ahead, such as the cases involving a previous government, the CBI has not been able to effectively investigate or close these cases. The consequence of the CBI’s lack of autonomy and its incompetence is that these cases are likely never to be closed but continue to run in political cycles for decades on end. The absence of a neutral and effective investigative and judicial process means that accusations of corruption essentially become simply political ploys rather than matters of justice that eventually reach any closure.

Thus, India is likely to continue facing to have difficult time with large defense acquisitions, especially when they involve foreign military equipment. And consequent to this, India’s defense acquisition is likely to continue to be slow and creaky. Combined with low levels of defense budgets, the effect on India’s defense preparedness is likely to be telling.