Why China, India Clash, my article in The Diplomat

Here's an article of mine of India-China relations, published in The Diplomat. While the prevailing view is that it is the border issue which is the most contentious issue between the two countries, I would argue that border issue is only a symptom of the larger problem that exists between India and China.

India-China relations are often seen through the prism of their bilateral disputes. Indeed, the border dispute between the two is generally seen as the biggest hurdle to improving ties. But it could be argued that disagreements such as that over the border in Arunachal Pradesh are only a symptom of the larger problem that exists between these two Asian giants, namely the inevitable and increasing competition between two rising powers.

For the full article, click here.

While the simultaneous rise of powers need not always result in a clash, the four major powers in Asia – established powers Russia and Japan, and newly rising China and India – have had troubled historical relations, contributing to deep-rooted mistrust and mutual suspicion. With the exception of India-Russia and India-Japan relations, the baggage of history is weighing on almost all bilateral relations. It may be true that this century will be an “Asian century,” but it can’t be said with certainty that it’s going to be a stable and peaceful one.

India and China have certainly gone through their share of ups and downs in their relations over the last six decades. Currently, their relations are probably on an upward curve, but one based on trade and raw economics. And while their bilateral trade has climbed to $60 billion, there has been a simultaneous rise in tensions. Improved economic relations don’t necessarily mean better ties overall, as has been demonstrated with U.S.-China relations, as well as those between Japan and China and Taiwan and the mainland.

So, if improved trade ties haven’t resulted in better political and strategic relations, what are the key issues that are holding the two back? Historically, it used to be the border issue, China’s relationship with Pakistan and the rest of South Asia in general, and China’s policy on Jammu and Kashmir specifically. But over the past decade, the emerging Asian strategic framework and the global role for each of these rising powers has been an important factor.

Sadly, this is only likely to get worse. As India’s influence increases within Asia and beyond, there are bound to be problems between Beijing and New Delhi as the two are seen competing for influence and resources. For instance, China is increasingly wary of India’s closer engagement with Japan, South Korea and some Southeast Asian countries. The Chinese leadership appears equally wary of India’s “Look East” Policy as it seems to believe that this will dilute Chinese influence in the region. India has improved its trade ties with Japan, South Korea and ASEAN countries, and there appears to be an increasingly strategic component to relations.

On the other hand, India has remained concerned about China’s ever-growing reach into South Asia, particularly in Pakistan. Of all the South Asian countries, it is Islamabad that most closely shares China’s strategic interests, and their interests vis a vis India have been crucial in cementing relations between the two. For Pakistan, Kashmir is an unfinished item on the agenda of the partition of the subcontinent. India’s sensitivity over Kashmir is matched by China’s worries about Tibet. China believes that New Delhi has ulterior motives regarding Tibet, and the very fact that the Dalai Lama and as many as 150,000 Tibetan refugees live in India continues to irk Beijing. For a country that’s actively engaged in image building as a responsible power, the shortcomings of China’s ethnic policy isn’t something China likes to be reminded about.

Complicating India’s relations with China was the fact that the George W. Bush administration saw a greater role for India and Japan in the emerging Asian strategic framework. The U.S.-India Nuclear Deal in 2005 furthered China’s anxieties, and the fact that the United States took the lead in altering the global rules so that India could engage in international nuclear commerce wasn’t well received by Beijing.

Ultimately, it’s India’s increasing role and influence that’s the crux of the issue. Although India and China both acknowledge the role of the other in the emerging Asian strategic order, they have different conceptions over how this will all pan out. India has continued to adopt an accommodative and inclusive approach in shaping this new architecture, while China has followed an exclusivist approach that appears to be directed against India, Japan and the United States.

Beijing has argued that its rise is peaceful, but as China’s military and economic strength grows, India may not be prepared to see an Asian order dominated by any single power. Given such trends, it’s likely that competition for influence between these new powers will be a significant feature of the Asian century.

U.S. Backs Efforts to Draft Space Code, article in Arms Control Today

Here's an article on the US effort in drafting a space code in the latest issue of Arms Control Today, quoting me ....

The United States will join with the European Union and other space-faring countries to develop an international code of conduct for outer space activities, but will not sign on to the EU’s current draft of a proposed code, U.S. officials have said.

“The long-term sustainability of our space environment is at serious risk from space debris and irresponsible actors…. A Code of Conduct will help maintain the long-term sustainability, safety, stability, and security of space by establishing guidelines for the responsible use of space,” Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said in a Jan. 17 press release. U.S. officials have discussed whether to support the EU’s draft of the code since the original version was circulated in December 2008.

Taking the effort forward, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Space and Defense Policy Frank Rose said the EU will take the lead on negotiating an international code and plans to host a series of experts meetings over the next several months. The United States “plans to actively participate in those discussions,” which aim “to develop a consensus text that could become an eventual international code,” he said.

Rose said the United States hopes to involve all space-faring nations in the meetings, but he highlighted five countries that should be a focus of EU efforts: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, and South Africa. However, experts say China and Russia are the two countries that matter most because they are the biggest space-faring countries after the United States.

In a Jan. 26 e-mail to Arms Control Today, Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, a senior fellow in security studies at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi, pointed to the fast-growing space programs in Asia and said that, “in the absence of an inclusive mechanism, the EU Code is likely to see a repeat” of the experience with the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, “where the majority of the Asian countries that contribute to the challenge of missile proliferation remain outside the mechanism.”

As Arms Control Today went to press, India had not come out with a formal position on the EU’s draft. However, India’s informal position is that the code lacks a provision for a legally binding mechanism, which has been “a long-standing demand from some of the Asian countries,” Rajagopalan said. Nevertheless, she said, India is “prudent” enough to “recognize that a legal framework may emerge much later” and legal frameworks often “are the by-products of normative exercises.”

To read the full article, click here.



The United States will join with the European Union and other space-faring countries to develop an international code of conduct for outer space activities, but will not sign on to the EU’s current draft of a proposed code, U.S. officials have said.

“The long-term sustainability of our space environment is at serious risk from space debris and irresponsible actors…. A Code of Conduct will help maintain the long-term sustainability, safety, stability, and security of space by establishing guidelines for the responsible use of space,” Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said in a Jan. 17 press release. U.S. officials have discussed whether to support the EU’s draft of the code since the original version was circulated in December 2008. (See ACT, January/February 2009.)

The EU released the latest draft of the code in 2010 after receiving feedback from other countries, including the United States. That document retained much of the language from previous versions, including a clause establishing a voluntary commitment to refrain from intentionally harming space objects, measures to control space debris, and mechanisms for cooperation and consultation. It added language to protect countries’ rights to self-defense under the UN Charter. (See ACT, November 2010.)

Despite the negotiations between the United States and the EU, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Ellen Tauscher told reporters on Jan. 12, “It’s been clear from the very beginning that we were not going with the [EU] code.” When asked why the United States would not sign on to the EU draft, Tauscher said that “it’s too restrictive.”

Speaking a week later at the Stimson Center, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Space and Defense Policy Frank Rose said Tauscher’s comment was referring to the process surrounding the creation of the EU code more than the substance of the code. “Before you convene a multilateral ad hoc conference to sign the code, you need to develop a process in between to build consensus on a code,” Rose said.

In a Jan. 25 interview, Michael Krepon, co-founder of the Stimson Center and director of its South Asia and space security programs, said that “leaders from other space-faring countries not in Europe, like India, rightly complained that they didn’t have co-authorship of the EU’s draft.” The code “already has important partnerships, like Japan, Canada, Australia, and Europe, but the task now is to get the concept of a code of conduct greater international standing,” Krepon said.

EU reaction to the U.S. decision not to sign on to the current draft of the code was “rather mixed and quite negative from the senior officials,” according to an EU government official familiar with negotiations over the proposed code.

According to the unclassified summary of the U.S. “National Security Space Strategy,” released in January 2011, space “is becoming increasingly congested, contested, and competitive.” The clutter of manmade objects is exacerbated by actions such as the “irresponsible” 2007 Chinese anti-satellite test that created more than 3,000 pieces of debris, the report said.

Next Steps

At the Stimson Center event, Rose said the EU will take the lead on negotiating an international code and plans to host a series of experts meetings over the next several months. The United States “plans to actively participate in those discussions,” which aim “to develop a consensus text that could become an eventual international code,” he said.

Rose said the United States hopes to involve all space-faring nations in the meetings, but he highlighted five countries that should be a focus of EU efforts: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, and South Africa. However, experts say China and Russia are the two countries that matter most because they are the biggest space-faring countries after the United States.

In a Jan. 26 e-mail to Arms Control Today, Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, a senior fellow in security studies at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi, pointed to the fast-growing space programs in Asia and said that, “in the absence of an inclusive mechanism, the EU Code is likely to see a repeat” of the experience with the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, “where the majority of the Asian countries that contribute to the challenge of missile proliferation remain outside the mechanism.”

As Arms Control Today went to press, India had not come out with a formal position on the EU’s draft. However, India’s informal position is that the code lacks a provision for a legally binding mechanism, which has been “a long-standing demand from some of the Asian countries,” Rajagopalan said. Nevertheless, she said, India is “prudent” enough to “recognize that a legal framework may emerge much later” and legal frameworks often “are the by-products of normative exercises.”

Krepon said that any involvement by India to help draft an international code would be “a change in its strategic culture, which is currently to be an outsider and to complain,” citing India’s reluctance to participate in the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Space and its absence from the Hague Code of Conduct.

The GGE, which was established by UN General Assembly Resolution 65/68 in October 2011 to examine transparency and confidence-building measures, is scheduled to start in July 2012 and is expected to finish by July 2013. The GGE process is separate from the one that Rose proposed and is not a formal negotiating process. It is not clear whether the GGE process will include discussion of a code of conduct.

China and Russia have proposed their own space agreements, most recently a draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects (PPWT). Rose stressed that the U.S. position is not to negotiate on the PPWT. The United States sees the code “as a pragmatic and responsible alternative to the PPWT,” he said. U.S. officials, including Rose, have said that the PPWT’s language is weak and lacks an effective mechanism for verification.

Domestic Politics

Four congressional Republicans expressed their support of the State Department’s decision on the EU code in a Jan. 28 letter to President Barack Obama, but said they were concerned about the administration’s plans to negotiate an international agreement similar to the EU’s draft.

“Such an international agreement could establish the foundation for a future arms control regime that binds the United States without approval of Congress,” said the letter signed by Reps. Michael Turner (Ohio) and Joe Heck (Nev.), and Sens. Jeff Sessions (Ala.) and Jon Kyl (Ariz.). Turner, Heck, and Sessions hold senior positions on their respective chamber’s armed services or intelligence committees; Kyl is the Senate minority whip and a leading Republican voice on national security issues.

At the Jan. 19 Stimson Center event, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy Gregory L. Schulte said nothing in the code would keep the United States from developing, deploying, or testing land or space ballistic missile defense systems. He said that any code would not be a legally binding arms control agreement, but a set of nonbinding “guidelines” that countries would follow.

The four lawmakers said in their letter that although “it is worth considering whether a non-binding arrangement for outer space activities could be in the interest of the United States, we are not comfortable that all policy and operational impacts of doing so have been assessed.” They went on to say that Republicans “are deeply concerned about the unknown consequences such limitations would have on future military or intelligence programs given that the draft Code appears to be of unlimited duration.”

The Space Code of Conduct Debate: A View from Delhi, my article in Strategic Studies Quarterly

Here's an article of mine on the space code of conduct debate, a perspective from Delhi published in the latest issue of Strategic Studies Quarterly, published by Air University, US Air Force.

While India has interests in drafting rules of the road on space issues, the EU has lost out an ideal opportunity to rope in India as a major spacefaring power to shape the debate. The “Not Invented Here” syndrome characterises, at best, India’s position on the EU Code. If the EU had to do this exercise all over again, it might be relevant to adopt an inclusive approach, bringing together all the spacefaring countries to debate and shape an instrument that is widely acceptable. India’s interests in writing the rules are driven by the fact that it has been one of the earliest space powers and therefore it should have been part of the debate. In addition, it also has interests in formulating rules that would affect and curtail certain space activities. Indian interests are also to do with the Indian economic growth story that is increasingly dependent on space utilisation.

Also certain measures, by way of narrowing down the differences, have been suggested including the idea whether states around the world can agree to an “IPCC model of experts” on space; mulling over new initiatives along the lines of International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO).


For the full article, click here.

Finally, what's the way around?

Can states around the world agree to an “Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change” model of experts to address space issues? Given that space debris or an arms race in space are universal problems confronting every nation-state, the idea of constituting a panel of experts under the aegis of the United Nations may be a good starting point. his may be the kind of inclusive mechanism India should aim for while making an effort to enlist the support of other key space-faring countries.

Obviously space traffic management is at the core of the entire issue. Countries could mull over new initiatives along the lines of the Inter­national Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Letting technical experts handle issues is one way to reduce political salience and competition.

Also, is the Conference on Disarmament (CD) still a relevant forum to discuss and debate space security? More than a decade has passed since the CD debated and moved forward on important security issues. Given such a track record, it is time to consider alternate venues to tackle these challenges. he ICAO model may be appropriate, since overcrowding,
industrialization, and weaponization of space and management of space traffic have become critical issues. One has to think of new platforms outside the CD, given the problems with the consensual decision-making process in the CD. Can there be
a major grouping of space-faring powers similar to the P-5 who are the nuclear weapon countries recognized by the NPT? Such a grouping might be keener on making decisions and moving forward than any other conceivable forum.

Finally, the EU has to recognize that geopolitics has significant value in determining and shaping norms and establishing practices. In this regard the geopolitical weight of Asia may be in a position to dictate new terms and conditions in formulating these norms and practices. Getting as many Asian countries as possible on board would be a major plus if the EU is keen on pushing an agenda. his is also important considering the increasing trend toward securitization of geopolitics in Asia. Therefore, the EU must listen and understand the Asian realities and concerns.

My interview with the Voice of Russia ....

Here's an interview of mine with the Voice of Russia on the developments in Asia Pacific including US-China relations, the new Chinese leadership.

Burning Point → Asian Pacific region: Cooperation or confrontation

What are the strategies of major regional players? How successful have they been in expanding their ties with other countries in the region? And what is it that we are going to witness there – the development of the working relationship, or rather a stand-off, between China and US over the control of the Asia Pacific?

We’ve been looking into the issue with the help from Dr. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, a Senior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi, India, and Alexander Gabuyev, expert on China and participant of the UN Millenium Program.

To hear the full interview, click here.

The text of the interview is available here.



Today we’ll be focusing on the Asian Pacific region – a location that has been playing an increasingly important role in the global politics and hence, has become an arena of growing competition between two of the world powers – China and the US.

New Delhi has shown a lack of strategic vision by choosing the Rafale fighter aircraft

Here is an article of mine on the recent MMRCA decision published by The Economic Times. I have argued that GoI underplayed the importance of strategic interests and went ahead with the risk free option of relying on technical inputs alone to make one of the most high profile defence deals.

India's long and convoluted search for a new fighter plane - a medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) - has entered its final stage. New Delhi has just announced that the Rafale, built by Dassault Aviation of France, has been chosen to meet the Indian Air Force's (IAF) requirement. Only price negotiation now remains.

For the full article, click here.



The Rafale had been shortlisted along with the Eurofighter Typhoon from a field that originally included four more jets: the US-built F-16 and F-18, the Russian MiG-35 and the Swedish JAS 39 Gripen. But though the fight over the selection is over, questions about the wisdom of New Delhi's choice are unlikely to end any time soon.

Commenting on the MMRCA decision, a former IAF officer proudly stated that this was probably the first decision that was made purely on technical grounds. If accurate, this reveals serious strategic shortsightedness. While the government should have received inputs from the IAF, such a decision should not have been taken on purely technical grounds. For India's decision-makers, limiting themselves to technical specifications was a risk-free option, but that reveals more about the state of strategic decision-making in Delhi than the wisdom of the choice they made.

Ideally, the Indian decision should have been guided by a strategy that balances reducing danger and broadening opportunity. Accordingly, the question for New Delhi should have been how to use this lucrative deal to beef up India's strategic options. Thus, it is probably a strategic blunder to narrowly focus on technical specifications and capabilities alone, as many proponents of the IAF's choice have done.

A decision of this magnitude should have been filtered through three key parameters: strategic, operational and tactical. A pragmatic strategy would have been to analyse the risk and opportunity through these three parameters and then make the final decision about which of the fighter plane choices would have best advanced Indian security. In strategic and geopolitical terms, France can provide little help to India in either Asia or in the global theatre. While France has always been a well-wisher, it has never had much capacity to help India. For example, though France wanted to sell India nuclear reactors, it could do little to change the nuclear non-proliferation rules that prevented it from doing so. It took Washington to change these rules to India's benefit.

Additionally, numbers (of aircraft India could acquire) and cost should have been factored in. Buying fewer but more expensive aircraft might make some fighter jocks happy, but having greater numbers might be more relevant to a country like India which faces a two-front threat from China and Pakistan. It was often argued in the MMRCA debate that maintaining air superiority required technological superiority, range and payload but an equally important consideration is that of numbers.

Numerical superiority in India's regional context is of particular significance given that the current strength of India's fighter jets is only around 600, and unless replenished, it will reach critically low numbers soon. Meanwhile, both Beijing and Islamabad have been augmenting their fighter fleets. India could have procured far greater numbers of fighters with the US or Russian option.

Though the probability of a two-front war is low, no pragmatic Indian strategic decision-maker should rule it out. Indeed, it is precisely for this reason that the Indian army is raising new forces to deploy on the China border. It is unclear if the technological superiority of the Rafale is so great as to compensate for the smaller numbers that India will have to settle for.

Cost should have also had an important role in the MMRCA decision. India's decision to go for Rafale is going to cost New Delhi around $20 billion, if not more. Opting for a Russian or US jet would have been far cheaper. The Russian option would have been the least expensive whereas the American fighters would have been somewhere in the middle with the European jets being the most expensive. In overall terms, the American F-18s would have been the best given that they (as well as the F-16s) came with the second-generation AESA radars.

Lastly, the most important consideration should have been the strategic benefits that accrue to India through this deal. Indian decision-makers should have been mindful of the fact that this deal was as much about making strategic investments in a relationship as simply buying fighters. India does not enjoy a benign neighbourhood, and these security needs are important. But India also needs to balance these with its requirements as a rising power, which means having capable friends. The MMRCA deal was a great opportunity to consolidate its strategic ties with either Russia or the US, or even with both. Instead, New Delhi has ended up antagonising both of them.

The standard response that India has signed many other defence contracts with both Russia and the US does not wash because this was a very different and high-profile deal which was closely watched around the world. Signing smaller deals, even if they add up to significant amounts, does not have the same weight as the MMRCA deal. New Delhi needs to be more careful in both understanding strategic moments and being able to exploit them if it wants to sit at the global high table.

India has made powerful enemies by selecting Dassault ... my take on the MMRCA decision in yesterday's Pioneer ....

Here's my OpEd on the recent MMRCA decision in yesterday's Pioneer. India is not likely to bow to Anglo-American pressure to revisit the MMRCA decision in favour of Dassault-Rafale. By deciding on the basis of technical parameters alone, India satisfied its own needs, but quite ignored the diplomatic fall out.



Price negotiation is what remains of the crucial MMRCA deal. It’s a complicated process. Nevertheless, it appears unlikely that the decision to buy the Rafale itself will be revisited. Given how drawn-out and difficult the choice was, the government is unlikely to add further controversy by admitting it made a mistake, which will be the consequence if the MMRCA competition is reopened. The selection apparently involved testing the platforms on around 600 odd technical parameters. This is the key argument made by proponents of the deal: that the deal was so carefully and technically handled that it should not be questioned.

But the premise that technical factors are all that matters is not defensible especially for such a large and politically important deal. While the technical qualifications are an important set of elements that should go into while making a decision, this has also brought to the fore how strategic factors were underplayed in this critical deal.

A decision made purely on technical parameters seems like the decision makers in India were opting for an easy, risk free option. This is understandable in the domestic political context. The single most important political concern today is about corruption in administrative decisions. Given the importance of this issue in public perception, and particularly given the many corruption scandals that have come out over the last year, it is not surprising that the government wants to play it safe. And the easiest way to play it safe is to leave political discretion out by letting the IAF make a purely technical decision.

Indian military services are known for their thoroughness in assessing weapons systems. Clearly the IAF did a good job of picking what was the best fighter from its perspective. But while the Rafale might have been the best from a

technical standpoint, it is not clear that it was diplomatically and strategically a good choice.

A strategic perspective should have looked at which of the countries fighting for the contract was most useful to India. This is not just about who wants good relations with India or who is a well-wisher because all of the competitors were good friends of India and were India’s well-wishers.

Where they were different was in terms of which could do more for India. This should have been a purely cold, hard assessment. Such an assessment would have put the US and Russia as the top choices. While the European consortium and Sweden would probably have brought up in the back of this list, France would have been somewhere in the middle. It definitely has greater global weight than Sweden and probably a better bet than a consortium of several countries, but it would have been no match for the US or Russia.

Of course, this should not have been the only consideration. Strategic and diplomatic reasons alone should not decide which fighter jet was picked. India’s decision-makers should have also looked at the different technical capabilities of the various competing planes. In fact, the final choice should have been a combination of the technical merits and the political and strategic requirements. And this is the key criticism if the manner in which India has chosen to make the deal — using only technical parameters to make a choice and ignoring diplomatic and strategic factors.

Considering how big this contract was, India could have received significant political benefits, which it stands to lose by making a technical decision. Even France could very well make the argument that there is no political quid pro quo for India choosing the Rafale because India itself claims that this was not a political choice. There is little reason why France has to give any political support for a decision that was purely technical in nature.

This leaves India in the politically the worst position possible — both the US and Russia, politically far more significant than France on global issues, are unhappy with India, but India is unlikely to get much benefit from France despite picking the French plane. And unlike Britain, which is also unhappy about the Indian decision, the US and Russia matter quite a lot in the global arena. So, India has effectively annoyed more important friends for nothing.

There are other factors in addition to the strategic factor that also needs closer examination. The cost factor itself is a serious issue. The unit cost of the plane is only one factor. The cost — acquisition, lifecycle and maintenance cost — should have been an important determinant in this decision. As against hundred odd Rafale, India could have procured many more Russian or US fighter jets for the same value. The Rafale option has cost India dearly both on the acquisition as well as the cost of spare parts.

Thus, though there may have been good reasons for picking the Rafale from a technical point of view, or even from a domestic political perspective, this is not enough. The choice should have at least considered the strategic implications in such a big contract.

That might still have led to the Rafale being picked, but it would have been a more defensible decision.

Flying into rough weather .... My OpEd on India's MMRCA decision in ToI

Here's a piece of mine on India's MMRCA decision that appeared in Times of India on Friday, Feb. 10, 2012.

New Delhi needs to be more careful in both understanding strategic moments and being able to exploit them if it wants to sit at the global high table.



India's long and convoluted search for a new fighter plane - a medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) - has entered its final stage. New Delhi has just announced that the Rafale, built by Dassault Aviation of France, has been chosen to meet the Indian Air Force's (IAF) requirement. Only price negotiation now remains.

The Rafale had been shortlisted along with the Eurofighter Typhoon from a field that originally included four more jets: the US-built F-16 and F-18, the Russian MiG-35 and the Swedish JAS 39 Gripen. But though the fight over the selection is over, questions about the wisdom of New Delhi's choice are unlikely to end any time soon.

Commenting on the MMRCA decision, a former IAF officer proudly stated that this was probably the first decision that was made purely on technical grounds. If accurate, this reveals serious strategic shortsightedness. While the government should have received inputs from the IAF, such a decision should not have been taken on purely technical grounds. For India's decision-makers, limiting themselves to technical specifications was a risk-free option, but that reveals more about the state of strategic decision-making in Delhi than the wisdom of the choice they made.

Ideally, the Indian decision should have been guided by a strategy that balances reducing danger and broadening opportunity. Accordingly, the question for New Delhi should have been how to use this lucrative deal to beef up India's strategic options. Thus, it is probably a strategic blunder to narrowly focus on technical specifications and capabilities alone, as many proponents of the IAF's choice have done.

A decision of this magnitude should have been filtered through three key parameters: strategic, operational and tactical. A pragmatic strategy would have been to analyse the risk and opportunity through these three parameters and then make the final decision about which of the fighter plane choices would have best advanced Indian security. In strategic and geopolitical terms, France can provide little help to India in either Asia or in the global theatre. While France has always been a well-wisher, it has never had much capacity to help India. For example, though France wanted to sell India nuclear reactors, it could do little to change the nuclear non-proliferation rules that prevented it from doing so. It took Washington to change these rules to India's benefit.

Additionally, numbers (of aircraft India could acquire) and cost should have been factored in. Buying fewer but more expensive aircraft might make some fighter jocks happy, but having greater numbers might be more relevant to a country like India which faces a two-front threat from China and Pakistan. It was often argued in the MMRCA debate that maintaining air superiority required technological superiority, range and payload but an equally important consideration is that of numbers.

Numerical superiority in India's regional context is of particular significance given that the current strength of India's fighter jets is only around 600, and unless replenished, it will reach critically low numbers soon. Meanwhile, both Beijing and Islamabad have been augmenting their fighter fleets. India could have procured far greater numbers of fighters with the US or Russian option.

Though the probability of a two-front war is low, no pragmatic Indian strategic decision-maker should rule it out. Indeed, it is precisely for this reason that the Indian army is raising new forces to deploy on the China border. It is unclear if the technological superiority of the Rafale is so great as to compensate for the smaller numbers that India will have to settle for.

Cost should have also had an important role in the MMRCA decision. India's decision to go for Rafale is going to cost New Delhi around $20 billion, if not more. Opting for a Russian or US jet would have been far cheaper. The Russian option would have been the least expensive whereas the American fighters would have been somewhere in the middle with the European jets being the most expensive. In overall terms, the American F-18s would have been the best given that they (as well as the F-16s) came with the second-generation AESA radars.

Lastly, the most important consideration should have been the strategic benefits that accrue to India through this deal. Indian decision-makers should have been mindful of the fact that this deal was as much about making strategic investments in a relationship as simply buying fighters. India does not enjoy a benign neighbourhood, and these security needs are important. But India also needs to balance these with its requirements as a rising power, which means having capable friends. The MMRCA deal was a great opportunity to consolidate its strategic ties with either Russia or the US, or even with both. Instead, New Delhi has ended up antagonising both of them.

The standard response that India has signed many other defence contracts with both Russia and the US does not wash because this was a very different and high-profile deal which was closely watched around the world. Signing smaller deals, even if they add up to significant amounts, does not have the same weight as the MMRCA deal. New Delhi needs to be more careful in both understanding strategic moments and being able to exploit them if it wants to sit at the global high table.