US-China Sub-Dialogue on South Asia

As China and the US gear up to "manage" South Asia, is this going to be the new theatre of conflict and competition? Or is Asia going to be left at the hands of the Chinese to manage and the US becomes the hegemonic power in Europe?

US Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia, Robert Blake who has been on a two-week tour to Nepal, Bhutan and China, will lead a delegation to Beijing for a bilaterl dialogue on matters South Asia on May 3-4, 2010. Blake is believed to initiate the dialogue by interactions with Chinese officials as well as the academics/think-tank community. Both China and the US, in fact, appears to be moving beyond the status of an "Observer" to pro-active participants in the affairs of the Indian Subcontinent.

Will China's pro-activism come at the cost of India? Until now, Beijing's government machinery was keen on ensuring that India remained a South Asian power, today, Beijing is beginning to challenge New Delhi in that very region. Has India taken a cosnious decision to outsource matters South Asia to China for the years/decades to come? What is the gameplan of the Indian government machinery? If India's aspirations to become even an Asian power are to be materialised, it should, in the first place, sort out its relations with its South Asian neighbours.



China is clearly taking important steps to solidify its relationship with SAARC as a whole, in addition to having excellent relations with each of the member countries. At the recently concluded SAARC Summit, Beijing proposed an assistance of $300,000 to the SAARC Development Fund.

China's pro-active approach towards South Asia appears to be a result of its own deepening relationship with South Asian countries as well as fulfilling its objective to emerge as a kind of "guardian" to all the South Asian countries. Second, it seems as an after-effect of the US-China Joint Statement in November 2009 for the two countries to jointly manage South Asia.

New Naval Strategy of China: "Far Sea Defence"

The New York Times, in a recent article brought out as to how China is moving away from its coastal defence strategy to that of a more expansionist strategy of "Far Sea Defence." Rear Adm. Zhang Huachen, deputy commander of the East Sea Fleet, in a recent interview to Xinhua, the State news agency, noted, "“With our naval strategy changing now, we are going from coastal defense to far sea defense." He detailed that, "With the expansion of the country’s economic interests, the navy wants to better protect the country's transportation routes and the safety of our major sea lanes. In order to achieve this, the Chinese Navy needs to develop along the lines of bigger vessels and with more comprehensive capabilities."

Bernard D. Cole, a former American naval officer and a professor at the National War College in Washington, commenting on some of the recent developments, noted that the Navy today gets a major chunk of the defence budget, indicative of Beijing's priorities.



Pasted below is the full New York Times story.

Chinese Military Seeks to Extend Its Naval Power
By EDWARD WONG
YALONG BAY, China — The Chinese military is seeking to project naval power well beyond the Chinese coast, from the oil ports of the Middle East to the shipping lanes of the Pacific, where the United States Navy has long reigned as the dominant force, military officials and analysts say.

China calls the new strategy “far sea defense,” and the speed with which it is building long-range capabilities has surprised foreign military officials.

The strategy is a sharp break from the traditional, narrower doctrine of preparing for war over the self-governing island of Taiwan or defending the Chinese coast. Now, Chinese admirals say they want warships to escort commercial vessels that are crucial to the country’s economy, from as far as the Persian Gulf to the Strait of Malacca, in Southeast Asia, and to help secure Chinese interests in the resource-rich South and East China Seas.

In late March, two Chinese warships docked in Abu Dhabi, the first time the modern Chinese Navy made a port visit in the Middle East.

The overall plan reflects China’s growing sense of self-confidence and increasing willingness to assert its interests abroad. China’s naval ambitions are being felt, too, in recent muscle flexing with the United States: in March, Chinese officials told senior American officials privately that China would brook no foreign interference in its territorial issues in the South China Sea, said a senior American official involved in China policy.

The naval expansion will not make China a serious rival to American naval hegemony in the near future, and there are few indications that China has aggressive intentions toward the United States or other countries.

But China, now the world’s leading exporter and a giant buyer of oil and other natural resources, is also no longer content to trust the security of sea lanes to the Americans, and its definition of its own core interests has expanded along with its economic clout.

In late March, Adm. Robert F. Willard, the leader of the United States Pacific Command, said in Congressional testimony that recent Chinese military developments were “pretty dramatic.” China has tested long-range ballistic missiles that could be used against aircraft carriers, he said. After years of denials, Chinese officials have confirmed that they intend to deploy an aircraft carrier group within a few years.

China is also developing a sophisticated submarine fleet that could try to prevent foreign naval vessels from entering its strategic waters if a conflict erupted in the region, said Admiral Willard and military analysts.

“Of particular concern is that elements of China’s military modernization appear designed to challenge our freedom of action in the region,” the admiral said.

Yalong Bay, on the southern coast of Hainan island in the South China Sea, is the site of five-star beach resorts just west of a new underground submarine base. The base allows submarines to reach deep water within 20 minutes and roam the South China Sea, which has some of the world’s busiest shipping lanes and areas rich in oil and natural gas that are the focus of territorial disputes between China and other Asian nations.

That has caused concern not only among American commanders, but also among officials in Southeast Asian nations, which have been quietly acquiring more submarines, missiles and other weapons. “Regional officials have been surprised,” said Huang Jing, a scholar of the Chinese military at the National University of Singapore. “We were in a blinded situation. We thought the Chinese military was 20 years behind us, but we suddenly realized China is catching up.”

China is also pressing the United States to heed its claims in the region. In March, Chinese officials told two visiting senior Obama administration officials, Jeffrey A. Bader and James B. Steinberg, that China would not tolerate any interference in the South China Sea, now part of China’s “core interest” of sovereignty, said an American official involved in China policy. It was the first time the Chinese labeled the South China Sea a core interest, on par with Taiwan and Tibet, the official said.

Another element of the Chinese Navy’s new strategy is to extend its operational reach beyond the South China Sea and the Philippines to what is known as the “second island chain” — rocks and atolls out in the Pacific, the official said. That zone significantly overlaps the United States Navy’s area of supremacy.

Japan is anxious, too. Its defense minister, Toshimi Kitazawa, said in mid-April that two Chinese submarines and eight destroyers were spotted on April 10 heading between two Japanese islands en route to the Pacific, the first time such a large Chinese flotilla had been seen so close to Japan. When two Japanese destroyers began following the Chinese ships, a Chinese helicopter flew within 300 feet of one of the destroyers, the Japanese Defense Ministry said.

Since December 2008, China has maintained three ships in the Gulf of Aden to contribute to international antipiracy patrols, the first deployment of the Chinese Navy beyond the Pacific. The mission allows China to improve its navy’s long-range capabilities, analysts say.

A 2009 Pentagon report estimated Chinese naval forces at 260 vessels, including 75 “principal combatants” — major warships — and more than 60 submarines. The report noted the building of an aircraft carrier, and said China “continues to show interest” in acquiring carrier-borne jet fighters from Russia. The United States Navy has 286 battle-force ships and 3,700 naval aircraft, though ship for ship the American Navy is considered qualitatively superior to the Chinese Navy.

The Pentagon does not classify China as an enemy force. But partly in reaction to China’s growth, the United States has recently transferred submarines from the Atlantic to the Pacific so that most of its nuclear-powered attack submarines are now in the Pacific, said Bernard D. Cole, a former American naval officer and a professor at the National War College in Washington.

The United States has also begun rotating three to four submarines on deployments out of Guam, reviving a practice that had ended with the cold war, Mr. Cole said.

American vessels now frequently survey the submarine base at Hainan island, and that activity leads to occasional friction with Chinese ships. A survey mission last year by an American naval ship, the Impeccable, resulted in what Pentagon officials said was harassment by Chinese fishing vessels; the Chinese government said it had the right to block surveillance in those waters because they are an “exclusive economic zone” of China.

The United States and China have clashing definitions of such zones, defined by a United Nations convention as waters within 200 nautical miles of a coast. The United States says international law allows a coastal country to retain only special commercial rights in the zones, while China contends the country can control virtually any activity within them.

Military leaders here maintain that the Chinese Navy is purely a self-defense force. But the definition of self-defense has expanded to encompass broad maritime and economic interests, two Chinese admirals contended in March.

“With our naval strategy changing now, we are going from coastal defense to far sea defense,” Rear Adm. Zhang Huachen, deputy commander of the East Sea Fleet, said in an interview with Xinhua, the state news agency.

“With the expansion of the country’s economic interests, the navy wants to better protect the country’s transportation routes and the safety of our major sea lanes,” he added. “In order to achieve this, the Chinese Navy needs to develop along the lines of bigger vessels and with more comprehensive capabilities.”

The navy gets more than one-third of the overall Chinese military budget, “reflecting the priority Beijing currently places on the navy as an instrument of national security,” Mr. Cole said. China’s official military budget for 2010 is $78 billion, but the Pentagon says China spends much more than that amount. Last year, the Pentagon estimated total Chinese military spending at $105 billion to $150 billion, still much less than what the United States spends on defense. For comparison, the Obama administration proposed $548.9 billion as the Pentagon’s base operating budget for next year.

The Chinese Navy’s most impressive growth has been in its submarine fleet, said Mr. Huang, the scholar in Singapore. It recently built at least two Jin-class submarines, the first regularly active ones in the fleet with ballistic missile capabilities, and two more are under construction. Two Shang-class nuclear-powered attack submarines recently entered service.

Countries in the region have responded with their own acquisitions, said Carlyle A. Thayer, a professor at the Australian Defense Force Academy. In December, Vietnam signed an arms deal with Russia that included six Kilo-class submarines, which would give Vietnam the most formidable submarine fleet in Southeast Asia. Last year, Malaysia took delivery of its first submarine, one of two ordered from France, and Singapore began operating one of two Archer-class submarines bought from Sweden.

Last fall, during a speech in Washington, Lee Kuan Yew, the former Singaporean leader, reflected widespread anxieties when he noted China’s naval rise and urged the United States to maintain its regional presence. “U.S. core interest requires that it remains the superior power on the Pacific,” he said. “To give up this position would diminish America’s role throughout the world.”

Thom Shanker contributed reporting from Washington.

US-India Deal Clouds Nuclear Summit

Here's a link to a story on India-US Nuclear Deal and the Nuclear Security Summit by Peter Brown that has quoted me. The story appeared today (April 13) in Asia Times Online.

For India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who was on Sunday tapped by US President Barack Obama for his first major one-on-one meeting at the sidelines of this week's Nuclear Security Summit in Washington DC, much has changed since his visit to the US capital last November.

The two-day summit, which is focusing on making atomic sites and materials safer from terrorists, comes after last week's release of the latest US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and the signing in Prague of the US-Russia START nuclear arms control treaty. In May, there is also the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference.



There are sub-plots to the US-India engagement, including the continuing dispute over Indian access to David Headley, the Mumbai terror suspect being tried in the US, relations with Pakistan and the situation in Afghanistan. Still, Singh's superb salesmanship is once again on display thanks to the US announcement in late March of a nuclear reprocessing agreement with India.

The deal will allow India to acquire spent nuclear fuel from the US, and as a result, places India in an elite group along with Japan and several European nations.

"At a time when overall relations have been under something of a cloud, the reprocessing agreement, and its timely completion, suggests that a bipartisan commitment at the highest levels of the US government on the single most consequential issue area in bilateral relations for New Delhi - high-technology trade - remains intact," said Sourabh Gupta, senior research associate at Samuels International Associates in Washington, DC.

This was billed as one of the expected outcomes of the broad "123 Agreement" - the name commonly used for the 2008 civilian US-India nuclear deal officially known as the US-India Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. But it has faced a barrage of criticism especially from domestic opponents in the US.

Unlike the new START treaty between Russia and the US, and the recent release of the NPR, the US-India deal has not captured everyone's attention as the curtain rises on the summit. Along with the summit's focus on the threat of nuclear terrorism, Iran and North Korea - though not officially on the agenda - are likely to feature heavily in Obama's talks with leaders.

In discussions with Chinese President Hu Jintao, Obama is likely try to cement China's commitment to pressuring Iran over its nuclear program through sanctions, as well as cool recent Sino-US tensions. The summit of 47 nations in Washington comes ahead of an alternative international nuclear disarmament conference in Tehran on April 17-18.

China has kept silent on the US-India nuclear reprocessing deal. The visit to China by India's Foreign Minister S M Krishna a fortnight ago may be one reason. China also advocates the right of all nations to pursue civilian nuclear programs and the peaceful uses of nuclear power in general. China probably prefers to mask its displeasure, since China will sit down with India again at the latest of the increasingly important BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) summits, to be held in Brasilia on April 16.

"From the day this agreement passed muster at the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in September 2008 - despite their non-constructive role in the NSG at the time, Beijing has known that this was a done deal,'' said Gupta, referring the US-India nuclear reprocessing agreement. ''To their credit though, they have thereafter chosen to pursue their interest in somewhat stabilizing the political relationship with New Delhi, rather than publicly nurse their grievances about an arrangement that became the capstone of the US-India bilateral partnership."

While Beijing would like the US and the international community to accord a similar set of civilian nuclear arrangements to Pakistan, that is not going to happen, Gupta said. ''And Beijing is not likely to facilitate such bilateral cooperation either to the extent that it calls into question its treaty and norm-based commitments to the international non-proliferation regime."

On the other hand, China has taken the opportunity to send a strong signal both to India and the US via its critique of the NPR, which China's views as deliberately distorting China's nuclear intentions at time when the US's strategy involves surrounding China with nations that have rapidly evolving nuclear capabilities of their own.

"It is publicly known that the US once had hundreds of nuclear warheads aimed at China. Even today, it has numerous naval vessels deployed carrying nuclear weapons that can be retrained on China swiftly," said an editorial in China's Global Times newspaper in early April. "In Asia, China is surrounded by countries that have signed nuclear pacts with the US. It is the US, not China, that should provide more transparency regarding its nuclear intentions." [1]

The reference to "nuclear pacts" applies to both India and Japan equally.

"I wouldn't be happy if I were [President Jintao], but China is also to blame for not blocking the original Nuclear Security Group waiver for India which was approved by consensus," said Miles Pomper, senior research associate at the California-based James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. "Still, I am not sure how much it will affect the tone of the summit, which is more focused officially on dealing with nuclear terrorism and, on the sidelines, on dealing with Iran."

India walks away the clear winner here. The Obama-Singh meeting further reinforces the perception that the US wants to highlight its strong relationship with India no matter how strong this relationship might be at present, especially in India's eyes.

"It is not the reprocessing capability right now that is the danger. India had sufficient capability to reprocess material in its existing unsafeguarded reactor facilities to build upon its stockpile," said Pomper. "It is what the agreement says about the willingness of the US to stand up to India, particularly when it comes the possibility of an Indian nuclear test such as one that clearly shows ability to develop a two-stage thermonuclear weapon. That is what I would worry about if I were China."

Pomper said the real problem with the deal is that it gives India a better deal in terms of reprocessing rights from the US than both Japan, which is a non-nuclear state, and Euratom, which is a mix of European nuclear and non-nuclear states.

"Not to mention those countries are closer allies to the US as well," said Pomper. "Those deals laid out explicit criteria under which the US could suspend the agreement. The most important of which that is in Euratom's [deal], for example, but is missing from the India deal is if the other party tests a nuclear device. This seems to open the door to further Indian nuclear tests. Also missing is a provision that it could be suspended in the case of a safeguards violation by Euratom and that was missing from this [agreement]."

Yes, there is a provision that if the agreement is suspended for more than six months, the US will have to enter into consultations on compensating India for its loss, too.

"For India, this is too good to be true, but US negotiators seem to have a congenital predisposition to giving away the store when they negotiate with India," said Pomper.

India is not changing any of its previously held positions with respect to nuclear issues as a result of signing this agreement. It will not be signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty anytime soon, for example. The same is true for the NPT.

Gupta emphasizes that the assurances that India has given here are contained "mainly within the understandings that were reached during negotiation of the umbrella 123 Agreement.

"Though the 123 Agreement, as read, leaves a degree of ambiguity as to what are the criteria for termination (so as to make ratification, then, of the deal palatable in both legislatures), a private communication from the State Department to then-chairman Lantos of the House Foreign Affairs Committee in January 2008 - and presumably known to the Indian side - explicitly lays out these criteria," said Gupta. "They are: detonation of a nuclear weapon; material violation of the 123 Agreement; or violation or termination by New Delhi of its IAEA-negotiated safeguard agreement. These are assurances communicated by India."

Furthermore, as part of the arrangement and procedures of the March 2010 agreement, New Delhi has provided written bilateral undertakings on end-user guarantees as well as non-diversion of nuclear materials.

"All overseas-supplied reactors, fuel, as well as facilities reprocessing such irradiated fuel are also to remain under IAEA safeguards. The [arrangement and procedures] also specifically list the number of facilities to be covered and the procedure for 'consultation visits' to such facilities by US officials," said Gupta.
India is very firm and relishes engagement in tough negotiations. These US visits may occur only every five years, for example. India makes no excuses, and retains its consistent hard-edged approach both in bilateral and multilateral forums.

"As far as the CTBT is concerned, our position is very well-known. It has been reiterated on a number of occasions. We are committed to a voluntary moratorium on nuclear explosive testing. That remains our position. That has been very clearly articulated to all our friends and partners," said India's Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao in response to a question at a press conference in New Delhi in early April.

India played trump card after trump card in this instance. The US wanted only a single reprocessing facility in India, but India prevailed after citing the 123 Agreement, and in the end, multiple reprocessing facilities were approved.

"According to the final agreement, the reprocessing of spent fuel is meant to be done at two dedicated stand-alone facilities, with India allowed to make additions and modifications without going back to the US for additional negotiations," said Rajeswari Rajagopalan, a senior fellow in security studies at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi. "In fact, India could take up the lead in setting up an international reprocessing center in India for the whole region. Such a facility could possibly aid Iran in getting reprocessed spent nuclear fuel for its civilian energy programs."

Iran will be a formal agenda item at the BRIC Summit for the first time. However, regardless of what does or does not happen in Brazil, the reprocessing agreement is behind schedule - and that it surfaced just before the Nuclear Security Summit is little more than a coincidence.

"The timing is not terrible, to start with. This agreement was meant to be concluded between India and the US way back in November 2009 during Singh's visit to Washington. However, the negotiations went on for several more months," said Rajagopalan. "It is up to the Obama administration to ably justify this to the Chinese leadership and the larger international community."

At a time when jobs are scarce and unemployment is high, the economic ramifications of this deal are not to be overlooked.

"This important step is part of the great, win-win narrative of the US-India global partnership, affirming the commitment of our two countries to realize the full potential of our landmark civil nuclear agreement [in 2008]," said US Ambassador to India Timothy Roemer. "These arrangements will help open the door for US firms in India's rapidly expanding energy sector, creating thousands of jobs for the citizens of both our countries. We applaud India's outstanding track record on non-proliferation issues, and we look forward to our continuing cooperation in this area." [2]

In addition, the US has watched as Russian and European companies have become more active in the India nuclear energy sector. While the final passage of India's Nuclear Liability Bill is still an obstacle, it is expected that differences will be ironed out.

"France and Russia have been more enthusiastic about working with India in its civilian nuclear energy sector. In fact, the India-Russian agreement signed during Prime Minister Putin's visit envisages building up 16 nuclear reactors in three different locations, of which six are to be finished by 2017," said Rajagopalan. "If the US does not get its act together, Russia and France will clearly have a head start. It is quite certain that commerce and big business are issues that the US will understand and accordingly tailor its policies. In fact, conclusion of this agreement facilitates early participation by US firms in India's rapidly expanding civil nuclear market."

The politics of job creation and politics of nuclear non-proliferation are two different things entirely. In this instance, India enjoys such a unique status that the lines are easily blurred when it comes to figuring out exactly where the US is heading.

"Reprocessing is the Holy Grail for non-proliferation advocates,'' said Subrata Ghoshroy, senior associate in the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. ''It is not such a bad idea as long as the facilities are under safeguards. Under the NPT, each nation has a right to technology for peaceful development of nuclear energy. So, we cannot deny specific technologies to countries. Now, it is true that India is not an NPT member state. So, it does not have that right. But, the US has branded India a 'responsible' nuclear state. So, how can we deny them this technology?"

By the way, India considers Iran to be a "responsible state" too in this regard.

"When we talk about nuclear security and the threat of nuclear terrorism, we are referring to it in a global context. All responsible members of the world community, international community, have a stake in ensuring that we have comprehensive nuclear security," said Rao in a recent news conference. "Iran is a country with which we have bilateral relations which go back many many years. It is a substantive relationship. We regard Iran as a very important country in the region and a country with which we have had, as I said, extensive bilateral relations and dialogue and cooperation. It is a responsible country."

As for the Russians, they benefit enormously in India from the inability of the US to establish and maintain firm policies.

"The Russians are not hampered by the liability issues as the US firms are. Russians are also cheap and they have maintained a long-standing relationship with the Indian [nuclear sector], when the US had sanctions on India. So, they do have a leg up," said Ghoshroy. "However, the Indians are interested in better technology, which the US could provide. The Russian presence continues to be significant, and as long as US equivocates perhaps of necessity between India and Pakistan, the Russian presence will continue."

As for the sense that things will simpler and less complicated as time moves along, well, there is little chance of that happening. The highway to nuclear energy nirvana features numerous large potholes.

"The Chinese also want reprocessing technology from the US. Pakistan may try to raise it, but it has lot on its plate given the continued controversy around the Khan network. It also wants a nuclear deal like India's," said Ghoshroy. "The main topics [at the Nuclear Security Summit] will be, of course, Iran and North Korea, which the administration wants and Israeli nukes, that both Israel and Obama do not want to discuss. Well, Netanyahu nixed that plan by not coming. The administration will also have a lot to defend about its new NPR."

Notes
1.) US nuclear review misreads China, Global Times, April 2010.
2. US - India Nuclear Deal, Voice of America, April 12, 2010
Peter J Brown is a freelance writer from Maine USA.

Discussion at the Department of Political Science, Kerala University

I was recently at the Department of Political Science, Kerala University, my alma mater (I did my Masters here). Went to the Department for meeting my professors, but ended up doing a lecture on "Changing Sino-Indian Military Equations," followed by an interaction for about 45 minutes. Curiously enough, there were a lot of questions on the rising Chinese capabilities and their tactics, some of which are meant to keep India under pressure and seek a compromise, thereafter, on the border issue. I found this curious because in Kerala, even among academics, there is a general pro-Left or the anti-US sentiment which is quite strong.



The pro-Left/anti-US sentiment is strong and this was in fact visible during a lecture that I was doing in one of the colleges in Cochin two years back. India was thick in the debate on India-US nuclear deal then and I was making a presentation on Indo-US ties in general. As I started explaining the nuclear deal and detailed as to how it is a good deal for India, few of the faculty members went out and later on, over a cup of coffee, they were in a sense questioning me as to how could I support a deal with the United States. And I spent the next 45 minutes explaining that this is a deal that benefits India immensely.

I must make a mention about this survey. The Department understakes surveys on a regular basis on a range of issues across the State. In fact, in one of the national security surveys, on a question regarding India's threat perceptions, Pakistan was listed as number followed by the US; China was nowhere in the picture.

US 2010 Nuclear Posture Review is out ...

The much-awaited US Nuclear Posture Review is out .... Some of the major objectives and recommendations are given below.



The document details key objectives as:
1. Preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism;
2. Reducing the role of US nuclear weapons;
3. Maintaining strategic deterrence and and stability at reduced nuclear force levels;
4. Strengthening regional deterrence and reassurance of US allies and partners; and
5. Sustaining a safe, secure and effective nuclear arsenal.

Lecture at North Carolina State University (NCSU)

I was in North Carolina recently and had given a lecture on the rising Chinese military power at the North Carolina State University (February 23, 2010). The lecture was essentially for two classes, one on Chinese Politics of Prof. Oliver Williams and the other, US National Security Strategy of Prof. William Boettcher.



Rise of China has clearly stirred a debate not only in India and other countries in Asia, but in the US and other western countries. It is unclear as to how China will behave as it grows stronger, but it is clear that it will have significant impact on the region. As a recent US report put it, as “Chinese military power grows, its leaders’ options increase with respect to the use of coercion to press diplomatic advantage, advance interests, or resolve disputes.” While some of the major powers have adopted inclusive and accommodative approaches, other powers have tended to assume exclusive approaches that are not congenial to a stable Asian security order.

What drives Chinese military strategy is its fast-paced growth rate that allows greater money in its kitty along with greater ambitions and even greater sense of insecurity. Chinese military modernisation is also clearly in tune with its ambition to become the number one power in the world. Chinese military modernisation and its enhanced capabilities have resulted in uncertainties in the region. While procurement of weapon systems need not necessarily result in better capabilities, China has systematically relied on Russian, Western and Israeli technology to buy as well as imbibe the technology into its own indigenous technology kitty.

China’s military modernisation and the secrecy that shrouds it also have serious consequences for Asian stability. China’s military modernisation would directly impact on the general military build-up in the region, particularly in countries like India, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. If India modernises its forces, there would be almost simultaneous enhancement of defence capabilities by Pakistan. China’s military modernisation, thus, has a cascading effect in the region, with increasing arms race as a constant feature.

While China’s behaviour, for the near-term, is likely to be defensive towards more capable powers such as the US, its overall capability building goes beyond its stated objectives (of defending themselves against Taiwan). This fits within its overall grand strategy of ensuring a peaceful external security environment in order to focus on its economic development. However, the increasing Chinese defence expenditure and its military modernization suggest that other powers need to be cautious in estimating the consequences of China’s rise.

This is the first time in centuries that there is simultaneous rise of three major powers in Asia. While China is realistic to understand that rise of other major powers in Asia -- Japan and India -- cannot be halted, it does adopt approaches that are counterproductive to a cooperative framework in Asia. India and Japan, for instance, will continue to look for an inclusive approach as opposed to the Chinese’ exclusivist approach that appears directed against India, US and Japan. Beijing has continued to believe that its peaceful rise and the emergence as a dominant power in Asia is only an assumption of its rightful place in the region and in fact a return to the old, but natural order for the region. India may not be willing to see an Asia dominated by any one power.

Therefore, competition for influence between China and Japan, China and the US, China and Russia and China and India are going to be some of the unfortunate features of the new Asian century. US choice as either an engaged Asian power or a reclusive offshore balancer will be an indicator to its key security partners in Asia about the credibility of the US extended deterrence strategy as well as the future Asian security matrix.

ISA Annual Convention in New Orleans

I recently attended the International Studies Association (ISA) Annual Convention at New Orleans, USA (February 17-20, 2010). I had put up a panel on India and the Major Powers, where I had Prof. Vincent Wang presenting paper on India-China relations titled, The Rise of India and / versus the Rise of China:
“Chindia” or Rivalry?; Dr. Katsuhisa Furukawa on Japan’s Evolving Perspectives toward India; Dr. Rudra Chaudhuri on Re-assessing India’s Emerging Foreign Policy of Strategic Engagement: An Inside Look at India’s Response to the Iraq War (2003); and I had a paper on US Strategy and Indo-US Relations.

For a panel abstract and brief synopsis of the papers, continue reading.



Asia is widely expected to be at the center of global politics in the 21st century. All the major powers today are Asian powers, either because they are on the continent, or, as in the case of the United States, they have vital interests and direct impact on the politics of this region. Whether they will cooperate with each other or compete will at least partly be determined by the kind of bilateral and multilateral interactions that each of these countries have with each other. India has been touted as the next major power that cannot be ignored by the international community. This panel on India and the Major Powers looked at India’s relations with the US, China, and Japan. Each of the papers looked at the important variables determining the state of bilateral relations as also make some prognosis about the future.

The Rise of India and / versus the Rise of China: “Chindia” or Rivalry? How and whether India and China can continue their respective rises will critically shape international relations of the young twenty-first century; they will also provide key answers to the debate on whether an “Asian century” has finally arrived, eclipsing five centuries of Western dominance.

Yet these two Asian great powers demonstrate sharp contrasts in terms of their political systems, economic models, and social structures, despite their common aspirations for greater stature on the world stage. They have also maintained a very complex relationship that is weighed down by history but also offers promising opportunities in an era of globalization.

While the implications for the rise of China have been debated in the global or systemic contexts, as well as regional or bilateral contexts, thin scholarly attention has been devoted to the rise of India, and how these two Asian great powers perceive the ascendancy of each other. Yet how they view each other and consequently negotiate their paths in substantially changed international milieus will be important for scholarly interest and policy making.

This paper examines the key factors influencing India-China relations, including history, geography, territorial disputes, mutual threat perception and alignment patterns, economic partnership and competition. It categorizes Indian elites’ perspectives on the rise of China into three paradigms: geopolitical, geoeconomic, and geocivilizational. It ends with a discussion of the possible scenarios of future India-China relations.

Japan’s Evolving Perspectives toward India
The bilateral relationship between Japan and India has been evolving rapidly over the past decade. Japanese Prime Minister Mori’s visit to India in August 2000 provided the momentum to strengthen this relationship. Similarly, the "Joint Statement on the Advancement of the Strategic and Global Partnership between Japan and India” and the "Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between Japan and India" signed during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Japan in 2008, have sought to promote bilateral cooperation on a range of areas, including security. While this paper examines factors that have determined the new direction in Japan-India ties, it will also examine the future trends and conceivable scenarios for the future.

From the Japanese perspective, various factors -- the rising China and its expanding influence on the sea-lanes of commerce -- have affected Japan’s interests in deepening bilateral cooperation with India. This is a motivation driven both by realist strategic calculations and liberal perspective, emphasizing the importance of promoting democracy and human rights which an increasing number of Japanese expect India to share with Japan. Japan also aspires to play a more leading role in global affairs partly in response to expanding Chinese influence on global politics, and partly as a reflection of the reality in Japan where new generations who are accustomed to the Western idea to respect rule of laws, governance, human rights, and democracy, takes responsible positions in Japan. Lastly, as globalization has blurred the regional boundaries for new security threats, such as infectious diseases, climate change, WMD proliferation, Japan needs to address challenges in other regions, including South Asia which was regarded as a far region for Japan traditionally.

Re-assessing India’s Emerging Foreign Policy of Strategic Engagement: An Inside Look at India’s Response to the Iraq War (2003)
The conventional wisdom regards India’s contemporary approach to foreign policy is underpinned on the central theme of change. Strategic engagement is a mantra that has come to replace the traditional moorings of non-alignment. Scholars and practitioners alike argue that since the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led Government came to power in 1998, a normative shift took place. ‘Pragmatism’ opposed to ‘age-old ideals’ came to inform policy. Yet, a detailed assessment of India’s response to the US request to contribute troops in 2003, an under-studied case, and the negotiations of the US-India Nuclear Deal in 2008, demonstrates that in fact, the political leadership were far more restrained in there interactions with US officials than commentators make out. This paper, based on extensive interviews with key bureaucrats, politicians, and negotiators both in India and the US, attempts to re-assess what now seems to be understood as the conventional wisdom in both countries. It makes the case that rather than change per se; India is undergoing a process of cultural change. Embedded are tensions that both these case studies make clear have not yet been unraveled by India’s policy/political elite across political parties.

US Strategy and Indo-US Relations
While it is difficult to predict the future of any bilateral ties, this would be particularly the case in US-India relations given the new administration in both New Delhi and Washington. It will be more useful to look at US grand strategy in Asia, and then analyze where India fits in the US scheme in Asia. Ever since the end of the Cold War, there has been an extensive debate about what kind of grand strategy the US should adopt. Although not conclusive, these debates provide a way of looking at American concerns and their impact on important bilateral relations.

US Grand Strategy has faced a couple of internal problems, problems inherent in the logic of the American approach. First, the US has swung between policies of confrontation and engagement, between a strategy based on ensuring American primacy and one based on American leadership. Second, the US has several strategic goals and they do not always complement each other. These problems are visible in all of the areas that are described below. The main components of the US grand strategy are changing conceptions of how Washington would deal with emerging great powers; manage the spread of weapons of mass destruction; prosecute the war on terrorism; and finally handle the complexities of the economic dynamism of the Pacific rim.

In addition to these grand strategic factors, there are three other factors that could potentially affect the US-India bilateral relationship. These include: the rise of China, nuclear-related issues including bilateral civil nuclear cooperation, concerns about nuclear proliferation in India’s neighbourhood and bilateral defence ties.