China in Indian Ocean Region

Here's a link to an article by Peter Brown on what China is actually doing in terms of extending its influence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), and how India and the US are likely to react, that has qouted me extensively. The story appeared in (October 22, 2009) the Asia Times Online.

India learned to live with Chinese merchant ships in the Indian Ocean region long ago, and even the Chinese vessel seized by pirates this week was bound for India from South Africa. And yet, India is taking stock of the presence of Chinese naval vessels in the Indian Ocean region. This development will constitute a major headache for India as it unfolds - something altogether new and unsettling.



Three Chinese PLA Navy (PLAN) vessels do not make a fleet, but they do make a statement. By sending them to patrol off the coast of Somalia as part of the multinational force, in effect, China simply is saying to India," We're back."

Just as it has done on India's northern border, where the number of reported border incursions doubled to almost 300 from 2007 to 2008, China has undertaken a series of actions in the Indian Ocean region which may not be as menacing or confrontational as what has been underway along India's northern border, but it suggests a shift in attitude in Beijing. In the process, these not-so-subtle naval moves by China are proving to be far more than mere distractions in New Delhi.

"For the first time ever in the western IOR [Indian Ocean region], India has set up a listening post in Madagascar - a high-tech monitoring station in northern Madagascar. This station is of great significance given its proximity to [the port of] Gwadar [in Pakistan] as well as the Chinese increasing [their] presence in the western IOR. Unlike in other countries of the region, China has not made much headway in Madagascar," said Dr Rajeswari Rajagopalan, senior fellow in security studies at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi.

"The Chinese were quick to note how their lack of a maritime capacity to engage in disaster relief and rescue during the 2004 tsunami also redounded in the formation of an ad hoc maritime alliance between the US, Japan, Australia and India to its detriment," said Sourabh Gupta, senior research associate at Samuels International Associates, Inc in Washington, DC.

"By appropriating capabilities in this disaster assistance and humanitarian relief area as well as participating in global stakeholder activities such as the Somalia anti-piracy mission, the PLAN seems to have cottoned on to a convenient vehicle for regional and 'out of area' naval activity - non-traditional security missions - without setting off alarm bells."

Beijing's resource-based diplomacy is emerging as a major challenge not only for the US - in the Indian Ocean region and elsewhere - but for other major players in Asia as well, including India.

"Energy security and hunger for other natural resources are the primary motivating factors besides gaining strategic foothold in the IOR. The region has about 40% of the world's oil and gas reserves and additionally the locus of several important sea lines of communication [SLOCs, or the primary maritime routes between ports]. Constraining India's growth aspirations and limiting its potential in the South Asian region continue to be underlying objectives in Chinese policies in several countries in the IOR such as Sri Lanka, Maldives and Pakistan," said Rajagopalan.

Gwadar in Pakistan, Hambantota in Sri Lanka and Marao in the Maldives along with another seaport site - or two - in Myanmar now serve as the nucleus for China's so-called "string of pearls" strategy. Gwadar in particular offers China a base of naval operations close to major energy transportation routes from the Persian Gulf, according to Rajagopalan.

"While many of the Chinese moves [in the Indian Ocean region] may not be overtly confrontational, they do create potential for tension between India and China, Japan and China and so on. Beijing has consolidated its relations with almost all of the IOR countries in the last few years," said Rajagopalan. "For example, President Hu Jintao's recent visits to Mauritius and Seychelles were about establishing a firm strategic foothold in these IOR states. Mauritius is particularly important, given its proximity to Diego Garcia and the US military presence there."

Despite much talk of this "string of pearls" strategy in the Indian Ocean region, Gupta sees no compelling evidence of PLAN basing activities as yet beyond port development activities in Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Myanmar.

"Indeed, the recently retired top Indian foreign policy bureaucrat - Shiv Shankar Menon - pointed this fact out very recently. Of course, the apprehension persists that some of the maritime security dilemmas that prevail in East and Southeast Asia will gravitate to the IOR and compound tensions," said Gupta.

Chinese shipping companies have maintained port operations on the Panama Canal and even in Long Beach, California, for years, but while this trend is disconcerting, it does not translate into any immediate overt military presence or decisive strategic advantage. It does, however, enable China to conduct naval intelligence, economic espionage and other related covert activities more easily.

Gupta emphasizes that while China is raising the temperature in the Indian Ocean region a notch, observers should avoid distorting or exaggerating the scope of China's naval activities there.

"Their naval forces are heading 'out of area' for the first time in many centuries and, paired with the poor communications skills of the Chinese military, there are concerns within the region. But when compared to the PLA Navy's [PLAN's] situation and activities in East and Southeast Asia - active maritime territorial disputes; snooping in territorial waters; tangling with US vessels in exclusive economic zones [EEZs] - the PLAN's current IOR activities are relatively benign," said Gupta.

Chinese naval strategists subscribe to the view that naval power is truly a representation of a country's comprehensive power. China cannot attain greatness without being a full-fledged seafaring power, and yet, "The Chinese do swimmingly free-riding on the back of US underwriting of the global commons," said Gupta.

Meanwhile, any reading of the tea leaves on the Southeast Asian side of the Indian Ocean region is difficult indeed.

"Some of the Southeast countries which are littoral states in the Indian Ocean region also have been watchful of the increasing competition in the region. Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand are becoming more aware of the consequences of a potential major power conflict in the region and are becoming parties to various regional and sub-regional groupings to mitigate the regional tensions," said Rajagopalan.

Singapore and Thailand, for instance, are already squaring off over the long-discussed Kra Canal, which would provide a direct link between the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean - bypassing the Straits of Malacca through which an estimated 80% of China's oil now flows.

"China is a new enthusiastic partner [and a big potential investor in this instance]. However, Singapore and the US remain opposed to the idea, for different reasons. The US opposition has to do with the fact that it will enable China to develop a much stronger influence in the region. This is a concern shared by countries like India and Japan as well," said Rajagopalan.

If angered, certain of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations' (ASEAN's) 10 countries could have an immediate adverse impact on China's naval operations, quickly sealing off the Indian Ocean region.

"ASEAN, because of its proximity as well as its South China Sea disputes with the PRC [People's Republic of China], has an especially lucid window to Chinese naval practices. It has the inclination and the will to invite US forces to bottle-up the Chinese navy in its own backyard if it was deemed to be acting mischievously," said Gupta.

As for the role of former US bases in ASEAN nations, especially Subic Bay in the the Philippines - once the site of a large US Navy base along with a US Air Force base until the end of the Cold War - in support of Indian Ocean region military operations, any return to Subic Bay by US military forces in large numbers now seems farfetched.

"Already, given the perennial controversy that surrounds the Okinawa bases, a return of US personnel in large numbers to any Southeast Asian base - short of outright Chinese regional aggression or provocation - is likely be seen as an unwelcome throwback to the past," said Gupta. "Given the recently agreed-upon realignment of forces in Japan and additional forward positioning there of some command functions as well as the availability of Guam, I think a Subic Bay redeployment in this day and age of beyond-the-horizon capabilities is superfluous."

Gupta recommends that if there are US needs beyond Japan and Guam, they are probably best attained through joint pre-positioning sites, similar to what exists in Singapore, "with additional contingency access to host-nation facilities, but with only a skeletal American permanent presence on site".

In addition to engaging in an extensive schedule of joint exercises and training, Singapore's level of cooperation with the US serves as a model here. It offers the US vital logistical infrastructure, including aircraft carrier dry-dock facilities, and pre-positioning of US equipment, among other things.

For years to come, the US will remain the dominant player in the Indian Ocean region, while "India is likely to pick up some of the slack in the future and be a reliable defender of regional maritime responsibilities. In its own theater, Australia already is projected to commit greater naval assets, too," said Gupta.

On the other hand, greater Asian economic interests might prove to be a powerful and quite unexpected catalyst for change in the Indian Ocean region.

"After all, in a significant way, the Chinese economic interest in the security and stewardship of SLOCs is synonymous with India's as well as its ASEAN and East Asian partners. Hence, cooperative great power initiatives including China to safeguard the maritime commons and limit their mutual competitive tendencies within a broader framework of cooperation is not beyond the realm of possibility," said Gupta.

Losing the Indian Ocean region as a sphere of influence is not an option for India under any circumstance. Sharing it is another matter entirely and India would have to be far more trusting of China than it is now for such a scheme to float.

Regardless, India cannot afford to become so narrowly focused on China's blue-water aspirations because India has urgent coastal protection concerns as well. The terror attack on the city of Mumbai last November demonstrated that India's coastline is quite unprotected - the militants arrived by sea.

"One must reflect on the fact that India's lone aircraft carrier provided no defense against the Mumbai attackers who after all infiltrated by sea from [the Pakistani port city of] Karachi. Big ticket items and strategic deterrence and power projection notwithstanding, it is coastal defenses and the unsexy business of strengthening coast guard capabilities that is the crying need of the hour," said Gupta.

Among other things, India still has considerable time to further develop and deploy land-based naval aviation assets in a multi-layered defensive posture using a forward-thinking approach. While borrowing certain elements from the system that was deployed by the Russians to counter US carrier groups in the western Pacific might make sense, the door is also open to a greater role for unmanned aerial vehicles both for maintaining maritime domain awareness and engaging in force projection.

India has room for "helicopter carriers" - both for defensive purposes and rapid response to disasters throughout the Indian Ocean region - such as those that Japan has been building lately and India has new space assets including a new ocean surveillance satellite at its disposal.

India has much to sort out. Its reluctance to join the anti-piracy mission off Somalia, and its attachment to big carriers with all their inherent littoral vulnerabilities, might be easily explained, but agility and quick maneuvers count as well when the chips are down. China may go on winning points and gaining some ground in the Indian Ocean region, but India sits right in the middle of it, and that geopolitical reality will not turn with the tide.

"The US is likely to play a greater role in the region, given the developments of the past few years. Its military presence in Diego Garcia is likely to be augmented in the coming years for several reasons, including the China factor," said Rajagopalan. "Additionally, it might be important for countries like India and the US, as key players in the IOR, to strengthen their maritime cooperation. Such cooperation could also involve other states such as Japan, Australia and Singapore."

INDIA/CHINA: Hopes for Early Border Settlement Recede

Here's a story by Ranjit Devraj on the recent India-China border controversies that has quoted me and it has appeared today on the Inter Press Service (Rome, Italy) website.



INDIA/CHINA:
Hopes for Early Border Settlement Recede

Analysis by Ranjit Devraj
NEW DELHI, Oct 16 (IPS) - Hopes for an early settlement of the ‘world’s oldest standing border dispute’ receded last week after Asian neighbours China and India engaged in a tit-for-tat spat that ran counter to the spirit of a formal dialogue they are engaged in.
On Wednesday India's external affairs ministry called on Beijing to cease work on development projects, including highways and hydro-electric dams, in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir.

That request was made apparently in retaliation for China’s objections to an electioneering visit made by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to the north-eastern state of Arunachal Pradesh, which Beijing considers to be disputed territory and part of the Tibetan Autonomous Region.

A day earlier, a Chinese spokesman had sent shockwaves through the Indian establishment by saying at a press briefing in Beijing: ‘’China expresses its strong dissatisfaction on the visit by the Indian leader to the disputed area in disregard of China’s grave concerns.’’

"By trying to tell the Indian prime minister where he can go within his own country, all limits of diplomacy have been crossed," said Sujit Dutta, one of India’s foremost China experts. "In fact, this is the worst of a series of provocations emanating over the last six months from Beijing, to which the Indian government responded in a muted fashion."

Dutta, who is currently a professor at the Nelson Mandela Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the Jamia Milia Islamia University, listed among those provocations the issuance of ‘stapled visas’ to Indian students from Indian Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh "as if to question their citizenship status".

China became a party to the territorial dispute over the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir state by occupying the Aksai Chin area following the 1962 Sino-Indian border war and was ceded the Trans-Karakorum tract (or Shaksam valley) by Pakistan in the following year. Currently, India administers 43 percent of Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan controls 37 percent and China holds 20 percent.

During the 1962 war China invaded and briefly occupied large parts of Arunachal Pradesh, which it officially refers to as ‘southern Tibet’, but withdrew its troops across the mountains for logistical reasons.

Currently, the effective border between China and India is the Line-of-Actual Control, which extends over 4,057 kilometres, with Kashmir on the west end and Arunachal Pradesh on the east. In between fall the Indian states of Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh, the republic of Nepal, Sikkim state and the kingdom of Bhutan.

Dutta also counted among the provocations the objections raised by China at the Asian Development Bank to a loan being provided for a hydro-electric project in Arunachal Pradesh, which caused the bank’s operations in the territory to cease. "Such actions are not conducive to an easy settlement of the border issue," he said.

Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, a senior fellow at the independent Organiser Research Foundation (ORF), told IPS that she believed China’s provocations were primarily calculated to put pressure on India to "soften its positions at the negotiating table" for a series of border talks that have been conducted between the two countries over three decades.

At the 13th round of talks, which took place Aug. 7-8 in Beijing it was decided to set up a ‘hotline’ between Beijing and New Delhi as part of confidence-building measures. "But there has been little real progress at these talks," observed Rajagopalan, who is currently working on a project to study the military strategies of the major Asian powers.

Ahead of the talks, on Aug. 4, the ‘People's Daily’ carried an interview with Zhang Yan, China’s ambassador in New Delhi, in which he said: "China and India should settle the existing border disputes properly, calling into play the greatest possible political wisdom.

It added: "Despite the twists and turns in China-India ties and border disputes, the two countries share the same historical responsibilities of developing economies, improving people's lives and safeguarding world peace and development, which requires them to properly handle existing problems with the utmost political wisdom."

Zhang observed that "China is now India's top trading partner, while India has become China's largest overseas project contracting market and an important investment destination. Bilateral trade volume between the two hit 51.7 billion U.S. dollars in 2008, up 35 percent over the same period a year ago. The two countries have also set a target of bilateral trade volume of 60 billion dollars by 2010."

But as the talks began, the Daily carried an article by Chinese military expert, Long Tao, who warned that though the two countries wished to develop bilateral ties, "China won't sacrifice its sovereignty in exchange for friendship. Therefore, India should not have any illusions with regard to this issue."

"This blow hot, blow cold approach is typical of Chinese diplomacy," said Rajagopalan. "But there could be real issues worrying Beijing, starting with vastly improved relations between India and the United States that led to the signing of a civilian nuclear pact between the two countries last year."

An editorial in ‘People’s Daily Online’ on Thursday accused India of attempts at "hegemony" and of following a policy of "befriend the far and attack the near".

The Daily issued the following admonishment: "India, which vows to be superpower, needs to have its eyes on relations with neighbours and abandon the recklessness and arrogance as the world is undergoing earthshaking changes."

According to the state-controlled paper, "the pursuit of being a superpower is justifiable, the dream of being a superpower held by Indians appears impetuous". It goes on to say: "For India, the ease of tension with China and Pakistan is the only way to become a superpower. At present, China is proactively engaging in negotiations with India for the early settlement of border dispute and India should give positive response."

But, said Rajagopalan, relations between the two countries were complex and there were many factors that needed to be addressed before anything like a permanent settlement of the border could be effected. ‘’One factor is the Dalai Lama who fled to India 1959 to set up a ‘government -in-exile’ in Himachal Pradesh.’’

The Dalai Lama plans to visit Arunachal Pradesh in November and this has not gone down well with Beijing, which regards the Tibetan leader as a ‘splitist’ and accuses him of being behind the protests that erupted in the Tibetan capital of Lhasa and elsewhere in March 2008.

Dutta commented that instead of accusing India of attempted hegemony, Beijing should look at its own record in Tibet, which, he said, is autonomous only in name. "The simple fact is that Tibetan refugees have continued to stream across the border into India after 1959 and they are now at least 250,000 of them resident in India. China has done nothing to encourage them to go back home."

My Book on Chinese Military Strategy

 


My book, The Dragon's Fire: Chinese Military Strategy and Implications for Asia, is going to be out on October 20.



This book has essentially looked into the military strategy of China and how it implicates on India and Asia. Rise of China has been a subject of interest and concern not only in India and Asia but globally. The growth of China as a major military and economic power along with its global aspirations for a superpower status remains a serious concern to India, as well as the United States, Russia, and Japan. For example, will China be more willing to resort to force to settle the various territorial disputes with its neighbours? Will it become more aggressive in other bilateral issues? While it may be important to analyse the military and other capabilities that China has acquired, it is more pertinent to look at the military strategy through which it will employ these capabilities. While China has continued to argue that its rise is peaceful and that its military modernization is only geared towards defensive purposes, it is the perception that matters. Perception of a potential China threat has had several spin-off effects, in the form of alliances and/or force posturing by regional and global powers.

Defence Spending of Major Asian Powers

How much Asian powers are spending on their militaries and the trends in that spending is important to look at because military spending is the basis of military capabilities and strategies.

Broadly, though US defence spending is still far greater than any other power by far, Chinese defence spending has been expanding rapidly, both because of greater commitment to the Chinese military but also because of the expansion of the Chinese economy.



The world military spending for 2007 stood at $ 1,214 bn of which the US accounted for 45 percent, with the next big spending powers – the UK, China, France and Japan – way down at 4 to 5 percent each. Therefore, in absolute terms, the US military budget still remains the largest. Its military spending is “more than the next 14 countries combined,” about 50 percent of world’s total military spending. The US military budget has gone up significantly since 2001. Although the 2007 budget was the highest since the end of World War II, the growth in US economy and total budget meant that military expenditure as a share of GDP and the total Government expenditure remained lower than previous peak periods (FY 1953, Korean War, FY1968 Vietnam War, FY 1989 Cold War spending).

The effect of US military spending is reflected in the US continuing to maintain a lead in military and technological areas. It is unlikely that any other power including Russia can catch up with the US in the near future. The US lead is across all the spheres of the military – land, sea, air and space. The US has also maintained nuclear primacy by enhancing its strategic weapons programmes, corresponding with decline and decay of the Russian strategic weapons programme and the slow development of Chinese programmes. This situation is unlikely to change in the near future. Although the US has undertaken a reduction in the number of strategic nuclear weapons under arms control/reduction agreements, it has continued to maintain and in fact beefed up its counterforce capabilities as well as the lethality of some of these weapon systems, particularly the SLBM and ICBM programmes.

China, on the other hand, has the fastest growing military budget not only in Asia, but in global terms. In Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms, it has overtaken Japan and has taken the second position in the world. Despite the discrepancy in the estimates of Chinese defence budget, it still remains an important indicator of its national defence priorities, strategies and capabilities. The discrepancies have varied from the current Chinese official estimates of $ 45 bn to the DIA estimate of $115 bn. Chinese military expenditure grew at the rate of 12 per cent in 2006. China is world’s fourth largest military spending power after the US, UK, and France, but in PPP terms (which is more relevant), China stands second at $188.2 bn after the US at $528.7 bn. As the country reaches higher stages of economic growth, the military spending power is only bound to increase, hence one can visualise higher per capita military spending as well.

The increased spending is reflected in its accelerated procurement/ development of newer and updated weapon systems. Chinese advancement in submarine warfare and air defence systems are a proof of their increased focused defence spending.

Other powers like Russia are lagging not too far behind in their military expenditure. According to SIPRI, Russia’s defence expenditure, since 1998 when it began to increase, has gone up by 160 percent, although the increase from 2005 over the previous years has been 19 percent in 2005, 12 percent in 2006 and 13 percent in 2007. In terms of the biggest military spending powers, Russia stands at 7th position after US, UK, China, France, Japan, Germany, and Russia and third in PPP terms, after US and China. However, due to the growth in the overall economy of Russia, military expenditure as a share of GDP has come down from 4.3 percent in 2003 to 3.6 percent in 2006. In recognition of the regional developments, including China factor and the US missile defence in Europe, Russia intends to spend a large amount of money on military modernisation -- prioritizing areas like air superiority, precision strikes at land and sea targets, large-scale production of warships, primarily nuclear submarines with cruise missiles and capability for rapid deployment of forces. However, given the lacunae in Russian conventional military strength, there will be added emphasis on strategic weapons and their delivery mechanisms.

Japan, on the other hand, having pursued a pacifist military posture, has the smallest budget of the four major powers discussed here. Japan in fact has exercised an unofficial cap on defence spending, limiting its budget to less than 1 percent of its gross domestic product (about $42 bn). Nevertheless, Japan still remains one of the largest military spenders, ranking fifth in the world after the US, UK, China and Russia and eighth in PPP terms. However, given the changing regional scenario with increasing threats from North Korea, Japan has been contemplating an increase in its defence spending focusing on missile defence issues.

Defence budget trends therefore show that though the US is nowhere near being replaced as the most powerful nation on earth, but Chinese defence spending does show large and continuing growth.

Role of Nuclear Weapons in Asian Security Landscape

In the nuclear arena, the US remains the only country that is capable enough to “disarm the long-range nuclear arsenals of Russia or China with a nuclear first strike.”



Scholars like Lieber and Press believe that a pre-emptive strike by the US on Russia during a “peacetime alert” and on China even during a “crisis time alert” can be reasonably successful. These scholars argue that China and Russia cannot claim to have a “survivable nuclear deterrent.” It should, however, be noted despite major technological gap, Russia and China in the last few years have been forced to improve their capabilities for two reasons. One, Russia and China want to eliminate their existing vulnerabilities; and second, because the US has continued with a policy of maintaining nuclear primacy.

Of course, China’s nuclear capabilities have been expanding also because it is not limited by any international arms control agreements, unlike the US and Russia. This could lead to a nuclear arms race, potentially reducing US security and increasing regional insecurities, particularly that of Japan. China and Russia could improve their nuclear capabilities by expanding their nuclear arsenals, dispersing their nuclear forces, pre-delegating the launch authority to local commanders, thus avoiding delay in decision-making, and possibly also adopting hair-trigger nuclear retaliatory doctrines. Japan also believes that China could move away from its current nuclear posture of minimum deterrence to developing a “robust second-strike capability, perhaps with Japan as a primary target.”

However, the more worrying aspect for Japan is that US nuclear primacy could be eroding with projected reduction in US nuclear capability and an increase in the Chinese capabilities. In such a scenario, the US might enter into a bilateral arms control agreement with China that “endorses protection of a Chinese limited nuclear strike capability against the United States, with a decoupling effect that would be devastating for Japan.” Also, if a nuclear arms race recurs, the chances for an accidental nuclear war cannot be ruled out. For instance, an accident involving the US and China during a Taiwan crisis cannot be overlooked. The impact on Japan in any of these situations can be nightmarish.

Go Russia -- President Medvedev on Russia's Problems and Possible Solutions

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev recently wrote an article titled, Go Russia, identifying the problems facing Russia and its possible future direction. He clearly indentifies that Russia has "a primitive economy based on raw materials and endemic corruption" which is not going to help Russia find a better future. He summed up the problems that Russia is faced with -- "an inefficient economy, semi-Soviet social sphere, fragile democracy, negative demographic trends, and unstable Caucasus represent very big problems." To read his article, click here. Later on September 20, on CNN's Fareed Zakaria's GPS show, he explained in detail some of the problems that he had identified in the article.



The article went into greater detail outlining the areas that need to focused on a priority basis. For instance, it identified five key vectors for the economic modernisation of Russia. "First, we will become a leading country measured by the efficiency of production, transportation and use of energy. We will develop new fuels for use on domestic and international markets. Secondly, we need to maintain and raise our nuclear technology to a qualitatively new level. Third, Russia's experts will improve information technology and strongly influence the development of global public data networks, using supercomputers and other necessary equipment. Fourth, we will develop our own ground and space infrastructure for transferring all types of information; our satellites will thus be able to observe the whole world, help our citizens and people of all countries to communicate, travel, engage in research, agricultural and industrial production. Fifth, Russia will take a leading position in the production of certain types of medical equipment, sophisticated diagnostic tools, medicines for the treatment of viral, cardiovascular, and neurological diseases and cancer." While emphasising on economic issues, Medvedev noted that the country will be well-armed that no one dare threaten Russia or its allies.

Talking about political reforms and democracy, the article read: "Russian democracy will not merely copy foreign models. Civil society cannot be bought by foreign grants. Political culture will not be reconfigured as a simple imitation of the political traditions of advanced societies. An effective judicial system cannot be imported. Freedom is impossible to simply copy out of a book, even a very clever one. Of course we'll learn from other nations – from their experiences, their successes and failures in developing democratic institutions. But no one will live our lives for us. Nobody is going to make us free, successful and responsible. Only our own experience of democratic endeavour will give us the right to say: we are free, we are responsible, we are successful."

On issues such as the emerging world order, Medvedev said, Russia will work towards establishing "a more equitable world order." In this regard, he said, "Russia has often sought to protect small nations, those confronted with the threat of enslavement or even destruction. This was the case only recently, when Saakashvili's regime launched its criminal attack on South Ossetia. Russia has often put an end to the plans of those bent on world domination. Russia has twice appeared in the vanguard of the great coalitions: in the 19th century to stop Napoleon and in the 20th by defeating the Nazis. In war and peace, when a just cause has demanded decisive action, our people have been there to help. Russia has always been a staunch ally in war and an honest partner in economic and diplomatic affairs."

Shelving of US Missile Defence in Europe: How Does it Impact on US-Russia Relations?

On September 17, 2009, President Barack Obama decided to do an overhaul of the US missile defence in Europe. The missile defence shield in Poland and the Czech Republic is going to be replaced with a revamped project, after a careful reconsideration of the threat from Iran. Obama, making a statement on the subject, said, "This new approach will provide capabilities sooner, build on proven systems and offer greater defenses against the threat of missile attack than the 2007 European missile defense program."

While the two East European allies are not entirely happy with the development, Russia has appreciated what the US has done, with the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, saying "We value the US president's responsible approach towards implementing our agreements ... I am ready to continue the dialogue." He went further to say that there are "good conditions" on the ground to start joint anti-missile projects. Konstantin Kosachev, a prominent MP and Chairman of the International Affairs Committee, State Duma of the Russian Federation, said: "The Obama administration is starting to understand us. Now we can talk about restoration of the strategic partnership between Russia and the United States."

How does Obama's temporarily shelving of the missile defence programme affect US-Russia relations? Will Russia come on board on Iran sanctions? Will Russia become far more cooperative on the Afghan front?



The decision was taken after a careful reading of the situation, noting that the threat from Iran's long-range missiles was not so immediate. The decision was also based on advances in US missile defense technology, particularly with land and sea based interceptors. Elaborating on the revamped programme, Defence Secretary Robert Gates said that interceptor missiles would be initially deployed on ships in order to enable easy transportation from one region to the other. He added, "The second phase, about 2015, will involve fielding upgraded land-based SM-3s. Consultations have begun with allies, starting with Poland and the Czech Republic, about hosting a land-based version of the SM-3 and other components of the system."

While the programme has been been put on hold for sometime, it is not being scrapped entirely. As Gates pointed out, the first stage does not include fielding of those interceptors in Europe, but a second stage, may be in 2015 will deploy the upgraded land-based SM-3s in Poland and the Czech Republic. It is quite apparent that the Russians are aware of this. For instance, one of the scholars on NATO at the Russian Foreign Ministry's Diplomatic Academy, Vladimir Shtol pointed out, "I don't believe the US would ever fully back out of the missile shield, because it is in their long-term interests and closely connected with their strategy in Europe." Similarly, Fyodor Lukyanov, editor of Russia in Global Affairs, says that the issue if never off the table. It may be off the agenda temporarily. He said, "Nothing has been canceled, missile defense has just been postponed. For a while this topic is off the agenda, but later it will return. So, for now the political situation may improve, but the underlying pattern of relations is unlikely to change in any basic way." However, there are Russian specialists in India like Nandan Unnikrishnan who believe that missile defence in Europe is a closed issue and that Obama's current posture is not temporary, but a permanent move. However, he added on to say that the missile defence issue will be a closed one, at least for the next couple of years.

While the US looks the change in posture as a major concession to Moscow, what does Washington expect in return? Tougher actions on Iran by Moscow may be one, better cooperation in the war on terror in Afghanistan may be another one. Renewal of START talks with lesser number of conditionalities (from Russian side) could be another expectation. Will Russia be able to deliver on all these major issues?

While tough action on Iran by Moscow is conceivable, it is not certain. If one has to go by what the Russian Foreign Minister Sregei Lavrov said last week, Iran issue is not going to be an easy one. He said, "I do not think these sanctions will be approved by the United Nations Security Council ... They [Iran] need an equal place in this regional dialogue. Iran is a partner that has never harmed Russia in any way." He went on to addd that the US cannot expect to have a timetable as far as the Iran issue is concerned. In fact, Lavrov went a step ahead to say that the changed US posture is not necessarily a concession, but merely a correction of the past mistake. A Christian Science Monitor report on the subject says that while the changed US posture on missile defence issue may contribute to a warmer dialogue between the US and Russia, Washington should not expect major concessions on some of the issues of key concern to the US like Iran. If Moscow has to extend some reciprocal concessions to Washington, the US will have to be more accomodative to Russian concerns on NATO expansion into the Russian backyard. In fact, as the US National Intelligence Strategy 2009 noted, Russia "may continue to seek avenues for reasserting power and influence in ways that complicate US interests." For instance, on September 15, 2009, Russian Defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov has signed agreements on cooperation in the military sphere with heads of the military departments of Abkhazia and South Ossetia Merab Kishmaria and Yuri Tanayev. As per the agreements, the headquarters of the Russian military base in Abkhazia will be in the Black Sea port of Gudauty, and in South Ossetia -- in Tskhinvali. The strength of the personnel of each of the military bases will be around 1,700. The agreements are signed for a period of 49 years, with an automatic prolongation for five years. These moves may come to compete with the US interests in the Russian backyard. Again, there are Russian experts in India who argue that the US is going to slow on the NATO expansion and that it will not pursue inclusion of Georgia and Ukraine into NATO in the near future.

Howevers, what appears certain is progress on arms control measures such as the START. The 1991 START that is expiring in December 2009 is likely to be replaced by a new arms reduction treaty. In fact, Lukyanov says, "Now we can be sure the new START agreement will be completed on time, because the vexing issue of missile defense and how it affects the strategic balance has been removed for the time being. “That’s quite an important matter."

Lastly, how does the changed posture affect Russian position on the war on terror in Afghanistan. Russia may possibly come around assisting the US significantly in the war in Afghanistan. However, what Obama has to do for long term stability in Afghanistan should include not just Russia, but also other regional powers such as Iran, India, China, Japan and some of the Central Asian states. The US has to become proactive to establish a larger colaition of states on Afghanistan if there has to be peace and stability in the Af-Pak region.