Chinese Defence White Paper: Highlights

This analysis on the Chinese defence White Paper first appeared on the ORF website.

China released its latest defence white paper titled, “China’s National Defense in 2008” on January 21, 2009. While categorical and specific about the threats and challenges that China faces today, it says that there are “long-term and complicated threats” that are more general. The long-term challenges cover all aspects: “existence security” and development security, traditional security threats and non-traditional security threats, and domestic security and international security which the report sees as interdependent in nature. The specific challenges that are highlighted include Taiwan, East Turkistan and Tibet, all issues of Chinese national integration. Ministry of Defense Spokesman Colonel Hu Changming, while releasing the report stated that the separatist moves by these three forces “form a major security threat to the unity of the nation and a challenge to our security organs,” and in the case of Taiwan, the issue is further complicated by US arms sales, which China opposes vehemently.



The white paper outlines that China is “pursuing an independent foreign policy of peace and a national defense policy solely aimed at protecting its territory and people, and endeavouring to build, together with other countries, a harmonious world of enduring peace and common prosperity.” The report also makes the point that while major powers are increasing the level of cooperation and drawing on each other’s strengths, they continue “to compete with and hold each other in check.” Identifying the challenges and difficulties, it says that there is an intensification of struggle for strategic resources, strategic locations and strategic dominance, along with hegemonism and power politics continuing with new power blocs emerging.

China continues to reiterate that its defence policy is purely defensive in nature, although it contradicts itself to state that it implements a military strategy of active defense.[1] According to the report, China formulated a military strategic guideline of active defense keeping in tune with the changes in international security as well as the concepts of warfare. One China scholar, Andrew Scobell, describes the Chinese strategic culture as a result of the “interplay between Confucian and Realpolitik strands.”[2] He in fact has coined the term “Cult of Defense” in which the Chinese elites believe that their country is pacifist, non-expansionist and purely defensive, but simultaneously be able to justify any use of force, including offensive and pre-emptive strikes and consider them defensive in nature. The aspect of offensive operations is another evidence of the continued relevance of Sun Tzu’s in the Chinese military strategy.[3]

Some of the key aspects highlighted in the white paper are informationization, training and jointness.

According to the report, informationization of the Chinese defense and armed forces is a key goal for China, for which it actively promotes the RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs) with Chinese characteristics. Making national defense building an “organic part of its social and economic development,” China is making efforts to balance between social & economic development and the military needs and in fact making the military and civilian forces compatible with and beneficial to each other, particularly in peacetime. China also has strategized plans to “lay a solid foundation” in its endeavour towards “national defense and armed forces building,” complete mechanization process and make significant progress towards informationization by 2020, and achieve a scale of modernisation of their forces by the middle of the century.[4] As part of reforming the PLA, China believes that it is essential to accelerate the processes of mechanization and informationization, improve training under conditions of informationization, advance innovation in military theory, technology, organisation and management, continuously increase core military capability of winning local wars under conditions of informationization as well as strengthening the capability to conduct MOOTW (military operations other than war). MOOTW has been introduced as an important “form of applying national military forces”; this would particularly be important under the concept of local wars in an informationalized scenario.

Training has been given particular emphasis in augmenting the overall fighting capabilities of the forces. In this regard, China reiterates the need to intensify strategic- and operational-level command post training and training in conditions of informationization, night training, integrated exercises for logistical and equipment support, on-base training and simulated training, web-based training, training with opposing players and training complex electromagnetic environments. The training evaluation mechanism as well as the standards of training is reported to have been improved. Training for jointness and on informationized platforms is seen as the key.

Logistics reform is another area that has been highlighted in the white paper. Upgradation of the logistical support and deepening the logistics reform are important objectives in this regard. Carrying it to the next level, the Jinan (Military) Theater in April 2007 formally adopted the joint logistics system based on the integration of tri-service logistical support. The leadership clearly sees the crucial importance of this in achieving tri-service integration and jointness in their operations. Maintaining that integrated joint operations are the way of the future, the PLA has established an army equipment system with high mobility and three-dimensional assault, a naval equipment system with integrated sea-air capabilities for offshore defensive operations, an air force equipment system with integrated air-land capabilities for both offensive and defensive operations, a surface-to-surface missile equipment system for the Second Artillery Force with both nuclear and conventional missiles, and an electronic information equipment system featuring systems integration and joint development. The white paper states that progress has been achieved in the field of command and control systems for integrated joint operations, which has improved the capability of battlefield information support in a significant manner. Main battle weapon systems are believed to have been informationized to a great extent, with particular focus on rapid detection, target location, friend-or-foe identification and precision strikes.[5]

China has also focused on the upgradation of weapons and equipment systems, with emphasis on MOOTW. PLA has been building new types of submarines, destroyers, frigates and aircraft, forming a preliminary weaponry and equipment system with second-generation equipment as the core and the third generation as the backbone. According to the report, the submarine force has underwater anti-ship, anti-submarine and mine-laying capabilities, as well as some nuclear counterattack capabilities. The surface ship force has developed a surface striking force represented by new types of missile destroyers and frigates, and has maritime reconnaissance, anti-ship, anti-submarine, air-defense, mine-laying and other operational capabilities. The aviation wing has developed an air striking force represented by sea-attack aircraft, and possesses reconnaissance, anti-ship, anti-submarine and air-defense operational capabilities. The Marine Corps has developed an amphibious operational force represented by amphibious armoured vehicles, and possesses amphibious operational capabilities.[6] Lastly, the coastal defense force is represented by new types of shore-to-ship missiles and possesses high coastal defense operations capability. China has also been building new ship bases, berthing areas, supply points, docks and airfields. Recently, a new naval base was discovered in Sanya on Hainan Island, which could house a large fleet of surface warships, and also serve as an underground base for submarines. The location is indeed critical as it will let China extend a greater influence in the South China Sea area besides allowing it greater access to the critical Straits of Malacca, while enabling China to have a larger naval presence closer to important sea lanes.[7] This development has certainly upped the ante for several countries including Japan, South Korea, India and the US. Housing of nuclear and non-nuclear submarines in Sanya, so close to the ASEAN region will also go against the 1996 Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty.

As a rising superpower, China can be expected eventually to seek sufficient capabilities for a sea control strategy, but clearly, China is decades away from such capabilities. The continued significance of an aircraft carrier[8] in the PLA’s strategic thinking comes out essentially from its objectives of sea control and sea denial as also the recognition that air superiority is essential in future combat, besides for power projection purposes, which was evident when PLA officials told visiting US Commanders that “there is no more prominent and visible signal of a nation’s resolve and might than an aircraft carrier coming into a port.”[9]

Similar has been the efforts made by the ground forces, moving from regional defense to trans-regional mobility, making its units small, modular and multi-functional and has stepped up the development of aviation, light mechanised and information countermeasure forces, prioritised the development of operational and tactical missile, ground-to-air missiles, in order to improve capabilities for air-ground integrated operations, long distance manoeuvres, rapid assaults and special operations. In a similar manner, the Air Force has been improving its equipment and weapon systems, with the development of new types of fighters, air and anti-missile defense weapons, and command automation systems, which will increase the air forces’s capability to undertake both offensive and defensive operations. Lastly, the most important arm of the PLA, the Second Artillery Force too has kept up with upgradation, logistical reforms and innovations, suited to informationized warfare.

While China reiterates that it is separatism – Taiwan, East Turkistan and Tibet -- that is the major challenge, its concepts of warfare and capability upgradation go well beyond meeting these challenges. The report once again highlights the Chinese intention to become a global power by the middle of the century.
[1] Mao’s People War and Deng Xiaoping’s local war concepts continue to be guiding factors in China’s military strategy even as it modernizes its forces. The white paper states, “China is striving to make innovations in the content and forms of people’s war, exploring new approaches of the people in participating in warfare and support for the front, and developing new strategies and tactics for people’s war in conditions of informationization.” Themes like active defense and local wars also have been modified keeping in tune with the changes in modern warfare. Even while modernizing its warfare concepts, China continues to emphasize the “people” aspect, saying that “China always relies on the people to build national defense and the armed forces, combines a lean standing force with a powerful reserve force.” Significant changes were brought in the Chinese military strategy after the 1991 Gulf War where the PLA recognised the importance of fighting a ‘modern war under high technology conditions.’ See, Y. Ji, “The Revolution in Military Affairs and the Evolution of China’s Strategic Thinking,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 21, no. 3, December 1999, p. 353, cited in Dennis Woodward, “The People’s Liberation Army: a Threat to India?,” Contemporary South Asia, vol. 12, no. 2, June 2003, p. 231.
[2] Andrew Scobell, “China and Strategic Culture” (Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College: Carlisle, PA, May 2002), available at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub60.pdf.
[3] Sun Tzu in his Art of War stated, “Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; ability to defeat the enemy means taking the offensive.” See, Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Foreword by James Clavell (London: Hodder and Stoughton Ltd, 1981), p. 23.
[4] Chinese military is the world’s largest military force, with the largest standing army (approx. 2.25 million strong), with well-established five wings – PLA Army, PLA Navy, PLA Air Force, Second Artillery Corps and PLA Reserved Force. Chinese defence expenditure for 2008 stood at 417.77 billion yuan, which is a rise of 62.379 billion yuan from the previous year’s actual spending, a 17.6 per cent increase. China is the world’s fourth largest military spender after the US, UK, and France, but in PPP terms (which is more relevant), China stands second at $188.2 bn after the US which spends $528.7 bn. Consistent with global changes taking place in defence science & technology and weaponry, Chinese military has maintained the pace in its modernisation too. Yet, China believes that it will be able to lay a strong foundation only by 2010.
[5] These have become of particular focus to the Chinese since the first Gulf War. Some of their tanks, artillery pieces, ships and aircraft are believed to be informationized, new types of informationized platforms are being developed and the ratio and number of precision-guided munitions are also on the rise. China, since 1991, has been in the process of development/procurement of precision-guided weapons, improvement of command and control structures as well as the non-conventional methods of warfare like electronic warfare, use of ultra-sonic weapons, laser weapons, stealth weapons, ultrahigh frequency weapons, and electromagnetic guns. The PLA is also believed to be designing a three-tier (land, sea and air) defence system for “outer detection and implicit warning, intermediate interception, and inner denial, including the lethal use of force against intruders.” See, Kenneth Lieberthal, “How Domestic Forces Shape the PRC’s Grand Strategy and International Impact,” Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills (Eds.), Strategic Asia 2007-08 (Washington D.C.: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2007), p.61.
[6] China has improved its amphibious capabilities in the recent years, with Beijing conducting more than a dozen such exercises in the last decade or so, with several exercises focusing on a Taiwan scenario. Given the logistics-intensive nature of these operations, and the need to have air and sea superiority, the probability of the Chinese venturing into amphibious operations against the Taiwanese is unlikely. However, the fact remains that China has significantly beefed up its capabilities in this regard.
[7] The new satellite images that are available now reveal cave openings around the Sanya base that can house up to at least eight submarines. It is also believed that there is space for a supported underground structure that could have more than 20 submarines. See, Richard Fisher, Jr., “China’s Naval Secrets,” Asian Wall Street Journal, May 05, 2008, available at http://www.strategycenter.net/printVersion/print_pub.asp?pubID=185. See also, “Japan urges greater Chinese transparency on military plans,” AFP, May 31, 2008, available at http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5gjnjcMWGDOTstNWHZOU8dwzg7nYw.
[8] There were media reports towards the middle of 2007 that China had given contracts to few Chinese companies for the development of systems and components for the aircraft carrier. Further, towards the end of the year, there was another media report, citing Xu Guangyu, an analyst and director of the government-backed China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, saying that it has almost been decided that the Chinese navy will build aircraft carriers. See, “China: Construction of An Aircraft Carrier,” ABC Radio Australia, July 11, 2007, available at http://www.abc.net.au/ra/connectasia/stories/s1975537.htm and http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20071111/news_1n11chinashp.html. Earlier, in 1997, Hong Kong media had reported Chinese plans to acquire a smaller aircraft carrier, rather than a large carrier. Later in 1999, the media reported that the Chinese leadership had essentially sanctioned Y 250 million for two carrier, estimated to be completed by 2009, with a displacement of 48,000 tons and could carry 24 Su-27Ks. However, it appears that these were speculations made on the basis of the arrival of a partially finished ex-Soviet carrier, the ‘Varyag’ at a Dalian shipyard. See, Sibapada Rath, “China’s Tryst with Aircraft Carrier,” Naval Despatch, December 2005, p. 37.
[9] Tim Johnson, “Aircraft Carriers on Horizon for China?,” November 11, 2007, available at http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20071111/news_1n11chinashp.html.

Obama and India

This analysis on Obama and India appeared first on the IPCS website.

Now that Barrack Hussein Obama has been sworn in as the 44th President of the United States of America, what does it mean for India? Three factors are likely to determine how relations between the US and India will be under Obama.



Generally, Democrats have tended to be more interventionist than the Republicans, as they believe that the US should play a role in regional conflicts to both resolve such conflicts and to protect human rights during these conflicts. During the Clinton Presidency, the US militarily intervened in a number of regional conflicts including in Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, Yugoslavia, Congo, Liberia, Albania, Iraq, Afghanistan and Yemen. Obama appears to want to continue with that trend. Susan Rice, a key Obama advisor and Obama's nominee as UN Ambassador, stated in her confirmation hearing that the Obama Administration will continue to see the promotion of democracy and human rights around the world as an important goal.
The pro-interventionist stance of the Democrats has tended to be a problem in Indo-US relations. In the India context, this would involve the Obama Administration wanting to intervene and seek to solve the Kashmir problem. Obama's recent comments in interviews to Time magazine in October and December 2008 and the reported consideration of former President Bill Clinton as a special envoy on Kashmir are indicative of this pro-interventionist stance that India will witness increasingly in the coming years. Obama had said that the US "should probably try to facilitate a better understanding between Pakistan and India and try to resolve the Kashmir crisis so that they (Pakistan) can stay focused not on India, but on the situation with those militants." Some analysts have tended to believe that a Kashmir-specific pro-active policy need not necessarily be bad, given Obama's pro-India statements. It should be remembered that his pro-India stance in the recent past had more to do with seeking the support of the Indian-American community. The concern however is that Obama believes that finding a solution to the Kashmir issue is almost a pre-requisite for getting Pakistan's support for the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), particularly in Afghanistan. New Delhi needs to be cautious of the US tendency of linking up Afghanistan's security with terrorism in Kashmir.
Obama's tough line against Pakistan might be heartening to Indian policy makers. The US has pledged huge military/financial aid to Pakistan, though this is conditional on Pakistan's cooperation on the war against terror. The Obama Administration, in its new foreign policy agenda document has made it clear that while the new administration "will increase nonmilitary aid to Pakistan," Pakistan will be held "accountable for security in the border region with Afghanistan." Earlier, Joe Biden, in his capacity as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, had introduced a legislation proposing to triple non-military aid to Pakistan in the next five years. The legislation authorised US$7.5 billion over next five years, mainly for building schools, roads and clinics. The bill, however, called for greater accountability and effective cooperation from Pakistan in fighting the Taliban and Al Qaeda.
The second issue which could act as "spoiler" is nuclear non-proliferation. While the Democrats and Republicans have both adopted strong non-proliferation measures, the Democrats have tended to be much more rigid "non-proliferation ayatollahs." The policies during the Clinton Presidency are a pointer of this. India's Pokhran tests in 1998 proved to be a major issue for the Clinton Administration and it invoked a series of technological and economic sanctions on India. India not being a member of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) continues to be a major issue for the Democrats. Despite being a member of NPT, China has consistently violated the treaty and engaged in proliferation activities, especially with Pakistan, but the US appeared willing to overlook the issue because China is an NPT-member state.
The new foreign policy agenda document of the Obama Administration stated that it "will crackdown on nuclear proliferation by strengthening the NPT," while working simultaneously on nuclear disarmament. What is more important is how the US deals with states that are members of certain security architectures, yet engage in proliferation.
Thirdly, Indo-US relations will to a great extent depend upon how the US engages with China. Democrats have tended to have a more than favorable approach towards China, with Clinton's presidency being a case in point. A close Sino-US partnership, with South Asia being jointly 'managed' by the US and China, remains an unappealing thought, a US-China clash will have wider security consequences throughout Asia and will affect India also. We need neither. Lastly, how Russia is viewed by the Obama Administration will have serious consequences. Russia remains an important power in the emerging Asian strategic framework and it is important that both India and the US recognize this reality and adjust their policies accordingly.

The Nuclear Deal: Implications for India and Global Nuclear Regime

This essay on India-US Nuclear Deal appeared first on the IPCS website.

It should be abundantly clear that the Indo-US nuclear deal is more than just about nuclear energy for India. The agreement has several strategic connotations, including with regard to China.



The Deal Itself
US President George W. Bush signed the legislation on the Indo-US nuclear deal into law on October 8, 2008. The law, now titled, “United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Non-proliferation Enhancement Act,” is a product of the March 2006 agreement between India and the US on civil nuclear cooperation based on the joint statement between President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on July 18, 2005. The agreement was a direct consequence of the US’ recognition of India as a major pole of power in the coming century, as “an anchor of stability in Asia and an engine of global economic growth.”[1] More importantly, the agreement is a result of India’s strong non-proliferation record despite not being a party to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT).[2] The deal also undoubtedly recognises India’s “de-facto” status as a nuclear weapon state.[3]

The Indo-US civilian nuclear cooperation agreement was a broad framework agreement, and not one dealing with specifics. The current agreement is rather a facilitating agreement to engage in nuclear commerce, and therefore, after the operationalisation of the deal, both India and the US will have to sign more specific agreements. However, if the two countries have to engage in nuclear commerce, a few conditions had to met, including change in US domestic laws, an NSG waiver and an India-specific safeguards agreement with the IAEA. While the US-India nuclear agreement was not designed to put restrictions on India’s strategic programme, the US wanted to ensure that no technology or fuel transferred for India’s civilian programme could be used for its military programme. These elements had also to be inserted into an India-specific IAEA Safeguards Agreement. Only after these conditions were met would India be allowed to do business with the US or any other country in the nuclear arena. India also had to put in place a new export control mechanism before the two countries could proceed with the agreement. Accordingly, India harmonised its export control laws with that of the NSG and the MTCR Guidelines, although India is not a member of either of them. Similarly, India’s “Weapons of Mass Destruction and their Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities) Act, 2005,” entered into force in June 2005 and brought about more stringent non-proliferations regulations and tighter export control measures and it also showed India’s commitment to non-proliferation.[4]

The path to the final agreement included many steps, each of which was controversial in India and/or the US, though usually for different reasons. Following the July 2005 statement to engage in civilian nuclear cooperation, President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh signed a Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement in March 2006, during Bush’s visit to New Delhi. Accordingly, in May 2006, a separation plan was announced by the Indian government, separating its military and civilian facilities.[5] The plan was immediately opposed: as per this separation plan, eight plants would be left outside international safeguards. In addition, the Fast Breeder Reactors (FBRs) located at Kalpakkam were not offered for safeguards, as the Fast Breeder Programme is at the R&D stage and the technology will take time before it matures. This came under sharp criticism from the non-proliferation activists in the US who argued that large number of facilities outside the safeguards will make available for India “significant additional nuclear weapons production capacity.”[6] Upon finalization of this separation plan, the US agreed to build into the bilateral 123 agreement fuel supply assurances, help negotiate with the IAEA an India-specific Safeguards Agreement, help develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to “guard against any disruption of supply,” and in case disruption occurs, the US and India would put in place alternatives, countries like France, Russia and UK who might be able to restore fuel supply to India.

After the separation plan was agreed upon, the Hyde Act was signed into law by President Bush in December 2006. The Hyde Act, considered the parent act of the 123 agreement, provides the legal basis for nuclear commerce between India and the US, since India is not party to the NPT. The Hyde Act came under sharp criticism because of certain clauses that said that India will work with the US in containing Iran’s nuclear programme and that India and the US will work together on a Fissile Materials Control Treaty. However, these are more by way of advisories than binding commitments. Nuclear testing has been another issue debated during the passage of the Hyde Act. The BJP, the main opposition party in the Indian parliament, focused on the right to test as a serious issue, arguing that the deal would prevent India from conducting future tests. This is a false claim: nothing in the deal says that India cannot test. There may be consequences if India tests, but even this has been minimised because under the conditions of the deal, the US will have to take into consideration whether India was forced to test because of circumstances such as nuclear tests by India’s neighbours. Moreover, if India conducts a test, it will have to face some international opposition irrespective of the signing the deal or not.

Whatever be the controversy surrounding the Hyde Act, the 123 agreement that was signed in August 2007 makes it abundantly clear that the Indo-US nuclear deal will not impact in any manner India’s strategic weapons programme. The agreement also makes no mention of India’s nuclear testing. The agreement also states clearly that the US will work with other countries in helping alter the NSG rules to facilitate nuclear trade with India. However, the agreement, for a period of 40 years and extendable by another 10 years, can be terminated by either party after giving a one-year notice. Upon termination of the agreement, the US retains the right to take back “any nuclear material, equipment, non-nuclear material or components transferred.” The understanding is that the “right of return” will impact on the bilateral relations significantly, and therefore a consultative mechanism has been put in place that will “give special consideration to the importance of uninterrupted operation of nuclear reactors of the party (country) concerned with respect to the availability of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as a means of achieving energy security.”[7]

Once the 123 Agreement was finalised, the next processes involved an India-specific IAEA Safeguards Agreement, which was secured in July 2008 and a waiver of NSG rules that came about in September 2008. Thereafter, the agreement was sent to the US Congress for approval, where despite enjoying bipartisan support to strengthening US relations with India, the agreement faced a lot of opposition from the strong non-proliferation lobby. While supporters of the deal like Senators Richard Lugar and Christopher Dodd have stated that the deal is in the long-term interests of the United States, those opposing it cited the deal as seriously undermining the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Senator Dodd highlighted some of the “compelling geopolitical reasons” like India’s geographic proximity to China, Pakistan and Afghanistan, as reasons to strengthen this relationship, while Senator Lugar emphasised the importance of strengthening US partnership with an India that shares democratic values and which could “exert increasing influence on the world stage.”[8]

However, even people like Strobe Talbott, former Deputy Secretary of State under President Clinton, who have worked hard for a closer partnership between India and the US maintained that the Bush Administration has given away too much and made “an India exception” to the NPT.[9] He worried that the “India exception” will be taken as a precedent by several other countries who may want to work out a similar deal for their allies/friends. A case in point is China wanting to do a similar deal for Pakistan. Robert Einhorn, former Assistant Secretary of State for Non-proliferation, and another critic of the deal also maintained that the Bush Administration gave away too much and that India has managed to get it all – “acquiring the ability to import uranium and nuclear reactor technology, obtaining recognition for India’s status as a nuclear power, and preserving all of India’s strategic options, particularly the ability to increase substantially its production of plutonium for nuclear weapons.”[10] Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association called the deal a “non-proliferation disaster.” As for the US administration’s claims about the utility of the deal, Kimball said that the deal does not bring India into the non-proliferation framework, as it has made a “country-specific exemption from core nonproliferation standards that the United States has spent decades to establish.”[11] Congressman Howard Berman, another vehement critic of the deal, wanted to introduce amendments to the deal stating in unambiguous terms that the US will terminate nuclear trade with India if India resumes nuclear testing; and that the President is required to review and implement applicable export control authorities for US nuclear exports to other nuclear supplier nations that continue nuclear trade with India.[12] However, this was withdrawn after Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice gave an assurance that it is the “highest priority” for the US to get an assurance to ban the export of enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technology to countries like India that are not party to the NPT at the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) meeting in November 2008. Several Senators also criticised the fact that there was hardly any debate on such an important issue as this and the hasty manner in which the deal was passed in the Congress. Another vehement critic, Senator Byron Dorgan stated that India was being rewarded for wrong behaviour.[13]

President Bush, however, using his overriding powers, killed thorny conditionalities and stated clearly that “The legislation does not change the terms of the 123 Agreement as I submitted it to the Congress.”[14] He went on to clarify that India’s right to reprocessing and fuel assurance commitments remain the same, as recorded in the 123 Agreement.[15] In the final steps towards operationalisation of the agreement, President Bush had to make two sets of certifications that (1) that conclusion and implementation of the agreement is consistent with US obligations under the NPT; and (2) that it is the policy of the US to work with members of the NSG to restrict transfers of enrichment and reprocessing technology. These certifications have now been made through a Memorandum to the Secretary of State (October 21) and the two countries will shortly exchange diplomatic notes as per Article 16 (1) of the 123 Agreement that brings the agreement into force.

Implications for India
It should be abundantly clear that the agreement is more than just about nuclear energy for India. The agreement has several strategic connotations, including with regard to China.

Firstly, the agreement is an outcome of the US’ recognition that India is a major power in the 21st century and its role in the emerging Asian strategic framework. If this century is going to be an Asian century, as is widely predicted, the major powers would be US, China, Russia, Japan and India. Hence, it is strategically important for the US to have a strengthened and comprehensive relationship with India. It should also be noted that both the US and India have concerns with the rising China and more specifically its military modernisation which would have a bearing on the way China conducts business with the rest of the world.

Second, if the US wishes to take this relationship to higher plane, the continuing technology controls placed on India will be a major stumbling block. All said and done, it is the trade in strategic goods and technology and not perceived common interests alone that will make this relationship an enduring one.[16] This is the second imperative on which the nuclear agreement with the US is to be looked at. However, many Indian analysts have contested this saying that the agreement is a way of bringing India into the non-proliferation order.

Third, the Indo-US nuclear agreement is in India’s interest. It gets India out of the nuclear apartheid of the last three decades. The deal recognizes India as a nuclear power, which has been a great concern to the non-proliferation ayatollahs of Washington.

Four, impact of nuclear disarmament on Indo-US nuclear deal. Impact on the nuclear deal and civilian nuclear cooperation if the global community agrees to a time framework to rid the world of nuclear weapons, which remains highly impossible, will be minimal. The nuclear deal, dealing with civilian aspects of nuclear programme will not be hampered by a universal disarmament plan.

Analysts have been concerned of implications for the Iran-India gas pipeline. Firstly, the Iran- India pipeline remains independent of the Indo-US nuclear deal. Given India’s increasing demand for energy, India must look at every option of energy including nuclear energy. The US position vis a vis Iran has become controversial due to Iran’s alleged pursuance of a nuclear weapons programme. India also may not like to see a nuclear Iran in its neighbourhood.

Impact on India’s military programme. India’s opposition party, the BJP, while criticizing the deal on the issue of nuclear testing, also raised concern that the deal puts a cap on India’s strategic nuclear arsenal. The deal was perceived as curtailing on India’s sovereign decision to decide on the size of its nuclear arsenal. The fact is that India already has indigenous uranium reserves (reserves of 78,000 metric tons of uranium (MTU)) to pursue its strategic weapons programme; hence the Indo-US nuclear deal will not in any manner hamper its military programme.[17]

Lastly, the impact is more in terms of the emerging Asian security framework. If India has to rise above the South Asian cocoon and take its rightful place in the world stage, it is the US that can help India get there. Russia too is interested in seeing a stronger India sit at the high-table with other major players, but Russia has little capacity to help India in this regard. But, China has consistently played a less than supportive role, as was seen at the recent NSG meeting.[18] China has little interest in seeing another power emerging in Asia, and it does not want India to build closer ties with the United States or other Asian powers that could be detrimental to Beijing’s own regional and global role.[19] It appears deliberate that Beijing has not categorized India as a challenge or threat, though it does consider India as a “future strategic competitor” that might join any anti-China grouping. As a matter of fact, China had undertaken an internal study in 2005 and the recommendations are revealing. It recommended that China undertake measures to keep the current strategic leverage in terms of territory, P-5 membership, or the Nuclear Club; hold on to diplomatic advantages through its special relationship particularly with India’s neighbouring countries; as also maintain the economic lead over India.[20]

Fears were also raised about possible loss of autonomy in the India’s foreign policy arena. Is it a valid concern? The Left parties in India were of the view that India cannot afford to be subservient to any nation.[21] But India is not a puppet nation which can be dictated to according to the whims and fancies of other countries. India’s vote on Iran at the IAEA in September 2005 triggered much of the controversy surrounding India’s foreign policy autonomy debate.[22] But it must be noted that majority of the opposition to the deal has been political, be it the Left parties or the BJP. If BJP was in power, they are likely to have agreed to a similar deal with the US. As far as the Left parties are concerned, they will have a myopic view and will see any agreement with the US as against India’s interests.

Implications for Global Nuclear Regime
Finally, how does the Indo-US nuclear agreement affect the global nuclear regime? Firstly, it is claimed that the deal would undermine US efforts to dissuade countries like Iran and North Korea from pursuing nuclear weapons. Several fierce opponents of the deal, including Edward Markey and Barbara Lee have said that making an India-specific exemption is seen as “creating incentives for other countries to withdraw from the NPT.”[23] It was argued that the US is adopting double standards on the issue of non-proliferation. The issue was probably best posed by Robert Einhorn, in an interview, when he stated that the US has obviously double standards in “not treating India the same way we treat NPT cheaters like North Korea and Iran.”[24] He went on to state that in the Bush Administration’s view, it is not the weapons that is necessarily dangerous, but the regime that is in control of those weapons. Einhorn disagrees with such an approach which focuses on the nature of the regime. He argues that while the US does not perceive it as a threat when a “good country” acquires nuclear weapons, it should also be borne in mind that the good country could be surrounded by a “not so good country” that might follow suit, which could be threatening to the US. Hence, he argues that it is not good to make a differentiation between good and bad proliferation. Second, a so-called good country could become bad, threatening or unstable and irresponsible. Lastly, the threat of nuclear materials or technology leakage exists even in a so-called good country and today’s good country can become tomorrow’s bad country.

The second impact relates to the spiral effect that the Indo-US nuclear agreement could have on the global nuclear regime. Pakistan has been making noises about its increasing energy needs and thereby the necessity for a similar deal with the US. Although the US, especially President Bush has been categorical in rejecting these demands as early as in July 2005, Pakistan’s all-weather friend China might want to come to Pakistan’s rescue. China could push for a similar deal with Pakistan, arguing, as Strobe Talbott puts it, for “equal treatment” for Pakistan, negating the special considerations and exceptions made for India.[25] Will that be in the interest of the US and more importantly India?

The third impact relates to the future of the nuclear regime itself and how the Indo-US nuclear deal has strengthened or weakened the regime. Is a dying non-proliferation regime in India’s interest? Obviously not. On the other hand, critics in India argued that the deal was a way of getting India into global nuclear regime through back door. Clearly, both these extreme positions are wrong, and the truth lies somewhere in between these positions. The deal will neither hurt the non-proliferation regime nor was it designed to trick India into the NPT.

Another issue relates to how the deal is viewed in the Islamic world. Pakistan being the only Islamic country that has a bomb, there could be demand from Muslim countries that Pakistan be treated equal and be given such a deal.[26] Though the US might say no, China in its efforts to strengthen its friendship with Pakistan in addition to creating a favourable influence among the Islamic countries could opt for a similar deal for Pakistan.

Several analysts believe that the Indo-US nuclear agreement has also set a precedent for several other countries aspiring to develop nuclear technology. Most recently, Israel was seen citing the Indo-US civil nuclear agreement as a model for developing its nuclear power option. It said that the Indo-US agreement has set the precedent for Israel to seek changes in the NSG rules and help construct its first nuclear power plant in the Negev desert.[27]

Lastly, does Indo-US nuclear deal contribute to arms race in Asia? The argument made by some of the analysts have been that in light of the infusion of foreign fuel and technology into India for its civilian nuclear programme, materials and technology would be available for its military programme thereby leading to the expansion of India’s strategic weapons programme. China and Pakistan will look at this development with some concern. Both these countries could further expand their own weapon programmes in reaction to the Indian programme. If China is seen expanding its weapons programme, Russia and thereafter the US could expand their arsenals too.

Conclusion
The Indo-US nuclear deal has been the logical conclusion of a vision for US-India relations as framed by President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. It is an opportune moment for India to get out of the South Asia cocoon and sit at the high table as a major power shaping the emerging Asian security architecture. The US has helped India reach the high table, but how India makes use of that seat and shapes that architecture is up to New Delhi. India may also consider using this high-chair and influence US actions/ policies vis-a-via Russia. In fact, India and the US need to leverage the mutual suspicion between Russia and China. Although tactical in nature, Sino-Russian relationship does have the potential to emerge as a potent strategic force if the current trend in international politics continues for the foreseeable future. In fact, there are several commonalities between Russia, US and India – terrorism, WMD proliferation and a stable Asian security order. The US has to shed its biases about Russia and exploit the Russian wariness of China to its fullest in order to build a cooperative security framework in Asia. The high-chair may be of no use if India continues to be reactive in its foreign and security policies.

The spiral effect that the Indo-US nuclear deal could have on the global proliferation regime is yet to be validated. It should be noted that irrespective of the deal, China and Pakistan continue with the process expanding their military arsenal. The Indo-US nuclear deal will only help them in so far as they use it as justification.

[1] Merle D. Kellerhals Jr., “Congress approves US-India Civil Nuclear Accord,” October 02, 2008, available at http://www.america.gov/st/peacesec-english/2008/October/20081002094758dmslahrellek0.3916284.html.
[2] While the Indo-US nuclear deal has been in clear recognition of India’s non-proliferation record, those lawmakers in the US who were against the deal questioned India’s track record. Senator Barbara Boxer, California Democrat, for instance, was quick to cite the September 18 the Washington Post story that highlighted leakage of sensitive nuclear blueprints by the Indian Department of Atomic Energy. A report by Institute of Science and International Security (ISIS) authored by David Albright and Susan Basu questioned India’s illicit procurement activities with regard to its nuclear programmes. See, Aziz Haniffa, “Lawmakers Question India’s Non-proliferation Track Record,” Rediff News, September 19, 2008, available at http://www.rediff.com/news/2008/sep/19ndeal2.htm; and David Albright and Susan Basu, “India’s Gas Centrifuge Program: Stopping Illicit Procurement and the Leakage of Technical Centrifuge Know-How,” Institute of Science and International Security (ISIS), March 10, 2006, available at http://www.isis-online.org/publications/southasia/indianprocurement.pdf. Other opponents as well as some Indian analysts noted that although India may not have engaged in proliferating any nuclear material or technology, the fact that it conducted nuclear tests in 1974 (although declared as a Peaceful Nuclear Explosion, PNE) and in 1998 is in clear violation of global non-proliferation objectives. See, Kelly Motz and Gary Milhollin, “Seventeen Myths about the Nuclear Deal: An Analysis of Nuclear Cooperation with India,” Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, June 13, 2006, available at http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/india/Seventeen_Myths.htm. This report also talked about India smuggling heavy water from the USSR, China and Norway in the 1980s, allowing India to use its reactors to make plutonium for bombs. India’s largest nuclear capable missile, Agni, was also cited as stolen/ illicitly procured technology (the design of an American space launcher from NASA) for peaceful purposes and diverted to military purposes.
[3] There are critics who stress that the deal does not recognise India as a Nuclear Weapon State.
[4] This piece of legislation was also in recognition of the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 that called upon states to establish stringent export control measures on the transfer, shipment, re-transfer and trans-shipment of materials or technology that may be used in the development, manufacture, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. See, United Nations Security Council, “Resolution 1540,” April 28, 2004, available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/328/43/PDF/N0432843.pdf?OpenElement. Also see, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “The Weapons of Mass Destruction and Their Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities) Act, 2005,” no. 21 of 2005, June 6, 2005, available at http://meaindia.nic.in/actsadm/30aa08.pdf.
[5] According to the separation plan, India has put 14 of the 22 thermal power reactors in operations under the civilian list. They include: TAPS 1, TAPS 2, RAPS 1, RAPS 2, KK 1, KK 2, RAPS 5, RAPS 6, RAPS 3, RAPS 4, KAPS 1, KAPS 2, NAPS 1 and NAPS 2. The facilities identified under the civilian category will be offered for the IAEA safeguards. However, the decision as to which facilities come under civilian or military category was solely an Indian one and based on Indian determination. In terms of future reactors, it is up to India to determine which category they belong to (except, of course, imported reactors, which will all be under safeguards). See, Ministry of External Affairs, “Implementation of the India-United States Joint Statement of July 18, 2005: India’s Separation Plan,” May 11, 2006, available at http://meaindia.nic.in/treatiesagreement/2006/11ta1105200601.pdf.
[6] Arms Control Association, “The US-India Nuclear Deal: A Critical Assessment,” Arms Control Association Press Briefing, Prepared Remarks of Daryl G. Kimball, February 15, 2006, available at http://www.armscontrol.org/events/20060215_Kimball_Prepared_Remarks. Also brought into issue was the fact that infusion of foreign fuel will free up India’s current stock for its weapons programme and thereby aid expansion of India’s nuclear weapons programme. This, according to Kimball, was in gross violation of Article I of the NPT, which stipulates that states shall “not in any way” assist the nuclear weapons programs of others.
[7] If the right to return is exercised at some stage, it is necessary under the agreement, to “compensate promptly that Party for the fair market value thereof and for the costs incurred as a consequence of such removal.” See, Text of the 123 Agreement titled, “Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of India and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy,” August 01, 2007, available at http://meaindia.nic.in/cgi-bin/db2www/meaxpsite/coverpage.d2w/coverpg?sec=pr&filename=pressrelease/2007/08/03pr01.pdf.
[8] Foster Klug, “Senate debates US-India Nuclear Deal,” The Associated Press, October 01, 2008, available at http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5hjHnPz7XX0WpdjPiswhHLvaXj0pAD93HPTU83.
[9] “The Indo-US Nuclear Deal,” interview of Strobe Talbott and Robert Einhorn by Meenakshi Ahmed, Seminar, 2006, available at http://www.india-seminar.com/2006/560/560%20interview.htm.
[10] “The Indo-US Nuclear Deal,” interview of Strobe Talbott and Robert Einhorn by Meenakshi Ahmed, Seminar, 2006, available at http://www.india-seminar.com/2006/560/560%20interview.htm.
[11] Glenn Kessler, “Senate backs far-reaching nuclear trade deal with India,” The Washington Post, October 02, 2008, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2008/10/01/ST2008100103654.html. In another statement on the same issue, Kimball went on to say that even “India’s so-called separation plan is not credible from a nonproliferation perspective.” See, Arms Control Association, “Statement of Daryl G. Kimball, Arms Control Association Executive Director, on the US-Indian Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation,” October 01, 2008, available at http://www.armscontrol.org/node/3363.
[12] Arms Control Association, “Statement of Daryl G. Kimball, Arms Control Association Executive Director, on the US-Indian Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation,” October 01, 2008, available at http://www.armscontrol.org/node/3363.
[13] Foster Klug, “Senate debates US-India Nuclear Deal,” The Associated Press, October 01, 2008, available at http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5hjHnPz7XX0WpdjPiswhHLvaXj0pAD93HPTU83. Similarly, Ambassador Robert Grey, former Representative at the Conference on Disarmament stated that the US was doing a bad deal with India as far as non-proliferation issue was concerned. He added, “This is a bad deal that we are getting into here in terms of nonproliferation. We created the nonproliferation regime, we got it through the international community. We supported it consistently over successive administrations, both Republican and Democrat. Now we have reversed course. We are opening a hole with this agreement with India that you could drive a truck through.” See, Dan Robinson, “US-India Nuclear Deal Poised for Approval by House of Representatives, Senate,” VOA News, September 27, 2008, available at http://www.voanews.com/english/2008-09-27-voa6.cfm.
[14] The White House, “Statement by the President on the Occasion of Signing H.R. 7081,” October 08, 2008, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/10/20081008-3.html.
[15] President Bush clarified these two issues by stating that “The Agreement grants India advance consent to reprocessing which will be brought into effect upon conclusion of arrangements and procedures for a dedicated reprocessing facility under IAEA safeguards. In addition, the legislation does not change the fuel assurance commitments that the US Government has made to the Government of India, as recorded in the 123 Agreement. See, The White House, “Statement by the President on the Occasion of Signing H.R. 7081,” October 08, 2008, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/10/20081008-3.htm.
[16] Several analysts have brought out this fact that it is the trade in strategic goods that will take the bilateral relations to a higher level. For instance, Varun Sahni, in an essay states, “access to dual-use technology” will be the “litmus test” of this strategic relationship between India and the US. See, Varun Sahni, “Limited Cooperation Between Limited Allies,” in Sumit Ganguly, Brian Shoup and Andrew Scobell (eds.), US-Indian Strategic Cooperation into the 21st Century: More than Words (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 178.
[17] Ashley Tellis, in his report, Atoms for War makes it abundantly clear that India’s quest for a large nuclear arsenal was never hindered due to shortage of uranium, rejecting the arguments of critics who had maintained that through Indo-US nuclear deal, India will be able to get additional uranium from outside that will free up the indigenous material for its military programme. See Ashley Tellis, Atoms for War: US-Indian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation and India’s Nuclear Arsenal, 2006, available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/atomsforwarfinal4.pdf.
[18] Some Indian analysts have tended to believe that the Chinese opposition to the Indo-US nuclear deal is not so much India-centric. One of the China watchers in Delhi, Jabin Jacob notes that the opposition is rather US-centric, the US position on Taiwan conflict. See, Jabin T. Jacob, “Indo-US Nuclear Deal: The China Factor,” IPCS Special Report 14, March 2006, available at http://www.ipcs.org/IPCS-Special-Report-14.pdf.
[19] Mohan Malik, “India-China Competition Revealed in Ongoing Border Disputes,” PINR Report, October 09, 2007, available at http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_printable&report_id=695&language_id=1.
[20] Mohan Malik, “India-China Competition Revealed in Ongoing Border Disputes,” PINR Report, October 09, 2007, available at http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_printable&report_id=695&language_id=. The study, undertaken on the behest of Chinese leadership’s “Foreign Affairs Cell,” had incorporated inputs from China’s South Asia specialists like Cheng Ruisheng, Ma Jiali, Sun Shihai, among others.
[21] According to them, the deal will have following major implications: a) it will seriously compromise India’s strategic autonomy; b) it will promote nuclear weaponisation and create a spiralling nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan; c) it will jeopardise India’s energy independence and security; and d) it will push India deeper into an unequal strategic partnership with the US with serious all-round implications for India’s foreign policy as well as internal policies. See, Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) Liberation, Editorial, “Indo-US Nuclear Deal: CPI(M) Joins Congress to Script a Spurious “Sense of the House,” September 2006, available at http://www.cpiml.org/liberation/year_2006/September/editorial.htm.
[22] Matters became complicated with some of the comments from US Congressmen like Tom Lantos, who stated in the House International Relations Committee, that “India had to choose between the “ayatollahs” of terror and the United States.” See, Ninan Koshy, “India and the Iran Vote in the IAEA,” Foreign Policy in Focus, October 27, 2005, available at http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/2907.
[23] See, Lalit K. Jha, NDTV, “Debate on Indo-US Nuclear Deal in US House: Who Said What,” September 28, 2008, available at http://www.ndtv.com/convergence/ndtv/story.aspx?id=NEWEN20080066943 and Dan Robinson, “US-India Nuclear Deal Poised for Approval by House of Representatives, Senate,” VOA News, September 27, 2008, available at http://www.voanews.com/english/2008-09-27-voa6.cfm. During the debate in the House, Edward Markey stated, “Flashing a green light to India sends a dangerous signal to all of those countries because these policies are interconnected. The Bush Administration argues that breaking the nuclear rules for India will not lead to broken rules for anyone else, but they are wrong. Like the financial crisis that is now gripping the globe, this disastrous nuclear deal will come back to haunt us because there is no bailout for a nuclear bomb.” See, Markey Decries House Approval of US-India Nuclear Deal,” September 27, 2008, available at http://markey.house.gov/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=3454&Itemid=125.
[24] “The Indo-US Nuclear Deal,” interview of Strobe Talbott and Robert Einhorn by Meenakshi Ahmed, Seminar, 2006, available at http://www.india-seminar.com/2006/560/560%20interview.htm.
[25] China may not push for a similar deal with Pakistan, as the US has done for India. During the visit of Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari to Beijing in October 2008, some senior Pakistan and Western officials commented that China in effect has agreed privately to follow a “step-by-step” approach in assisting Pakistan’s quest for nuclear energy, rather than a formal civil nuclear agreement on the lines of the Indo-US nuclear deal. China has already installed a 325-MW nuclear power reactor at Chashma, Punjab province, and additionally China plans to install a second power reactor of the same capacity there, expected to be completed by 2011. Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi stated that Chashma III and Chashma IV reactors would provide Pakistan with an additional 680 megawatts of generating capacity. Qureshi did not elaborate on the kind of assistance that Chin may provide in this regard, although it is assumed that China will introduce grandfather clause into its earlier agreements with Pakistan. Prior to joining NPT in 1992, China had signed an agreement with Pakistan (December 31, 1991) to build the Chasma nuclear power reactor in the Punjab province. See, Farhan Bokhari, “China Aiding Pakistan’s Nuclear Ambitions,” CBS News, October 16, 2008, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/10/16/world/main4527309.shtml; “China to Help Pakistan Build Two More Nuclear Power Plants,” CNN, October 18, 2008, available at http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/10/18/pakistan.china.nuclear.ap/; “Pakistan Gets Confirmation on Chinese Reactor,” Nuclear Engineering International, March 1992, p. 7; and Robert Shuey and Shirley A. Kan, “Chinese Missile and Nuclear Proliferation: Issues for Congress,” CRS Issue Brief, September 29, 1995, p. 9, cited in “China’s Nuclear Exports and Assistance to Pakistan,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, updated November 14, 2003, available at http://www.nti.org/db/china/npakpos.htm#3.
[26] This idea was well-articulated by Strobe Talbott in an interview to Seminar. See, “The Indo-US Nuclear Deal,” interview of Strobe Talbott and Robert Einhorn by Meenakshi Ahmed, Seminar, 2006, available at http://www.india-seminar.com/2006/560/560%20interview.htm. Islamic countries are not one huge monolith, and one should keep in mind the Saudi-Iran rivalry in mind.
[27] Amit Baruah, “Now, Israel Wants NSG Rules Changed,” Hindustan Times, August 28, 2007, available at http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/FullcoverageStoryPage.aspx?id=9a7f3e9c-db05-4333-beb1-ccece17c6658_Special&MatchID1=4858&TeamID1=1&TeamID2=5&MatchType1=1&SeriesID1=1224&MatchID2=4862&TeamID3=9&TeamID4=8&MatchType2=2&SeriesID2=1225&PrimaryID=4858&Headline=Now%2c+Israel+wants+NSG+rules+changed.

Just Another BRIC in the Wall?

This analysis on BRIC appeared first on the ORF website.

The BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) grouping has been touted as yet another grouping opposing unipolarity. However, the key question is whether the unipolar movement is over and what alternatives are available at this juncture or even in the future. Does BRIC have the potential and prospects for emerging as a strategic bloc? Is the unipolar movement over? Analysts note that the US hegemony has reached its peak and is on a downward spiral. The rise of the BRICs needs to be analysed in this context. The fact that the BRIC countries have been identified as some of the fastest growing economies in the world does not mean that they can alter the current US-dominated global order.



Is the Unipolar Movement Over?
Several analysts have pointed to the declining US share in the world economy. In 1939, the US share of global wealth was about 30%. By 1945, after the Second World War it rose to 45%; it is currently at about 20%. The post-WWII US share does not make a correct estimate of the US share because after the war, must of the other major economies were destroyed and therefore the US share was high. Therefore, one must look at the 1939 figures to get a correct picture. When compared with the 1939 share, the US share today is not that small, especially considering the rise of several other major powers in the meantime. .
Second, why do we say it is the decline of US-led unipolarity? The US has been a superpower in a bipolar world for 5 decades and a sole superpower in the last decade and more. But on what basis are we concluding that the US-led unipolarity is over? The Roman Empire lasted for centuries (14 to 476 AD). Brazil has been a great power of tomorrow for decades now. India and China are touted as great powers. Prospects for both India and China emerging as great powers come with certain amount of scepticism. The internal problems, mostly socio-economic in nature, in both the countries might pull these countries down.
How do we make these assumptions with certainty? The US power might not decline as one expects. The lead - in politico-economic, military and strategic spheres - that the US maintains cannot be challenged soon by any power or any group of powers in the near future. While this is true, it must also borne in mind that although the US has continued to maintain a lead, it is being increasingly faced with challenges from peer competitors like China, Russia and at a lower level, from India too. More significantly, China and Russia are moving into the Western hemisphere, US’ backyard in a significant manner, trying to reduce the traditional US influence in there.1
Does rise of BRICs give way to a multipolar world?
At the end of the Cold War, there were expectations of a multipolar world order (Japan, Germany, Europe), although these expectations have not been borne out. It was a clear unipolar order, led by the US. This has been furthered by the neoconservatives a decade later, who advocated and pronounced the ability to lead as well as the duty to lead. Analysts now note that US-led unipolar movement is over, although this time around, the spoilers are not the western European countries, but principally countries from Asia. It is predicted that the twenty-first century will witness power dispersed among several countries – China, Russia, Japan, India and the European Union. In the context of this debate, BRICs also have been identified, as potential future competitor to the US and other advanced industrial countries. Nevertheless, it should be noted that despite the relative decline in US power, the unipolarity is still a feature of the international system. Although countries like China, in an effort to counter such unilateral tendencies on the part of the US, started aligning with major powers such as Russia as well as strengthening bilateral and multilateral ties within the region, it has not been able to shift the balance in its favour or even form a wider coalition of nations to counter Washington.2
While the US acknowledges the difficulty in maintaining a unipolar world order, given that the rise of new power centres is a reality, the US wants to maintain its primacy in the international system as an important grand strategic objective through a range of tools, including political, economic and military.3 Scholars have argued that “continued American hegemony is important because it is seen as the prerequisite for systemic stability,”4 while acknowledging that maintaining a preponderant position may not be an easy thing for the US especially after a decade or so, given the relative decline in US power along with the rise of new powers and the gradual erosion of the its extended deterrence strategy.5 Various analyses claim that US’ “unipolar movement is over” and the power will be increasingly spread around major power centres like China, Japan, India, Russia, the US and Europe.6 Haass in fact terms the emerging scenario as nonpolarity meaning to say that the power will be dispersed among not just two or three powers, but several countries will exercise various dimensions of power. Does BRIC have relevance in this context?
If China and the BRICs concretise their power in the next decade or so, then the neoconservative school of thinkers have something to be concerned about – the demise of America’s unipolar moment. As several analysts have noted, there is fear among such thinkers of the rise of an anti-liberal values coalition. There is scepticism among these thinkers as to whether these powers once they become superpowers, will continue to value the current liberal framework of global governance or will they be more revisionist in nature in altering the global governance structures?7
Even among the four BRIC countries, the world has been less concerned about the emergence of India and Brazil, whereas rise of Russia and China assuming a superpower status has been of concern. Both China and Russia can pose a great military threat, with both being acknowledged nuclear states and large standing armies.8 However, the fear is not just of their rising military profiles, but more importantly due to the character of the political regime in both of these countries. These two countries also pose themselves as revisionist powers, wanting to possibly establish an alternate institutional architecture, articulating new ways to mange international politics and economics.
Thus, what the neocons fear is the rise of a powerful anti-Western and anti-liberals value coalition, led by China and possibly even Russia. The rise of an economically successful authoritarian capitalist power bloc is the threat that they want to address and that appears to be the appeal that the BRICs currently have.
What are the likely consequences of rising multipolarity, including the potential of the BRIC. Can it be the catalyst to induce serious alterations to the existing international system and its institutions?
The end of US-led unipolar moment may be the right opportune time for a China-centred politically authoritarian-economically capitalist bloc. Russia will be forced to see which is a bigger threat, China or the US and align with the West or China accordingly. Although there appears to be a tactical partnership between Russia and China on an anti-US platform, the US has followed policies towards Russia that have been particularly adversarial in nature, further strengthening this tactical relationship between Moscow and Beijing. If Washington continues with such policies, it has the potential for creating a Moscow-Beijing strategic alliance which could be detrimental for the US and all the major powers in Asia.9
The realist school of thinkers also fear and in fact suggest the emergence of a dangerous trend in international politics – danger of inter-state wars as one (super)power is declining and new powers are emerging. Rise of Russia and China have again raised concerns in this regard.
While there has been so much apprehension on the emergence of BRICs, the BRIC concept has also gained popularity and has great appeal. As Goldman Sachs propounded, the imminent rise of BRICs had to do with the significant investment opportunities that might be there in these countries because of their fast growth in the last few years. They predicted that their already large domestic markets will further lead to growth of the middle class, new consumers, resulting in demand growth in sectors like automobiles, electricity and local capital markets.10 Hence, the central principle guiding BRICs, as the West sees it, is not only its growth rate or opportunities for investors but its sheer economic size and thereby the markets.
China a superpower?
The lead that the US maintains cannot be challenged soon by any power and any group of powers in the near future. China is trying to dominate Asia the way the US dominates the Western hemisphere. China will want to ensure that it is so powerful that no state in Asia has the wherewithal to threaten it. China’s military superiority along with its expansionist tendencies will be of concern to the region.11 Beijing will ideally seek a militarily weak Japan, India and Russia as its neighbours, just as the US prefers a militarily weak Canada and Mexico on its borders. But how do the neighbours look to it? Can India, Russia and other neighbours live under a hegemonistic China? Will these countries join a US-led balancing coalition? If that be the case, does BRICs have a future?
Does BRIC Offer A Viable Option?
The very fact that Goldman Sachs identified BRIC due to the huge investment potential, size appears to be an important criterion. Economic size is an important factor; in fact Realist thinkers consider economic size as an essential indicator of their relative capabilities or rather the power of countries.
For the BRIC to emerge as a strategic bloc, it is essential to analyse the bilateral framework in this grouping. In fact, if one goes by the theory of economic liberalism, there is a huge potential in this grouping. The economic partnership among the four countries should be sufficiently strong to create a momentum in the grouping. Additionally, these countries also have to engage in certain strategic areas that might give them the necessary fillip. These areas could be sectors of nuclear, space and such high-tech areas.
Is strategic cooperation possible in this grouping given the mutual history of mistrust and suspicion? It might be pertinent to analyse the issue through a realist framework. Under a realist framework, every major power will try to be as powerful as possible, in relation to their potential rivals. The more powerful a state is, particularly in military-economic terms, the less likelihood of another state attacking it. Therefore, the powerful states in a region will try to establish regional hegemony while also ascertaining that no other state assumes greater power that might seek to alter the power equation.12 In this scenario, can India, China and Russia grow together and is there convergence of interests among these three countries? This is where one sees conflicting sets of approaches. For instance, China tends to adopt an exclusive approach as against India’s and even Russian and Japanese approaches of inclusiveness.
In conclusion, analysis of BRIC suggests that it does not offer itself as a viable option in the near future. In addition, factors like history and unsettled boundary and territorial issues will continue to hinder any prospect of this group emerging as a formidable bloc other than merely an economic bloc. The group, at best, will cooperate and take unified stance on softer issues like poverty and climate change.
• Dr. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan is Senior Fellow at the Institute of Security Studies (ISS), Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. Her areas of research include US foreign and security policy, military strategies of major Asian powers including China, US, Japan and Russia. She can be reached at rajeswarirajagopalan@gmail.com. 1 Although Chinese policies in Asia and elsewhere in Africa that appear to be both more defensive and economic in nature are also meant to create a deeper foothold in these areas. Such policies in the long term could counter-balance the US interests in the region as also affect the US’ relative power and influence in the region. 2 Richard Haass writes that despite the rise in anti-American sentiments, no alternate power bloc has been able to challenge the United States in a significant manner, due to the huge gap that the US has managed to create between Washington and centres of power in almost all spheres. See, Richard N. Haass, “The Age of Nonpolarity: What Will Follow US Dominance,” Foreign Affairs, May/ June 2008, available athttp://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080501faessay87304/richard-n-haass/the-age-of-nonpolarity.html?mode=print. 3 Ashley J Tellis, “Assessing America’s War on Terror: Confronting Insurgency, Cementing Primacy,” NBR Analysis, National Bureau of Asian Research, Vol. 15, No. 4, December 2004, p. 9, available athttp://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/NBRAnalysis-Tellis_December2004.pdf. 4 Christopher Layne, “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America’s Future Grand Strategy,” International Security, vol. 22, no. 1, Summer 1997, p. 94. Other scholars like Zalmay Khalilzad have also maintained that American hegemony will likely lead to a period of international stability rather than bipolarity or multipolarity that instills instability, the assumption being balancing may not be effective. See, Christopher Layne, “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America’s Future Grand Strategy,” International Security, vol. 22, no. 1, Summer 1997, p. 96. Also, see, Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States’ Unipolar Movement,” International Security, vol. 31, no. 2, Fall 2006, pp. 7-8. 5 There have been problems with the strategy of extended deterrence, right from the beginning. For instance, if China attacks Tokyo, by the logic of extended deterrence, the US should attack Beijing. The question has been whether the US will attack Beijing or not; whether Tokyo is worth the cost. The key task is for the US to convince its partners/allies that it will come to their aid if there is a problem. The strategy also works under the assumption the US’ extended strategy will “actually dissuade an adversary from attacking the target state.” See, Christopher Layne, “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America’s Future Grand Strategy,” International Security, vol. 22, no. 1, Summer 1997, p. 104. The concept has become even more problematic with the relative decline of the US power and its capability to protect the interests of the allies and the nature of new threats. 6 Richard N. Haass, “The Age of Nonpolarity: What Will Follow US Dominance,” Foreign Affairs, May/ June 2008, available at http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080501faessay87304/richard-n-haass/the-age-of-nonpolarity.html?mode=print. 7 Leslie Elliott Armijo, “The BRICs Countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) As Analytical Category: Mirage or Insight?,” Asian Perspective,” vol. 31, no. no. 4, 2007, p. 33. 8 Leslie Elliott Armijo, “The BRICs Countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) As Analytical Category: Mirage or Insight?,” Asian Perspective,” vol. 31, no. no. 4, 2007, p. 27. 9 Given the Sino-Russian competition and rivalry in Central Asia and Africa, it is unlikely that any strategic partnership will emerge between Russia and China. 10 Leslie Elliott Armijo, “The BRICs Countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) As Analytical Category: Mirage or Insight?,” Asian Perspective,” vol. 31, no. no. 4, 2007, p. 11. 11 The expansionist tendencies of China are visible in its dealings with the neighbours, especially as it relates to the border problems. One case in point is that of Russia, where despite the settlement of the border and territorial problems, Beijing continued to show parts of Russia as part of China in the maps produced in China. Concerns to India arise from the Chinese assertion over Arunachal Pradesh. Its claims vis-à-vis South China Sea are other such instances. It should also be borne in mind that war is part and parcel of the Chinese strategic culture, and China does not hesitate to use of force for protection of its national interests (as it visualizes). Here is the relevance to understand the strategic culture and the military strategy, because a nation would typically read and interpret the signals of an adversary through one’s own understanding of the military doctrine. 12 Wei Liang, “China: Globalization and the Emergence of A New Statusquo Power?,” Asian Perspective, vol. 31, no. 4, 2007, pp. 128-9.

Understanding Chinese Military Strategy

This essay on Chinese military strategy first appeared in IDSA/ Routledge's Strategic Analysis (November 2008).

Chinese military modernization and its resulting aggressive posturing
have serious implications for Asian stability and Indian security. This
article is an attempt to understand the main security challenges from a
Chinese perspective; the kind of responses, especially military, that
China has undertaken; and the way Chinese military strategy has
evolved from Mao’s People’s War days to a modern hi-tech military force
today. In the short run Chinese military objectives appear focused on
finding ways to defeat the United States in the event of a conflict
between the two countries, possibly over Taiwan. But the long-term
consequences of Chinese strategy remain uncertain, at least partly
because the rise of China, on which that military power will depend, is
itself difficult to predict with certainty.



War is the continuation of politics.1

Introduction
Few will doubt the important role of the Chinese military and how it
affects Asian stability as well as India’s security.2 China’s military modernization
has generated considerable debate. China’s rapid rise as a major economic
power, coupled with its military expansion, has serious implications
for Asia and the world. For example, Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI) has reported that Chinese military expenditure,
Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan is Senior Fellow at the Institute of Security Studies
(ISS), Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. She can be reached at
rajeswarirajagopalan@gmail.com.
This essay is a shortened version of a forthcoming monograph to be
published by Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.
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1014 Strategic Analysis
if calculated in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, is almost US$200 billion
every year.3 China’s anti-satellite (ASAT) test in January 2007 is another
indicator of its ambitions that go well beyond its borders. The most worrying
aspect is the pace of its military modernization and the secrecy that
shrouds it. Concern also stems from the fact that the military leadership in
China sometimes appears to have an independent agenda.
The first section of this article looks at security challenges from the
Chinese perspective. Specifically this concerns the following major issues:
the challenge of integrating Taiwan, balancing the United States, countering
other Asian powers such as India and Japan, and the possibility of a
resurgent Russia. The second section deals with Chinese responses to
these evolving issues. The concluding section focuses on how effective
Chinese military strategy is in dealing with them.
Chinese Security Environment
China does not face any serious security threat in general terms and
does not foresee a war breaking out in the near future. In fact, China
appears to be enjoying one of its most stable and peaceful periods. It is
seeking to follow a road of peaceful development, focusing on economic
and technological issues. China believes that construction of a harmonious
world remains a long-term goal, which needs concerted efforts from
people all over the world, rather than just from China alone.4
As Chinese strategic thinkers and leaders have pointed out from time
to time, the three most important national security concerns of China
relate to maintaining national unity, safeguarding stability, and maintaining
sovereignty.5 General Jijun argues, for example, that each nation
and its notion of war is conditioned by its own ‘cultural background’.6
As its defence white paper of 2006 notes, China seeks ‘a road of peaceful
development and a harmonious world, enduring peace and common
prosperity’.7
With this background China has identified the following critical
challenges:
• Taiwan;
• US foreign and militarily policies/strategies, particularly in Asia;
• a resurgent Japan;
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Understanding China’s Military Strategy 1015
• Russian revival; and
• India’s growing political and military profile in Asia and beyond.
8
Taiwan Secessionist Threat
The most important security threat that China faces concerns Taiwan.
Calls for independence by the Taiwanese leadership will be a direct threat
to China’s basic concerns—unity, stability, and sovereignty.9 The defence
white paper of 2004 stated clearly that ‘the separatist activities of “Taiwan
independence” forces have increasingly become the biggest immediate
threat to China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as peace and
stability on both sides of the Taiwan Straits and the Asia-Pacific region’.10
Taiwan on its own may not be a large threat but, combined with major
defence assistance from the United States, it is a worry for the Chinese
leadership.11 US assistance to Taiwan has gone up significantly after the
Chinese missile firings in 1995–1996 during the Taiwan Straits crisis.12
Taiwan’s military expenditure has generally been constant for the past
five years, being 241 billion new Taiwan dollars in 2006 (four new Taiwan
dollars equal one RMB yuan).13 Further, although the US missile defence
may not be of a totally offensive nature, the Chinese leadership will
continue to oppose it because its mobile, ship-based, upper-tier systems
can protect Taiwan against China’s short- and medium-range ballistic
missiles. A more potent threat for the Chinese will be the development of a
ship-based system by the United States along with Japan, because it could
raise the potential danger of Japanese naval involvement in a Taiwan crisis.14
In essence, an independent Taiwan continues to remind Beijing of the
Chinese suffering and even humiliation at the hands of imperialist forces,
and it is a perfect symbol of the ‘incompleteness in China’s sovereignty’,
especially after the peaceful ceding of Hong Kong and Macao to China.15
Further complicating Taiwan’s relations with China is the territorial dispute
over the South China Sea, specifically the Spratly Islands.16 The
Chinese Government has consistently reiterated its claims on Taiwan.
There have been two white papers on the Taiwan issue—one in 1993 and
the second in 2000—that clearly provide the ‘basis for one China, de facto
and de jure’.17 The defence white papers of 2004 and 2006 reiterated this
theme, as did Premier Wen Jiabao at the 10th National Party Congress,
and President Hu Jintao at the 17th National Party Congress.18
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China has tried to deal with these challenges through a range of measures.
19 Since the mid-1990s the Beijing leadership has recognized the
importance of military modernization in crushing the Taiwan threat.
However, given the huge political, economic, and even social cost of
using force against Taiwan, Beijing may not perceive this as a serious
policy option, but may use it as a deterrent against Taiwan.20 Any
Chinese attack on Taiwan will be a formula for disaster, and Chinese
leaders are aware of this.21 However, this does not mean that China will
sit by and watch the Taiwanese making moves towards independence,
as was evident in the statement made by the Taiwan Affairs Office of the
PRC State Council and the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee,
that ‘if Taiwan should provoke major incidents of “Taiwan
independence”, the Chinese people will crush their schemes firmly and
thoroughly at any cost.’22 The following are some of the major options
short of war that have been considered in recent scholarly literature on
the issue but may not necessarily be options that the Chinese leadership
might actually be considering.
Air and Missile Strikes:23 Short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) strikes
and precision strikes against vital installations in Taiwan would weaken
its leadership’s will to start a counter-attack. The attacks could target
Taiwan’s air defence systems, its air bases, radar sites, missiles, and command
and control facilities, in effect crippling all of Taiwan’s defences
against a Chinese attack.
Limited Military Campaign: An attack on Taiwan’s information and
computer networks, particularly in the country’s political, economic, and
military infrastructure, would be able to dilute the leadership’s capability
and will to undertake any counter-measures. As a Pentagon report noted,
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Special Forces have in recent years
upgraded themselves from being an auxiliary and supplementary force to
a fully fledged ground combat force.24
Naval Blockade:25 Naval blockade is another option that Beijing could
consider. A complete submarine blockade of Taiwanese ports would pose
an enormous security threat to Taiwan.26 This may not even need China to
have a very advanced navy, in terms of power projection. Submarine use
as an effective coercive instrument in China’s naval warfare strategy has
been highlighted in several Chinese articles.27 Taiwan’s close location to
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Understanding China’s Military Strategy 1017
the mainland also makes it an easy target for a blockade.28 Sea mining or a
sea-air blockade is another tactic that the Chinese could employ.
Amphibious Invasion:29 China has improved its amphibious capabilities
in recent years, with Beijing conducting more than a dozen such exercises
in the past decade or so.30 Although China has beefed up its
capabilities in this regard, given the logistics-intensive nature of these
operations and the need to have air and sea superiority, the probability of
the Chinese venturing into amphibious operations against Taiwan is
unlikely.
In any of the above-mentioned scenarios the United States and even
Japan might be involved, though China’s improving submarine capabilities
would increase the risk for US forces or vessels operating in the region.31
China’s improving air defence systems would also have an effect on US
forces. Although China’s air defences have traditionally been weak, they
have made significant progress in this area, setting up multilayered air
defence systems through Russian-origin surface-to-air missiles (SAMs)
and advanced Russian aircraft such as the SU-30.
Pre-eminence of the United States in Asia
China has viewed with caution the emerging international scenario as
well as some of the arms control regimes, which are spearheaded by the
United States. China has vacillated from an extreme viewpoint of ‘imminent
US hegemonic decline’ to a viewpoint that ‘US-dominated unipolarity’
will continue well into the 21st century.32 Additionally, there is not a single
major strategic issue in which the West and China are on the same side.33
In fact, the Chinese also believe that, after the end of the Cold War, the
nuclear balance has shifted in favour of the United States, which has led to
US hegemony over the rest of the international community.34
The Chinese continue to believe that the post-cold war phase of a USdominated
world is likely to be a transition period. They visualize a
multipolar world emerging after this transition period, with China, the
United States, Japan, Europe, and Asia emerging as the significant poles.35
In fact, Chinese scholar Li Zhongcheng wrote in 1997, that ‘the US will
strive for maintaining global unipolarity with its status as the sole superpower
intact’.36 Yao Youzhi of the Department of Strategic Research of the
Chinese Academy of Military Sciences, PLA, believes that the United States
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1018 Strategic Analysis
has undertaken several measures to incorporate and integrate certain powers
like Europe and Japan, or to try and contain other powers like Russia and
China, to stem the rise of any potential regional grouping opposing its
hegemonic power.37 Although China, in an effort to counter such unilateral
tendencies on the part of the United States, has started aligning itself with
major powers such as Russia, as well as strengthening bilateral and multilateral
ties within the region, it has not been able to shift the balance in its
favour or even to form a wider coalition of nations to counter Washington.
China is also clear that its economic engagement with Washington is
beneficial and it will continue. Most importantly, China appears to believe
that a US strategic presence in Asia is still necessary for stability in the
region. While China believes that its economic interaction with the United
States is to its own benefit, it is clearly wishful thinking to imagine that
‘economic and institutional engagement with the US will automatically
bring about a democratic and peaceful China’.38
A serious conflict with the United States is possible only under two conditions:
(1) a Taiwanese call for independence and (2) a situation of Chinese
superiority sufficient to challenge the US superpower status directly, resulting
in yet another Cold War, in which case a US–Soviet style confrontation
will be a possibility. The United States, in its Nuclear Posture Review (NPR),
noted that a ‘military confrontation over the status of Taiwan’ could force
the United States to consider the use of nuclear weapons as well.39
Emergence of a Resurgent Japan
Although an economic superpower, Japan has never managed to
become a major geopolitical actor because of its pacifist military posture.
This posture is undergoing change, with Japan assuming larger security
responsibilities, as was evident in the deployment of Japanese troops in
Iraq and of its naval vessels in the Arabian Sea in support of US military
operations in Afghanistan.40
The resurgence of a militarily assertive Japan will pose serious challenges
for China. Although Beijing recognized the need to have better
relations with Tokyo, which resulted in a ‘new thinking’, followed by
then President Jiang Zemin’s visit to Japan in 1998, the anti-Japanese disturbances
in China in 2005 were a pointer to the difficulties that exist in
the bilateral relationship, carrying as it does heavy historical baggage.
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Understanding China’s Military Strategy 1019
Visualizing a more aggressive Japan in the coming decades, China has
called for more dynamic political ties, while maintaining that Japan adopt
stances that are not offensive to Chinese sensitivities. These Chinese
efforts can also be construed as laying the foundation for a counter-US
grouping in East Asia.41
Issues that worry Beijing where Japan is concerned include its aggressiveness,
its participation in a US-led ballistic missile shield in the region,
recent Japanese naval exercise with the United States, India, Singapore, and
Australia, and its trilateral summit last year with the United States and
Australia. China is also seriously concerned by the possibility of Japan
adopting a more ‘manipulative role’42 in a Taiwan conflict as well as in
directing the shape of Taiwanese politics. This possibility, along with the
new security alliance between the United States and Japan, which encompasses
not just bilateral security issues but also those of Japan’s neighbours,
has become a serious worry for the Beijing leadership.43 But Beijing
appears resigned to the idea that a resurgent Japan is a reality.44
Bilateral tensions also revolve around various territorial issues such as
the East China Sea and the Senkaku Islands.45 Similarly claims by Tokyo
and Beijing over the gas-rich East China Sea continue to affect their
bilateral ties.46
Russian Revival47
Russia today exhibits a peculiar mix of weakness and strength, as was
illustrated in the 2003 Russian defence white paper, which stated that
Moscow might consider preventive strikes in case of dire threats to its
national security. It illustrated both the weakness of its conventional
military might and the continuing potency of its strategic forces.
Despite their mutual wariness, both Russia and China have utilized
opportunities after the fall of the Soviet Union to solidify relations, essentially
through trade and arms transfers.48 Relations were further strengthened
with the signing of the ‘Sino-Russian strategic partnership of
equality, trust and cooperation’, following which the two countries maintained
that their improved relations were not directed against any particular
country and did not have an anti-US agenda. More significant was
President Putin’s offer in 2000 of Russia’s ’direct military assistance to
China’ in the case of a Taiwan crisis.49
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1020 Strategic Analysis
Nonetheless, one of the major nuclear challenges that China may
face comes from Russia. Published in 2000, the National Security Concept
of the Russian Federation (2000 Concept) and the Military Doctrine made
bold statements about the use of nuclear weapons. These documents
are significant for two reasons: first, because they highlight the importance
of nuclear weapons in Russia’s military strategy and, second,
because they make a departure from the declared ‘no-first use’ policy,
widening the scope of the use of nuclear weapons.50 Further, Russia has
continued with its programme of modernizing its nuclear triad of
land-based strategic missiles (ICBMs), sea-based strategic weapons
(SLBMs and submarines), and air-delivered strategic weapons (heavy
bombers).51 And there are other statements emanating from the
Russian leadership which may be worrisome to the Chinese leadership.
52 While these may not necessarily be targeted against the Chinese,
Beijing is doubtless wary of Moscow’s willingness to have options that
include pre-emption.
Despite the existence of a tactical understanding between Russia and
China in shaping the international order and undermining the role of US
hegemony, there exist deep mutual suspicions between the two countries.
Despite a border agreement between the two countries, territorial
issues have not been entirely sorted out. Another issue, that of bilateral
economic ties, appears to be the weakest link in the wide spectrum of
Russia–China ties.53 The Chinese might also be interested in getting a
deeper foothold in Russia’s far east.54 Another serious Russian concern
centres on the issue of Chinese migration, both legal and illegal. Despite
the Russian law on regulation of migration (January 2007), the government
reported the registration of two million Chinese migrants in May
2007.55
Another aspect that worries Russia concerns the Chinese development
of intermediate range missiles. In the absence of long-range missiles that
can target US cities, it is quite clear that Russia and India remain China’s
potential targets.56 Even in military-to-military relations or arms transfers,57
while the general assumption is that all is well, there exist concerns. The
Chinese often complain that Russia has given the best technology to
India.58
The desire to dominate the Central Asian states is another issue
between China and Russia. Though disguised by diplomatic facades like
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Understanding China’s Military Strategy 1021
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), two recent military exercises
were essentially a Chinese display of modernization of its military
prowess. Despite their rivalry as two major powers, a technological gap
and the US and EU embargo on technology has forced China to rely on
Russian technology to get its arms industry going, while it is value-added
by stolen Western technology.
Besides their science and technology cooperation, for both China and
Russia, it is the anti-US sentiment that is critical in cementing bilateral
relations.59 However, whether Russia prefers to see itself as a rising Asian
power or as a Eurasian power remains to be seen.
India’s Growing Political and Military Profile in Asia and Beyond
Relations between India and China have vacillated from one end of
the spectrum to the other, with Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s
‘Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai’ to the 1962 war and the rancorous ties after
India’s nuclear tests in 1998. Relations have smoothed out a great deal
thereafter and in fact today are at their best in decades. While it is never
easy to predict the future of this relationship, it is amply clear that Sino-
Indian ties will certainly be a factor in establishing a stable balance of
power in Asia. For China improving ties with India is not only an end in
itself, but a means to achieving its larger objective of emerging as a major
regional and global player. While China may not be interested in seeing
another giant in Asia, it does not want India to forge closer ties with the
US or other Asian powers as that may be detrimental to Beijing’s own
regional and global role.60 Finally, the way the issue of energy security
affects bilateral ties—whether it will foment and be manifested in a
cooperative partnership or result in a conflicting framework—remains to
be seen.
Despite recognizing their inevitable role in shaping the Asian security
order, the two countries differ on the kind of Asian layout they favour for
the future. India continues to look for an inclusive approach as opposed to
China’s exclusivist approach, which appears directed against India, the
United States and Japan. Beijing continues to believe that its peaceful rise
and emergence as a dominant power in Asia is only an assumption of its
rightful place in the region and, in fact, a return to the old, but natural
order. For its part, India may not be willing to see an Asia dominated by
any one power.
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China’s Response to the Emerging Threats and Challenges
Although Chinese policies in Asia and elsewhere in Africa today are
more defensive and economic in nature, they are meant to create a deeper
foothold in these areas. In the short run the Chinese military objectives
remain focused on finding ways to defeat the United States in the event of
a conflict between the two countries, possibly over Taiwan. But the longterm
consequences of Chinese strategy remain uncertain, at least partly
because the rise of China, on which that military power will depend, is
itself difficult to predict with certainty.
Specific Military Measures
One of the most effective deterrent measures that China has developed
in recent years is its missile capabilities, particularly a series of SRBMs.
PLA strategists, especially after the first Gulf War, recognized the importance
of precision strikes in modern warfare and hence the importance of
precision-guided weapons in their operations, particularly as they plan a
Taiwan contingency.61
Chinese attention to developing SRBM capabilities began in the early
1990s.62 During this time Beijing developed—specifically for export
purposes—the M-9 and M-11 solid-fuelled missiles (with a 300 km to 600 km
range) for sale to the Middle East and South Asia. After receiving serious
criticism from the US and other Western powers, China stopped exports of
these missiles and in 1994 inducted them in to the PLA’s Second Artillery,
under the new designations of Dongfeng-11 and Dongfeng-15, popularly
known as DF-11 and DF-15. These missiles were placed in the missile
brigades facing Taiwan.63 This also coincided with the period when the
role of the Second Artillery was evolving and expanding to include
several unconventional activities like blockading and deterrence.64
In addition, the Chinese continued to make improvements in their
capabilities by, first of all, increasing the number of missile launchers, making
a transition from liquid to solid-fuelled missiles and shifting from fixedlaunch
sites to mobile missiles, all of which increases the survivability of their
nuclear and conventional missile forces.65 The Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA) estimates, cited in the Pentagon annual report to the US Congress on
China’s military power, suggest that there were roughly 900 SRBMs with the
PLA as of October 2006. Production was estimated to be at a rate of 100 units
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per year. Towards the end of 2003 the Taiwanese president, Chen Shui-bian,
put the figure at 496 units, deployed at bases in Jiangsi, Guangzhou, and
Fujian provinces.66 More than the numbers, this signifies a systematic development
pattern being followed by the Chinese in anticipation of a Taiwan
crisis or to create an effective deterrent to stop Taiwan from declaring independence.
It also illustrates the Chinese capability to undertake development
of these missiles and the willpower to withstand any international backlash.
Other missile capabilities developed by China include medium-range ballistic
missiles, with a range of between 1,000 and 3,000 km. These capabilities may
not be targeted against Taiwan, but can be used to conduct precision strikes,
particularly on naval ships operating far from China’s shores.67 Given that the
range of these missiles is insufficient to reach the shores of the United States,
it is clear that Russia, Japan, and India remain the main targets.
Other measures adopted by Beijing include a variety of unconventional
means like political and psychological warfare, information and
electronic warfare, and even Shashaiojian weapons.68 The Chinese recognize
the increasing potential of communications and reconnaissance in
future warfare.69 Emphasizing this, Chang Mengxiong of the Committee
of Science, Technology, and Industry of the System Engineering Institute
said that gaining information superiority is more important than air and
naval superiority.70 The PLA is now believed to have built information
warfare units in the Guangzhou, Nanjing, and Jinan military regions, each
with about 500 specialists.71 The PLA is also believed to have conducted
exercises focusing on offensive and defensive computer network attack
operations.72
Recognizing the significance of electronic warfare at both the strategic
and tactical levels, the 4th Department of the General Staff was set up in
1990, focusing entirely on electronic warfare. Besides concentrating on the
defence of key military and state institutions in Beijing, this department
might also be developing the capability to jam other communication satellites,
radar satellites, and the US global positioning system (GPS).73 China’s
ASAT in January 2007 is an indicator of its evolving capabilities in this
regard.74 As well as jamming and other attacks on electronic/computer
networks, the PLA is also believed to have developed the means for soft
kill and hard kill options.75
However, recognizing its backwardness and inability to catch up with
the United States in terms of its command, control, communications,
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computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR), the
Chinese have resorted to the use of asymmetric weapons, or what are
called ‘assassin’s mace’ weapons.76 Some media reports say that China has
developed lasers that can disable low-Earth orbiting satellites as well as a
range of miniature satellites.77 Such nano satellites can be launched in
batches on demand by road-mobile DF-21 or DF-31 booster rockets.78 US
capabilities or defence against such weapon systems are unknown.
The Chinese military has also learnt a great deal from US operations in
Iraq in terms of the use of special operations forces.79 US Department of
Defense reports have affirmed the Chinese capability to ‘adopt a decapitation
strategy, seeking to neutralize Taiwan’s political and military leadership
on the assumption that their successors would adopt policies more
favourable to Beijing’.80 Similar capability-building has been undertaken
with regard to airborne forces.81 Another effective method in the field of
asymmetric warfare that China is engaged in involves the capability to
disrupts opponents’ logistics. Shen Zhongchang of the Naval Research
Institute in Beijing details the vulnerability of superior naval forces like
those of the United States because of the significant amount of human and
material resources employed in these kinds of situations, whereby
‘logistics survival will face a greater challenge, [thereby] making logistics
security harder’.82
The Chinese use of submarines with new types of torpedoes is
another effective approach in the new warfare. China is believed to be
making systematic progress in this arena, as is evident from its agreement
with Russia in May 2002 to procure eight new Kilo-class diesel
submarines.83 In addition, China continues with its domestic production
of the new Song-class diesel submarine. China’s nuclear propulsion programme
is also estimated to be fielding its new second-generation vessels,
which will include both attack submarines and strategic missile boats.84
The Chinese are seriously pursuing their nuclear submarines project to
match other advanced navies. Production of the second-generation SSBN
(Type 094) appears to be underway. China might also be working to get
the more advanced SSBN (Type 095), which carries more capable ballistic
missiles.85 Simultaneously, the PLA Navy is seriously reworking its
weaponry, training, recruitment, and doctrine.86 The evolution of the PLA
Navy and its strengths was deliberately showcased by China when its
diesel submarine surfaced 25 miles off the southwest coast of Japan in
November 2003.87
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Understanding China’s Military Strategy 1025
In this regard, Shen Zhongchang suggests that in this century, ‘the
most powerful weapon will be the submarine. In addition to submarines,
subsonic radiate weapons, high-energy electromagnetic wave weapons
and computer virus would be used to increase the power of weapons’.88
The Chinese have also paid great attention to the kind of weaponry that
will be employed, particularly in naval warfare. This includes nuclear
technology to be in wider use in naval propulsion systems as a means of
supporting the development of larger naval ships; growth of ‘stealth technology
with anti-visible light, anti-radar, anti-sonar, anti-infrared and
anti-electronic reconnaissance’;89 infrared technology; precision-guided
technology; satellite technology; development and employment of superconduction
technology that will enable ships to travel very fast without
noise, making a qualitative jump in naval combat capability; new materials
technology to make it possible for undersea weapons systems; and laser
technology to be used in anti-ship missile defence systems.90
Denial of air space may also be adopted as a tactic in the overall
Chinese military strategy. For instance, Taiwan considers it to be a
militarily provocative move for China to establish an Air Defense Identification
Zone (ADIZ) within the Taiwan Straits.91 Similar tactics were
adopted by China in the East China Sea area in September 2007.92
As a rising superpower China can be expected eventually to seek sufficient
capabilities for a sea control strategy, but clearly Beijing is decades
away from such capabilities. The continued significance of an aircraft
carrier in the PLA’s strategic thinking comes from its objective of sea
control,93 as does the recognition that air superiority is essential in future
combat for power projection purposes, as was evident when PLA officials
told visiting US commanders that ‘there is no more prominent and visible
signal of a nation’s resolve and might than an aircraft carrier coming
into port’.94
Nuclear Weapons in Chinese Thinking
What is the value of nuclear weapons in the Chinese strategic calculus?
Historically speaking, China had neglected the role of nuclear weapons in
its strategic thinking. Mao was famous for calling them ‘paper tigers’.95
However, this position changed in the late 1950s and 1960s. The nuclearization
of China was critical to Deng’s view of making China a great
power.96
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1026 Strategic Analysis
Even though the original intention of making nuclear weapons was a
forced one, over the years Beijing has begun to see greater potential for
nuclear weapons in its strategic thinking. The Chinese leadership has
begun to view nuclear weapons as its ‘only reliable assurance of military
supremacy’.97 Developing a nuclear capability is considered to be an
important element of its national defence strategy, which constantly
strives to improve the comprehensive fighting capability of the PLA. The
PLA leadership takes the view that China should ‘develop a limited
number of high quality strategic nuclear weapons that could be used effectively
to strike back against an enemy using nuclear weapons to attack us.
We should strive to build a small in number but effective strategic missile
corps with Chinese characteristics, and make further contributions to the
safeguarding of our country, world peace and the progress of mankind’.98
Beijing continues to assert that its nuclear weapons have a limited role in
the overall national security strategy, and it will adhere to the no-first-use
(NFU) principle, including on Taiwan.99 Beijing has reiterated from time to
time that it does not propose to use nuclear weapons on any of its smaller
neighbours; in fact the only probable situation where China will consider
the use of nuclear weapons is when the sole superpower threatens to destroy
it. Since border and territorial issues have been partially resolved, Beijing
does not foresee the use of nuclear weapons against Russia.100
The symbolic importance of the presence of nuclear weapons in China
and the asymmetry they create cannot be neglected. China’s possession of
nuclear weapons and of a triad of delivery mechanisms has tilted the
balance in its favour. Despite the existence of an NFU policy, it feels that it
can use nuclear weapons under extreme circumstances (Taiwan being one
case), ‘without fearing a large-scale retaliatory strike on its territory’.101
Conclusion
Essentially, China’s military strategy has evolved from the People’s
War direction of Mao to Deng Xiaoping’s people’s war under modern conditions
in the late 1970s. Deng further developed the local/limited war
concept in 1985, emphasizing that limited wars are the wars of the future,
similar to the one that China had with Vietnam in 1979. The adoption of this
doctrine brought about changes in force restructuring and modernization of
the PLA. Large-scale troop reductions took place, rapid reaction or
‘fist’ units were established and joint forces training initiated. It was
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Understanding China’s Military Strategy 1027
emphasized that, in the new evolving warfare, the PLA should have the
capability to win quick victories, with concepts like active defence,
forward-positioning, pre-emptive strikes, in-depth strikes, and victory
through elite troops becoming pronounced. Further changes came about
after the 1991 Gulf War, where the PLA recognized the importance of
fighting a ‘modern war under high technology conditions’.102 Woodward
notes that even a limited war under high-tech conditions will require a ‘forward
defense posture’ rather than just an active one.103 Also highlighted is
the need to develop rapid information communication technology, stealth
capabilities, and long-range precision weapons, as well as the capability
for intercontinental and outer space combat. This will essentially mean the
development or procurement of precision-guided weapons, improvement
of command and control structures as well as of non-conventional methods
of warfare like electronic warfare, and use of ultra-sonic weapons,
laser weapons, stealth weapons, ultrahigh frequency weapons, and electromagnetic
guns. The PLA is also believed to be designing a three-tier
(land, sea, and air) defence system for ‘outer detection and implicit warning,
intermediate interception, and inner denial, including the lethal use of
force against intruders’.104
Economic compulsions sometimes determine a nation’s military
strategy, as is evident in the case of the Chinese Navy. With China’s huge
dependence on oil imports, concepts such as the protection of sea lanes of
communications (SLOCs) have emerged as a result of the aggravating shortage
of energy resources as well as of the vulnerability of transporting such
resources from one part of the world to the other.105 Sea denial and denial of
air space are also emerging as major features of the new military strategy.
Finally, China’s military expenditure figures illustrate which way the
PLA is going. Although there is a huge discrepancy in the Chinese defence
budget figures, these still remain an important indicator of its national
defence priorities, strategies, and capabilities. The discrepancies have varied
from the current Chinese official estimates of US$45 billion to the DIA estimate
of US$115 billion.106 China is the world’s fourth largest military spending power
after the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, but in PPP terms
(which is more relevant), China stands second at US$188.2 billion after the
United States (see Appendix A). According to Chinese official sources, its military
budget for 2007 is 350.92 billion yuan or roughly US$44.94 billion, which
is a 17.8 per cent increase over the previous year (see Appendix B on Chinese
defence expenditure). The Chinese argue that this growth is primarily caused
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1028 Strategic Analysis
by the sharp increases in the wages, living expenses, and pensions of
2.3million PLA officers, civilian personnel, soldiers, and army retirees.107
The Chinese budget comes under sharper criticism because it does not
cover several critical areas. These include: military-related research and
development costs,108 arms imports, and expenses for the People’s Armed
Police and reserve forces, while the financial support for China’s militaryindustrial
complex comes from the State under a different head.109 Several
of the PLA-run businesses110 also provide large amounts of revenue to the
government, which are being diverted for modernization purposes. It is
also revealed that the defence budget covers only 70 per cent of PLA
expenditure, with the balance of 30 per cent having to be generated from
elsewhere.111As the country reaches the higher stages of economic growth,
its military spending is only bound to increase, hence one can visualize
higher per capita military spending as well.112
The final question is whether China matters, as Gerald Segal put it in
an article in Foreign Affairs. In economic and political terms China has
managed to create a space for itself, highly interlinked with the international
community, more so in economic terms. How China is progressing
in military terms is still a debatable issue. While it has come a long way
from its People’s War orientation and tried to adapt itself as a modern
force, whether the PLA take on the major powers or even assume the same
position as the USSR during the cold war years is doubtful.113
Notes
1 Mao, ‘On Protracted War’, Selected Works, Vol. II, May 1938.
2 See Jonathan D. Pollack and Richard H. Yang (eds.), In China’s Shadow: Regional
Perspectives on Chinese Foreign Policy and Military Development, RAND Corporation,
Santa Monica, CA, 1998; Bang Quan Zheng, ‘A Rising China: Catalysts for
Chinese Military Modernisation’, in Sujian Guo (ed.), China’s Peaceful Rise in the 21st
Century: Domestic and International Conditions, Ashgate Publishing House,
Hampshire, 2006, pp. 183–210. Ka Po Ng, Interpreting China’s Military Power: Doctrine
Makes Readiness, Frank Cass, New York, 2005; Mark Burles and Abram N. Shulsky,
Patterns in China’s Use of Force: Evidence from History and Doctrinal Writings, Project
AIR FORCE, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 2000; and Rommel
C. Banlaoi, ‘Southeast Asian Perspectives on the Rise of China: Regional Security
after 9/11’, Parameters, Summer 2003, pp. 98–107.
3 Petter Stalenheim, Catalina Perdomo, and Elisabeth Skons, ‘Military Expenditure’,
SIPRI Yearbook 2007, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, p. 270.
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Understanding China’s Military Strategy 1029
4 Yu Xintian, ‘Harmonious World and China’s Path for Peaceful Development’, International
Review, 45, 2006, p. 6, at http://www.siis.org.cn/ (Accessed August 5, 2008).
5 ‘PLA Threat Perceptions and Force Planning’, in Keith Crane, Roger Cliff, Evan
S. Medeiros, James C. Mulvenon, and William H. Overholt, Modernising China’s Military:
Opportunities and Constraints, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 2005, p. 192.
6 Li Jijun added that, for a country that has been the victim of repeated aggression
and pillage and which suffered a great deal of war and turmoil, peace, and unity
are very critical in the national thinking. See Li Jijun, ‘Traditional Military Thinking
and the Defensive Strategy of China’, address at the United States War College,
Letort Paper No. 1, August 29, 1997, at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.
army.mil/pdffiles/PUB82.pdf (Accessed July 21, 2007).
7 The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China’s
National Defence in 2006, Beijing, December 2006, at http://www.chinadaily.
com.cn/china/2006-12/29/content_771191.htm (Accessed August 5, 2008).
8 Although India has not been identified as a threat by China in any of the white
papers or other documents, it might be useful from an Indian point of view to
analyse Chinese perspectives on the country and its role in the emerging Asian
security architecture.
9 A Taiwan seeking independence could also give rise to new separatist movements
in Xinjiang and Tibet. The move is also seen as an exercise that would provide
the United States with a much better manoeuvring space, as well as the
ability to shape the Chinese security environment to its advantage.
10 The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China’s
National Defense in 2004, ch. I, ’The Security Situation’, at http://www.fas.org/
nuke/guide/china/doctrine/natdef2004.html (Accessed July 4, 2007).
11 The United States, bound to protect Taiwan under the US–Taiwan Relations Act of
1979, is authorized to supply it with weapons of a defensive nature. See Shirley
A. Kan, ‘China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy—Key Statements from
Washington, Beijing and Taipei’, CRS Report for Congress, updated December 13,
2007, at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30341.pdf (Accessed January 7, 2008).
12 During 2002–2006, Taiwan was the 12th largest recipient of major conventional
weapons, at an aggregate value of US$2.1 billion (at constant 1990 prices).
‘Appendix 10A: The suppliers and recipients of major conventional weapons’,
SIPRI Yearbook 2007, n. 3, pp. 418–421.
13 ‘Table 8A.2: Military Expenditure by Country, in Local Currency, 1997–2006’, SIPRI
Yearbook 2007, n. 3, pp. 303–309. In June 2007, Taiwan’s legislature passed the
national defence budget, which allotted funds for the purchase of P-3 Orion antisubmarine
reconnaissance, the upgrading of the Patriot missile defence batteries,
and to provide for the purchase of additional F-16 C/D fighters. In September 2007,
the Pentagon announced the total weapons sales at a value of US$2.2 billion, which
additionally included 12 surplus Orion P3-C maritime patrol craft and 144 SM-2
Block 3A Standard anti-aircraft missiles. Kerry Dumbaugh, ‘Taiwan: Recent
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1030 Strategic Analysis
Developments and US Policy Options’, CRS Report for Congress, updated November
9, 2007, at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33510.pdf (Accessed January 7, 2008).
14 In March 2005, the United States and Japan designated Taiwan as a common strategic
objective. If the United States decides to transfer such a system to Taiwan,
Beijing would construe that move as the restoration of a quasi-alliance. See
Thomas J. Christensen, ‘The Contemporary Security Dilemma: Deterring a
Taiwan Conflict’, The Washington Quarterly, 25(4), 2002, pp. 13–14.
15 See Jing Huang, ‘Economic and Political Costs’, in Steve Tsang (ed.), If China Attacks
Taiwan: Military Strategy, Politics and Economics, Routledge, New York, 2006, p. 201.
16 The economic significance arises out of the large volume of trade shipments that
pass through the region. More importantly, from China’s point of view, about 75
per cent of Japan’s oil is transported through the South China Sea. There is also a
great potential for oil and gas exploration in this region, which complicates the
issue further. See David G. Wieneck, ‘South China Sea Flashpoint’, China Brief,
July 24, 2001, at http://www.jamestown.org/china_brief/article.php?articleid=
2372974 (Accessed September 5, 2007).
17 Taiwan Affairs Office and the Information Office of the State Council, The One-
China Principle and the Taiwan Issue, February 21, 2000, at http://jm.chinaembassy.
org/eng/zt/zgtwwt/wp/t211261.htm (Accessed September 10, 2007).
18 The 2004 defence white paper stated that ‘It is the sacred responsibility of the Chinese
armed forces to stop the “Taiwan independence” forces from splitting the country.’
The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, n. 2, ‘National
Defense Policy’, at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/natdef2004.
html (Accessed July 3, 2007). For Hu Jintao’s statement, see Hu Jintao, ‘Hold High the
Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive for New Victories
in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in all’, Report to the Seventeenth
National Congress of the Communist Party of China, October 15, 2007, at http://
www1.china.org.cn/english/congress/229611.htm#1 (Accessed November 16, 2007).
19 The anti-secessionist law brought out by Beijing in March 2005, was one such
measure. See text of the translation of the explanations on the draft Anti-Secession
Law, made by Wang Zhaoguo, vice-chairman of the Standing Committee of the
National People’s Congress (NPC), at the NPC session Tuesday, March 8, 2005, at
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-03/08/content_422875.htm
(Accessed August 5, 2007). The law brought to the fore Beijing’s intention to use
‘non-peaceful means’ to crush any Taiwanese independence movement.
20 Michael O’Hanlon, ‘Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan’, International Security,
25(2), 2000, especially p. 53; and David A. Shlapak, David T. Orletsky, and Barry
A. Wilson, Dire Strait? Military Aspects of the China–Taiwan Confrontation and
Options for US Policy, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 2000, cited in
Michael A. Glosny, ‘Strangulation from the Sea: A PRC Submarine Blockade of
Taiwan’, International Security, 28(4), 2004, p. 126.
21 Specifically it would isolate Beijing from its important economic partners—the United
States, European Union, Japan, Taiwan, Korea, and Australia—as well as constituting
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Understanding China’s Military Strategy 1031
a blunder of sorts from a military point of view. For detailed analysis of the economic
costs of attacking Taiwan, see Jing Huang (ed.), ‘Economic and Political Costs’, in
Steve Tsang, n. 6, pp. 193–206. The economic impact would be felt in bilateral and
multilateral trade as well as in the huge loss of foreign direct investment (FDI). In
December 2003, Major General Peng Guangqian and Colonel Luo Yuan listed loss of
the 2008 Olympics, loss of foreign investment, deterioration in foreign relations, economic
slowdown or recession, and ‘necessary’ casualties in the army as the costs
China would have to bear to reunify the mainland by use of military force. Joseph
Kahn, ‘Chinese Officers Warn that Taiwan Referendum Could Lead to War’,
New York Times, December 3, 2003, at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/03/international/
asia/03CND-CHIN.html?ei=5070&en=9ab78294dca72de0&ex=1201064400&
pagewanted=print&position= (Accessed August 5, 2007).
22 Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America,
‘Taiwan Affairs Office Issues Statement on Current Cross-Straits Relations’, May
17, 2004, at http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t111117.htm (Accessed
August 5, 2007).
23 Many books written by PLA officers have suggested possible use of SRBMs and
submarines as effective methods of coercion against Taiwan. See Wang Houqing
and Zhang Xingye (eds.), Zhanyi Xue (The science of campaigns), National
Defense University Press, Beijing, May 2000, pp. 320–324, 407–421; Li Mingliang,
Fengsuo yu Fan Fengsuo Zuozhan (Blockade and anti-blockade warfare), Military
Sciences Press, Beijing, 2001; and Hu Wenlong (chief ed.), Lianhe Fengsuo Zuozhan
Yanjiu (Research on joint blockade operations), Military Sciences Press, Beijing,
1999, all cited in Michael A. Glosny, n. 20, p. 127.
24 Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act,
Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2007, p. 32.
25 The PLA Navy may not actually have to destroy very many merchant ships in
Taiwanese waters to create a major economic problem for Taiwan. Once there was
a serious threat, ships would be deterred from entering the waters, while Taiwan’s
potential competitors would exaggerate the threat in an effort to divert the shipping
traffic to them. This would all be a recipe for disaster for Taiwan’s economy.
26 The Beijing leadership is apparently of the view that this option is less likely to
provoke outside intervention than others. US Department of Defense, Annual
Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2003; US Department of
Defense, ‘The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait’, February 1999, at http://
www.fas.org/news/taiwan/1999/twstrait_02261999.htm (Accessed August 7,
2007); Michael O’Hanlon, Budget Options for the Bush Administration, Brookings,
Washington, DC, 2001, p. 225; and China Post, cited in Michael A. Glosny, n. 20,
p. 127.
27 See, for example, Tang Fuquan, Huang Jinsheng, and Zhang Yonggang, ‘Shin
Shiji Haiyang Zhanlue Xingshi Zhanwang’ (Prospects for a maritime strategy in
the twenty-first century), Junshi Kexue (Military Science), 15(1), 2002, pp. 88–97;
Hou Songling and Chi Diantang, ‘Zhongguo Zhoubian Haiyu de Zhanlue Diwei
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1032 Strategic Analysis
he Dilu Zhanlue Jiazhi Chutan’ (China’s near seas: strategic position and geostrategic
importance’, Dangdai Yazhou (Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies), 10, 2003,
pp. 47–52, cited in Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, ‘Undersea Dragons:
China’s Maturing Submarine Force’, International Security, 28(4), 2004, p. 162; and
Captain Shen Zhongchang, Lieutenant Commander Zhang Haiyin, and Lieutenant
Zhou Xinsheng, ‘The Military Revolution in Naval Warfare’, in Michael Pillsbury
(ed.), Chinese Views of Future Warfare, National Defense University Press,
Washington, DC, 1997, at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/
pills2/index.html (Accessed June 10, 2007). In May 2003, China reported that 70 of
its navy’s submariners had died in an undersea accident, which was revealing of
its capabilities. However, it should be borne in mind that even the most advanced
submarines are not immune from accidents. Following the accident Hu Jintao
changed the top leadership and Admiral Shi Yunsheng, who had been the Navy
leader since 1996, was relieved of his command and replaced by Adm. Zhang
Dingfa. See John Pomfret, cited in Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, n. 27, p. 165.
28 These ports handle about 90 per cent of shipping entering and exiting Taiwan,
including most of Taiwan’s imported items like food and oil, increasing the
potential for a blockade. Further, the shallow waters of these ports make it difficult
for Taiwan to operationalize its anti-submarine warfare operations. Michael
A. Glosny, n. 20, p. 130. These three ports together manage traffic of about 30,000
merchant vessels every six months.
29 Some China scholars are of the view that Beijing may not actually carry out an
amphibious invasion before 2010 and may instead take recourse to employing
coercive strategies. See Michael A. Glosny, n. 20, p. 126.
30 One of the two exercises conducted in 2004 dealt purely with a Taiwan
scenario.
31 Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, n. 27, p. 183. There have been debates on the
Chinese capability in this regard, particularly in the West and views are divided,
with one group suggesting that US anti-submarine warfare capabilities have
withered after the end of the Cold War. The Taiwanese capabilities are also estimated
to be poor.
32 Yong Deng, ‘Hegemon on the Offensive: Chinese Perspectives on US Global
Strategy’, Political Science Quarterly, 116(3), 2001, pp. 343–344.
33 Gerald Segal, ‘Does China Matter?’, Foreign Affairs, September/October 1999,
at http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/reg.burma/archives/199909/msg00848.html
(Accessed September 10, 2007). Although in the post-9/11 era the United States
and China have agreed to cooperate in the war against terror, the Chinese role has
been minimal. Despite the Chinese wariness of the US presence in Asia, in some
ways it views its favourably as a factor for regional stability. China otherwise
believes that new potential powers could emerge, and even a nuclear Japan.
34 Wang Zhongchun, ‘Nuclear Challenges and China’s Choices’, China Security,
Winter 2007, pp. 53–54. On a similar note, speaking on rules of the game in
international relations, the two colonels—Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui—who
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Understanding China’s Military Strategy 1033
authored Unrestricted Warfare say that small nations use rules to protect their own
interests, whereas large nations employ rules to control other nations. Qiao Liang
and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare, PLA Literature and Publishing House,
Beijing, February 1999, p. 131.
35 See Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment, National
Defense University Press, Washington, DC, 2000, at http://www.fas.org/nuke/
guide/china/doctrine/pills2/index.html (Accessed June 10, 2007). These five
poles would by then have more or less equal Comprehensive National Power
(CNP). CNP, an important concept in Chinese contemporary political thought,
refers to the general power of a nation-state. Chinese political thinkers believe
that CNP can be calculated numerically and there is a number of formulae which
combine various quantitative indices to create a single number which purports to
measure the power of a nation-state. These indices take into account both military
factors (hard power) and economic and cultural factors (soft power). In fact, the
concept comes out of the ancient Chinese notion of shi which when translated
means ‘strategic configuration of power’, although this still does not fully capture
the sense of the word.
36 Li Zhongcheng, ‘World Politics’, Contemporary International Relations, 7(1), 1997,
p. 1, cited in Michael Pillsbury, n. 35.
37 See Deng, n. 32, p. 347.
38 Ibid., p. 344.
39 Further, the NPR adds that ‘due to the combination of China’s still developing
strategic objectives and its ongoing modernization of its nuclear and non nuclear
forces, China is a country that could be involved in an immediate or potential contingency’.
Nuclear Posture Review (Excerpts), January 8, 2002, at http://www.globalsecurity.
org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm (Accessed December 15,
2007).
40 The rise of a more independent and assertive Japan in the coming years is a reality
that China, Russia, and the United States will have to deal with: the change of
nomenclature from Japanese Defence ‘Agency’ to ‘Ministry’ appears to indicate
this new reality. Japan’s 2005 White Paper saw a shift from its earlier reports in
the sense that, unlike the 2004 report, Chapter II of the 2005 Report included the
new National Defense Programme Guidelines, which will determine the form of
Japan’s defence capability from now on, and the whole report has been compiled
in accordance with these guidelines. Some of the main threats and challenges
identified in the report include nuclear developments, missile tests conducted by
North Korea and the rise of China. The report also emphasized Japan’s need to
deal effectively with ballistic missile and guerrilla attacks, while maintaining the
ability to respond to invasions of Japanese islands and intrusions into Japan’s
airspace and territorial waters.
41 The feasibility of such a grouping is seriously questionable given the historical
baggage that both nations have. Meanwhile, several Chinese security analysts
have begun to identify cracks in the US–Japanese security alliance, as a result of
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1034 Strategic Analysis
which Japan has begun to assume assertive roles in the military/security sphere,
possibly leading to a nuclear Japan sometime in the near future. For instance,
Feng Zhaokui of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) states that Japan’s
nuclear ambitions will distance it from the United States and ‘will very likely damage
the 50-year old US–Japan security relationship’. See Feng Zhaokui, ‘Lengzhan
jiexu dui Ri-Mei keji guanxi de xiangying’ (The impact of the end of the Cold War
on US–Japan relations in science and technology), Heping yu fazhan (Peace and
Development), 48(2), 1994, pp. 5–13, cited in Michael Pillsbury, n. 35. Others
believe that the United States itself has become wary of the changes taking place in
Japan and of it becoming a more ‘normal’ nation and assuming a more independent
and aggressive military role. See Zhao Jieqi, ‘The Present Status and Prospect of
Japan–US Military Relations’, International Strategic Studies [English], 4, 1989, pp.
12–15. See also Ge Gengfu, ‘Changes in the Development of Japan’s Defense Policy
and Defense Capabilities’, International Studies [English], January 13, 1989,
cited in Michael Pillsbury, n. 35.
42 Michael Pillsbury, n. 35.
43 For instance, Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing said: ‘The Taiwan question is China’s
internal affair and should by no means be deliberated in the framework of the
security alliance between the United States and Japan.’ See Hu Xiao, ‘Japan and
US Told: Hands off Taiwan’, China Daily, March 7, 2005, at http://www.chinadaily.
com.cn/english/doc/2005-03/07/content_422393.htm (Accessed October 25,
2007).
44 Therefore Beijing wants to see how a positive spin could be given to its relations
with this resurgent Japan and to find a way of bringing it under its influence. See
Lu Lei, Wu Youchang, and Hu Ruoqing, Riben fu guo zhi mi (The riddle of Japan,
the wealthy country), Jiefangjun wen yi chubanshe, Beijing, 1994, cited in Michael
Pillsbury, n. 35.
45 The Senkaku Islands or Diaoyutai Islands are a group of disputed uninhabited
islands currently under the control of Japan, but claimed by both China and
Taiwan. When the United States was to hand over the disputed islands to Japan,
the PRC, and ROC governments protested and reiterated their sovereignty over
the islands.The ROC made an official announcement on June 11, 1971, followed
by the PRC on December 30. Despite the Chinese protest, the United States
handed over the disputed islands to Japan in 1972.
46 Tokyo proposed the joint development of four gas fields, including Shirakaba
and Asunaro (known by the Chinese as Chunxiao and Longjing, respectively),
which straddle the median line that it claims divides the two countries’ overlapping
exclusive economic zones. Beijing does not recognize this border and
insists on joint development only on what Japan claims to be its side of the
line. See Yasuhiro Goto, ‘East China Sea Dispute: Learn from the Australians
and East Timorese’, AJISS-Commentary, December 7, 2007, at http://
www.jiia.or.jp/en_commentary/200712/07-1.html (Accessed December 15,
2007).
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Understanding China’s Military Strategy 1035
47 This section has benefited immensely from my discussions with Nandan
Unnikrishnan; however, I take responsibility for any shortcomings that still
remain.
48 By the mid-1990s, the two countries were equal partners, principally thanks to the
economic advantage that Beijing enjoyed. In April 1996, Moscow undertook a
major troop readjustment, moving forces away from the 2,500-mile border with
China. For its part China shifted its troops—at least 200,000 soldiers and a
substantial amount of heavy weaponry—from the Russian and Kazakh borders to
the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea coast. See Alexandr Nemets, ‘Russia
and China: The Mechanics of an Anti-American Alliance’, Journal of International
Security Affairs, 11, 2006, at http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2006/11/
nemets.php (Accessed December 12, 2007).
49 However, what was more significant in that agreement was article 5, Russia’s
opposition to Taiwan’s independence. It was reported that, after his meeting with
Chinese President Jiang Zemin, President Putin instructed his military that, in the
case of a US intervention in the Taiwan crisis, ‘Russia would dispatch its Pacific
Fleet to cut off the route of the US fleet in order to keep the latter far away from
the Taiwan Strait.’ See Sing Tao Jih Pao (Hong Kong), internet edition [Chinese],
July 8, 2000, cited in Yu Bin, ‘In Search for a Normal Relationship: China and Russia
Into the 21st Century’, China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, 5(4), November 2007,
p. 66. It should be borne in mind that the security scenario has undergone major
changes since 2000, when the agreement was signed. Whether Russia will extend
direct military assistance in the changed scenario is doubtful, given the emerging
strains in the Russia–China bilateral relationship.
50 Chinese concerns also arise from the fact that the 2000 Concept document did not
shy away from threatening the use of nuclear weapons to deter small-scale wars
that do not necessarily threaten Russia’s security or territorial integrity. See Wang
Zhongchun, ‘Nuclear Challenges and China’s Choices’, China Security, Winter
2007, pp. 53–54, at http://www.wsichina.org/cs5_4.pdf (Accessed January 10,
2008).
51 Nikolai Sokov, ‘Modernization of Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Russia: The
Emerging New Posture’, Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), May 1998, at http://
www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/over/modern.htm (Accessed December 15, 2007).
52 While speaking at a scientific conference in Moscow, Chief of General Staff Yuri
Baluyevsky said, ‘We are not planning to attack anyone. But our partners should
clearly understand … that the armed forces will be used if necessary to protect the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and its allies,
including on a preventative basis, including with the use of nuclear weapons.’
‘Top Brass Defends Russia’s Right to Preemptive Strike’, Moscow News, January
24, 2008, at http://mnweekly.rian.ru/news/20080124/55305669.html (Accessed
December 10, 2007).
53 Russia is wary of the Chinese capability to dominate the Russia/Central Asia
region economically. What Russia calls ‘too much’ relates to the large quantities of
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1036 Strategic Analysis
cheap poor-quality Chinese products dumped in the Russian market, as well as to
the huge number of Chinese migrants in Russia’s far east and in Moscow. See
Yu Bin, n. 49, p. 72.
54 The far east isan area that is abundantly rich in resources of all kinds, whose territory
remains predominantly unoccupied. The Chinese might be tempted to
extend their hold all the way up to the far east, to gain a firmer grip of the region.
55 Celeste A. Wallander, ‘Russia: The Domestic Sources of a Less-than-Grand
Strategy’, in Ashley Tellis and Michael Wills (eds.), Strategic Asia 2007–08,
National Bureau of Asian Research, Washington, DC, 2007, p. 168.
56 Alexander Hrmchin, head of the Analytical Division of the Institute for Political
and Military Analyses, suggested an interesting arrangement among all the
nations that possess intermediate-range missiles with a range of 500–5,000 km. As
of now the majority of these missiles are in China. Hrmchin suggested that India,
China, Iran, and other West Asian countries join and form a comprehensive
agreement on such missiles. He added that, if China, for instance, does not join
(China is certainly not going to join), it would become very clear who China is targeting.
Alexander Hrmchin, ‘Without Panic and Hysteria’, Nezavisamaya Gazeta
(Independent Newspaper), March 30, 2007. I thank Nandan Unnikrishnan for
bringing this source to my attention.
57 The arms trade between Russia and China began on a contradictory note, contradicting
Russia’s strategic interests. In the immediate post-cold war period, Russia
was in dire need of hard currency and China was looking for a major supplier of
arms. Hence, the Sino-Russian arms trade was imposed on Russia rather than
chosen, keeping in mind its long-term strategic interests. Russia was faced with
the choice of accepting China as an arms buyer or facing economic and social
instability in Russia. See Nicklas Norling, ‘China and Russia: Partners with
Tensions’, Policy Perspectives, p. 42, at www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/
publications/2007/Norling_China_and_Russia.pdf (Accessed January 12, 2008).
58 Since 2006 there have been no new major contracts from China to Russia. The
causes of this are (1) Russia’s postponement of the delivery of 40 IL transport planes
and 10 oil tankers, worth US$1.5 billion; (2) the near saturation of China’s market
with Russian fighter planes or naval vessels; and (3) the lack of a breakthrough in
getting any major technology transfers from Russia to China. Yu Bin, n. 49, p. 79.
59 At the beginning of 2000, after the signing of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership
agreement (during President Boris Yeltsin’s visit to China) both Russia and
China were enamoured of each other, and hailed the agreement as historic for a new
type of inter-state relations. However, officials of both countries were keen to highlight
that neither the treaty nor their relations were based on ‘anti-Americanism’ or
any other hidden agenda. Ibid., p. 66.
60 Beijing is also wary of India’s ‘Look East’ policy, and of the strengthening of New
Delhi’s ties with Japan, Vietnam, and several other ASEAN countries. Beijing feels
that India’s diplomacy in Southeast Asia could potentially hamper China–
ASEAN ties as well as reduce Beijing’s manoeuvring space in Asia.
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Understanding China’s Military Strategy 1037
61 Zheng Shenxia and Zhang Changzhi, ‘The Military Revolution in Air Power’, in
Michael Pillsbury, n. 27. Zheng Shenxia and Zhang Changzhi of the Air Force
Command College highlighted the need to develop precision-guided weapons,
automatic command and control systems, and a combination of air defence,
aviation, and space defence weapons.
62 This was following the suspension of military-to-military interactions
between China and the United States, the sale of 150 F-16 fighter aircraft to
Taiwan and the pro-independent moves in Taiwan after Lee Teng-hui became
president.
63 These missiles were used by the PLA in the Taiwan Straits crisis in 1995–1996.
Mark A. Stokes, ‘Chinese Ballistic Missile Forces in the Age of Global Missile
Defense: Challenges and Responses’, in Andrew Scobell and Larry M. Wortzel
(eds.), Chinese Growing Military Power: Perspectives on Security, Ballistic Missiles and
Conventional Capabilities, US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute,
Carlisle, PA, September 2002, p. 114.
64 Ka Po Ng, n. 2, p. 124.
65 Bates Gill, James Mulvenon, and Mark Stokes,‘The Chinese Second Artillery
Corps: Transition to Credible Deterrence’, in James C. Mulvenon and Andrew
N.D. Yang (eds.), The People’s Liberation Army as Organization, Reference Volume,
v1.0, RAND Corporation, CF-182-NSRD, Santa Monica, CA, 2002, pp. 510–586;
and Kenneth Allen and Maryanne Kivlehan, ‘Implementing PLA Second Artillery
Doctrinal reforms’, paper delivered at the Center for Naval Analyses–RAND Conference
on PLA Affairs, December 2002, cited in Jonathan D. Pollack, ‘Short-range
Ballistic Missile Capabilities’, in Steve Tsang, n. 15, pp. 60–61.
66 Taipei Times, cited in Jonathan D. Pollack, n. 65, p. 61.
67 ‘Chapter Four: Force Modernization Goals and Trends’, Report to Congress
Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act, Annual Report on the
Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2007.
68 For a detailed analysis of these measures, see Richard D. Fisher, Jr., ‘Unconventional
Warfare Options’, in Steve Tsang, n. 15, p. 72.
69 From the early 1990s, soon after the Gulf War, China started devoting considerable
resources to developing doctrine, infrastructure, and the means to conduct
information warfare, attacking the computer network of enemy forces. Major
General Wang Pufeng, the former Director of the Strategy Department of the
Academy of Military Sciences highlighted the importance of information warfare
when he stated that, ‘in the near future, information warfare will control the form
and future of war. We recognize … it as a driving force in the modernization of
China’s military and combat readiness. This trend will be highly critical to achieving
victory in future wars.’ Major General Wang Pufeng, ‘The Challenge of Information
Warfare’, in Michael Pillsbury, n. 27.
70 Chang Mengxiong, ‘The Revolution in Military Affairs: Weapons of the 21st
Century’, in Michael Pillsbury, n. 27.
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1038 Strategic Analysis
71 Estimate by Andrew Yang of Taiwan’s Council of Advanced Policy Studies
(CAPS), cited in Richard D. Fisher, Jr., n. 68, p. 79.
72 These exercises could potentially come in handy to the Chinese in the case of a
Taiwan crisis where the heavily networked US and Japanese forces were employed
on a large scale. Significant cyber counter-attack operations could include: jamming
as well as changing network data of the opponents or enemy forces, destroying
computer systems through an infusion of computer viruses, releasing of cloned
information, formation of network spy work stations, and so on. Zhang Haiping
and Zhou Meng, ‘Nanjing Military Region’s Information Warfare Drill was Splendid
but received Scattering of Applause, which was Worrying’, Jiefangjun Bao, August 9,
2000, cited in Richard D. Fisher, Jr., n. 68, p. 79.
73 The PLA is also said to be developing the capabilities to jam US airborne radar
and modern communication networks like the Joint Tactical Information Distribution
System (JTIDS). Taiwan is believed to have procured one of these versions.
Mark Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United
States, US Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 1999, p. 53, cited in Richard D. Fisher,
Jr., n. 68, p. 81.
74 Certain media reports also point to another anti-satellite weapon in the works,
which is a land-based laser that blinds the sensitive sensors of satellites or even
destroys them completely. Victor N. Corpus, ‘America’s Acupuncture Points: Part
2—The Assassin’s Mace’, Asia Times, at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/
HJ20Ad01.html (Accessed February 10, 2008).
75 Soft kill options could include defensive jammers, use of electromagnetic bombs
or high-power microwave weapons that disable electronic circuitry. Hard kill
options are the use of surface-to-air missiles, and close-in weapon systems,
designed for attacking electronic hardware. Anti-radiation missiles could potentially
target Taiwan’s fixed early warning radar, Patriot missile radar, and the
E-2T Hawkeye airborne warning and control systems (AWACS). Use of microwave
weapons to ‘destroy the opponents’ is a considered option in any future
warfare that China might be engaged in. See Chang Mengxiong, n. 70. China has
strengthened its capabilities in anti-radiation missiles too, through its collaboration
with Russia and Israel. See Richard D. Fisher, Jr., n. 68, p. 82.
76 The phrase ‘assassin’s mace’ is the English translation of ‘Shashoujian’, a term of
ancient Chinese strategy. This essentially applies to any weapon that will incapacitate
the enemy, suddenly and totally, instead of fighting him according to ‘the
rules’, which the two colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, in their work
Unrestricted Warfare, characterize as Western nonsense.
77 They are apparently experimenting with ‘parasitic microsatellites’, which could possibly
latch onto US satellites and disable them or even hijack information that they
have gathered. See ‘The Assassin’s Mace: China’s Growing Military Might’, The New
Atlantis, Summer 2004, p. 109, at http://www.thenewatlantis.com/archive/6/soa/
TNA06-State%20Of%20The%20Art-Assassins%20Mace.pdf (Accessed September 23,
2007).
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Understanding China’s Military Strategy 1039
78 Victor N. Corpus, n. 74. Other more traditional weapons, some of which have an
asymmetric capability, might include supersonic cruise missiles that can defeat
and sink US aircraft carriers; and medium- and short-range ballistic missiles with
independently targetable warheads. Ibid. See also Alastair Iain Johnston,
‘Towards Contextualizing the Concept of a Shashoujian (Assassin’s Mace)’,
August 2002, at http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~johnston/shashoujian.pdf
(Accessed September 23, 2007).
79 These forces are not just support forces of the regular army units; they can have
an independent impact.
80 Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act,
Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2002, p. 47.
81 According to a 2001 Taiwanese assessment, the capabilities of airborne forces
have been strenghtened to a significant level, much beyond the role of ‘an auxiliary,
supporting arm’ particularly as they relate to a Taiwan scenario. These kinds
of exercises, along with simultaneous air and missile attacks, could hamper
Taipei’s capability to counter-attack, even if some of its vital installations are
intact. Although China is relatively new in these areas, it has improved and constantly
updated its skills by studying the Soviet operations in Hungary, US operations
in Iraq and other such cases. Lin Chu-chin, ‘PLA Special Operations
Exclusive—PLA Airborne Operations’, Chun Shih Chia (Defense International),
May 2001, pp. 24–39, cited in Richard D. Fisher, Jr., n. 68, p. 85.
82 Shen Zhongchang, ‘21st Century Naval Warfare’, in Michael Pillsbury, n. 27.
83 The new Kilo-class submarines ordered from Russia, and expected to be delivered
in five years (but currently delayed) are likely to be more advanced, with superior
batteries, an enhanced digital sonar system, and quieter main engines. In addition,
they are expected to be equipped with a better and more potent Klub weaponcontrol
system that will allow them to fire their 3M-54E anti-ship cruise missiles
(ASCMs). It is suspected that these new submarines will deploy the supercavitating
Shkval torpedo. See Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, n. 27, p. 166.
84 Ibid., p. 162.
85 Ibid., p. 172.
86 Ibid., p. 166.
87 The recent confrontation between the Chinese attack submarine and destroyers
and the USS Kitty Hawk and its battle group (January 2008) is another indicator of
the PLA Navy’s increasing capabilities in this regard. In yet another instance
Taiwan’s Vice Minister for Defence, Ko Chen-heng, in an interview with the
Japanese newspaper Yomiuri Shimbun, reported that Chinese warships had
expanded their naval activities ‘along the first island chain with five to six
recorded incursions in the past two years.’ These incursions, Taiwan claims,
demonstrate the Chinese intentions to make the Taiwan Strait an ‘internal sea of
China’. See China Times, January 24, 2008, cited in Russell Hsiao, ‘China’s Expanding
Naval Presence Troubles Neighbors’, China Brief, January 31, 2008,
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1040 Strategic Analysis
at www.jamestown.org/china_brief/article.php?articleid=2373935 (Accessed
February 11, 2008).
88 Shen Zhongchang, ‘21st Century Naval Warfare’, in Michael Pillsbury, n. 27.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
91 Liberty Times, December 6, 2007, cited in Russell Hsiao, ‘“China Plans Air Defense
Identification Zone (ADIZ) Within Taiwan Straits’, China Brief, January 4, 2008, at
http://www.jamestown.org/china_brief/article.php?articleid=2373912 (Accessed
February 11, 2008). Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian added that China has plans
to submit the proposal to the International Civil Aviation Organization and meanwhile
plans to inaugurate a new air route some 4.2 nautical miles (7.8 km) west of the
centre line. This move would constrain or even deny access to foreign aircraft in the
area. See Taipei Times, December 20, 2007, cited in Russell Hsiao, n. 91
92 This route is jointly covered by the Taiwan Straits Air Defense Identification Zone
and the Japan Air Defense Identification Zone. It was reported that Chinese Hong-6
bombers from the Huanining air force base flew 20 sorties on September 11 and 23,
following which the Japanese F4 fighter jets flew a total of 12 sorties along these
routes. Such moves could be construed as militarily provocative and could spiral into
a limited conflict. Russell Hsiao, n. 91. A Japanese expert, Kensuke Ebata believes that
Hong-6 bombers, a copy of the Russian Tupolev Tu-16, can carry long-range air-to-sea
missiles and that this was a possible training exercise for a scenario of blocking the
arrival of US aircraft carriers in Taiwan. The H-6 bombers have remained the backbone
of the PLA’s long-range strike fleet for more than three decades.
93 There were media reports towards the middle of 2007 that China had given contracts
to a few Chinese companies for the development of systems and components
for the aircraft carrier. Further, towards the end of the year, there was another
media report, citing Xu Guangyu, an analyst and director of the governmentbacked
China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, saying that it has almost
been decided that the Chinese navy will build aircraft carriers. See Tim Johnson,
‘Aircraft Carriers on Horizon for China?’, San Diego Union Tribune, November 11,
2007, at http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20071111/news_1n11chinashp.
html (Accessed August 5, 2008). Earlier, in 1997, Hong Kong media had reported
Chinese plans to acquire a smaller aircraft carrier, rather than a fixed-wing carrier.
In 1999, the media reported that the Chinese leadership had essentially sanctioned
Y250 million for two carriers, estimated to be completed by 2009, with a displacement
of 48,000 tons and the ability to carry 24 Su-27Ks. However, it appears that these were
speculations made on the basis of the arrival of a partially finished ex-Soviet carrier,
the Varyag at a Dalian shipyard. See Sibapada Rath, ‘China’s Tryst with Aircraft
Carrier’, Naval Despatch, December 2005, p. 37, at http://indiannavy.gov.in/
NavDespatch05/Chapter%207.pdf (Accessed August 5, 2008).
94 Tim Johnson, ‘Aircraft Carriers on Horizon for China?’, November 11, 2007, at
http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20071111/news_1n11chinashp.html
(Accessed November 14, 2007).
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Understanding China’s Military Strategy 1041
95 ‘Talks with Marshal Montgomery on the Three Principles and the Question of
Nuclear Weapons (September 1961)’, Selected Military Works of Mao Zedong, at
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-09/28/content_6143129.htm (Accessed
January 12, 2008). However, this appears to have been more of a propaganda
exercise by the Chinese leadership, making a virtue out of necessity. This is evident
from a statement made by Mao in 1955 on the need to develop nuclear weapons
on a priority basis. He said, ‘During the past years we have been busy doing
other things, and there was not enough time for us to pay attention to this matter
[of nuclear weapons]. Sooner or later, we would have had to pay attention to it.
Now, it is time for us to pay attention to it. We can achieve success provided we
put it on the order of the day. Now, the Soviet Union is giving us assistance, we
must achieve success! We can also achieve success even if we do this ourselves.’
See Atomic Forum, ‘China’s Nuclear Weapons Programme’, at http://
www.atomicforum.org/china/china.html (Accessed January 12, 2008).
96 Deng Xiaoping said, ‘If China does not have atomic and hydrogen bombs and has
not launched satellites since the 1960s, it is not worthy of being called a big and
influential country and will not have its present international prestige’. See Federation
of American Scientists, China Doctrine Overview, at www.fas.org/nuke/
guide/china/doctrine/overview.htm (Accessed January 12, 2008).
97 Thomas M. Kane, ‘Dragon or Dinosaur? Nuclear Weapons in Modernizing
China’, Parameters, Winter 2003–2004, p. 98, at http://carlisle-www.army.mil/
usawc/Parameters/03winter/kane.htm (Accessed July 26, 2007). As Major General
Yang Huan noted, ‘to oppose nuclear war, smash nuclear blackmail, safeguard
national security and sovereignty, and keep peace throughout the world,
China needed a powerful national defense and its own strategic nuclear weapons’.
See Major General Yang Huan, ‘China’s Strategic Nuclear Weapons’,
excerpted from Defense Industry of China, 1949–1989, National Defense Industry
Press, Beijing, 1989, in Michael Pillsbury, n. 27.
98 Major General Yang Huan, n. 97.
99 Nuclear Threat Initiatives, ‘China’s Nuclear Doctrine’, at www.nti.org/db/
china/doctrine.htm (Accessed September 15, 2007). Recently there have been
some debates on China’s NFU policy, particularly its application to Taiwan.
100 This is again debatable given the fact that, despite the so-called border agreement,
the territorial issues are not entirely sorted out. Hence, if a war breaks out in the
future, use of nuclear weapons cannot be ruled out.
101 Sujit Dutta, ‘China’s Emerging Power and Military Role: Implications for South
Asia’, in Jonathan D. Pollack and Richard H. Yang, In China’s Shadow: Regional Perspectives
on Chinese Foreign Policy and Military Development, RAND Corporation,
Santa Monica, CA, 1998, p. 97.
102 Y. Ji, ‘The Revolution in Military Affairs and the Evolution of China’s Strategic
Thinking’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 21(3), December 1999, p. 353, cited in
Dennis Woodward, ‘The People’s Liberation Army: A Threat to India?’, Contemporary
South Asia, 12(2), June 2003, p. 231.
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1042 Strategic Analysis
103 Dennis Woodward, n. 102, p. 231.
104 Kenneth Lieberthal, ‘How Domestic Forces Shape the PRC’s Grand Strategy and
International Impact’, in Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills, n. 55, p. 61.
105 Beijing has serious fears that this could become a reality at a time of crisis, as
China still lacks the naval power necessary for the protection of SLOCs. It is in
this context that Japan and China attach significant importance to the Malacca
Straits. The Malacca Strait is a narrow and congested waterway separating Indonesia
and Malaysia, with Singapore located at its southern tip. As the shortest
route between the Indian and Pacific oceans the Malacca Strait is one of the
world’s most important waterways. See Ian Storey, ‘China’s “Malacca
Dilemma”’, China Brief, April 12, 2006, at http://www.jamestown.org/
publications_details.php?volume_id=415&issue_id=3686&article_id=2370974
(Accessed October 15, 2007).
106 Chinese military expenditure grew at the fast rate of 12 per cent in 2006.
107 It is to be noted that there was a pay rise in the latter half of 2006.
108 Interestingly the Chinese defence budget does not cover costs relating to research
and development for new weapons and equipment. In the Chinese usage there are
two classifications: military research and defence research. Military research, covered
under the official defence budget, covers research in military science, including
medical research for military purposes, and testing and evaluation of weapons
and equipment currently used by the PLA. This research is done exclusively in
PLA research institutes. However, defence research covering all kinds of defencerelated
research, done by research institutes belonging to other government agencies,
is not covered by the official defence budget. The allocation of military R&D
sometimes comes under money earmarked for the Commission on Science, Technology
and Industry for National Defence (COSTIND), which is the main body
responsible for co-ordinating military R&D as well as for the production of weapons.
COSTIND is responsible to the Ministry of Finance for budget preparation on
military R&D. See Shaoguang Wang, ‘Estimating China’s Defence Expenditure:
Some Evidence from Chinese Sources’, China Quarterly, 147, 1996, pp. 892, 896.
109 Richard A. Bitzinger, ‘Just the Facts, Ma’am: The Challenge of Analysing and
Assessing Chinese Military Expenditures’, China Quarterly, 173, 2003, pp. 169–170.
110 According to a Chinese scholar, profits from PLA-run business have ranged
between US$600 million and US$3 billion. See Wang Shaoguang, ‘The Military
Expenditure of China, 1989–98’, at http://www.cuhk.edu.hk/gpa/wang_files/
Milex.pdf (Accessed December 14, 2007).
111 Earnings from foreign arms sales are believed to be a major source of the PLA’s
extra-budgetary revenue. Shaoguang Wang, ‘Estimating China’s Defence
Expenditure: Some Evidence from Chinese Sources’, China Quarterly, 147, 1996,
pp. 893, 907.
112 The same point was brought out by President Hu Jintao when he said, ‘We will
gradually increase input in national defense as the economy grows, and continue
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Understanding China’s Military Strategy 1043
to modernize national defense and the armed forces in a way that serves the interests
of our national security and development.’ See ‘President Hu: PLA budget to
rise with the economy’, China Daily, August 2, 2007, at http://www.chinadaily.
com.cn/china/2007-08/02/content_5447330.htm (Accessed September 10,
2007).
113 This is so despite China maintaining the pace of its modernization, in tune with
global changes taking place in defence science and technology, and weaponry.
President Hu Jintao reiterated that China must build a ‘slim but strong’ armed
forces by striking a sound balance between speed, quality, and efficiency in the
modernization drive of the country’s 2.3 million troops. Ibid.
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1044 Strategic Analysis
Appendix A: Top 15 Countries with the Highest Military Expenditure in 2006 in Market Exchange Rates and
PPP Terms
Table A1 Top 15 Countries with the highest military expenditure in 2006
Military Expenditure in MER Dollar Terms
Military Expenditure in PPP
Dollar Terms
Rank Country
Spending
($ Bn)
Spending
Per
Capita ($)
World Share (%)
Spending Population Rank Country
Spending
($ Bn)
1 USA 528.7 1756 46 5 1 USA 528.7
2 UK 59.2 990 5 1 2 China [188.2]
3 France 53.1 875 5 1 3 India 114.3
4 China [49.5] [37] [4] 20 4 Russia [82.8]
5 Japan 43.7 341 4 2 5 UK 51.4
Sub-total top 5 734.2 63 29 Sub-total top 5 965.5
6 Germany 37.0 447 3 1 6 France 46.6
7 Russia [34.7] [244] [3] 2 7 Saudi Arabia 36.4
8 Italy 29.9 514 3 1 8 Japan 35.2
9 Saudi Arabia 29.0 1152 3 – 9 Brazil 32.0
10 India 23.9 21 2 17 10 Germany 31.2
Sub-total top 10 888.7 77 50 Sub-total top 10 1147.0
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Understanding China’s Military Strategy 1045
11 South Korea 21.9 455 2 1 11 South Korea 30.1
12 Australia 13.8 676 1 – 12 Iran 28.6
13 Canada 13.5 414 1 – 13 Italy 28.6
14 Brazil 13.4 71 1 3 14 Turkey 20.2
15 Spain 12.3 284 1 1 15 Pakistan 15.6
Sub-total top 15 963.7 83 56 Sub-total top 15 1270.2
World 1,158 177 100 100
Notes: MER, market exchange rate; PPP, Purchasing Power Parity. The estimated figures are in square brackets. Spending figures are
in US$, at constant (2005) prices and exchange rates.
Source: SIPRI Yearbook 2007 Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 2007, p. 270.
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1046 Strategic Analysis
Appendix B: Chinese Defense Budget (1991–2007)
Table B1 Budget of national defense
Budget Year
RMB Yuan
(Billion)
=$USD
(Billion)
% of Total
National
Expense
% Increase
over Last
Year
1991 32.50 3.92
1992 37.00 4.46 13.8
1993 42.70 5.14 15.4
1994 55.00 6.63 28.8
1995 63.00 7.59 14.5
1996
1997
1998 93.47 11.26 8.66
1999 107.67 12.97 8.20 15.2
2000 121.29 14.61 8.29 12.6
2001 141.04 17.00 8.30 16.2
2002 166.00 20.00 17.6
2003
2004 200.00 24.00 7.7
2005 7.3
2006 297.93 7.4
2007 350.92 44.94 7.5 17.8
Notes: Unit: billion yuan RMB/billion yuan US$, and the exchange rate between USD
and RMB is about 1:8.3.
Sources: White Paper on National Defense issued by Chinese Government and other
government publications.
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