India-China Talks on the Standoff: Cautious Optimism? - The Diplomat, 12 November 2020

In my column for The Diplomat last month, I looked at the India-China talks on the continuing stand-off in Ladakh and if there was any room for optimism.  Reports vary about the details of the latest talks, but there seems to be some optimism for an agreement.  

Indian and Chinese military forces have been engaged in a military standoff in Ladakh for more than six months now. Several rounds of military and diplomatic talks had yielded no progress. But there was cautious optimism in New Delhi after the eighth round of corps commander-level talks between India and China, held on November 6. There are increasing hints that some agreement may be reached. According to one report in the Indian media, the two sides reportedly “agreed to restoring status quo ante” on the Line of Actual Control (LAC). According to sources quoted in the report, “all that remains is for both sides to formalize the sequencing of steps required to achieve the objective.”  

But this is the most optimistic of the reports, though earlier reports about the November 6 meeting also claimed that progress had been made. On the same day that these more optimistic reports appeared, Indian Army Chief General M.M. Naravane, speaking at a public event in Delhi, said, “We are hopeful of reaching an agreement which is mutually acceptable and is really beneficial in keeping with the overarching policy guidelines.” There remains understandable caution, as he also added that the border troops are fully equipped with appropriate clothing and weapons and that the forces face “no shortages whatsoever.”  

For the full post, click here.  

In earlier reports on the November 6 meeting, an official said that India “want[s] complete de-escalation. Reduction of troops from some areas and de-induction of weapons is not a viable option and is not what we have proposed.” Chief of Defense Staff General Bipin Rawat also maintained that the any change in the status quo “is not acceptable to India” and that one cannot rule out the “situation getting out of hand and spiralling into a larger conflict.”  

India’s official statement was also along the same lines and did not mention “restoring status quo ante.” The statement simply said that “the two sides had a candid, in-depth and constructive exchange of views on disengagement along the Line of Actual Control in the Western Sector.” The statement further added that the two sides would “earnestly implement the important consensus reached by the leaders of the two countries, ensure their frontline troops to exercise restraint and avoid misunderstanding and miscalculation.” 

Other Indian media reports also suggested some progress, though not that the two sides had agreed to restore the status quo ante. According to one of these reports, an Indian Army officer said that “China’s latest proposal is better than their previous proposals.”  

There is also disagreement in the reports about the sequencing of steps for a withdrawal of forces. Some media reports said that India and China have agreed to a three-point disengagement agenda which included pulling back of tanks and anti-personnel carriers within a day as the first step. A second step would involve the withdrawal of 30 percent of troops on both sides every day for three days around the northern bank on the Pangong Tso.  This reportedly would push the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) east of Finger 8. The third step would include withdrawal of frontline troops on both sides in the southern bank of Pangong Tso, as well as areas around Chushul and Rezang La  The three-step disengagement process is to be enforced through a joint verification mechanism, which includes both delegation meetings as well as the use of drones.  

Another report, however, suggested that China would pull back from the Pangong Tso area first. China “has apparently agreed to go back to Finger 8 and remove all temporary structures and deployments the PLA had put up between Finger 4 and Finger 8 since May,” according to this report. The area between Finger 4 and 8 could be kept as a “no-patrolling” area, with neither side permitted to patrol.  But there is no agreement to this effect, yet. The second step would be disengagement of heavy armor and artillery. Currently, the deployment of tanks in close proximity, T-72 Indias on the Indian side and Type-99s on the Chinese side, in the Chushul sector, is seen by both sides as risky. Other reports have said that these are all still proposals, which will be taken up in the next round of talks. It should be noted too that only one report has talked about both sides agreeing to restoring the status quo ante.  

Even if the current tensions were to be resolved in the near term, India’s security perceptions about China are forcing India to undertake some force restructuring to maintain constant vigilance along the LAC, especially in the western sector. In addition to the 3 Infantry Division that is responsible for the LAC in eastern Ladakh, the Northern Command has decided to deploy another division of around 10,000 troops in Ladakh on a longer-term basis.  

Whether these optimistic reports will be borne out remains to be seen. On both sides, there are likely to be worries about the risks involved in withdrawing from positions that they now hold, which carries with it the risk that the other side may renege and attempt to occupy these positions. Trusting each other may still be the biggest hurdle.  

Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Set to Enter Into Force - The Diplomat, 5 November 2020

In my column for The Diplomat in November, I looked at the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons that is set to enter into force in January 2021.  But the key question I asked is if it will matter.  

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), or the Nuke Ban Treaty, is set to enter into force soon. In 2016, the U.N. General Assembly, through resolution 71/258, decided to hold a conference for the negotiation of the treaty. The conference took place in March 2017. The treaty was subsequently adopted by a vote with 122 states in favor (with one vote against and one abstention) at the United Nations on July 7, 2017 and was opened for signature by the U.N. Secretary General on September 20, 2017.  When Honduras ratified the treaty in late October, it reached the requisite 50 ratifications, and is set to enter into force on January 22, 2021.  

For the full post, click here.  

The TPNW contains provisions that prohibit states from participating in any nuclear weapons-related activities including development, testing, possession, stockpile, use, or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Signatories are required “to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited under the TPNW undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.”  

While this is commendable on its own, the efficacy of the treaty is questionable because none of the current nine nuclear-armed states support the treaty or have signed it.  The United States in a recent letter sent to signatories of the TPNW stated that the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council — the P-5 countries, who also happens to be the five nuclear weapons states recognized by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) — and NATO allies “stand unified in our opposition to the potential repercussions” of the treaty. In fact, the only NATO country that took part in the negotiations was the Netherlands but due to its NATO commitments, it voted against the treaty when it came up for adoption. 

The letter from the United States went on to add that the TPNW also “turns back the clock on verification and disarmament and is dangerous” to the NPT. Urging the signatories to walk out of the treaty, the letter further said that while these states have the sovereign right to determine whether to become parties to and ratify the treaty, “we believe that you have made a strategic error and should withdraw your instrument of ratification or accession.” 

The day when the treaty was opened for signature at the U.N., the United States, the United Kingdom, and France issued a joint statement slamming the treaty, saying it “risks undermining the existing international security architecture which contributes to the maintenance of international peace and security,” and that all states “share a common responsibility to protect and strengthen our collective security system in order to further promote international peace, stability, and security.”  

Countries like India, which have opposed the treaty. also made their positions clear.  While responding to a query on the Indian position on the treaty, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) spokesperson said that it “did not participate in the negotiations… Also, none of the other States possessing nuclear weapons participated in the negotiations.” It had also voted against a U.N. General Assembly resolution in 2019 welcoming the adoption of the treaty. Earlier in 2016, it abstained from voting on the U.N. General Assembly resolution that gave the formal mandate for states to start the treaty negotiations.  

Much of Asia and the Middle East also remains outside of the TPNW. Ratification of the treaty by just 50 state parties still means that there is a sizeable number of countries that remain outside the TPNW. The International Campaign for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) has engaged in an effort to name and shame states that are not party to TPNW, but how effective that effort will be remains to be seen.  

Without the support of the nuclear armed states, it may not be possible to promote nuclear disarmament. Beyond nuclear-armed states, even those states such as Japan that are under the extended U.S. nuclear umbrella may be somewhat reluctant to support the TPNW.  While prestige may remain a factor in countries’ decision to pursue nuclear weapons, security considerations may not entirely be absent. These considerations should not be allowed to prevent progress on nuclear disarmament, of course, but treating such concerns as serious may help move the conversation in a more helpful direction than simply preaching or castigating such states. 

There are also complications that arise from the relationship of the TPNW to the NPT.  The NPT also includes obligations toward nuclear disarmament, though these obligations have not been seriously addressed by the nuclear weapon states. Some believe that the nuke ban treaty undermines the importance of the NPT as the foundation of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Gustavo Zlauvinen, president-designate of the 2020 Review Conference for the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) raised questions about the effectiveness of the TPNW saying that it cannot challenge the “legitimacy of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).” 

In a recent interview to Kyodo News, he said, “You can’t have nuclear disarmament without the nuclear weapon states in that system. And that’s why, for the time being, the only treaty that has been accepted by at least five nuclear weapon states, that includes obligations on nuclear disarmament, is the NPT.” He added that there exists a “huge difference” between the NPT and the TPNW and that the TPNW should not “erode the validity and the legitimacy of the NPT.” He also feared that this will be “another issue of contention” at the upcoming review conference. Maintaining the significance of the NPT as the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime, he added that “I believe that once the TPNW reaches numbers similar to the NPT, and obviously includes the signature and ratifications of nuclear weapon states, then probably we can talk about that new treaty being another pillar of the regime.”  

Although the TPNW is the realization of a long and dedicated struggle by civil society activists and some states, the history of previous such efforts are not encouraging. For example, the International Campaign to Ban Land Mines (ICBL) has done stellar work that led to the Land Mine Ban Treaty and for greater endorsement of the treaty globally, with the aim of banning landmines and cluster munitions. While the Mine Ban Treaty is often showcased as one of the more successful treaties with only 32 states outside the treaty, many critical states including the U.S., Russia, China, India, Iran, and Pakistan remain outside.  Their refusal to adhere to the treaty undermines its effectiveness, and there has been little pressure on these states to change their minds. This experience suggests the need for some caution about the TPNW. Addressing the critical problem of nuclear disarmament should fare better than that example.  

India and the US Are Expanding Their Space Cooperation - The Diplomat, 30 October 2020

In my column for The Diplomat, I looked at the expanding US-India space cooperation.  I argue that Space Situational Awareness (SSA) is a very specific subfield, but an increasingly important one for safeguarding space operations, and that is slowly gaining traction in the US-India context.  

The third India-U.S. 2+2 strategic dialogue, with the foreign and defense ministers of the two countries, has just concluded. The joint statement issued at the end of the dialogue is a remarkable and significant one. Space cooperation has usually not featured prominently in discussions between the two sides, yet the joint statement noted the agreement among the four ministers to start cooperation on a specific agenda within the broad space domain – Space Situational Awareness (SSA). The importance of SSA cannot be overemphasized given its utility in ensuring safe, secure, and sustainable use of outer space.

For the full post, click here.  

As important as space has become, it is also crowded and congested with more than 80 countries active in way or another in this domain. In addition, private companies have plans to launch thousands of satellites for broadband and communication purposes.  This will make space traffic management a nightmare in the coming years. The first step is awareness of the space environment. SSA is simply that: awareness about the space environment, which can help ensure safety of space missions by giving collision avoidance information, information about space weather, and related natural phenomenon in space. Unless states are able to develop a clear picture of the space environment that they operate in, space assets could be in danger from both intentional threats and natural hazards. SSA is an effort at collating data on orbiting satellites, old rocket bodies, and other space debris, predicting re-entry of space objects into the atmosphere, and monitoring any threats to spacecrafts and satellites. The overall goal is to generate the ability to monitor, understand, and predict the physical space environment.

There are good reasons for India and the United States to develop a collaborative mechanism to start sharing SSA data. Both are major spacefaring nations with significant investment in space; their societies and militaries are dependent on space for a number of critical functions. Therefore, any disruptions of their space assets would result not only in social and economic disruption but interference in the effectiveness of their militaries as well.

SSA involves collection and analyses of data to convert them into actionable information to deal with threats to space assets. A report by Bhavya Lal et al for the Washington D.C.-based IDA Science & Technology Policy Institute divided the space traffic system into six components. This includes the data collection component “which refers to civil, military and commercial sensors, whether ground- or space-based,” the data processing part, and the data products component, “such as conjunction or collision warnings” so that operators can avoid collisions. Then there’s the oversight and coordination component, which “includes regulations, policies, guidelines, standards, and best practices.” The fifth component is data sharing, which “spans the entire continuum of the space traffic system.” The last component is external factors, “the combination of environmental and operational realities that are driving changes both on the technical and coordination sides.” 

This is obviously a complicated set of capabilities that are better handled cooperatively. India has been in the space business for about five decades now but it has developed only limited SSA capabilities. Many other players including China and Japan also do not have extensive capabilities in this regard. As of today, the United States has the largest network – the Space Surveillance Network – which has maintained among the most comprehensive coverage so far, though its coverage of the southern hemisphere is a bit weak. The U.S. is followed by Russia, which has the second largest network and has better coverage of the southern hemisphere. The EU also has a fairly detailed SSA network.

With India’s space program expanding in its scope and sophistication, India’s civil space organization, the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) has established a dedicated SSA department at the ISRO headquarters. Prior to this, without a dedicated SSA department, India did not show much interest in collaborating with other countries or their space agencies. But other major space players such as the United States and Japan have been keen to work with India on SSA.

Until now, the ISRO relied on limited data from the North America Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) for tracking space debris as well as checking on the active and passive satellites in orbit. But this has been insufficient because this did not give India access to full or real-time data because India was not part of the NORAD network. The ISRO could only access the two-line element (TLE) data set, which is a specific format used by NORAD and provided free to the ISRO as well as other space players. TLE provides data on space objects that are orbiting the earth at a particular point in time. But the fact that the ISRO cannot access real-time NORAD data imposes limitations in terms of accuracy and precision of data acquired and delay in tracking objects in space. 

The urgency and the need for India to monitor and track space objects and space debris became particularly evident after India’s anti-satellite (ASAT) test in March 2019. This possibly led to the establishment of the ISRO’s Space Situational Awareness and Management Directorate at the ISRO Headquarters, which is an important step as India’s space program grows. India’s decision to establish its own dedicated SSA capabilities also comes from the growth in the number of satellites and counter-space capabilities such as ASATs. India today operates a combination of communication satellites including GSATs and INSATs, navigation satellites (IRNSS constellation), and a series of surveillance satellites such as CARTOSAT and RESOURCESAT series.

As for its SSA capabilities, the ISRO started a new initiative called Project NETRA (Network for Space Object Tracking and Analysis) that will keep track of satellites in Low Earth Orbit to prevent them from being hit by space debris or space weather incidents. The ISRO is also in the process of establishing several observation facilities that would include radars, telescopes, data processing centers, and a control center. These are meant to “spot, track and catalogue objects as small as 10 cm, up to a range of 3,400 km and equal to a space orbit of around 2,000 km.” According to reports quoting ISRO Chairman Dr. Sivan, NETRA will become part of the global efforts at “tracking, warning about and mitigating space debris.” NETRA is to eventually track objects in GEO or geostationary orbit, at 36,000 km. 

According to Sivan, India’s SSA capabilities will include a long-range telescope in Leh, a radar in India’s northeast, and a Multi-Object Tracking Radar (MOTR) in Sriharikota, in southern India. As for telescopes, India has a number of optical-infrared observatories including at Bangalore, Pune, Mt. Abu, Nainital, and Hanle. MOTR has been in use already for carrying out space debris proximity analysis in powered and orbital phases during satellite launch, re-entry prediction of debris, and TLE catalogue building. In June this year, the ISRO signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Aryabhatta Research Institute of Observational Sciences (ARIES) for collaboration in SSA and Astrophysics. In fact, a telescope that belongs to the ARIES Devasthal Observatory was used for tracking the Indian GSAT-6A satellite. 

These are fairly limited SSA capabilities that can be expanded in collaboration with others like the United States, France, and Japan to develop better coverage and more comprehensive SSA systems. India can also take advantage of the amateur astronomer community in building up its capabilities. 

Even though late in the day, the ISRO’s steps to establish an SSA Directorate are important. In addition to establishing a certain amount of self-sufficiency in its ability to track and monitor the space environment, it also showcases India as a responsible stakeholder in the space arena. These are baby steps, but SSA is a very challenging problem. As Moriba Jah explains, the absence of standardization and a common “lingua franca” so as to “minimize redundancy and confusion” are issues that need to be addressed. SSA systems themselves will probably need to be adapted with newer applications such as rendezvous and proximity operations, satellite servicing and refueling, inspection, and space-based manufacturing. Another set of challenges will be tracking small satellite constellations that are set to grow exponentially in the coming years. Thus, the SSA challenges will continue to grow manifold. 

This also makes international collaboration a necessity. India-U.S. SSA collaboration is a good starting point that can be expanded to include other like-minded partners such as Japan, France, and Australia.

Chinese Misbehavior Increases Support for Taiwan - The Diplomat, 24 October 2020

In my October column for The Diplomat, I looked at how China's misbehaviour has increased support for Taiwan.  I argue that Beijing’s pressure on Taiwan and on other countries is generating greater sympathy and support for Taiwan.  

As China’s relations with many countries in the region and outside deteriorate, sympathy for Taiwan and its plight is growing. While there is little to indicate that any country is considering dramatic shifts to their Taiwan policy, China’s aggressive behavior is generating growing concerns about a conflict across the Taiwan Strait. There is also increasing public sympathy for Taiwan in many countries in the region, especially in Southeast Asia and India, because most have now experienced some form of coercion from China. This provides a fertile ground should there be considerations of any shifts in policy toward Taiwan in any of these countries. Equally, China’s sensitivity about Taiwan provides a ready handle for others to retaliate for unfriendly Chinese behavior. 

For the full post, click here.  

Some of these growing concerns are a result of Chinese behavior toward Taiwan itself. Repeated military exercises in the vicinity of Taiwan and efforts to pressure Taiwan militarily have been growing. According to Taiwan’s defense minister, the PLA has engaged in 49 military aircraft sorties across the Taiwan Strait median line in 2020, the highest number since 1990. The minister, who made a statement in the parliament, said that the Chinese military “conducted 1,710 aircraft sorties and 1,029 military vessel sorties into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ) this year.” The minister added that, countering these moves, Taiwan’s military undertook around “3,000 military aircraft sorties to intercept and monitor the Chinese aircraft and vessels.” There is even some concern that China might be doing this as a tactic to force Taiwan to waste its resources.  

In response to these Chinese moves, the United States has stepped up its diplomatic and military support to Taiwan. In August this year, the U.S. Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar traveled to Taiwan. This was “the highest-level visit by an American Cabinet official since the break in formal diplomatic relations between Washington and Taipei in 1979.” The discussions during the visit focused on COVID-19, the impact on global health, and Taiwan as a possible supplier of medical equipment and technology to deal with the pandemic. In September, another high-level U.S. visit took place with Keith Krach, under secretary of state for economic growth, energy, and the environment. Krach was also accompanied by a U.S. delegation that included Robert A. Destro, assistant secretary of the department of democracy, human rights, and labor. 

More recently, the U.S. has also agreed to a major arms package for Taiwan worth almost $2 billion. The total package may increase to as much as $5 billion. The military package includes sensors, missiles, and artillery, all designed to boost Taiwan’s capacity to defend itself from China. China has threatened unspecified retaliation against the United States for such arms transfers, but it is unlikely that the United States will stop making them. 

Support for Taiwan is growing at the popular levels in countries like India. This was in no small measure the result of Chinese heavy-handedness, such as its recent “instruction” to Indian journalists that they should observe the “One China” principle. This was triggered by reports and advertisements in the Indian media regarding Taiwan’s National Day. Far from winning any compliance, the Indian media dismissed and laughed off Chinese efforts. The Indian government was less than amused. The spokesperson of India’s foreign ministry rejected the Chinese statement saying, “there is free media in India, that reports on issues that they see fit.” The growing sympathy in India toward Taiwan, including at official levels, is most clearly the result of the Sino-Indian confrontation at the border this summer. There was even reportedly considerations in the Indian government of starting free trade talks with Taiwan, though this appears to have been shelved for the time being. The contrast between India’s attempts to curtail its China trade while seeking greater trade with Taiwan is stark. As in the Indian case, sympathy toward Taiwan has also grown in Southeast Asia as a result of crude Chinese pressures. The so-called “Milk Tea Alliance” is one reflection of this phenomena. 

The increasing salience of the Taiwan issue is reflected in the growing debate in the United States about the appropriate level of commitment to Taiwan. There is also some concern in Australia about the potential impact of U.S. involvement in Taiwan on Australia. There are, equally, concerns about whether Taiwan itself is doing enough to defend itself. 

Much of the new attention and support that Taiwan is getting is clearly the consequence of both the Chinese actions in the Taiwan Strait as well as its unrelenting pressures on other countries, even those far from China. China recently engaged in a spat with Sweden after the country banned Huawei from its 5G network. China responded by asking Sweden to “correct its wrong decision” or face consequences for Swedish businesses. Just a few days earlier, the Chinese ambassador to Canada held out a not-so-veiled threat to the 300,000 Canadians living in Hong Kong if Canada continued to grant asylum to democracy activists from Hong Kong. China’s unusually foolish behavior and its growing pressure on Taiwan is likely to continue to garner greater sympathy for Taiwan, a democracy that has successfully fought the coronavirus epidemic which originated in China. 

Sino-Indian Competition in the Indian Ocean Region Intensifies - The Diplomat, 16 October 2020

In my third column for The Diplomat, I looked at the Sino-Indian competition in the Indian Ocean Region.  As competition intensifies in the Region, India loses touch with Sri Lanka and solidifies relations with the Maldives.  

India has recently faced some stiff competition from China for influence in its South Asian neighborhood. China’s increasingly visible footprint in Sri Lanka since the return of the Rajapaksas has made India’s position a little shaky. While New Delhi’s relations are being put to the test in one Indian Ocean state, India has had better luck with the Maldives, another key state in the region. 

For the full post, click here.  

With the Rajapaksas back in office, Sri Lanka appears to be once again on the verge of rebuilding a stronger Sri Lanka-China relationship. Last week, a group of senior officials led by top foreign policy official Yang Jiechi, a member of the Chinese Communist Party’s Politburo and the director of the Central Committee’s Foreign Affairs Commission, its top policymaking body, visited Sri Lanka. The visit was part of a four-nation tour by Chinese officials, which included visits to the UAE, Algeria and Serbia. 

In a statement, Sri Lanka’s foreign ministry reportedly lauded this “first ever Chinese visit in the South Asian region since the global coronavirus epidemic,” and looked forward to strengthening cooperation between Sri Lanka and China, “in the areas of combating the global pandemic and revival of economic relations.” The high-powered delegation met with both President Gotabaya Rajapaksa and Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa in Colombo.  

Since the Rajapaksas returned to power, China-Sri Lanka relations have been warming up. Following Mahinda Rajapaksa’s landslide victory, China welcomed him as the prime minister and pledged complete support, stating that “Beijing looks forward to advancing its strategic cooperative partnership with Colombo.” After he took office, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian stated during a press briefing that two countries enjoyed a “traditional friendship” and that the two have been advancing their “strategic cooperative partnership based on sincere mutual assistance and ever-lasting friendship.” 

China’s influence in Sri Lanka will remain a cause of concern for India. The Rajapaksas have been generally perceived as close to China. The fact that the Hambantota Port development was given to China by Mahinda Rajapaksa during his previous term in office as president continues to be a sore point for India. While this has been worrying enough, that the Sri Lankan government signed the Hambantota Port to China on a 99-year lease is even more of a concern in New Delhi.

With China giving high-profile attention to Sri Lanka, Colombo is slowing down some of its planned projects with India and Japan. Reports have suggested that China believes that Colombo must maintain some distance from New Delhi and Tokyo. Accordingly, Sri Lanka has decided to pause or slow down some of the development projects involving India and Japan, such as a Japanese-funded light rail project and the East Container Terminal (ECT) project in Colombo, which is backed by both Japan and India. In the latter case, this came despite the fact that the three countries signed an MoU for the project more than a year ago. Since the recent change in political dispensation in Colombo, there is no assurance that these projects will go through. 

In contrast, India appears to have got a bit of a breather in the Maldives. In fact, the Maldives may be one of a couple shining spots for India in its immediate neighborhood. India has been pitching a number of economic, connectivity and capacity-building projects in the Maldives. While many of the recently announced projects are economic in nature, the Indian objective is to limit China’s footprint in India’s backyard. Earlier in the week, the EXIM Bank of India entered into a line of credit agreement for $400 million for the Greater Male Connectivity Project. This is reportedly the largest of the infrastructure projects in the Maldives, connecting Villingili, Gulhifalhu and Thilafushi islands. This comes in addition to $100 million that India has promised for the project, which involves the construction of a 6.7-kilometer bridge and causeway network linking Male with the other three atolls. It is reported to be second most important connectivity project in the Maldives, after the China-Maldives Friendship Bridge linking the airport island of Hulhule with the capital’s island.

India announced its assistance for the project in a virtual meeting between External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and Maldives Foreign Minister Abdulla Shahid in August. Thanking India for this assistance, the Maldivian foreign minister tweeted, “The Greater Male Connectivity Project will lead to greater possibilities. It is the gateway to a more developed & economically resilient nation.” The current assistance package comes in addition to a previous line of credit of $800 million, which is one of the largest loan packages that India has given to any nation in its  neighborhood.

Earlier in July, India also gave the Maldives a symbolic check providing assistance for nine projects, through the High Impact Community Development Projects (HICDP) scheme. India has signed several bilateral MoUs for the construction of fish processing and bottled water plants, and the establishment of tourism zones. Prior to this, New Delhi had offered Male $400 million through an extended currency swap arrangement in order to deal with its liquidity crisis. India is also reported to have granted the Maldives $1.4 billion in budgetary aid to negate the adverse economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.  

Things have turned around for India in the Maldives since the 2018 elections, when Ibrahim Mohamed Solih was elected president. But another change in political dispensation could just as easily sour relations with India. So, while things are still working in its favor, India is trying to do its best to bring Male under its wing. Whether these aid and assistance efforts can maintain a positive role for India in Male over the longer term is unclear. But for the time being, the Maldives remain a relative success story for Indian diplomacy. More importantly, the course of events suggests that competition with China has forced India to up its diplomatic game in the region. 

India and France Partner for Expedition to Venus - The Diplomat, 8 October 2020

In this post, I look at the India-France space collaboration, looking at a niche area of Venus exploration.  This is an article I did for The Diplomat in October.  I argue that India has long valued France’s partnership on issues ranging from defense and space exploration to civil nuclear power generation.  

After the success of its first interplanetary mission to Mars in September 2014, India has now set its eyes on a mission to Venus. The Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO), India’s civilian space agency, will be undertaking the mission in 2025. According to reports, France has agreed to be part of the mission, the first time a French payload will be carried on an Indian space exploration mission. The French space agency, Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales (CNES), is reported to have confirmed this in a statement last week, saying that it “will coordinate and prepare the French contribution.” ISRO’s Venus instrument, VIRAL (Venus Infrared Atmospheric Gases Linker) has been co-developed by Russian and French agencies. 

For the full post, click here.  

Last week’s announcement appears to be a follow-up to the March 2018 India-France Joint Vision for Space Cooperation, which identified Mars and Venus as possible areas of future cooperation. The statement said the ISRO and CNES would work together in exploring the solar system and beyond, including joint work on the autonomous navigation of rovers on the Moon, Mars and other planets; aero-braking technologies for planetary exploration; modelling of the atmospheres of Mars and Venus;  and inflatable systems for the exploration of Venus.

In November 2018, ISRO issued an “Announcement of Opportunity (AO) to international science community for Space-Based Experiments to Study Venus,” seeking international proposals for science payloads for its Venus mission. The AO provided the details of the Indian payloads on the Venus mission which include an S-band synthetic aperture radar (SAR), advanced radar for topside Ionosphere and subsurface sounding, ultraviolet (UV) imaging spectroscopy telescope, thermal camera, cloud monitoring camera, Venus atmospheric spectropolarimeter, airglow photometer, radio occultation experiment, Ionospheric electron temperature analyzer, mass spectrometer and a plasma wave detector. ISRO stated that the satellite will weigh around 100 kilograms with about 500 watts of power. 

Though other countries have conducted missions to Venus, there is still a lot of exploration left to do. According to the ISRO, the Indian interest in pursuing the Venus mission is to gain greater understanding of surface/subsurface features and resurfacing processes; atmospheric chemistry, dynamics and compositional variations; and interaction with solar radiation/solar wind on Venus. Venus is generally considered uninhabitable “due to its volatile and acidic clouds,” but recent discovery of phosphine is an indicator of possible microbial life on the planet. 

The recently announced partnership between India and France on the Venus mission comes against the backdrop of a long-standing and robust cooperation between the ISRO and CNES. India has long valued France as an important strategic partner and the two nations are engaged in many other sectors, including civil nuclear power and defense. France has cooperated with and aided the Indian space program since the 1960s. In March 2018, during the visit of the French President Emmanuel Macron to India, the two countries signed the India-France Joint Vision for Space Cooperation, identifying nine specific areas of cooperation including space situational awareness (SSA), high-resolution earth observation, satellite navigation, and space transportation systems. The two nations also pledged to work together to maintain space as a safe, secure and sustainable domain. In the context of Indian and French interest in maritime security in the Indo-Pacific region, SSA and high resolution earth observation satellites could also mean the two countries will likely pursue maritime domain awareness (MDA). 

ISRO and CNES are also working together on India’s first crewed space mission, Gaganyaan, scheduled for launch in 2022. The mission was announced by Jean-Yves Le Gall, president of CNES, on the sidelines of the 2018 Bengaluru Space Expo organized by the Confederation of Indian Industry and Antrix, the commercial arm of ISRO. France has reportedly agreed to train Indian flight surgeons, essentially Indian Air Force doctors working on aviation medicine and those responsible for the astronauts’ health before, during and after the space mission. These doctors are to undergo a critical two-week period of training. 

All this is made possible because of India’s and, in particular, ISRO’s comfort in doing business with France. This comes from the fact that France enjoys great confidence as a reliable partner of India. The fact that the two countries share a common strategic vision for the Indo-Pacific region only helps to cement their partnership further. India has traditionally had a well-recognized aversion to the concept of “alliance” in international politics, but Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi overcame this when he referred to France as an ally during a speech  in Paris, when he said that for him “infra” meant something other than short-hand for infrastructure: “I would like to say that for me it is IN+FRA, which means the alliance between India and France.” France’s recent steps in supporting what India considers its core interests, such as the Indian position on Jammu and Kashmir at the United Nations Security Council, are a testament to the close strategic partnership between India and France. The fact that France, unlike the United States, has no negative baggage in Indian perceptions from the Cold War period helps. Moreover, Paris stood alone in supporting India’s decision to go nuclear in 1998, unlike other partners like Australia and Japan, which further reinforces Indian confidence in France as a long-term, reliable partner. 

Australia-Japan-India Trilateral Sets Sights on Supply Chain Resilience - The Diplomat, 2 October 2020

In my first article for The Diplomat in October, I looked at the Australia-Japan-India trilateral which has its eyes on supply chain resilience as the first concrete agenda driving their cooperation.  I argue that China's assertive behaviour is the glue that holds the trilateral together.  

Recently, the trade ministers of Australia, Japan and India agreed to develop a supply chain resilience program for the Indo-Pacific region. The announcement, which followed a video conference between Australia’s Simon Birmingham, Japan’s Kajiyama Hiroshi and India’s Piyush Goyal in in early September, came amid a growing recognition in all three nations of the dangers of excessive economic reliance on China. While the details of the initiative remain sketchy, the three countries have tasked their respective bureaucracies with looking for ways to develop an initiative that would strengthen alternate supply chains in an effort to counter China’s control of the trade of essential supplies. The initiative is being planned for launch next year. It is meant to be an inclusive initiative and the three countries are looking to extend it into Southeast Asia.

For the full post, click here.  

The idea of the Australia-Japan-India (AJI) trilateral is not itself new. The three countries had their first trilateral dialogue in June 2015. The meeting saw the participation of then Indian Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar, Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Akitaka Saiki and Peter Varghese, the secretary of Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Predictably, a dominant theme in the discussions was maritime security and freedom of navigation, which continues to be the case five years later. In fact, the three nations’ shared concerns on the maritime front have only increased due to China’s recent assertive behavior in the region. While the Indo-Pacific region has an alphabet soup of minilaterals and formal arrangements, the AJI trilateral appears to be one of the strongest, despite some challenges. A recent report on the trilateral by the Perth USAsia Centre highlights the potentials of the trilateral, as well as some of the challenges that still persist. Nevertheless, the decision to form a trilateral supply chain initiative is an indicator of the actionable agenda that could be pursued by the AJI in the coming years.

China’s behavior has provided the glue that binds the trilateral together. For all the rhetoric about its peaceful rise, China’s behavior since the beginning of 2020 has antagonized many. China’s actions have forced the AJI trilateral to acknowledge the danger of economic over-dependence on China. As such, supply chain diversification and resilience has become an important issue for all three countries. Commenting on the initiative, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has stated the need to reshape global supply chains “based on trust and stability.”

Reducing dependence on China is not going to be easy for India in the short term. At the same time, difficulties with China have reached a point where opinion is shifting in New Delhi. Indian elite opinionmakers have made it amply clear that India will need to bite the bullet, even if it means going through some hard times. India is still not considering complete economic decoupling, of course, but a significant reduction in terms of its reliance on China. Because India exports mostly primary commodities, China can easily replace India, but it is going to be difficult for India to overcome its dependence on China  This is not a challenge unique to India, but it forces India and other countries to consider together what steps to take to diversify their economies away from a heavy reliance on China.

India would also like to take advantage of the general interest that many countries have in moving their manufacturing out of China, but this is easier said than done. For instance, even though many industries leaving China may want to come to India – and though India may be even keener to attract them – India still faces many challenges, including problems of land acquisition, outdated labor laws, an uncertain tax regime and growing domestic conflicts, to name just a few. In contrast, Vietnam is emerging as a major destination for businesses leaving China.  

Discussing these measures together with like-minded partners may help in setting up alternatives to these nations’ economic dependence on China  Each country in the AJI trilateral recognizes that alone, they are no match for China’s economic power. Alone, each is much more vulnerable because of their dependence. But together, they might be able to find some solutions. Whether this will work is yet to be seen, but a beginning is being made.

Another area that is high on the agenda for the AJI is maritime security and ensuring freedom of the seas in the Indo-Pacific. This is not all about navies and formal security collaboration, but will also involve the important notion of “norm entrepreneurship,” as identified in the Perth USAsia Report. The trilateral will thus try to promote respect for international law, and a free, open, rules-based and inclusive Indo-Pacific. The hope is that eventually the three nations can think in terms of doing joint military exercises or even coordinated patrols in the Indo-Pacific. India has resisted such steps for a long time, but China’s aggressive actions on the borders and elsewhere are likely to make New Delhi more amenable to considering bolder steps.