India’s Defense Chief Opposes Aircraft Carrier Plans - The Diplomat, 14 May 2020

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I write on the Indian military debate about the Navy's plans for a third aircraft carrier. The piece looks at the CDS General Bipin Rawat's comments that reiterated doubts about acquiring a third carrier.

Last week, India’s Chief of Defense Staff General Bipin Rawat said in an interview to an Indian newspaper that the Indian military is not an expeditionary force and should not be deploying forces around the globe. He said that Indian forces have “to guard and fight only along our borders, and, of course, dominate the Indian Ocean Region.” He went on to add that the military services should not seek large imports “by misrepresenting our operational requirements.” He targeted the Indian Navy’s carrier plans, saying that because carriers, as surface vessels, can be “knocked off by missiles,” the Navy should invest more in submarines.

For the full essay, click here.



Rawat’s statements have several implications. Most importantly, it calls into question the Indian Navy’s and the Air Force’s acquisition plans. These are particularly important at a time when China has been both putting pressure on the Sino-Indian border and venturing into the Indian Ocean Region. Rawat’s comments could also bring back concern within the Navy and the Air Force about the Army’s dominance within the Indian military and potentially lead to intensified interservice rivalry among the three services. The creation of the chief of defense staff (CDS) post was meant at least partly to create greater synergy among the services and greater jointness, but that could be at risk if the two smaller services feel the CDS is being partial to the Army.

Clearly, the economic impact and the financial implications of the COVID-19 pandemic is going to be significant. The Indian defense budget allocation over the last two years has been the lowest since the early 1960s, but the COVID-19 impact is likely to lead to further slashing the defense budget. This in turn will affect major defense procurements, particularly for the Navy and Air Force. Both are services that require capital-intensive investment in acquisitions that take longer term planning and a lot of lead time. They are not going to be happy about the CDS’s comments.

This issue has clearly been on Rawat’s mind for some time, and possibly has been under debate within the government too; the CDS was repeating earlier comments. In February this year, Rawat said that the Indian Navy’s request for a third aircraft carrier may not be approved any time soon because the priority is to strengthen the submarine fleet. The CDS cited cost as the major factor for this pushback. Rawat of course has to prioritize the military’s acquisition, depending on the available funds, but cutting down on aircraft carriers is likely not going to be easy. The Indian Navy is already pushing back.

Sources in the Indian Navy are reported to have said that the service is certain about its plans for a third aircraft carrier. They added that “the third aircraft carrier is an operational necessity. It is not that an aircraft carrier can be bought off the shelf. Even if all permissions are given today, it will take 15 years for the carrier to be inducted.” Admiral Karambir Singh, chief of the Indian Navy, previously stated that he was convinced that “the country needs three aircraft carriers, so that two are operational at all times. And it should be 65,000 tonnes with electromagnetic propulsion,” probably a misquoted reference to the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) with which the Navy plans to equip future aircraft carriers. Navy sources have also argued that shore-based aircraft operations, as indicated by the CDS, will be limited in terms of range.

India currently has one operational aircraft carrier, the INS Vikramaditya, which can host around 30 aircraft. The second, INS Vikrant, is still being built at the Cochin shipyard in south India, and is expected to be operational only by 2022, though even that is likely an optimistic timeline.

But Rawat’s emphasis on dominance in the Indian Ocean Region also cannot be addressed adequately if he plans to shrink the naval budget. Both Prime Minister Narendra Modi and External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar have emphasized an ambitious agenda for the Indian Ocean Region. To play an effective role in this vast maritime space, India would need a much higher number of ships. A falling naval budget would not permit this. India’s declining submarine fleet has been an additional matter of concern. With only 13 operational submarines, many of which are old, India cannot match the more capable navies in the Indo-Pacific, such as those of China and Japan. Unless India adds to its submarine fleet quickly, it may move down to the level of Pakistan, which has just eight operational submarines.

But the budget woes are unlikely to ease. The CDS and the Army leadership are also likely come under pressure to seriously think about downsizing the Army. With a strength of around 1.4 million personnel, the Indian Army is the world’s largest land force, followed by North Korea and China. China, in its attempt at modernizing its military, reduced the size of its Army by half and is now increasing its emphasis on the People’s Liberation Army Navy and Air Force. Pensions and salaries are becoming the biggest burden on the military budget and crowding out capital investments and much of this is the result of India’s massive army. The CDS is right in arguing for budget prioritization, but this might lead to calls for pruning the Army.

PLA Joint Exercises in Tibet: Implications for India - ORF Occasional Paper, February 2020

Pulkit Mohan and I published our co-authored Occasional Paper, PLA Joint Exercises in Tibet: Implications for India, in February 2020. This is a paper that I have wanted to do for a very long time and am glad it is done, finally.

Since President Xi Jinping’s ascendency to power in 2012, China has had a more assertive foreign policy, aiming to increase its influence in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. Speaking at a press conference in March 2018, Xi highlighted China’s shift towards “rejuvenation” as a world power. Xi also attached great importance to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and under his watch, the military has undergone changes in its doctrine and force modernisation.

Indeed, Xi has partly bolstered China’s rise in the region through these military reforms, beginning in 2015. Since then, there have been major changes in the operational structure of the PLA, with the modernisation and optimisation of the military to “achieve enhanced jointness and efficiency.” China’s inclination towards building an improved operational force is driven by its need to safeguard its national interests amidst the changing dynamics of power.

According to the US Department of Defense’s 2018 China Power report, China’s military has introduced reforms to the operations of the PLA with the “most comprehensive restructuring of forces in its history.” The PLA’s ultimate focus is to improve its ability to conduct joint operations in an effective manner. Its most recent defence White Paper 2019 highlighted maintaining combat readiness, in particular, empahasising the need “to improve the capabilities of joint operations command to exercise reliable and efficient command over emergency responses, and to effectively accomplish urgent, tough and dangerous tasks.” According to the White Paper, the PLA, since 2012, have conducted extensive mission-oriented training including 80 joint exercises at and above brigade/division level.

This White Paper is a significant departure from its predecessor, published in 2015. In that document, China maintained that its intentions in force modernisation was defensive and in the interest of safeguarding national security and development interests. The 2019 White Paper emphasises the impact of competition in the military sphere with the US and how China’s growing military is being developed and modernised to face such challenge. China, according to the document, will pursue national defence goals which include safeguarding national sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity and security as well as maritime interests.

Even as China’s primary objective is to compete with the US, however, the strategic consequences of a more modern PLA will be felt in India as well as in its neighbourhood. China argues that seeking hegemony or expansion in its areas of influence are not part of its strategy; yet, the reality has been different. Maintaining its position in the power hierarchy in the region, and beyond, remains at the core of China’s goals with regard to both military modernisation and its foreign policy strategy. This has been evident in the last several years in its various policy statements. At the 6th Xiangshan forum in October 2015, for instance, vice foreign minister Liu Zhenmin detailed some of what he called the “injustice” to China in its relations with other countries. While this is nothing new, the problem comes from the deep contradictions between China’s rhetoric and the reality. For instance, Liu called on the big powers to not seek spheres of influence, and of the small and medium countries to not take sides between big powers. The flaw in this formulation is that China looks at the world through a divided prism that categorises countries into big, small and medium, highlighting China’s hierarchical approach in international politics and the differentiated response that Beijing assumes these countries to play. Clearly, India needs to be mindful of such Chinese inclinations and work with like-minded partners in shaping an inclusive agenda in the Asian strategic space.

This paper examines a particular aspect of the PLA reforms as they pertain to training and jointness in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and the Sino-Indian border areas. The paper starts with an examination of the Chinese military reforms as it applies to these areas, in terms of the military restructuring and the new commands responsible for them. The paper then chronicles the increasing number of military exercises being undertaken by China in these areas. The paper also examines the Sino-Indian border landscape and weighs China’s state-of-the-art infrastructure against India’s own. The paper concludes with the strategic consequences and tactical implications of these for India.

For the full essay, click here.



It is a long paper but I conclude with a few thoughts on what these imply for India.

Implications of PLA’s Joint Exercises

PLA’s impressive achievements with regard to troop mobilisation, joint training, and integration on the Sino-Indian border as well as in the TAR should be of concern to India. Given the unresolved border and territorial issues between India and China, the PLA’s military buildup and the overall capability mix could produce outcomes possibly in China’s favour, at least in the initial stages of a conflict. China has made significant advances for such an outcome through a number of reforms including through overhauling combat units to undertake joint, integrated and “informationised” operations. China could be engaged in these for a number of reasons. One, Xi’s attempts could be to reassure the domestic audience on the combat preparedness of its military. Chinese security analysts believe that demonstrating combat readiness to adversaries can deter an actual conflict.

Irrespective of the logic, PLA is attempting to address a serious lacuna with its military. Its lack of operational experience for the last several decades has been considered a serious deficiency of the PLA, and the intensive trainings and frequent joint military exercises are meant precisely to address this. PLA exercises held over the last few years have been focused on joint and integrated military operations to bring about a synergistic approach under informationised conditions. The establishment of logistic centres and oil depots in TAR and Sino-Indian border areas along with the improved road, air and rail networks have enhanced their ability for rapid mobilisation. This has also strengthened their capacity to sustain forces in the border areas for reasonably longer periods of time. Exercises testing their mobilisation and coordination capabilities have been undertaken through many joint exercises in the TAR.

Second, the improved physical border infrastructure that has aided the mobilisation of forces for training and joint exercises have also demonstrated the effectiveness of their command and control networks. Today, the PLA is in a position to undertake quick troop deployment to the Sino-Indian border areas. Previously, such mobilisation exercise would stretch over six months and could be undertaken only during the summer. The PLA has been engaged in military exercises to test the effectiveness of the Rapid Reaction Forces in mobilising them to the border areas in any weather or season. The quick mobilisation capabilities tested during these military exercises essentially validate the effectiveness from both operational and mobilisation perspectives.

Third, the PLA has also used these military exercises to assess the effectiveness of jointness and integration. Moving away from Military Regions to Theatre Commands is a big shift aiding the process of military integration. Nevertheless, operational jointness and integration may still be an issue. A joint and integrated planning is again not an easy task. There is no clarity on this issue until they engage in an actual operation – there have been no open reports assessing the success of the training and exercises but certainly they are making the efforts, which is worth closer examination.

Four, the overall military balance is tilted in favour of China. The former Indian Air Force Chief Air Chief Marshal BS Dhanoa, for instance, had noted the big increase in the number of Chinese aircrafts in the TAR. He mentioned in particular the deployment of Sukhoi-27 and J-10 aircraft for year-round operations, giving the PLAAF possibly a major tactical boost. This is a new trend as against the earlier practice of deploying these aircrafts during summer months alone. The overall mix of multi-role fighter and strike aircraft of the PLAAF can address any possible attrition during a conflict.

Five, improved border infrastructure has assisted the PLA in making a realistic appraisal of the state of their infrastructure. The multiple exercises done along the border areas and in the TAR can help identify the weaknesses and problems that need to be addressed on a realistic basis.

For its part, India’s lack of physical border infrastructure has impeded progress on multiple fronts, including its ability to undertake military mobilisation to engage in joint military exercises in the border areas. The critical role of strengthened physical infrastructure cannot be emphasised enough in this regard. India’s ability to bring about more effective jointness and integration will also depend on a better border management system, possibly under a single command structure that will focus on infrastructure and the capability mix for the border forces, and monitor the frequency of exercises.

Conclusion

Since the ascent of Xi Jinping to China’s presidency, strong emphasis has been given to the Chinese military’s competitiveness as well as that of the world’s other major militaries. This emphasis has translated to greater prominence for jointness and integration among the different arms of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), especially the PLA Army and the PLA Air Force. These joint exercises and efforts at bringing about better integration have been on full display on the Sino-Indian border areas and the Tibetan Autonomous Region. This brings about serious security implications for India.

The problem becomes more acute with the massive military imbalance in the border areas, both in terms of infrastructure and equipment, in favour of China. India’s poor infrastructure has also impacted on the military’s ability to mobilise forces, undertake exercises to test out the vulnerabilities and gaps, and the overall jointness in terms of operations and strategic approach. The central government must undertake two important measures in this regard. One, the government has to find a way of incentivising private sector participation in infrastructure development in the border. In the harshest of terrains, private sector ventures have succeeded in setting up, for example, hydroelectric plants. However, the private sector will not enter an area unless there is a profit calculation to its benefit. Given the strategic nature of these infrastructure projects, the central government has to find a way of encouraging the private sector to take them on.

There should be a new institutional authority established under the PMO that will track the progress of these projects on a periodic basis. While the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) has undertaken a review of these projects, these were merely recommendations that have not necessarily been followed up by the political leadership to address the inadequacies, especially the problem of multiplicity of agencies involved in the development of border infrastructure including road and rail networks and bridges. The need for a single authority for periodic monitoring and completion of these projects cannot be overemphasized. The government should constitute a parliamentary committee on strategic infrastructure which could monitor and update the status of the projects.

Given China’s apparent seriousness in its single-service and joint military operations in the Tibetan region, India should urgently step up its own capabilities on multiple fronts.

PLA Joint Exercises in Tibet: Implications for India - video link to our fellows seminar discussions, 17 April 2020

Here's the video link to our fellows seminar discussions on PLA Joint Exercises in Tibet: Implications for India. The discussions were based on an Occasional Paper that Pulkit Mohan, my colleague and I published a few months ago on the same issue. You can find the video here and the Occasional Paper here.

The Pandemic and China Are Strengthening U.S.-India Relations, for Now - Asia Unbound, Council on Foreign Relations, 4 May 2020

In a first, I have a short essay on India-US relations for the Council on Foreign Relations blog, Asia Unbound where I guest-blogged for Alyssa Ayres. The Pandemic and China Are Strengthening U.S.-India Relations, for Now, as the title suggests, argued that the pandemic and China's aggressive behaviour are driving the US-India relations.

This post was published a few days ago, and is part of an Asia Unbound series of voices from Asia on the COVID-19 crisis, and on its implications for Asia and for Asian views of the United States. This is the ninth post in this series; the first can be found here, the second here, the third here, the fourth here, the fifth here, the sixth here, the seventh here, and the eighth here.

Despite the COVID-19 pandemic, U.S.-India relations have shown signs of continued cooperation. Officials of the two countries are in frequent contact, including President Donald J. Trump and Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and his counterpart, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar. Concerns about China’s growing aggressiveness may be driving New Delhi and Washington closer together. But there are signs of turbulence ahead, and the outcome of the U.S. presidential election and the uncertain path of the pandemic itself make any prognosis tentative at best.

For the full essay, click here.



The United States has taken the lead in extending assistance to other countries, including India. According to a Department of State Fact Sheet issued on April 16, the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) together have earmarked about $500 million dollars in emergency health, humanitarian, and economic assistance. This is in addition to State Department funding to multilateral and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) actively providing assistance during the pandemic. Washington and New Delhi have great potential for further collaboration. This crisis drives home the importance of ensuring that multilateral agencies remain effective and unbeholden to any one power. India and the United States can work together with their allies to promote neutrality, transparency and accountability in such agencies.

Both countries have a stake in ensuring that they do not cede influence to China in the provision of pandemic relief, especially to smaller countries in the region. The pursuit of influence continues unabated despite the pandemic. China’s missteps such as allowing the pandemic to spread, focusing more on shifting blame than investigating the origins of the virus, using pandemic aid for publicity, and engaging in assertive military behavior toward its smaller neighbors have helped but they only provide an opportunity, not a guarantee, for regional leadership. The United States has stepped up diplomatic consultations for cooperation with a geographically diverse group of countries, which has now been dubbed the Quad-plus because it includes South Korea, Vietnam and New Zealand in addition to the original Quad (United States, India, Australia and Japan). The crisis could help generate subsequent strategic cooperation—the original Quad grew out of multilateral cooperation after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami.

China’s behavior is also making this cooperation easier. Despite the crisis, China appears to be stepping up its military presence in the region. Since early February, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been probing Taiwan’s air and maritime borders. The PLA Eastern Theatre Command has been particularly active, deploying fighter jets and bombers around Taiwan. According to reports, Chinese fighter planes momentarily traversed into Taiwanese airspace. China has claimed that it was only conducting military exercises though the United States has said that this was completely inappropriate. PLA air exercises have continued into April. In addition, China’s new aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, and five other warships sailed close to Taiwan’s waters in mid-April.

Meanwhile, in Southeast Asia, the PLA has been particularly aggressive toward Indonesia and Vietnam. Chinese fishing vessels accompanied by coast guard ships have been intruding in Indonesian waters off the Natuna Islands. Last week, China also established two districts on disputed territories in the South China Sea. China this week also targeted a Philippine Navy vessel that was conducting territorial defense operations and sovereignty patrol. And in a more serious incident in early April, Chinese ships hit and sank a Vietnamese fishing vessel near the Paracel Islands, leading Vietnam to issue a formal diplomatic protest. The U.S. State Department also put out a strongly worded statement, expressing serious concern at “the latest in a long string of PRC actions to assert unlawful maritime claims and disadvantage its Southeast Asian neighbors in the South China Sea.”

If COVID-19 cooperation and China’s behavior are helping to keep the momentum in U.S.-India relations, there are also some uncertainties. New Delhi is unlikely to be happy at the latest changes in U.S. immigration rules which could pose a challenge to the Indian expatriate community in the United States. New pressure on India’s budget means that India is unlikely to have enough money to buy foreign military equipment, including from the United States. Trump has been a keen promoter of U.S. arms sales and could retaliate if deals with India fall through.

But the most serious uncertainty concerns the U.S. elections in fall 2020. On one side, there appears to be a growing political consensus in the United States that China is a problem, leading to efforts by both U.S. presidential candidates to frame the other as “soft on China." This is music to India’s ears. But New Delhi has concerns about both candidates. The Democrats are perceived to have been traditionally soft on China. But Trump’s unsteady hands at the tiller is also a problem for New Delhi. His early praise for Chinese President Xi Jinping’s handling of the crisis, in particular, is seen in India as an example of his undependability. New Delhi should be most concerned about the growing chorus from both sides of aisle in the United States to draw down its global commitments. As China flexes its muscle, India is looking for more U.S. involvement, not less.

This could take several forms. At the declaratory level, Washington could emphasize that ensuring a non-hegemonic Asia is a core American interest. But the US also needs to act consistently to promote this value including by supporting countries that are threatened by coercive trade practices and by leading regional response against using force to resolve territorial disputes. Finally, the United States should also take the lead to coordinate the various minilaterals in the region in order to promote the values enshrined in the idea of the free and open Indo-Pacific.

Towards A Quad-Plus Arrangement? - Perth USAsia Centre, 21 April 2020

As I mentioned in previous blog, along with my regular work at the Observer Research Foundation as a Distinguished Fellow and head of the Nuclear and Space Policy Initiative, I am also a Non-Resident Indo-Pacific Fellow at the Perth USAsia Centre for a period of 9 months starting in April. As part of this, I will be doing a series of papers, video blogs and webinars. The first of my papers is this: Towards a Quad-Plus Arrangement? which came out in the third week of April (I have been late in updating my blog).

It is probably too early to sense the shape of the post-COVID world. But there are some early hints of how international partnerships might be shaped by the crisis. Recently, senior officials of the four “Quad” countries (Australia, India, Japan and the
United States) teleconferenced about how to respond to the pandemic.

Quad meetings are no longer unusual. But this one was special because it included three additional Indo-Pacific powers:NewZealand, South Korea and Vietnam. The call, reportedly initiated by the US Deputy Secretary of State Steve Beigun, was intended to exchange notes on how these powers were tackling the COVID-19 pandemic.

But it also raises a broader question: Is this is a sign of possible expansion of the Quad mechanism, and how might such an expansion be feasible?

For the full essay, click here.



I concluded the essay with the following thoughts. Efforts to coordinate responses to COVID-19 by the Quad-Plus countries may be a means to expand the original formulation at a pace that would be comfortable to potential new members and without eliciting a Chinese rebuke. It would be hypocritical for China to oppose countries collaborating on COVID-19 when it has itself made precisely such calls. But such cooperation
also sets the stage for further Quad dialogue on other problems these countries face, potentially including security problems.

Indeed, a Quad-Plus expansion makes sense for a number of reasons. One is the common security concern these countries share regarding China’s behaviours. Each have faced Chinese pressure plays in recent years, and harbor concerns regarding China’s military and political expansion into areas they consider their ‘neighbourhood’. Additionally, none are in a position to effectively challenge China on a bilateral basis,
making minilateral cooperation with likeminded partners a better approach.

Together, these factors provide a pragmatic path to greater security cooperation via a Quad-Plus arrangement in future years. Expanding the Quad is not going to be easy, and will bring with it challenges of divergent concerns and burdensharing problems. But there is clearly an impetus for Quad expansion that will begin to find expression in coming months.

Professional update: Non-Resident Indo-Pacific Fellow at the Perth USAsia Centre - April-December 2020

On the professional front, there is an update I would like to share - I am a Non-Resident Indo-Pacific Fellow with the Perth USAsia Centre from April to December this year. As part of this, I will be contributing essays on the Indo-Pacific developments, doing webinars and blogs including video ones. It is an exciting time to be doing work on the Indo-Pacific. As they say, there is never a dull moment in the Indo-Pacific. Here, you will find all the five Indo-Pacific Fellows at the Centre - one each from Australia, India, Indonesia, Japan and Vietnam.

As part of this Fellowship, I published my first Analysis Brief, examining the possibilities of a Quad-Plus arrangement. You can click here for the publication. I also did a public event with the Perth USAsia Centre on the Quad-Plus arrangement. Here is the video link for the discussions.

Amid COVID–19, India’s Modi and Australia’s Morrison Plan Virtual Prime Ministerial Summit - The Diplomat, 07 May 2020

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I wrote about Prime Minister Modi's upcoming virtual summit with Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison. The Indian and Australian leaders are expected to “meet” virtually soon. There’s no shortage of important topics to cover, especially related to China.

In a first, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is planning to host a virtual bilateral “summit” meeting with Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison. While the date for the meeting has not been announced, an Indian news report said that it will be soon. The Australian prime minister was initially scheduled to travel to India in January, but that had to be postponed due to the bushfires in Australia. The two leaders had been looking toward scheduling an in-person meeting in May, but that does not appear feasible under the current circumstances as much of the region is reeling under the stress of containing the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, there is excitement on both sides about the prospects of their meeting and New Delhi and Canberra are likely to conclude the much-awaited Mutual Logistics Sharing Pact (as well as other agreements covering science and technology and public administration).

While recent Indo-Pacific developments, including China’s muscle flexing in the South China Sea, may likely be on the agenda, it will be interesting to see how India positions itself on such issues.

For the full essay, click here.



Australia is going through one of the worst phases in its contemporary relations with China. In an opinion piece in The Conversation, Tony Walker from La Trobe University wrote that Australia-China relations are “fractured,” calling it “the worst moment in Sino-Australian relations since Gough Whitlam normalised ties on his election in December 1972.” Australia’s call for an independent investigation into the origins of the pandemic has not been well-received by China, to put it mildly. China, in response, unleashed its “wolf warrior” diplomats to lambast the Australian political leadership by threatening economic penalties. In a direct threat, China’s ambassador to Australia, Cheng Jingye, warned that Canberra asking for an independent probe “could spark a Chinese consumer boycott of students and tourists visiting Australia, as well as sales of popular agricultural exports like beef and wine.”

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang also commented:

at such a critical juncture [pandemic], it is highly irresponsible to resort to politically motivated suspicion and accusation. We advise the Australian side to put aside ideological bias and political games, focus on the welfare of the Australian people and global public health security, follow the international community’s collective will for cooperation, and contribute to the global cooperation in fighting the virus, instead of doing things to the contrary.

But Australia is not the only target of China’s economic coercion and trade threats, which have angered many countries. In fact, the Morrison government has found significant support for its call for an independent inquiry into the pandemic’s origins.

On the South China Sea as well, tension has been picking up and Australia is involved. The Chinese Haiyang Dizhi 8 survey ship was operating in the Malaysian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), around 325 kms away from the Malaysian coast starting around April 20. Following this, in a show of support, Australian ships joined three U.S. warships operating close to where the Chinese vessel was suspected to be undertaking oil exploration operations. The Australian Department of Defense in a statement said, “During the passage exercises, the ships honed interoperability between Australian and U.S. navies, including replenishment-at-sea, aviation operations, maritime manoeuvres and communications drills.”

China’s survey ships were operating close to where Malaysia’s Petronas state oil company was already engaged in exploratory drilling. Harassment by China is not new. Even the recent events are a culmination of developments that have been going on since December, according to Asia Maritime Transparency International. Even amid the current stand-off, China claimed that Haiyang Dizhi 8 was only conducting its normal activities. Meanwhile, Malaysian Foreign Minister Hishammuddin Hussein has come out with grim warnings that while “international law guarantees the freedom of navigation, the presence of warships and vessels in the South China Sea has the potential to increase tensions that in turn may result in miscalculations which may affect peace, security and stability in the region.”

India has not responded to either China’s trespassing into the Malaysian EEZ or the Chinese sinking of a Vietnamese fishing vessel last month. Both incidents have increased concerns about China’s behavior in the region.

The Modi-Morrison meeting agenda is not clear but the Indian government will likely be under some pressure to address at least some of these difficult issues. India will be expected to take a stand especially as it moves to take over as the Chairman of the WHO Executive Board. Australia will seek greater support from India to push for a clearer understanding of the role of the WHO in the early stages of the pandemic. India should take this opportunity to build a larger coalition of like-minded states such as the Quad-Plus grouping including New Zealand, South Korea and Vietnam to develop a coordinated actionable agenda to bring about better reforms and accountability within the WHO. More importantly, at a bilateral level, the Morrison government will expect a strong show of support for Australia in the face of China’s bullying behavior.

The Modi-Morrison summit could also possibly cover the recent developments in the South China Sea. China’s continuing harassment of small and big neighbors alike, including Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia is reaching a peak and could call for concerted action among the key southeast Asian players. As a key Indo-Pacific and Quad player, India could be expected to take a clear stand and gradually ready itself to play a more active operational role. The U.S.-Australian joint patrols were impressive and important for the southeast Asian countries which were at the receiving end of China’s harassment. As the Quad enhances its role, India may be asked to take part in activities like joint and coordinated patrols with others such as Australia.