my Shangri-La Dialogue Remarks

This was my second time at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue which is Asia's premier defence summit, a unique meeting of ministers and delegates from over 50 countries. 2017 was my first appearance at this premier Dialogue and I had contributed an essay on India's evolving strategic response to China which appeared in the IISS' Regional Security Assessment 2017.

This year, the keynote address was delivered by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. This was a much-awaited one, particularly because of the general low-key and irregular participation from the Indian establishment.

This time around, the IISS organised an inaugural female leaders panel to talk about the strategic implications of new technology on the security dynamics in the Indo-Pacific. It was a terrific panel featuring Australian Minister of Defence Ms. Marise Payne, Canadian Deputy Minister of Defence Ms. Jody Thomas and CEO of Boeing Defence, Space and Security Ms. Leanne Caret and ably chaired by the IISS’ Deputy Director General Dr. Kori Schake. My brief was to look at the nuclear and space advancements and competition in the Asia Pacific, and also the strategic competition between India and China in the Asia Pacific as it relates to these two domains.

Here is the synopsis of my remarks.

Asia is already rife with mistrust, rivalry, competition and both nuclear and space domains are beginning to see a fresh phase of competition. This is a reflection of the larger geopolitical competition in the Asia Pacific and beyond. While there are several factors that have driven this competition, China’s rise has been most consequential. The rise of China and the strategic uncertainties it has created has necessitated countries like India, US, Japan, Australia and other like-minded countries to come together, though this is still at a nascent stage. The augmentation of nuclear and space capabilities will only accentuate the already existing tensions.

I outlined two sets of concerns each with regard to nuclear and space technologies. On the nuclear front, the key concern is potentially the inability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime to deal with the many challenges which present with serious problems for strategic stability. One is the development of hypersonic weapons. A key problem here is that such weapons can increase the potential for surprise attacks, because of the difficulty of detecting and countering them. This could lead to a destabilizing arms race spiral between key great powers in the region, all of whom are working on developing these weapons. An additional problem is that hypersonic weapons potentially erode the line between conventional and nuclear weapons, which will also increase instability. Another evolving technology is BMD, which also has similar problems.

Coming to outer space issues, two issues stand out. There is a growing intensity of competition which is partially due to the increasing number of commercial players and partially due to underlying geopolitical tensions. Outer space has become one more area of the strategic competition on Earth, as seen during the Cold War. This means that the race to return to the moon, as well as to explore the moon and asteroids for mining and resource extraction, are likely to intensify in the coming years. Two, the number of countries using space assets to step up their military capabilities and national security functions has gone up. Also, the fact that states are looking at space utilization for conventional military operations as against the use for strategic operations in the earlier decades, has added a new dimension.

Over and above, automation, machine learning and AI bring in new dynamics to security in the Asia-Pacific.

Finally, I took a couple of minutes to speak about the strategic competition primarily between India and China in the nuclear and space arenas. India’s nuclear weapons programme has been evolving at a slow but steady pace, and it can be expected to continue expanding in both quantity and quality. Like in space and other areas, much of this expansion is driven by the need to build adequate deterrent capacity against China. It is estimated that India currently has around 100 nuclear warheads, of which only half are strategic missiles. But most of India’s long-range missiles are not sufficiently long enough to cover all of China unless they are deployed in northern India. This is true of both the land-based and submarine-based missiles. This means that India will continue developing its capabilities for the near- to long-term but this could trigger negative reactions from China on the one side, and from Pakistan from the other.

However, it must be noted that India is at least a couple of generations behind China and India is not in competition with China in numerical terms but the need to develop certain capabilities and capacities as a deterrent against China will continue. In the space sector, demonstration of China’s military space capabilities, including ASATs, is driving the militarization of India’s space program. This will propel further competition between these two powers.


Type rest of the post here

The Strategic Logic of Modi’s Indonesia Visit - my OpEd in The Diplomat, June 6, 2018

It has been a busy month and I am once again lagging behind in writing my posts but let me try and get up-to-date.

In the first week of June, I wrote a piece for The Diplomat looking at the strategic logic of Modi's Indonesia visit. Modi undertook a three-nation Southeast tour before heading to make his maiden speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue. His short visit to Malaysia was importance because of the change in leadership in Kuala Lumpur but I thought his Indonesia visit was a really substantial one. This visit has been planned for a while and the trip reinforced both the growing strategic alignment between New Delhi and Jakarta as well as its limits.

Last week, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was on a three-nation visit to Southeast Asia – Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore – in an effort to give a fillip to India’s ‘Act East’ Policy. India’s Act East Policy acquired fresh momentum when Modi re-launched the original Look East Policy at the East Asia Summit in 2014. Most recently, the leaders of the ten Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries were in India for the 69th Republic Day celebrations in January 2018, a reflection of the growing strategic convergence between India and Southeast Asia in ensuring a free, open, and transparent Indo-Pacific.

Driven by the China factor, Modi’s visit to the three key states in Southeast Asia has the potential to propel greater strategic engagement especially in the maritime domain, but India’s capacity and strategic interest in playing a proactive role in the region is key. The most interesting of the three stops was Modi’s visit to Indonesia.

For the full essay, click here.



Indonesia remains a key player within Southeast Asia for several reasons. Most clearly, Indonesia will be essential in extending India’s maritime outreach. Indonesia is the largest archipelagic state, and has a coastline of 108,000 kilometers, 17,504 islands, and a total of maritime areas of 6,400,000 square kilometers, including its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The distance from India’s Andaman Islands to Indonesia’s Aceh province is barely 80 nautical miles, underscoring the importance to both India and Indonesia of the importance of enhanced maritime cooperation for the continuing peace, stability and economic prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region.

These make India and Indonesia two key maritime powers in the Indo-Pacific, and the two navies have partnered in naval exercises for several years now with naval ships patrolling between the Andaman Sea and Malacca Straits. But it has also become clear that is is time to deepen these engagements in the light of the changing strategic dynamics in the broader Indo-Pacific front.

Modi’s visit to Jakarta from May 29-30 witnessed extensive strategic discussions with President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo on everything from maritime issues to outer space and broader defense cooperation. According to the joint statement signed by the two leaders, the big underlying emphasis was the “importance of achieving a free, open, transparent, rules-based, peaceful, prosperous and inclusive Indo-Pacific region, where sovereignty and territorial integrity, international law, in particular UNCLOS, freedom of navigation and overflight, sustainable development and an open, free, fair and mutually beneficial trade and investment system are respected.”

Modi and Jokowi emphasized also the importance of rule of law, in particular the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS), clearly with China’s recent behavior in mind. Elevating the importance of Andaman Islands and increasing maritime connectivity were also emphasized during the visit.

Indonesia has also shown some interest in joining the Bay of Bengal initiative, which appears sensible both from an economic and security perspective. Given the geographical proximity of the Andaman Island with Sumatra Island to the south, Indonesia should be part of this initiative. The Lombok Strait also provides “an easy access to the Indian Ocean and Australia.”

India has also shown interest in joining the Malacca Straits Patrol (MSP), a four-nation arrangement between Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand for exchange of intelligence, and coordinated air and sea patrol through the Malacca Straits. But India may have to wait a bit on this. For one, New Delhi does not appear to have paid much attention to the mechanics of how the MSP operations actually work. For instance, a meeting among technical experts on May 10 explored the issue but it is reported that “both sides quickly realised that the Indian side had not fully come to grips with the nuts and bolts of the MSP.” India expected that its navy could undertake patrols in the Malacca Straits, whereas under the MSP, each of the four countries do “coordinated patrols” within their own territorial waters and do not cross into each other’s waters.

Similarly, New Delhi also appears not to have understood how MSP aerial patrols work, assuming that Indian aircraft could patrol on their own in the region, which is not the MSP practice. New Delhi will have to prepare much more professionally in future engagements. As a political face-saver, the joint statement issued by the Modi and Jokowi simply noted that the technical experts meeting on May 10 was “to explore ways in enhancing strategic technical cooperation on maritime security.”

For another, Indonesia and others in the MSP also appear to worry about setting a precedent that China can exploit if they allow an extra-regional power such as India join the MSP. These are understandable concerns, and New Delhi and the MSP countries will have to figure out carefully how they can cooperate but at a pace and manner that is comfortable for all.

India appears to have assumed that China’s aggressive push in South China Sea would make Southeast Asian states welcome India with open arms, but New Delhi must realize they have their own concerns about antagonizing China. Nonetheless, there is an underlying commonality of strategic concerns that can be the foundation for deepening ties, even if both sides have to be careful in how they proceed. But proceed they must.

A new space race in Asia, my article in East Asian Forum

The East Asian Forum of the Australian National University published an article of mine, titled, A new space race in Asia, which examines the new and evolving geopolitical context that has pushed India to become more active in strengthening space cooperative engagements with countries such as Japan, France and the US. Indeed, rise of China and the strategic consequences of its rise have been important contextualising factors for these countries to coordinate their space programmes and policies.

Asia houses three established space powers — Japan, China and India — with space exploration goals ranging from social and economic development to improving telecommunications and national security. But it is the national security drivers of Asian space exploration that are becoming more prominent, partly driven by the changing balance of power equations both within Asia and beyond.

China’s growing space capabilities are driving much of the space competition in Asia. For one, it has led to greater cooperation in space exploration between India and Japan. In September 2017, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe vowed to put outer space at the centre of their bilateral relationship. They welcomed the ‘deepening of cooperation between the space agencies of the two countries in the field of Earth observation, satellite-based navigation, space sciences and lunar exploration’. Later in November 2017, the president of the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum announced that ‘India and Japan will lead the space sector in the Asia Pacific region’.

The Indian space program is more than six decades old, and until recently, New Delhi’s primary focus was in using space technology to improve social and economic conditions for its population. Before China’s first anti-satellite (ASAT) test in January 2007, India appeared to think that security competition in outer space was confined to the big powers. The Chinese ASAT test awakened India to the kind of challenges it needs to confront in its own backyard and demonstrated that even areas of the global commons such as outer space are not spared from terrestrial geopolitical competition. The ASAT test gave way to new debates in India on the kind of counter-space capabilities that it must develop to protect its own space assets.

India says that it has the technological blocks for a successful demonstration of an ASAT capability, should the need arise. An Indian ASAT test would go against the grain of India’s decades-long stance that space must be used for peaceful purposes alone and must not be weaponised. This shift in rhetoric reflects India’s recognition that if it does not keep up with emerging trends in space, it stands to lose in a critical area of technology.

Similar deliberations are taking place in Japan and the new Japanese space policy highlights space security as a key focus area.

Yet space competition in Asia began well before the Chinese ASAT test. China’s first manned space mission in October 2003 — making China the third country after the United States and the Soviet Union to achieve this feat — provided the initial spark. This achievement is part of China’s larger plan to carry out a human exploration program, which has as its final goal the development and operation of a Chinese space station in low earth orbit. At a time when the International Space Station will be winding down its operation, China plans to get its own station up and running by 2024.

China’s growing counter-space capabilities, including developing technologies such as the robotic arm, and the increasing number of close rendezvous operations of Chinese satellites are also raising concerns about the possible security implications of China’s military space program.

In response to China’s accomplishments in space, India and Japan initially looked at pursuing their own independent lunar missions. But so far they have not been able to successfully compete with China’s robotic exploration program. For instance, China’s Chang’e robotic lunar exploration program is considered technologically far superior to anything India or Japan could develop. The Chang’e 4 mission plans to land and explore the surface on the far side of the Moon, which no other country has done so far. Neither India’s ad hoc lunar and Mars robotic missions nor Japan’s exploration of the Moon and near-Earth objects come close to challenging China in this regard. India and Japan have instead decided to combine their efforts, outlined in the Modi–Abe statement.

India is also undertaking meaningful conversations with other space players, such as France and the United States. With China’s aggressive posturing in the South China and East China seas and its growing profile in the Indian Ocean, the use of space assets to achieve maritime domain awareness (an understanding of issues related to the maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy or environment of a country) has the potential to emerge as a shared area of cooperation among India, the United States, Japan and France.

All of this suggests that a new space race is heating up in Asia that is compounded by the region’s changing balance of power alignments. Space is becoming yet another domain of competition among Asia’s great powers. It can no longer be seen as an innocent and cooperative arena of policymaking, and one cannot remain sanguine about outer space stability.

It is unlikely that the balance of power equation in Asia will stabilise anytime soon, which would suggest that the budding space race is only going to continue to intensify into the future.

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I focused on drone regulations in India and why that Policy needs a rethink. New Delhi needs to think more about drone technology and its domestic, regional, and global implications.

Though India is beginning to deal with the impact of drone technology, unsurprisingly, the Indian government has been slow to understand the implications, both at the domestic and at the international level.



For the full essay, click here.



India has had military drones – or Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) – for many years and is also developing combat versions (UCAVs or Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles). But the use of drones for civilian purposes remain underdeveloped, because regulations regarding the technology are not yet fully established. At the same time, India has not been as active as it could be in the international debate about global governance aspects of drone technology, which represents a lost opportunity for New Delhi.

The development of drones has had a significant impact in a number of ways. The obvious one is its application in warfare. A number of countries around the world use drones for military operations, for applications such as reconnaissance and surveillance, search and rescue operations, and border patrols, as well as combat. Former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency Michael Hayden famously said that “Targeted killing using drones has become part of the American way of war.”

Of course, drone use now goes beyond military applications. Use of UAVs in the commercial and social sectors has increased. Many large corporations are looking at using drones for a number of different functions. For instance, Amazon stated in 2013 that it will use drones for delivery of packages and has been exploring its feasibility since then. It even did its first drone delivery in the university town of Cambridge in the United Kingdom in July 2016. Monitoring critical infrastructure such as ports, power plants, and infrastructure construction with drones are other important civilian functions that are being explored.

Given the multiplicity of functions both in the civilian and sectors, the use of drones and the market for drones is expected to pick up – a recent Goldman Sachs report said the global spending on UAVs over the next five years will be approximately $100 billion. A large chunk of this spending is likely to be on the commercial and civil sector. However, there are still several questions about the legal, regulatory, and policy aspects, both at the global governance and the national levels, that need to be addressed.

In India, the first true notification regarding drones came as a Public Notice issued by the Office of the Director General of Civil Aviation (DGCA), India’s civil aviation regulator, on October 7, 2014. The document listed out the need for potential operators to take “approval from the Air Navigation Service provider [Airport Authority of India], defense, Ministry of Home Affairs, and other concerned security agencies, besides the DGCA,” onerous conditions that in reality means a near complete ban on drones. It also stated that the “DGCA is in the process of formulating the regulations (and globally harmonize those) for certification & operation for use of UAS in the Indian Civil Airspace.”

Two years later, in April 2016, the DGCA prepared another set of draft guidelines on the use of drones for civilian or recreational purposes and sought comments from different stakeholders for a period of 21 days. In October 2017, the DGCA produced another set of guidelines seeking once again comments from the stakeholders by December 31, 2017. However, the government is yet to formalize these draft guidelines into policy measures or manuals.

It appears clear that the Indian government is yet to comprehend the rapid changes taking place within the industry, and that the repeated draft guidelines are a reflection of the pressure they are facing from multiple stakeholders to develop an effective regime. It should worry New Delhi that despite a near complete ban on drones, there have been large number of drone sightings in Indian skies. Indian policymakers need to recognize that blanket bans do not work.

A new policy framework is needed, which must effectively address issues such as liability in case of drone-to-drone collisions and interference, regulatory, legal, and quality control and licensing requirements. For instance, a conspicuous lacuna is that the DGCA circulators do not mention anything about import standards, even though the majority of the drones in India are imported. The lack of a policy outline on quality control for indigenously manufactured- and built-drones is equally troubling.

At the international level, policy regulations for drones are still in the making. But New Delhi will be well advised to take an active part in the discussions because new global rules will surely affect its interests. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has been the primary platform leading the global governance efforts. Though these efforts began in 2007, an outcome is expected only later this year. The ICAO has issued several rules in the form of circulars and manuals but for obvious reasons, these are stop-gap measures. Meanwhile, a few countries have established certain ground rules with regard to the use of drones. It may be useful for ICAO to consult these as well before coming out with its own guidelines.

For New Delhi, there are both domestic and international imperatives for paying greater attention to this critical issue. But whether Indian bureaucracy’s glacial pace and coordination problems will permit this is anybody’s guess. Thus far, the record does not seem encouraging in this respect.

The Quad Reborn, my article The Diplomat Magazine

The May issue of The Diplomat magazine was a special issue on the quad. A decade after it was first proposed, the U.S., Japan, India, and Australia are getting the squad back together. I wrote the Indian perspective for this essay.



For the full essay by five authors, click here.

The idea itself is rather simple: the Indo-Pacific’s four most prominent and powerful democracies engaging directly on the basis of shared security interests and mutual geopolitical concerns. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue – the Quad – is an idea whose time came and passed quickly a decade ago and seemingly has arrived again. In this month’s cover story, we aim to present the perspectives of the Quad countries on the concept, its rebirth, and its future. As the following four perspectives show, the United States, Japan, India, and Australia share as much as they differ and the reborn Quad continues to face challenges in one of the world’s most dynamic regions.

Jeff M. Smith, a research fellow at the Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Center, charts the re-emergence of the Quad concept, a decade after it was first proposed, and why it has come back to life at this particular moment in history.

Yuki Tatsumi, co-director of the East Asia Program and Director of the Japan Program at the Stimson Center, then takes up the case of Japan. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, as the originator of the Quad in his first term as prime minister back in early 2007, has a unique stake in its success this time around.

I laid out India’s perspective in the essay. In the years since the first Quad failed to take wing, India’s relationship with China has deteriorated. This informs New Delhi’s revived interest in the concept, which would link India to a wider security network in Asia.

Rory Medcalf and David Brewster, head of college and senior research fellow, respectively, at Australian National University’s National Security College, present the view from Australia. For Australia, they write, the revived Quad is “a natural reflection of an evolving Indo-Pacific strategy of creative balancing and adaptive diplomacy.”



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What Does Trump’s Iran Deal Withdrawal Mean for India’s Security?, my weekly essay for The Diplomat, 12 May 2018

My this week's Diplomat column focused the Trump's Iran nuclear deal deal and what it means for India's security. Though the decision itself may not have been surprising, the consequences could be serious for New Delhi’s security. In fact, the United States pulling out does create more than a few uncertainties – for regional security, for nonproliferation, and for American credibility more generally.



For the full article, click here.



On May 9, U.S. President Donald Trump announced his decision to pull out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), popularly called the Iran nuclear deal. While the decision itself may not have been surprising, its consequences could be serious for other regional actors, including India.

The JCPOA, meant to stall Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, was finalized in July 2015. The deal was concluded between Iran and the P5 (United States, Russia, France, China, and United Kingdom) plus Germany and the European Union. The deal was controversial in the United States, and Trump had promised to get rid of the deal even during his election campaign. So, his decision itself was not a surprise.

Nevertheless, the United States pulling out does create more than a few uncertainties – for regional security, for nonproliferation, and for American credibility more generally. There could also be potentially serious consequences for third countries such as India.

Typifying its usual balancing act, New Delhi issued a statement following the U.S. pull out, saying, “All parties should engage constructively to address and resolve issues that have arisen with respect to the JCPOA.”

In reality, even though India was not party to the deal, India supported it. New Delhi had watched the growing tensions between Iran and the United States before the deal was reached with some trepidation because a war could have had multiple negative consequences for India, including threats to the very large Indian expatriate population, disruption of oil supplies, and being forced to pick sides between Iran and the United States, to name just a few. Thus, India was quite happy with the nuclear deal because it eliminated the probability of immediate war.

Now, with the future of the deal in doubt and increasing tensions in the region, India has reasons to be concerned and cautious. Some officials have sought to promote calm: Commerce Secretary Rita Teaoti, for instance, stated that the U.S. decision to pull out of JCPOA will have limited impact. She said that the Obama administration’s partial easing of sanctions did not lead to larger trade between India and Iran and that the “trade with Iran has remain at even levels.” Therefore, she argued that the reinstatement of sanctions will not have a significant impact on India-Iran ties. There is an element of truth to this: India’s Iran projects were not exactly progressing with any great speed in any case.

A bigger concern is regarding India’s energy security. Iran is the third largest supplier of oil to India, supplying 18.4 million tons (mt) of crude from April 2017 to January 2018 and 27.2 mt in 2016-17. Iran’s acting ambassador in India, Massoud Rezvanian Rahaghi, attempted to reassure New Delhi, stating that “oil trade with India will not be affected.” But it is quite apparent too that he was attempting desperately to keep India engaged with Iran, arguing that given the strategic importance of the Chabahar port to India, no political issues should come in the way of developing the port.

Rahaghi went on to suggest that the India and Iran must therefore find ways to “immunize” the relationship and keep it “sustainable and durable.” India-Iran relations tend to shift in terms of who holds more of the leverage depending on how troubled Iran is: now, with Iran potentially facing isolation, New Delhi clearly is in a better position.

The second concern is about Chabahar port. Development of the port has been delayed by several years, although it appears to have gained new momentum following Modi’s visit to Tehran in May 2016. According to Nitin Gadkari, the national minister of roadways, the port will be operational by 2018. There is fear that U.S. sanctions could affect this timeline and delay the handing over of the project further.

But New Delhi is likely to make a strong case with Washington for Chabahar by highlighting the connectivity that will be established through the port. The port will create direct links with Afghanistan, which India believes is vital for New Delhi as well as Washington, in addition to becoming the gateway to Russia and Central Asia for India. More critically, if India fails to complete the project, China could step in, which would be a double blow to India.

A broader concern is about the general stability of the region. If the increasing tension in the region should ignite into a full-scale war, India faces a number of challenges. Millions of Indian expatriates live in the Arab states of the Gulf, and they would be in the direct line of fire. And politically, it will become very difficult for India to continue playing the balancing game between Iran on one side and Israel, the Arab states and the United States on the other.

Finally, India will also have to balance its other interests with the developments in the Gulf. Important as Iran might be, there is little comparison between Iran and the United States when it comes to protecting India’s larger national security interests, which heavily concerns China. If India is forced to choose, it is likely to decide that it needs Washington more than Tehran. This would not be unprecedented: India sided with the United States against Iran in critical IAEA votes when New Delhi was negotiating the U.S.-India nuclear deal. If the push comes to shove, India’s choice is likely to be no different.

India, Malaysia Kick Off Military Exercise, my column in The Diplomat, 4 May 2018

In May, my first piece for The Diplomat was on the latest round of India-Malaysia military exercise held in Malaysia from 30 April - 13 May. The essay published on 4 May looked at the strategic rationale that is driving both countries to cultivate and nurture deeper security ties.


The Indian defense ministry, in a statement, said that the exercise is aimed at “bolstering cooperation and coordination between the armed forces of both the nations and to share the expertise of both the contingents in conduct of counter-insurgency operations in jungle terrain.” The 4 Grenadiers Battalion of the Indian Army and 1 Royal Ranjer Regiment and the Royal Malay Regiment from the Malaysian Army are participating, and, with a focus on tactical operations in jungle warfare, the two sides will engage in joint training, planning and executing a series of training activities in the dense forests of Sengai Perdik, Hulu Langat, Malaysia.

These exercises will refine and sharpen the operational counterinsurgency tactics of both the armies, but the larger aim is clearly to boost the strategic partnership between the two countries. Though this is not the first joint military exercise in this series, New Delhi has claimed that “(T)his is the first instance wherein a joint training exercise of this magnitude involving Indian and Malaysian soldiers is being organized on Malaysian soil.”

For the full essay, click here.



In the face of unprecedented uncertainties in the Indo-Pacific, mostly driven by China’s rise, India’s outreach efforts to ASEAN has accelerated. The effort has included an increased number of security consultations, political dialogues, and joint military exercises with Southeast Asian countries.

All 10 ASEAN leaders were in India for the 69th Republic Day celebrations, a first. The usual pattern has been to invite one foreign leader for these celebrations. The invitation was indicative of the importance India attaches to the strategic engagement with the ASEAN countries.

Now, in another indicator of India’s stepped up outreach to the region, India is holding another iteration of a large joint military exercise with Malaysia. The military exercise, titled “Harimau Shakti,” is being held in Malaysia from April 30 to May 13. The joint combat exercise is meant to create greater synergy and interoperability between the two armed forces.

The Indian defense ministry, in a statement, said that the exercise is aimed at “bolstering cooperation and coordination between the armed forces of both the nations and to share the expertise of both the contingents in conduct of counter-insurgency operations in jungle terrain.” The 4 Grenadiers Battalion of the Indian Army and 1 Royal Ranjer Regiment and the Royal Malay Regiment from the Malaysian Army are participating, and, with a focus on tactical operations in jungle warfare, the two sides will engage in joint training, planning and executing a series of training activities in the dense forests of Sengai Perdik, Hulu Langat, Malaysia.

These exercises will refine and sharpen the operational counterinsurgency tactics of both the armies, but the larger aim is clearly to boost the strategic partnership between the two countries. Though this is not the first joint military exercise in this series, New Delhi has claimed that “(T)his is the first instance wherein a joint training exercise of this magnitude involving Indian and Malaysian soldiers is being organized on Malaysian soil.”

The two sides have had a history of military cooperation, and became strategic partners in 2010. In the defense arena, the two sides have engaged in exchange of information on training, maintenance and technical support for Su-30 fighter aircraft, in addition to the establishment of a “Systems School” for the fighters at the Gong Kedak airbase. The Indian Air Force had also stationed a team in Malaysia between 2008 and 2010 as Malaysia was inducting and starting the operation of the Su-30 MKM fighter aircraft, which they had just procured. Earlier in the 1990s, the Malaysian Air Force had sent its pilots and technicians to India to train on the Mig-29 Fulcrums.

Bilateral naval cooperation has also remained strong, and the Indian Navy regularly participates along with other external partners in the Langkawi International Maritime and Aerospace Exhibition in Malaysia. Port visits by Indian Navy and Coast Guard ships are also of significance especially in the context of the increasing Chinese naval footprint in in the Indian Ocean. India and Malaysia have also established a mechanism for information sharing information for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) and white shipping.

The relatively increased emphasis on the defense domain in India’s ties with Southeast Asian states including Malaysia bears watching from a historical perspective. When India’s Look East Policy was announced in the early 1990s, India’s focus was limited mostly to economic and trade issues, and Singapore was the focal point within ASEAN. The economic focus is still important, including in India’s ties with Malaysia. Najib during his trip to India in 2017 noted that Malaysia had not tapped into realizing “the full potential of the bilateral relationship” but “is belatedly showing interest in the Indian economy to some extent.”

But the strategic aspects of the relationship have also clearly become more important over time as “Look East” has begun to be translated more into “Act East.'” Ties with individual countries in the region such as Indonesia and Malaysia are gaining greater traction and visibility. Malaysia and India, for one, have emphasized their commitment to maintaining open seas and freedom of navigation, on the basis of the principles enshrined in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The two have also reiterated their call to all claimant parties to avoid using unilateral measures and find peaceful solutions to disputes involving sovereignty and territorial integrity. As China becomes increasingly active in India’s backyard in South Asia, New Delhi can be expected to focus equally on China’s backyard in Southeast Asia.