How does India manage its strategic relations with the US and Russia?

India appears to be forging strategic partnerships with US, Russia, Israel, Japan, South Africa, the EU and so on. Is India clear as to what it means by this strategic partnership? Sandeep Dikshit of Hindu reported that during a recent Parliament debate, on a question on India's strategic relations with the US and Russia, the government avoided any attempt at juxtaposition and spelt out its policy for both the countries separately.



The reply said the government not only wanted to “strengthen and deepen” the relationship with the U.S. in ongoing areas of bilateral cooperation but also identify newer areas to take bilateral ties to a “higher level of engagement.” It also sought intensified engagement with the U.S. on global issues such as climate change, disarmament, international terrorism and maritime security to “strengthen India-U.S. strategic partnership.”

Russia is described as strategic partner with the decades-long association providing a “solid framework” for long-term and all-round development of relations. During the coming high-level interactions, the government hopes to hold discussions with the Russian leadership on all strategic areas of bilateral cooperation such as defence, space, energy, science and technology and trade & economy.

India is scheduled to hold high-level engagements with both countries this year. President Pratibha Patil, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna and Defence Minister A.K. Antony are all scheduled to visit Russia this year. Dr. Singh will also go to the U.S. in November while Mr. Krishna will review the progress of the recast strategic dialogue with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in Washington. With the U.S. keen on closer intelligence sharing and supplying modern communications and surveillance equipment to India, Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram has a pending invitation to visit Washington.

Split India,says Chinese strategist

Zhan Lue of the Chinese government-funded think-tank, China International Institute for Strategic Studies says Beijing should join forces with different nationalities like Assamese, Tamils, and Kashmiris and support the latter in establishing independent nation-states of their own, out of India, for its own interest as also for the progress of Asia.

Should India have a panicked response to this writing? No. However, India cannot ignore such sentiments for two reasons. First of all, such expressions are being quite frequent. Second, CIISS being a government-funded think-tank, one can be reasonably certain that these expressions do have the government backing.

Here's D.S. Rajan's translation of the original Chinese article.

Almost coinciding with the 13th round of Sino-Indian border talks (New Delhi, August 7-8, 2009), an article (in Chinese language) has appeared in China captioned “If China takes a little action, the so-called Great Indian Federation can be broken up” ( Zhong Guo Zhan Lue Gang, www.iiss.cn , Chinese,8 August 2009). Interestingly, it has been reproduced in several other strategic and military websites of the country and by all means, targets the domestic audience. The authoritative host site is located in Beijing and is the new edition of one, which so far represented the China International Institute for Strategic Studies (www.chinaiiss.org).



Claiming that Beijing’s ‘China-Centric’ Asian strategy, provides for splitting India, the writer of the article, Zhan Lue (strategy), has found that New Delhi’s corresponding ‘India-Centric’ policy in Asia, is in reality a ‘Hindustan centric’ one. Stating that on the other hand ‘local centres’ exist in several of the country’s provinces (excepting for the U.P and certain Northern regions), Zhan Lue has felt that in the face of such local characteristics, the ‘so-called’ Indian nation cannot be considered as one having existed in history.

According to the article, if India today relies on any thing for unity, it is the Hindu religion. The partition of the country was based on religion. Stating that today nation states are the main current in the world, it has said that India could only be termed now as a “Hindu Religious state’. Adding that Hinduism is a decadent religion as it allows caste exploitation and is unhelpful to the country’s modernization, it described the Indian government as one in a dilemma with regard to eradication of the caste system as it realizes that the process to do away with castes may shake the foundation of the consciousness of the Indian nation.

The writer has argued that in view of the above, China in its own interest and the progress of whole Asia, should join forces with different nationalities like Assamese, Tamils, and Kashmiris and support the latter in establishing independent nation-states of their own, out of India. In particular, the ULFA in Assam, a territory neighboring China, can be helped by China so that Assam realizes its national independence.

The article has also felt that for Bangladesh, the biggest threat is from India, which wants to develop a great Indian Federation extending from Afghanistan to Myanmar. India is also targeting China with support to Vietnam’s efforts to occupy Nansha (Spratly) group of islands in South China Sea. Hence the need for China’s consolidation of its alliance with Bangladesh, a country with which the US and Japan are also improving their relations to counter China. It has pointed out that China can give political support to Bangladesh enabling the latter to encourage ethnic Bengalis in India to get rid of Indian control and unite with Bangladesh as one Bengali nation; if the same is not possible, creation of at least another free Bengali nation state as a friendly neighbour of Bangladesh, would be desirable, for the purpose of weakening India’s expansion and threat aimed at forming a ‘unified South Asia’.

The punch line in the article has been that to split India, China can bring into its fold countries like Pakistan, Nepal and Bhutan, support ULFA in attaining its goal for Assam’s independence, back aspirations of Indian nationalities like Tamils and Nagas, encourage Bangladesh to give a push to the independence of West Bengal and lastly recover the 90,000 sq km. territory in Southern Tibet.

Wishing for India’s break-up into 20-30 nation-states like in Europe, the article has concluded by saying that if the consciousness of nationalities in India could be aroused, social reforms in South Asia can be achieved, the caste system can be eradicated and the region can march along the road of prosperity.

The Chinese article in question will certainly outrage readers in India. Its suggestion that China can follow a strategy to dismember India, a country always with a tradition of unity in diversity, is atrocious, to say the least. The write-up could not have been published without the permission of the Chinese authorities, but it is sure that Beijing will wash its hands out of this if the matter is taken up with it by New Delhi. It has generally been seen that China is speaking in two voices – its diplomatic interlocutors have always shown understanding during their dealings with their Indian counterparts, but its selected media is pouring venom on India in their reporting. Which one to believe is a question confronting the public opinion and even policy makers in India. In any case, an approach of panic towards such outbursts will be a mistake, but also ignoring them will prove to be costly for India.

(The writer, D.S.Rajan, is Director of Chennai Centre for China Studies, Chennai, India, email: dsrajan@gmail.com).

NYT story: Do Women Make Better Bosses?

An interesting set of arguments on women, whether they make better bosses or not, appeared in The New York Times (August 02, 2009). It is an interesting reading, if nothing else.

Do Women Make Better Bosses?
By The Editors



Credit, left to right: Barry Wetcher/Twentieth Century Fox, Andrew Schwarz/Twentieth Century Fox, United Artists Not the best role models: Meryl Streep in “The Devil Wears Prada”; Sigourney Weaver in “Working Girl”; Diane Keaton in “Baby Boom.”
Do “female bosses tend to be better managers, better advisers, mentors, rational thinkers”?

That is the view of Carol Smith, the senior vice president and chief brand officer for the Elle Group, expressed in a short interview published inside The Times’s business section a week ago Sunday. Ms. Smith also said that male bosses “love to hear themselves talk” and that in some previous jobs she purposely arrived late to meetings so she could miss the men’s conversations about golf and football.

The interview, conducted by Adam Bryant, The Times’s deputy business editor, generated a lot of reaction and debate among readers last week.

What does research show about the differences between women and men as managers?

Alice Eagly, Northwestern University
Leora Tanenbaum, author of “Catfight”
Joanna Barsh, McKinsey and Company
Susan Pinker, psychologist and columnist
Gary N. Powell, University of Connecticut
Sharon Meers, former managing director at Goldman Sachs

Advantages, Yes, but Also a Double Standard
Alice Eagly is chairman of the department of social psychology at Northwestern University.

As a researcher on managerial behavior, I have read hundreds of studies that have compared women and men as managers. When we summarize all of that research, some differences do show up, although only “on the average.”

As with all averages, there are many exceptions. But here’s what we know from research:

Women are less ‘bossy,’ probably because people dislike bossy women even more than bossy men.

First, as Carol Smith illustrates, women are less “bossy,” probably because people dislike bossy women even more than bossy men. As a result, female managers are more collaborative and democratic than male managers. Second, compared with men, women use a more positive approach by encouraging and urging others rather than a negative approach of scolding and reprimanding them. Third, women attend more to the individuals they work with, by mentoring them and taking their particular situations into account.

Finally, there is the matter of getting the job done efficiently. Most managers, male and female, get their work done in a timely way, but some do not. When you find one of those barely functioning managers — that is, someone who avoids solving problems and just doesn’t get the job done, that person is more likely to be a man than a woman. Why? Perhaps because a woman would be fired or demoted more quickly for poor managing.

So, are women better managers than men? In terms of their day-to-day actions, women managers should have advantages. But the answer is really not so simple because managers do well only if people accept their authority.

In roles that have been held mainly by men, women’s competence is often questioned. In these situations, women managers can face a double standard. They have to be extra-competent to be recognized as effective. Where women managers are more common, this type of bias is less likely to prevail.


Belittling Other Women
Leora Tanenbaum is author of “Catfight: Rivalries Among Women: From Diets to Dating, From the Boardroom to the Delivery Room.”

Yes, countless female managers are great at making lists and sure, lots of men love to hear the sound of their own voices — endlessly. But none of this behavior matters if it’s accompanied with a denial of the continued existence of sexism in the workplace.

Many women who make it to senior management feel a need to prove their own superiority.

Consider: Women are routinely undervalued and assumed to lack competence. Successful men don’t have to worry about when and if to become parents; successful women do. Men earn more and are promoted more.

Troublingly, many individual women who make it to senior management refuse to acknowledge these very real conditions. They position themselves as uniquely and unusually qualified, implicitly belittling other women in a move to prove their own superiority.

Upon becoming president and C.E.O. of Hewlett-Packard in 1999, Carly Fiorina immediately distanced herself from her corporate sisters. Fiorina announced that “there is not a glass ceiling…. My gender is interesting but really not the subject of the story here.” Whether or not Fiorina was a superior CEO because she was a woman is certainly debatable — she was forced out in 2005 — and she was succeeded by another woman, Patricia Dunn, who was accused of spying on the company’s board members.

The best managers, female or male, are those who admit that the corporate structure favors men and who recognize their responsibility to help others follow in their footsteps.


More Emotional, for Better or Sometimes Worse
Joanna Barsh is a director in the New York office of McKinsey and Company and co-author of “How Remarkable Women Lead,” to be published in September.


We’ve been researching remarkable women leaders for the past five years. Indeed, we’ve now interviewed well over 100 women and a few good men. We’ve also developed a research survey that almost 2,000 men and women have responded to from around the world.

In a word, women have an edge over men in terms of what we call centered leadership. Women tend to look for meaning more than men at work (no surprise, men go for pay and status more often).

Women are natural relationship builders, but in general they take fewer risks than men.

Women also bring emotion to the workplace, and when those emotions are positive — that is quite powerful. Psychologists tell us that women experience emotions more at the extremes than men.
That’s why many women do replay negative events over and over.

But female optimists are a different story. Whereas many men rush off in any direction when adversity strikes, optimist women diagnose the situation, make a plan and then act. Are pessimists doomed to the cycle of spiraling down? Not at all. Positive psychologists teach learned optimism, and we can all take a lesson there.

Then there is connecting. Women are natural relationship-builders. But the debate rages as to whether men or women are better at networking. Our own work suggests women hold back, more reluctant to use reciprocity to build “transactional” relationships. That said, the research shows women are more inclusive and build consensus to reach decisions — something that may be increasingly important for large, complex and changing companies today.

When it comes to engaging, men are risk-takers. The women who have made their way to the top have also taken risk — it is the best way to develop at an accelerated pace. In general, we have found that many women don’t. We wait until we have all the necessary skills or the full answer.

Our model ends on energizing, because most women still do more of the household work. Energizing is critical for leaders — both to sustain one’s own path and also to infuse energy into the organization. One area where women can improve is to stop (yes) multitasking when our full attention is required. When you attempt to facilitate a phone conference while doing email, your brain switches between tasks, and you lose focus and energy.

When men and women assessed their own centered leadership practices, it turned out that women scored higher on almost all factors by a marginal amount. We haven’t got enough data to validate that finding, but there’s room for thought.

Are these the right attributes to gauge leadership? We believe they are even more important in today’s marketplace.


Women Are More Effective Mind Readers
Susan Pinker is a psychologist and columnist for the Globe and Mail in Canada. She is the author of “The Sexual Paradox,” about the roots of sex differences in the classroom and the workplace.


No doubts: Some sex differences exist, and there’s new evidence to prove it. Women are often better communicators because their brains are more networked for language. The majority of women are better at “mind-reading,” than most men; they can read the emotions written on people’s faces more quickly and easily, a talent jump-started by the vast swaths of neural real estate dedicated to processing emotions in the female brain, and boosted by jolts of oxytocin at critical moments in their lives. (Amazingly, oxytocin, a hormone circulating in greater quantities in women, squirted up a man’s nostril boosts his mind-reading skills, too.)

While women may be more empathetic than men, individual female managers who have climbed the ladder may not be.

And the thicker corpus callosum connecting women’s two hemispheres provides a swifter superhighway for processing social messages, such as reading the morale of a group, or the mood of a colleague. And there are measurable sex differences in empathy, as President Obama suggested when he nominated Judge Sonia Sotomayor to the Supreme Court. There are more women who are champions at imagining what other people are thinking and feeling, and more men who struggle mightily with this skill.

But is this profile true of all women, and does it mean women make better managers? The answer is no, and no.

First, all scientific evidence is based on statistical averages; an individual’s unique qualities are always blended into the group’s. So, even if men are taller than women, on average, variation means that there will always be some women who are taller than some men. And just as women are more empathic, on average, there are certainly men who are softer, and better empathizers than some women.

The readers’ complaints about difficult female managers that appear under the interview with Carol Smith make that clear: aggression is certainly more common among men, but for many reasons, the women who rise up the ranks may be on the more competitive and aggressive side — and their subordinates often feel it — especially the women who work with them.

Competition within each sex is more fierce than it is between the sexes, and one study shows that women report less stress if the boss is a man.

One reason is that competition within each sex is more fierce than it is between the sexes, and within-sex tension increases when resources are tight, as they are in this recession. One study published in 2008 by two sociologists at the University of Toronto, Scott Schieman and Taralyn McMullen, reinforces that maxim. When the scientists looked at physical and mental distress among 1,000 American employees working in a variety of jobs, they found that men worked best with gender-mixed managers: one male, one female. Women, however, worked best with one male manager — reporting fewer headaches, backaches anxiety, and difficulties concentrating than they did when they worked for a woman.

Which shows that Carol Smith is wrong about her blanket statement about women being better managers. But she’s right about something else. Whether we’re talking about mentoring, managing or office politics, the research is clear: “Men and women together are the best.”


A Transformational Style
Gary N. Powell is professor of management in the School of Business of the University of Connecticut in Storrs. He is working on the fourth edition of “Women and Men in Management” and is author of “Managing a Diverse Workforce” and editor of “Handbook of Gender and Work.”


Carol Smith sounds like an excellent manager. Further, her statement that women as a group are better managers than men as a group is supported by recent research. Female leaders tend to display a “transformational” leadership style, which has been demonstrated to contribute to leader effectiveness, more than male leaders do.

Good managers have been seen over three decades as exhibiting more masculine traits than feminine traits.

Transformational leadership includes charisma (communicating the purpose and importance of a mission and serving as a role model), inspirational motivation (exuding optimism and excitement about the mission’s attainability), intellectual stimulation (encouraging others to think out of the box), and individualized consideration (focusing on the development and mentoring of subordinates as individuals).

Ms. Smith is a good example of a transformational leader. When she sits at the middle of the conference table rather than at its head, arriving after the requisite jokes have been told, she communicates, “We are all in this together and I am part of it, but let’s not waste time,” which is the starting point of transformational leadership.

So why aren’t there more women in the corner offices of corporate America? Although more women than ever before are in the managerial ranks of businesses at all levels, women continue to face significant disadvantages in the leader role than men do not face.

First, polls suggest that about twice as many people would rather work for a male boss than a female boss, although “it doesn’t matter to me” is the slight favorite. Second, in my research with D. Anthony Butterfield, good managers have been seen over three decades as exhibiting more masculine traits associated with men, such as autonomy and independence, than feminine traits associated with women, such as warmth and sensitivity to the needs of others.

Many people still see an incongruity between the female gender role and the leader role, which makes it harder for women to attain corner office positions and puts them in an unwelcome spotlight when they do. In 2006, after PepsiCo announced that Indra Nooyi would become its new CEO, the headline of the New York Times story was, “A Woman to Be Chief at PepsiCo.” No headline has ever announced “A Man to Be Chief at Acme Corp.”


A Female Specialty: Feedback
Sharon Meers is co-author of “Getting to 50/50,” about working couples, and a former managing director at Goldman Sachs. She and her husband created the Partnership for Parity at Stanford Business School and the Dual-Career Initiative at Harvard University.


The best thing about female managers? They get you paid more. Women bosses tend to fight harder for their subordinates, according to negotiation research, getting better raises for their teams.

I’ve worked for many great men. But, in my experience, female managers are a special breed. We won’t know for decades if the differences are due more to nature or nurture but they are largely good — and stem from the fact that senior women are still outsiders.

Harvard Business School research says star women are more likely than male stars to remain persistently high performers. Why? Women don’t get the same access to mentors and networks and have to build muscle that men don’t. Star women have to innovate to outperform — building stronger client ties, finding outside advisers, seeking opportunities with results that can be measured objectively.

Women often take an alternative approach to leading teams — encouraging more open discussion, cultivating talent and sharing credit. Feedback is the place where women bosses may add the most value.

Straight talk from a boss at Goldman Sachs.

After seven years at Goldman, I got my first female manager — and more straight talk than in my entire career. She minced no words when I messed up, but she also made it clear she was on my side: my advocate. That powerful combination — candor and trust — inspired her team to accept and act on feedback in a way I hadn’t seen before.

In hundreds of interviews of workers and bosses for our book, we repeatedly heard employees complain about the feedback style of male bosses (everything from excessively harsh to evasive). Male bosses were no more satisfied: Many are now so unsure what’s O.K. in the workplace, they fear female workers’ crying or complaints to HR.

So here’s the real question: How to make the positive qualities we see in female managers more common in men — and more useful to all? A new report from Catalyst shows how companies win when we escape the idea that men and women are so different and work harder to get on the same page — so that men and women bring out the best in each other sharing the same C-suite.

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India-China Border Talks

On August 7 and 8, 2009, India and China held the 13th round of talks. PLA Daily, in a story on the subject, noted that during the talks, the two sides exchanged in-depth views on the further development of China-India Strategic Cooperative Partnership, as well as regional, international and global issues of mutual interest. The Chinese side emphasized that China and India have no other option than living in peace and developing side by side. China stands firmly committed to working with India to press ahead with the bilateral ties. The Chinese side expressed belief that both countries need to promote the relationship with a higher and strategic perspective and continue to uphold the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. China and India should endeavor to build the strategic mutual trust. Both need to expand the common interests and cooperation bilaterally and on regional and global affairs.

While the Chinese official line is all about friendship and peaceful co-existence, the tone and tenor of academic and think-tank writings are not that reassuring. The anti-India rhetoric in the Chinese writings have gone up significantly in the last few years.

Here's an article published a year ago on some of these aspects, more specifically a provocative article, ‘A Warning to the Indian Government: Don’t Be Evil!' in one of the Chinese think-tanks. The article was published by the Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi.



In a provocative article entitled, ‘A Warning to the Indian Government: Don’t Be Evil!’ China has sent a strong message to India. Posted on the website (http://str.chinaiiss.org/content/2008-3-26/26211952.shtml) of a prominent Chinese think-tank, the China Institute of International Strategic Studies, the article by Zhan Lue (March 26, 2008), compares the present India-China situation to that of 1962 when, the author claims, India provoked a war with China. He notes that China today is better prepared in terms of its military presence in Tibet and nearby regions, besides possessing nuclear weapons. He also contends that China believes that India has been in an aggressive mood as evident in its stationing of more troops on the border, conduct of military exercises with countries, and massive arms acquisitions with China as the target. He concludes by accusing the Indian government of “walking today along the old road of resisting China,” advising India “not to requite kindness with ingratitude.”
Chinese rhetoric has undoubtedly intensified in the last few years, be it from the Chinese politico-military leadership or senior academics. Earlier, Professor Ma Jiali of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), a government think-tank, had argued that India should “return” Tawang, a sacred place for Tibetan Buddhists in Arunachal Pradesh, to China for resolving the vexed border issue, as Beijing could then be “magnanimous” in settling the border in the Western and Middle Sectors of the disputed boundary. Of course, by the same logic, China should be ready to give Lake Mansarovar to India as it is considered one of the most sacred pilgrimage centres for the Hindus!
Will China really launch an attack on India in Tawang or elsewhere in the eastern sector? If so, is India prepared for such an eventuality? While India has improved its overall fighting capability and is willing to use air power in combat (something it did not do in 1962), infrastructure development on the Indian side of the border has remained inadequate. This has been partly the result of the belief harboured by the Indian military and political establishment that infrastructure development in the region would actually enhance the Chinese ability to move into Indian territory in case of a crisis.
In the last few years, the infrastructural developments that China has undertaken in Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) as well as on the India-China border provide the potential to the PLA Army to mobilise forces and equipment in a much shorter span of time. It would enable China to mobilise large forces by train and by road onto Indian borders. Earlier this exercise not only took a long time but also was impossible during periods of snow. The new rail line into Tibet, and expressways, have changed the scenario totally. It is believed that China has about 160,000 troops in Tibet, and with improved infrastructure, it will be able to amass another 100,000 troops from the central reserve in a span of six weeks. Indian military planners have also noted that China has vastly improved its air force capability in the region, with multiple air bases and forward airstrips near the border. The PLA Air Force is also believed to have improved its command and control structures, as was evident from an air battle drill staged on March 30, 2008. China can also deploy heavy-lift planes in Tibet, though they may not be able to land and take-off fully loaded because of altitude restrictions. Besides the positioning of intermediate range ballistic missiles such as DF-4 and DF-21 in Tibet, it is reported that they could also deploy DF-31 ICBMs in bases such as at Delingha. This may mean that even a limited conflict between India and China has the potential to spiral out of control to become a dangerous nuclear flashpoint.
India, on the other hand, has about twelve mountain divisions capable of swift offensive operations in the mountainous areas. Two of these were reportedly created in February 2008, specifically for combat in Arunachal Pradesh. Two additional such divisions are estimated to become operational by 2015-16, at a cost of around INR 14 billion (USD 358 million). These will be reinforced by air power, including AWACS and fighter jets. There have also been reports of India’s plans to procure 140 ultra-light 155mm artillery pieces, as also a large number of heavy lift and combat ready helicopters, all of which would have special utility in mountain warfare. Although India has tested a number of intermediate-range missiles, including the Agni-3 capable of hitting both Beijing and Shanghai, these missiles are still not operational.
Despite the rhetoric, it may not be feasible for China to undertake military action against India for at least two reasons. Firstly, present day India is very different from the one defeated by China in 1962 – a fact that was evident to the Chinese even during Operation Falcon/Exercise Chequerboard in 1986/87. Secondly, in any future conflict with China, the use of air power will be critical and is likely to change the outcome in India’s favour. There have been several debates on the offensive use of air power in high altitude areas, the potential of which was well demonstrated in the high-altitude air war during the Kargil conflict. Limited conflicts can be contained to India’s advantage if India takes recourse to the use of air power.
The belligerent tone of Chinese writings and the improved connectivity to its borders notwithstanding, China may not go in for a military attack, given its understanding of improvements in India’s military capabilities. India should not, however, rule out the possibility of occasional Chinese adventurism till such time that there is a clear demarcation of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) on the ground and in military maps.

The Evolution of US Policy towards Kashmir

Here's a recent essay on the US policy towards Kashmir published in the Summer issue of the CLAWS Journal, published by the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS).

The main argument is that American policy towards the Kashmir dispute has changed from active efforts to resolve the dispute in the 1950s and 1960s, to benign neglect in the 1970s, to a more proactive approach during the early Clinton period, to a more nuanced but hands-off approach subsequently. The US policy on the Kashmir dispute has changed because the US approach in Kashmir has changed, from attempting to solve the complicated dispute, a ‘broad’ approach, to ensuring that the conflict over Kashmir does not lead to instability and war in the region, a more narrow approach. How the Obama Administration wishes to take the issue further might be important to analyse what kind of a security-stability index might appear in the region.



Background
In 1947, at the time of Indian independence, the princely state of Kashmir was headed by a Hindu King, Maharaja Hari Singh, who ruled over a predominantly Muslim population. The Pakistan military attack on the western border of Jammu and Kashmir at the time, when the issue of accession of Kashmir to India or Pakistan came up, prompted Maharaja to seek Indian government support. Support was granted by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru but on the condition of Kashmir’s accession to India. Following the agreement, India deployed its forces to repel the invaders, leading to the first Indo-Pak war over Kashmir in 1947. When a cease-fire was eventually declared in early 1949, India controlled two-thirds of the territory, a position which has remained more or less constant over the last half-century, despite a war over Kashmir in 1965. After remaining dormant through the 1970s and 1980s, an insurgency, actively supported by Pakistan, began in the late 1980s, and continues to this day.

US Policy towards the Dispute
American position on the dispute has shifted several times in the last half-century. There appears to have been at least two broad approaches in recent American policy towards the Kashmir dispute, what may be referred to as the ‘narrow’ and the ‘broad’ approaches. Both were motivated by concern that the Kashmir dispute might lead to a new crisis and war, and possibly, nuclear escalation. The ‘narrow’ approach focussed on the core American concern -- the possibility of a crisis or war in the sub-continent, which the US tried very hard, and successfully, to prevent. The ‘broad’ approach sought to solve the Kashmir dispute itself, as a way of preventing the dispute from having any potential for escalation. These changes can be seen in the way Washington’s policy evolved throughout the 1990s.

When the Kashmir insurgency began in 1989, the (elder) Bush administration’s primary concern was to avoid a clash between the two countries. Several administration officials made clear the US position that it no longer supported the move for a plebiscite in Kashmir and the stated position was that the United States thought that the best framework for a resolution of the Kashmir dispute was through the 1972 Shimla Agreement, in which India and Pakistan agreed to resolve their dispute peacefully and through bilateral channels. US policy in fact was in complete endorsement of the Indian position on the dispute that the Kashmir dispute had to be resolved through bilateral negotiations. The primary Bush effort as regards the Kashmir dispute was directed at dampening down the 1990 crisis, which US intelligence believed had the potential for escalation.

US policy changed dramatically when the Clinton administration took over in 1993. It became much more pro-active, attempting to move towards the resolution of the dispute itself. However, after several mis-steps, and avoidable controversies, the US position became much more conservative, eventually returning to a posture that appeared similar to the earlier Bush approach of attempting to prevent a war or escalation rather than attempting to solve the dispute itself. This was best demonstrated by the US approach during the Kargil war in the summer of 1999.

The second Bush administration had taken a more conservative approach to the Kashmir dispute taking the position that the dispute needed to be solved through a bilateral framework between India and Pakistan. However, after the 9/11 terror attacks in the US, and with the war on terror emerging as a major foreign and security policy preoccupation, there was a general sense that this position would change as Pakistan, which has been a frontline state along with the US, could put pressure on the US to take on a more active role in the resolution of the dispute. Much to the disappointment of Pakistan, the US maintained its balanced approach in not dragging Kashmir as part of the Pakistan-Afghanistan problem. This is not to suggest that the US was not concerned about the problem. The US, particularly the Bush Administration obviously has had serious concerns that the Indo-Pak stand-off might escalate into full-fledged war in the sub-continent. Operation Parakram and the build-up of forces on both sides after the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001, saw a renewed US interest in Kashmir. The approach, however, was more similar to the Bush Senior’s approach of attempting to prevent a war or escalation rather than attempting to solve the dispute itself. In essence, both the exigencies of the situation (satisfying Musharraf’s desire for a more active American role), and a perception that Kashmir requires a fundamental solution could have led to a return to the ‘broad’ approach to the problem of the Kashmir dispute. But the Bush Administration’s position was much more nuanced. And, given Bush’s overall approach towards India and Pakistan’s double standard on the war on terror, there was no return to the broad approach in dealing with Kashmir.

Bush’s approach towards Kashmir was also conditioned by the 9/11 terror attacks in the US. There was a decisive shift after the terror attacks, which was reflected essentially in the definitional aspects of terrorism. The US has had to accept a broad definition on terrorism to include all forms of terrorism, and everywhere, and not just acts committed on US soil, and against US citizens or institutions. Again, although the US appeared willing to adopt a broader connotation to “terrorism,” it was still not clear whether the US was using the same yardstick to terrorism in the US and in other parts of the world, including India. For example, the US was reluctant to characterise as terrorism various acts of political violence that terrorist groups have indulged in various parts of India. Though the US did characterise the December 13 attack on the Indian Parliament as a terrorist act, they have been unwilling to accept the considerable quantity of evidence that suggest that Pakistan had, at the least, an indirect hand in the attack. Even the concern that the US had shown appeared more motivated by the desire to soothe Indian anger rather than the result of genuine concern. This suggests two different yardsticks to define and tackle terrorism. When terror strikes America, war and other military action is the immediate response, but when India faces with an attack on its Parliament or a 26/11, restraint is sought.

Another aspect of change in the US approach was about how the US views liberation movements and freedom struggles all over the world. For example, violence by terrorists in Kashmir was not considered terrorism until 9/11. Today, some of the active terrorist groups in Kashmir - Jaish-e-Mohammad, Lashkar-e-Toiba (the two groups responsible for the December 13 attack on Indian Parliament) - are designated Foreign Terrorist Organisations (FTOs) under US law. It is well known that these two groups have been nurtured by the Pakistan government and its intelligence arm, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The Indian demand to Pakistan to take action against these two groups was not heeded by the Pakistan government until President Bush categorised these two groups as terrorist organisations. Hence, the US action on different terrorist groups and its overall approach to tackling terrorism has tremendous impact on several individual countries’ approach towards terrorism as well as the international counter-terrorism measures. India in fact has had its difficulties on the manner in which terrorism has been defined by the US. What constitutes terrorism for India has not been what the US characterised as terrorism.

It is however now appropriate to analyse how an Obama Administration would handle the Kashmir issue in his yearning to solve the Afghanistan problem and the war on terror. A few fundamental issues are to be borne in mind before analysing what Obama’s prescription for Kashmir would be.

The Democrats have generally tended to be more interventionist than the Republicans, as they are of the view that the US should play an active role in regional conflicts to both resolve these conflicts as well as to protect human rights during these conflicts. The Clinton Administration had intervened in a number of such conflicts including in Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, Yugoslavia, Congo, Liberia, Albania, Iraq, Afghanistan and Yemen. Obama appears set to continue with that trend. Susan Rice, a key Obama advisor and US Ambassador to the UN, stated during her Senate confirmation hearing that the Obama Administration will continue with the traditional Democratic party policy of promoting democracy and human rights around the world.

The pro-interventionist strategy of the Democrats has caused problems in the Indo-US relations in the past. If Obama is to continue with such a strategy, this would involve the Obama Administration wanting to mediate and seek a solution to the Kashmir problem. Obama’s recent comments during interviews to Time magazine in October and December 2008 and the reported consideration (earlier) of former President Bill Clinton as a special envoy on Kashmir had created major stir in the Indian political and policy circles. Obama in his interview said, “We should probably try to facilitate a better understanding between Pakistan and India and try to resolve the Kashmir crisis so that they (Pakistan) can stay focused not on India, but on the situation with those militants.” Some analysts in India have tended to believe that a Kashmir-specific pro-active policy need not necessarily be bad, given Obama’s pro-India statements. However, it should be noted that his pro-India statements in the recent months had more to do with getting support from the Indian-American community.

The issue, however, is that Obama considers finding a solution to the Kashmir issue almost as a pre-requisite for getting Pakistan’s support for the war on terror in Afghanistan. Linking Afghanistan to the resolution of Kashmir dispute, as Obama did in his interview to Time magazine when he said that “working with Pakistan and India to try to resolve their Kashmir conflict would be a critical task for his administration’s efforts to try to counter growing instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” will be problematic. The tendency to link up Afghanistan’s security with terrorism in Kashmir is a dangerous trend and India must keep a close watch. The US has to focus on the problem, which is Pakistan, rather than get diverted by Pakistan’s diversions into Kashmir. As the chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Mike Mullen, recently noted, it is the Afghan-Pakistan border region that is the ‘site of planning for the next attack’ on the United States; hence, the US should not lose sight of their target - Pakistan.

For the time being, the Obama Administration seems sensitive enough to India’s concerns in this regard. The recent news of the possible appointment of Richard Holbrooke as the special envoy on South Asia had created concern in India. Any individual would have been bad, but as one former US official noted in an article in Foreign Policy, “The Indians do not like Holbrooke because he has been very good on Pakistan ... and has a very good feel for the place.” However, thanks to Indian lobbying in Washington, India has been able to ensure that the official “Terms of Reference” of Holbrooke is limited: he has been appointed as “special representative for Afghanistan and Afghanistan.” This remains, as the Foreign Policy reported, “a sharp departure from Obama’s own previously stated approach of engaging India, as well as Pakistan and Afghanistan, in a regional dialogue.” South Asian analysts in Washington noted that it was prudent of the Obama Administration not to include India in Holbrooke’s official mandate, or else the special envoy’s mission could have been a “non-starter.” It might be true that the Obama transition team did not meet with any foreign representatives on the issue, but a meeting of the Aspen group in Washington was attended by some of the Obama team members where it was categorically stated that “India might pre-emptively make Richard Holbrooke persona non grata if his South Asia envoy mandate officially included India or Kashmir.” Among the Obama team members who attended the meeting were former Navy Secretary Richard Danzig; Kurt Campbell, the director of the Aspen Strategy Group who was later named as assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, and former Pentagon official and Harvard University professor, Ashton Carter,.

In conclusion, one might say that it will be prudent of Obama Administration not to meddle in the Kashmir imbroglio, not because India cannot withstand those pressures but because it might avoid an irritant in the otherwise prospering Indo-US bilateral relations. At some level, it can be concluded that India is comfortable with the ‘narrow’ approach towards Kashmir that the US has adopted from time to time, as was done during Kargil. It may not be correct to say that India does not seek US involvement in India-Pakistan issues. India does seek selective US intervention as is being witnessed currently too. After the Mumbai terror attacks, India has been unable to bring Pakistan to cooperate and so sought US intervention to put pressure on Pakistan. However, such intervention can only douse the occasional fire, not settle the matter once and for all.

Military Diplomacy: India needs to use it more effectively in its conduct of diplomcy

Attached is an essay published almost two years ago on the subject. One of the issues looked at closely was the Brahmos jointly developed by India and Russia, presisely for export purposes. Today's newspapers say that both countries are close to final development and testing of the air-launched version of the BrahMos. supersonic cruise missile. Can the two countries look at the prospects of selling these missile to countries of mutual interests to both India and Russia? For instance, Brahmos has generated interest in South Africa, South Korea and Vietnam. Commercial considerations coupled with strategic interests in all of these three countries would be significantly beneficial to India and Russia.



Military diplomacy is generally seen as one of the tools in the conduct of a country’s diplomacy. It should however be noted India has not made much use of it. It is not clear whether this was deliberate or simply a result of bureaucratic and political inertia. Nonetheless, the time has come for India to push the use of military diplomacy aggressively in furthering its own national interests.

Elements of Military Diplomacy
While diplomacy may be broadly defined as the art and practice of conducting a nation’s foreign relations, military diplomacy may be categorised as the conduct of foreign relations by the men in uniform or even the civilian defence ministries. Military diplomacy is also categorised under such heads as defence exchanges to include joint training with the militaries of foreign countries. However, China, which effectively uses military diplomacy, defines it in a narrower sense as “foreign affairs work performed by defence institutions and armed forces.” Yasuhiro, writing on the Chinese military diplomacy, quotes Chinese authors who have differentiated military diplomacy from political or regular diplomacy by stating that military diplomacy is “all diplomatic activities relating to national security and military diplomatic activities.”

Military diplomacy does not differ very much from the regular diplomacy in its content in the sense that it includes visits, meetings, exchanges, negotiations, participating in international conferences, treaty signings and exchanges of diplomatic documents. The difference is that all these would essentially be conducted by men in uniform or otherwise civilians in the defence ministries and that the content would be military-oriented. It should however be noted that these activities would be undertaken in tune with the general foreign and security policy guidelines set by the political leadership, but one that would have strategic and military significance. Broadly, military diplomacy aims at the following: training of one’s own military for any emergency situation, strengthening of ties with other countries, sales of weapons and military technologies, and more importantly establishment of a sphere of influence as also learn a lot about foreign militaries, their way of working, their equipments through direct interaction with such organizations. The exercises would also help in conveying a nation’s security interests/threats to the foreign countries. If one were to look at the recent SCO-China military exercises in August 2007, China announced that it intends to fight the three evils of terrorism, separatism and extremism. Despite the Russian wariness of a rising China, it participated in the exercise. The exercises were also indicative of the Chinese efforts in restraining the US influence in these countries, as also to counter any ‘China threat theory’ that might exist in any of these countries. These exercises would also provide an opportunity to understand other militaries’ organizational ethos, culture, philosophies, strengths and weaknesses and most importantly get a sense of the other military’s modernisation processes.

Facets of Military Diplomacy
The main facets of military diplomacy include strategic level activities that include defence consultations and strategic dialogues, arms transfers, regional activities, including state to state military protocols, opening of military bases, participation in bilateral and multilateral military exercises, professional military education exchanges, including Track 1.5 and Track II dialogues besides cooperation in non-traditional security areas, like sending armed forces to counter-terrorism exercises, UN Peacekeeping operations. Some of the items in military diplomacy include: exchange of military attaches, visits by military delegations, military study abroad, participation in international arms control and disarmament programmes, arms import and export, and military assistance to friendly countries. Military diplomacy also addresses the need to co-opt surrounding countries and certain advanced countries that could become potential threats in the future, and lastly a category of military diplomacy aimed at avoiding conflict.

Military Diplomacy – India
India has been lagging behind in using military diplomacy as an effective tool in its diplomacy. But this has been gradually changing over the last few years. It is important to augment this beyond the traditional level of bilateral joint exercises to include multilateral exercises in our neighbourhood and beyond as well as to engage in arms sales instead of leaving this to our neighbours like Pakistan and China, who are already engaged in such businesses and creating influence in other parts of the world.

Some of the recent actions of India including the participation in the quadrilateral exercises are steps in the right direction. India has also strengthened its bilateral defence ties with some of the Southeast Asian countries including Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam and Singapore. Signing of a defence cooperation pact with Singapore in 2004 has drastically changed the fabric of New Delhi’s defence ties in the region. Similarly post-Tsunami 2004, the Indian Navy was quick to respond, first on its own, sending 35 ships, and later was joined by the US, Japan and Australia for rescue and relief operations in the region. Some of the other steps that India has initiated, which have been critical components of India’s military diplomacy in Southeast Asia, include regular discussions on the safety of sea lanes of communication (SLOC), coordinated patrols, port calls by ships, training of naval officers in Indian military institutions, and intelligence sharing particularly on maritime affairs. At the multilateral level, India joined the first trilateral naval exercises with the US and Japan off Guam, followed by the recent quadrilateral exercises with the US, Japan and Australia.

So far as joint military exercises are concerned, India has not fared too poorly. For example, the Indian Navy has conducted exercises with navies of several friendly countries, including with the French Navy (the Varuna Exercise(s)), the British Navy (the Konkan Exercise(s)), the Russian Navy (the Indra Exercise(s)), the MALABAR series with the US Navy, SIMBEX with the Singapore Navy, Japanese Maritime Self Defense Forces and the Chinese PLA Navy among others. A trilateral naval exercise among the IBSA countries (India, Brazil and South Africa) is proposed to be held in May 2008. Indian ships also made port calls in Israel, Turkey, Egypt, Libya, Greece, Oman, Thailand, Indonesia, Australia, New Zealand, Tonga, South Africa, Kenya, Qatar, UAE, Bahrain and Kuwait during 2005-07.

While New Delhi has made significant progress with joint military exercises, it has to do more in other areas of military diplomacy. Recently, India along with China came in for criticism for its proposed arms sales to Myanmar. India has reiterated that these arms are defensive in nature. Despite the abhorrent nature of the Burmese regime, New Delhi has to go ahead with the deal not so much to increase India’s sphere of influence but to curtail that of Beijing.

Potential for Arms Sales
There are many reasons, including technological and economic, why India should consider foreign arms sales but an important one is to prevent China or Pakistan from gaining an advantage in areas of India’s concern. India should consider selling items such as the Brahmos cruise missile, and the INSAS small arms systems. Regarding Brahmos, since it was jointly developed with Russia, there might be objections from Russia. However, such issues could be sorted out. For instance, Brahmos has generated interest in South Africa, South Korea and Vietnam. Commercial considerations coupled with strategic interests in all of these three countries would be significantly beneficial to India. Similarly, the INSAS small arms systems have evinced interest in some of the smaller western African countries.

Other weapon systems that India could potentially do business with include Dhruv – the Advanced Light Helicopters (ALH). A multi-role new generation helicopter, produced by Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd., it has a variety of capabilities, including heliborne assault, logistic support, casualty evacuation, reconnaissance and training, besides its utility as air observation post. Dhruv was featured at the Paris Air Show in June 2007, where it did see some potential buyers. HAL plans to sell six to Chile and two to Bolivia, and is making a pitch to supply some to Turkey. India also has good ship-building capabilities. Until now, India has been building destroyers though it is also building its own aircraft carrier. India builds whole range of smaller boats, ships, frigates, missile boats, patrol boats, and OPVs. India should identify potential buyers in Southeast Asia and create a niche for itself in this area too.

Among non-lethal weapons, India could possibly sell trucks, other military vehicles and radars. India is already selling trucks to the Malaysian Army; other military vehicles to some African countries and air defence radars – Indra - have been supplied to Sri Lanka. The effectiveness of the Indra radars may be questionable but it could still serve some limited purpose.

Problem Areas
India’s plans to export arms and equipments will be faced with huge problems unless the current export policy is revamped. Between the DGFT and the MOD, India has to finalise on a policy that is attractive enough to sell these weapons systems without much delay and red tapism. Revamping the export policy would also involve updating the Munitions List and the list of the Waasenaar Arrangement.

Conclusion
Military diplomacy, conducted as part of India’s overall diplomacy, will act as a significant catalyst in strengthening its ties with friendly countries. Successive joint military exercises with a range of nations would further deepen the content and form of bilateral ties. India needs to pursue military diplomacy much more aggressively in order to create a strategic space for itself in India’s own neighbourhood, before losing out to Beijing and Islamabad that have been cashing on India’s lethargic approach in this arena. Keeping in mind larger strategic interests and not just commercial ones, India needs to step up arms transfer relations with important countries.

India and US build stronger ties in space

Here's a story on Indo-US space cooperation by Peter Brown that has qouted me extensively. The story appeared in (August 06, '09) the Asia Times Online.



Peter J Brown

New rules for India's space program are now in effect with respect to India's access to United States space technology and components - thanks to a Technology Safeguards Agreement (TSA) signed on July 20 by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and India's Foreign Minister S M Krishna.

However, many are misreading the full scope and impact of this TSA. Yes, the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) is now considerably closer to launching US commercial satellites - as well as European commercial satellites with US components - but ISRO still has a long way to go.

According to a US State Department's Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) notice last month entitled, "Licensing

Satellite Components for Launch from India," this new TSA, "effectively changes US Government policy to permit the launch of civil or non-commercial satellites containing US ITAR [International Traffic In Arms]-controlled components on Indian space launch vehicles.

"For the purposes of this policy, 'civil or non-commercial satellites' does not include commercial satellites [communications or otherwise]. Commercial satellites will continue to be subject to a presumption of denial," the DDTC notice stated.

"Presumption of denial" simply means go ahead and submit a license application for export of a commercial satellite with ITAR content, but do not hold your breath because without a high priority US foreign policy interest - ie, extraordinary circumstances - this application is dead on arrival.

"The export from the US of ITAR parts and components to India for incorporation by India into an Indian space vehicle was permitted prior to execution of the TSA," said John Ordway, a partner at Berliner, Corcoran and Rowe, LLP in Washington, DC.

"If misunderstandings were to arise in the DDTC licensing process following execution of the TSA, they would probably arise over what is civil or non-commercial use of a satellite."

An attempt to clarify matters with Anthony Dearth, the DDTC's chief of the Space and Missile Technology Division, was unsuccessful.

"The TSA will ensure monitoring by the US side against any diversion or misuse of equipment or technology," said Rajeswari Rajagopalan, senior fellow in security studies at the New Delhi-based Observer Research Foundation.

"Negotiations on a possible Indo-US TSA have been underway for the last few years. The US has been insisting on restrictive movement of the payload, constant overseeing and monitoring by the US, and solid firewalls separating civil and military payloads. However, the current agreement is [identical] with what the US has with other countries, [and] is essentially driven by US laws. India did not have much maneuverability in negotiating the details."

According to Rajagopalan, even with this TSA, the profitable market for the launch of US commercial satellites or even third-country commercial satellites with US components remains off limits to India until a separate Commercial Space Launch Agreement (CSLA) is signed. Negotiations continue, but serious differences are not being successfully resolved.

"US communications satellites are part of the US Munitions List [USML], and a separate certification from the US State Department will be required to enable ISRO to launch [them]. The CSLA is still insufficient for some purposes because there is another layer of clearance and certification required," said Rajagopalan.

As David Karl observed in his recent Asia Times Online commentary, "The Clinton trip underscored how the secretary has taken ownership of the India portfolio in the Barack Obama administration, filling an important void at the top levels of the US government that has existed for several years." (See Clinton's India visit a low-key success Asia Times Online, August 5, 2009.)
However, regardless of who owns the India portfolio, many US space companies want the US State Department to be replaced by the US Commerce Department, as they view the latter as more supportive when it comes to commercial satellite exports. These companies also want many existing rules revised if not eliminated entirely, including the removal of commercial satellites from the USML, a measure which is now under consideration by the US Senate after being recently approved by the US House of Representatives.

The new TSA, "represents positive progress in reversing the US's obsolete, arrogant, and counterproductive export control regime. However, much remains to be done, particularly in regard to re-evaluating the classification of space hardware in the context of an overall review of the USML," said Mike Gold, the director of Nevada-based Bigelow Aerospace's Washington DC office and chair of the US Federal Aviation Administration's Export Controls Working Group under the Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee. [1]

However, while India would benefit immensely from this regulatory change, the current legislation on Capitol Hill would still prevent any changes to the USML affecting China.

"Although I understand the politics of the situation, I question the policy of isolation that we are practicing vis-a-vis China, and believe, if nothing else, we need to have a robust discussion as to if this policy is really helping us to achieve our legitimate foreign policy goals," said Gold.

"The legislation does not provide for an ongoing review of the USML or establishing a standing entity to conduct such work. Technology is not static, and, after five years, we will find ourselves with the same problems in terms of the obsolescence of the USML that we are facing today. We must provide for an ongoing review process. Technology will not stop changing, and therefore any finite attempt to review and revise a list like the USML is destined to fail."

Regardless of what happens to the USML, the US government is being constantly pushed and pulled in various directions by different departments which tend to disagree more often than agree on which is the best approach to take in South Asia.

"There has always been internal bickering between various governmental departments - the departments of Defense, Commerce, State, Energy and the National Security Agency - along with big defense [contractors]," said Rajagopalan. "In fact, the Pentagon maintained that the State Department still had a Cold War approach as it relates to its policies to South Asia. On the other hand, the State Department often argued that any arms transfers to India would adversely impact the military balance of the region. Cooperation on space technology could potentially create similar concerns."

According to Sourabh Gupta, senior research associate at Washington, DC-based Samuels International Associates Inc, readers should not underestimate the significance of what took place on July 20.

"Clearly the exchanges between the two countries, rather than the TSA itself, is the more significant factor. The TSA is just an umbrella arrangement that simply opens the door to a host of more specific, contentious but rewarding arrangements," said Gupta. "The exchanges [in the] meantime help build a culture of trust that's value exceeds any one agreement - and can in fact be leveraged across the spectrum of bilateral relations."

"Getting beyond the technology denial regime, imposed by the West ever since [India's] nuclear test in 1974, has been a touchstone of Indian governments ever since - and not merely for enhancing technological competencies," added Gupta.

For one of Ordway's clients based in the United Kingdom, the TSA opens the door to an enticing possibility.

"It means that my UK client that builds remote-sensing satellites that contain ITAR content now can apply for a license from the US State Department to 're-export' such satellites to India for launch on ISRO launch vehicles - again, if the remote-sensing satellites are for civil or non-commercial uses," said Ordway.

"On the other hand, the TSA and DDTC's implementation of the TSA would not permit the launch on an ISRO launch vehicle of a commercial non-US remote-imaging satellite that contains ITAR content."

Besides ISRO, beneficiaries of the TSA might also include any foreign universities that build very small, so-called "pico" satellites with ITAR content, although this is a rare event indeed it would provide an alternative to Russian launch vehicles. It is possible, for example, that the TSA could speed India's deployment of a constellation of small, formation-flying earth observation satellites which would mirror what a few other countries have already placed in orbit.
Still, it is unlikely that US and European commercial satellites will be launched atop ISRO rockets until well into the next decade. Among other things, another potentially enormous political obstacle exists in the form of the Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR).

Despite the fact that none of the 17 large commercial communications satellites which were launched in 2008 flew aboard a US-built rocket - France-based Arianespace accounted for almost half the payloads placed successfully in orbit last year - one cannot rule out the possibility that USTR may intercede on behalf of some US-based launch service providers. So, in addition to the tension between the State and Commerce departments over who might become the primary overseer of US satellite exports, one must also be aware that USTR could erect an unwelcome roadblock in the future, too.

Gupta wants to see more details related to liability, insurance, pricing and intrusive monitoring requirements for space launches.

"[When these details] become more widely known, and very difficult political decisions have to be taken in this regard, a more sobering understanding of what high-technology cooperation entails will likely take hold," said Gupta. "We are already seeing some of these issues rearing themselves in New Delhi by way of the recently signed End-User Monitoring Agreement [EUMA] which is small beer compared to the intrusiveness of a CSLA."

Fireworks apparently erupted in the Indian parliament after the EUMA was signed by India and the US at the same time as the TSA. The opposition walked out after asserting that the EUMA which attempts to address sensitive and potentially defense-related high technology transfers in particular was placing Indian sovereignty in jeopardy. (See, For New Delhi, a week that wasn't, Asia Times Online, July 23)

The opposition argued, among other things, that by granting US inspectors unprecedented authority via the EUMA verification process, that a door was perhaps opening for other governments to possibly pursue the same intrusive approach. Foreign Minister Krishna attempted to assure the opposition that their concerns were off target and not supported by the facts.

Ordway views the process underway as eventually placing India in the same boat as Russia and France (Arianespace), assuming that approval of the CSLA takes place.

"But that will just mean that satellites exported to India will be 'normal' and will have the same rules as satellites exported to Russia and France," said Ordway.

Rajagopalan points out that although ISRO represents the civilian side of Indian space research, the level of advancement has created a certain amount of wariness, and raised potential fears of a possible shift underway at ISRO involving its role in direct support of military space programs. And while China has not responded to the signing of the TSA - or the EUMA - per se, any strengthening or streamlining of relations between India and the US will not be taken lightly.

"Beijing will maintain a strict watch on India's advancing defense/space technological ties with the US, Israel or the European countries. As one of the Chinese internal studies brought out, China will continue to undertake various measures to maintain its current strategic leverage in terms of territory, P-5 membership [the United Nations Security Council], and [participation in] the nuclear club, [while retaining] its important diplomatic advantages through its special relationships with India's neighboring countries," said Rajagopalan.

Greater India-US cooperation in space will likely intensify the competition between India and China over the coming years. If India's space sector suddenly surges ahead as a result, this will do more than lightly annoy Beijing.

"[While] high-technology trade and interaction with the US has an inherent sensitivity and strategic component built into it, it [also] signals that Washington is keen to expand and deepen its strategic ties with India," said Gupta. "And further, to the extent that Beijing remains under de facto high-technology embargoes initiated by the West, [US space cooperation with India] signals that strategic cooperation in highly sensitive sectors continues, at minimum, to remain weighted against Chinese interests."

After all, the TSA has emerged at a time when Japan may soon be making significant adjustments to its military space policies, such as becoming more firmly attached to the East Asian US anti-missile network. The fact that a US company is picking up the pace of its launch activities using a remote launch site on an atoll in the western Pacific cannot go unnoticed either. All of this recent activity must have been assessed carefully by Beijing. Finally, the TSA and the atmosphere surrounding it may also bear directly upon the direction and scope of India-Israel joint operations in space.

"[Although] it might be a bit premature to speak definitively about it, much of recent cooperation has been in the defense and military technologies area - both in platforms and sub-systems. And much of it has been a one-way flow, ie from Jerusalem to New Delhi," said Gupta. "The TSA potentially opens the door to endowing greater depth to India's high-technology sector which, in time, could entail spillover effects in the area of cooperative Israel-India ventures in space. To the extent that TSA also binds the US-India relationship in a greater bond of trust, Washington might also take a more forthcoming view to Indo-Israeli technology-sharing in more sensitive sub-system areas. This will have beneficial implications both on the commercial and military side for India."

Rajagopalan agrees that the TSA will further strengthen and seed India-Israel initiatives, too.

"The two countries have been cooperating in the space sector and in 2008, ISRO launched an Israeli spy satellite. The TSA can establish trilateral cooperation in this arena," said Rajagopalan.

Still, Gupta points to an important domestic dimension to all of this space-related activity in India. One possible snag lurks beneath the surface.

"[The vague sense/hope in India is that] high-technology cooperation will inevitably and tacitly translate on the military side too, particularly on the missile development and space side," said Gupta, who went on to emphasize a possible misunderstanding that looms large here in terms of any ongoing cooperation.

"Washington and the Democratic [Obama] administration are likely to be ultra-careful this time after the experience of the late-1990s vis-a-vis China. There is always the danger that demands for intrusiveness [stemming from] such cooperation with India will be hard to stomach domestically in the rabble that is New Delhi politics."

Note
1. Mike Gold's comments are his own and do not reflect that of the working group.

Peter J Brown is a freelance writer from the state of Maine, USA, who specializes in the global satellite arena.

(Copyright 2009 Asia Times Online)