State of US-China relations will affect Indo-US relations. Neither do we want to see very close relations between the two countries like during the Clinton administration, where they “want to jointly manage south Asia” just as they did post-1998 n-tests. On the other hand, we do not want to see them hostile to each other and get into conflict situations, where India being a neighbor, may be forced to take sides. That could prove dangerous for India. While the two extremes should be avoided, there are increasing concerns about China, its rise, particularly on the military side. The rising profile actually translates into hardline postures adopted by china in various decision-making foras and those decisions are more taking care of china’s national interests reasons than for regional and global issues. Every country will pursue its national interests, but if they are pursued in a short-sighted manner without any regard for other country could be harmful. Here, China’s repeated attempts at curtailing India’s rise could prove a limiting factor in improving the atmospherics of this important bilateral relationship.
China’s hardlining positions in the last few years, clearly a result of its increasing international profile, is creating difficulties for India and other regional players. It has toughened positions on the border issues, Arunachal Pradesh, Tibet issue. China adopted a less than constructive role in the last few years, evident at the September 2008 NSG meeting, post-Mumbai attacks at the UNSC, and most recently at the ADB where it vetoed and withheld its approval on a development loan for India’s northeast Arunachal Pradesh. Such behaviour on the part of china is going to create increasing frictions on the bilateral relations as well as on the emerging Asian strategic framework.
Such concerns on the part of US and India had become the basis for closer indo-US relations in the last few years. In fact, indo-US nuclear deal was the result of such a line of thinking. The more sec concerns with china, the more we will look at the US for closer relationship. How and whether the US reciprocates in another matter. So far it has. But how the Obama administration will look at the China and india is extremely important. Especially under the current circumstances where china and the US are caught in a symbiotic relationship. Their closer ties are bound to have effect on Indo-US relations. However, this is not to suggest that this is a zero sum game, that improvement in one relationship will necessarily lead to complete downturn in the other relationship. It might be correct to say that it will be a negative sum, where a strengthened US-China relationship could slowdown in certain aspects. An improved Indo-US relationship will have negative effect on Sino-India ties as well as a slowdown in US-China relations. Similarly, an improved US-China relations will raise the antenna in New Delhi and could affect both US-India as well as Sino-India relations.
US partnership with China on a range of issues on global governorship, is understandable, from North Korea to Afghanistan and Central Asia to the current economic crisis, but if this relationship is strengthened at the cost of India, it could lead to a slowdown of Indo-US relations. It will also have its ramifications on the emerging Asian security order.
This is not to say that the US does not have any concerns. At least until early this year, these concerns were pretty loud and clear.
At the same time, closer Indo-US partnership – concern for china. India’s rising profile of which Indo-US relations is one aspect, continues to worry China. Although India has never been formally listed as one of the challenges that China faces, it certainly irks them to see a more powerful India in its neighbourhood. As India continues to re-define and modify its foreign and security policies, given its increasing stature in the international arena, it calls for a dynamic debate on how Beijing views this emerging pole.
There have been several analyses pointing out to Chinese concern on a rising India –talking about India’s democratic and capitalist orientations, India’s territorial disputes with China, talking about India having a militaristic and religion-based strategic culture. Similarly, China views India as a “future strategic competitor” that would join any anti-China grouping in the future. In fact, one of the well-known scholars, Mohan Malik brings to the fore an internal study undertaken in 2005 that recommended China to undertake measures to keep the current strategic leverage in terms of territory, P-5 membership, and the Nuclear Club, hold on to diplomatic advantages through its special relationship particularly with India’s neighbouring countries and as also maintain the economic lead over India. This has become evident several times in the recent past, which all is an evidence that China does not willingly accept India's rise on the world stage, nor the prospect of closer US-India ties. However, India’s rising stature is a reality and China has to live with that reality.
Another issue. India’s role and stand on Tibet may be irksome to the Chinese leadership.
China has continued to reiterate its claims on Tibet and thereby Arunachal Pradesh through a series of statements as well as action on the ground by the PLA forces. Chinese leadership’s assertion to choose the next Dalai Lama is another way of pressuring India and Tibet on its claims, because such a step would essentially mean India conceding its access to the Tawang monastery. Article 2 of the Shimla Agreement was categorical to state that China recognizing the autonomous nature of Tibet shall “abstain from interference in the administration of Outer Tibet (including the selection and installation of the Dalai Lama),” which was totally left to the Tibetan government in Lhasa. The recent Chinese interest in the selection of Dalai Lama go against the principles of this treaty. However, China will continue to maintain the stand that it does not recognise this treaty as any valid instrument.
China has unleashed huge economic and infrastructural development programmes in Tibet as part of this larger politico-military objective of systematically killing the spirit of Tibetan nationalism. The new railway line – Qinghai-Tibet line – is being further extended, linking Lhasa with Shigatse and Yadong, near the Sikkim border. Hence, if China has some concerns of India’s strengthening relations with the US and other major powers, India too has concerns of a rising China whose ambitions are not very clear.
Arms control issues: FMCT, CTBT. These are issues that are going to be taken up by the Obama administration before too long. Obama’s renewed interest in getting the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) ratified by the US Senate and thereafter by other countries, including India and Pakistan could become a sore point in bilateral relations. India remains opposed to signing CTBT and this was clarified recently again by India’s envoy on nuclear issues, Ambassador Shyam Saran. He stated that India remained opposed to CTBT because it “was not explicitly linked to the goal of nuclear disarmament.” Additionally, he said, “this was crucial since it was not acceptable to legitimize, in any way, a permanent division between nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states.” Shyam Saran in fact suggested that if abolition of nuclear weapons was an agenda, then both India and the US should establish a working group at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to chart a future direction, which could possibly be a positive and constructive link in the bilateral relations. If Obama administration is willing to look at strengthening Indo-US ties, this could be a positive agenda on the table. Otherwise, this is an area where the US and China will arrive at a common position and that could prove harmful for Indo-US relations. US and China already have similar positions on FMCT.
Terrorism: South Asia is the other area. In fact, the AfPak strategy that has come about, linking Kashmir to the security of Afghanistan, it is not a very palatable situation to India. This is exactly what Pakistan has always sought and it could possibly an area that China too agrees. There again, you have China, US and Pakistan on the same side and this could create setbacks in Indo-US relations.
Thursday, April 16, 2009
A critique of Obama's AfPak strategy
President Barack Obama has called his new AfPak initiative, which he unveiled on March 27, 2009, a stronger, smarter, and comprehensive strategy that aims to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The White Paper brought out three major objectives: removal of al Qaeda’s sanctuary; helping to create an effective democratic government in Pakistan and a self-reliant Afghanistan. The US fear remains that al Qaeda is still actively planning attacks on the US homeland from its safe haven in Pakistan. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Mike Mullen recently noted that it is the Afghan-Pakistan border region that is the ‘site of planning for the next attack’ on the United States. The White House claims that its strategy is well-thought out and well-resourced, although there is no estimate available as to how much it would cost the US or its other allies.
Despite pronouncements that al Qaeda/ Taliban is not the problem of the US alone, but an international problem, it appears that the US has a limited objective – ensuring that the Taliban/ al Qaeda do not use the Pakistan-Afghan territory to carry out terrorism against the US. This could be seen as a long-term objective and in the meantime, the US has to look at a series of short-term issues which can ensure that long-term gain. Is the US really interested in installing a civilian government or undertake nation-building activities in Pakistan or Afghanistan.
The US has emphasised that its relationship with Pakistan is “grounded in support for Pakistan’s democratic institutions and the Pakistan people.” Is that valid for the US that there is a democratic government in Pakistan. The US has dealt with Pakistan military dictators for a long time in the past and has found it convenient to deal with the military leadership than the civilian government who is not control of the army and the ISI. Second, what is the guarantee that the civilian leadership in Pakistan will ensure their goal of eliminating terrorism or that they will not be party sponsoring or supporting terrorism? Benazir Bhutto is a case in point.
Under the new strategy, the US plans to deploy an additional 17,000 troops and another 4,000 that would be essentially for training purposes. These forces are meant to fight Taliban in the south and the east, as also improve the capacity of Afghan forces to go after the terrorists. Military aid for Pakistan would go into training as well as for buying helicopters, night vision equipments and other weapon system needed to fight insurgency in the tribal areas. There is also a provision for non-military aid of $ 1.5bn each year for the next five years to undertake civilian activities. Unless monitored in an effective manner, such funding will find its way into anything and everything other than civilian/ development programmes.
The US spending is supposed to be judged against a set of benchmarks. These benchmarks could be improvements in Afghanistan, better cooperation from Pakistan, and reduced violence in Pakistan and Afghanistan. In this regard, there is funding for a strong Inspector General at the State Department and USAID, who will oversee the spending to ensure accountable spending and avoid wasteful expenditure.
While this is all well and good, there is unease about the new policy. A recent RAND study found that only 7% of terrorist organisations end their activities because they are militarily defeated; the majority will end terror when they become part of a political process. While Obama was correct in saying that terrorism cannot be defeated militarily, the question is how the US or Afghanistan or Pakistan can ensure that these forces are brought into a political process.
Reconciliation with former enemies, the so-called non-violent Taliban, is a possibility that the US is looking at. The Hague Conference brought out clearly that the US will offer an “honourable” form of reconciliation to those Taliban fighters who renounce violence in Afghanistan as part of a revamped strategy to tackle the deepening insurgency. This makes a distinction between those who joined Taliban out of desperation and those who joined out of conviction. The White Paper made a note of exploiting differences among the insurgents “to divide Taliban’s true believers from less committed fighters.” Dennis Blair, now Director of National Intelligence, has indicated something similar. He said that roughly 2/3rd of Taliban are primarily concerned with regional issues and hence can be defeated or co-opted by the Karzai government. This can boost its ability to provide security and services beyond Kabul. But the remaining 1/3rd of the group is under the leadership of Mullah Omar and will be a tough case, because they want power in Afghanistan.
Splitting the Taliban is seen as a tactic in the overall US strategy of defeating Taliban. One way of doing this is to exploit “fractures” or fissures within the Taliban. The US, by working with other Afghans, hopes to assimilate Taliban foot soldiers into the political system. Obama in his interview to NYT suggested that he might do something similar to what was had done in Iraq – peace agreements with Sunni militias in Iraq. However, the situation is much more complex in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Splitting the Taliban is not easy. Not only is doing deals with Taliban more complex but could prove destabilising for Afghanistan. Firstly, as some analysts have brought out, unlike in Iraq, there is a sovereign government in Afghanistan and if at all any deal is done, it should be done by the Karzai government and not the US. This could otherwise prove to be what India did in Sri Lanka in the late 1980s. Second, given that Taliban controls the entire southern belt of Afghanistan, it appears to be on the winning side and no Taliban will be willing to enter into a deal with Karzai or the US at this time. And in the case of Afghanistan, it has been known that tribal groups shift their allegiance depending which side is winning. Third, a deal with Afghan Taliban may not bring much positive results as long as effective command & control comes from Pakistan. In the last few years, when Pakistan has done peace agreements with Taliban, it has been after failure on the part of Pakistan army. Thus, the Taliban has always gained greater control. There is no reason why the results should be different this time. Lastly, the US risks making the same mistake as it did during the 1980s, pumping money to militia groups which, over a period of time, become dangerous and out of control.
Instead of doing deals with these militia groups and Taliban, it might be prudent for the US to strike a deal with Iran, replacing US reliance on Pakistan. The US would be able to use the Iranian port of Chabahar and the Indian-built Zaranj-Delaram highway, which links up to the ring road to Kandahar and Kabul.
Lack of good intelligence is seen as another serious issue. In this regard, Dennis Blair stated that lack of solid intelligence and understanding of Afghanistan at the level of intelligence agencies is be a serious flaw. This intelligence imbalance would hamper Obama Administration’s efforts, especially as it shifts from one theatre to another.
The other issue is whether the Obama administration, given the economic difficulties, will be able to sustain the extended commitments and for how long.
Lastly, should the US be engaged in such activities and is there ground support for the US to engage in such activities? In fact, it has been the presence of US and other foreign troops that has created strong resentment and the resultant growth of radical militia groups in Pakistan.
The new strategy emphasises more on training and thereby increasing the size as well as strengthening of the Afghan Security Forces – the Afghan Army and Police. Every American unit will be partnered with an Afghan unit; this will accelerate as well as strengthen the process of creating a more effective Afghan force (Army of 134,000 and Police of 82,000) by 2011. This is being complimented with civilian activities in fighting corruption, narcotics trade that give way to criminality and funding of insurgency. Besides interdiction, for which Iran has agreed to cooperate, the US has to think of other programmes like crop substitution and alternative livelihood programmes.
While Obama recognises that the US alone will not be able to achieve all these objectives, it is important that the US engages Iran, Russia, China, Japan and India in this regard. Iran has come on board partially, extending help in tackling the huge opium trade in the region, while emphasising its opposition to US and other foreign troops there. Russian position has been that there is a need to combine anti-terror measures with socio-economic measures to rebuild Afghanistan. Russia has expressed its willingness to participate in this effort.
How different is Obama strategy from the strategy followed over the last eight years? Increasing the civilian component and nation-building activity is a new element. Even with such addition, is it significantly different? Despite being a strong critic of Bush’s policies, Obama’s AfPak strategy appears to be a repeat of what President Bush had done in Iraq.
However, be it old or new, what is of concern is the US’ short-sighted policies, be it vis a vis terrorism or WMD proliferation. The US sidelines some of these important goals for minor, but quicker gains vis a vis certain other national security objectives. The way WMD proliferation was sacrificed for the sake of Pakistan’s support against the Soviets in the 1980s is a classic case. This short-sightedness is visible even now - in not going after other terror groups like LeT, JeM, which will in the future be critical threats to US security. Until and unless the US is attacked, they do not see the danger some terrorist groups pose. These approaches have a significant impact on other important bilateral relationships.
One case in point is Indo-US counter-terrorism cooperation. What constitutes terrorism for India has not been considered terrorism by the US. India has been the victim of cross-border terrorism from Pakistan in Kashmir and elsewhere in the north-east, whereas the US looks at Pakistan as a necessary link to prosecute the war against the Taliban and al Qaeda. The US has adopted very short-term approach in dealing with these issues and it will be a folly if India follows the US line. The US needs to formulate long-term strategies which ensure that American policies do not create the conditions that directly or indirectly encourage terrorism. Overlooking terrorism in some parts of the world because it inconveniences other American interests, or pursuing the war on terrorism in an insensitive manner can create problems in the long run.
Matters have become further complicated due to the Indo-Pakistan issues and Pakistan’s continued reliance on cross-border terrorism as state policy. Pakistan had also believed that it can support Kashmiri insurgents against India but that they would not turn against other countries or even Pakistan. Today, Pakistan is faced with this monster and the government appears to be not in full control of the situation. Additionally, Pakistan always made a distinction between terrorism directed against India and terrorism against the US and other western nations. Pakistan was prudent enough to make sure that several of the terrorist groups under its control did not act against US interests, but the terrorist groups grew under the leadership of Al Qaeda and did not appreciate the need to take orders from Pakistan anymore. The September 11 terrorist attacks in the US was one such case. Hence, be it for India or the US, there has to be a clear recognition that Pakistan remains the culprit. And accordingly, India and the US have to take appropriate actions.
Lastly, while there is acknowledgment that Pakistan is the root cause, the calls for constructive diplomacy between India and Pakistan suggests that the Obama administration is still of the view that Kashmir issue is key and resolution of the Kashmir problem will let Pakistan cooperate with the US on war on terror. That explains the Obama Administration’s keenness to mediate and seek a solution to the Kashmir problem. Obama’s comments during interviews to Time magazine in October and December 2008 and the reported consideration (earlier) of former President Bill Clinton as a special envoy on Kashmir had created major stir in the Indian political and policy circles. Obama in his interview said, “We should probably try to facilitate a better understanding between Pakistan and India and try to resolve the Kashmir crisis so that they (Pakistan) can stay focused not on India, but on the situation with those militants.” Some analysts in India have tended to believe that a Kashmir-specific pro-active policy need not necessarily be bad, given Obama’s pro-India statements.
The issue, however, is complicated as Obama believes that solving Kashmir as a pre-requisite for ensuring Pakistan’s support in the war on terror against Taliban and al Qaeda. Linking Afghanistan to the resolution of Kashmir dispute, as brought out in Obama’s interview to Time magazine, is problematic. Such an inclination of linking Afghanistan’s security with terrorism in Kashmir could prove dangerous and India needs to maintain a close watch. The US must retain its attention on the real problem – Pakistan, instead of getting diverted into Kashmir.
Despite pronouncements that al Qaeda/ Taliban is not the problem of the US alone, but an international problem, it appears that the US has a limited objective – ensuring that the Taliban/ al Qaeda do not use the Pakistan-Afghan territory to carry out terrorism against the US. This could be seen as a long-term objective and in the meantime, the US has to look at a series of short-term issues which can ensure that long-term gain. Is the US really interested in installing a civilian government or undertake nation-building activities in Pakistan or Afghanistan.
The US has emphasised that its relationship with Pakistan is “grounded in support for Pakistan’s democratic institutions and the Pakistan people.” Is that valid for the US that there is a democratic government in Pakistan. The US has dealt with Pakistan military dictators for a long time in the past and has found it convenient to deal with the military leadership than the civilian government who is not control of the army and the ISI. Second, what is the guarantee that the civilian leadership in Pakistan will ensure their goal of eliminating terrorism or that they will not be party sponsoring or supporting terrorism? Benazir Bhutto is a case in point.
Under the new strategy, the US plans to deploy an additional 17,000 troops and another 4,000 that would be essentially for training purposes. These forces are meant to fight Taliban in the south and the east, as also improve the capacity of Afghan forces to go after the terrorists. Military aid for Pakistan would go into training as well as for buying helicopters, night vision equipments and other weapon system needed to fight insurgency in the tribal areas. There is also a provision for non-military aid of $ 1.5bn each year for the next five years to undertake civilian activities. Unless monitored in an effective manner, such funding will find its way into anything and everything other than civilian/ development programmes.
The US spending is supposed to be judged against a set of benchmarks. These benchmarks could be improvements in Afghanistan, better cooperation from Pakistan, and reduced violence in Pakistan and Afghanistan. In this regard, there is funding for a strong Inspector General at the State Department and USAID, who will oversee the spending to ensure accountable spending and avoid wasteful expenditure.
While this is all well and good, there is unease about the new policy. A recent RAND study found that only 7% of terrorist organisations end their activities because they are militarily defeated; the majority will end terror when they become part of a political process. While Obama was correct in saying that terrorism cannot be defeated militarily, the question is how the US or Afghanistan or Pakistan can ensure that these forces are brought into a political process.
Reconciliation with former enemies, the so-called non-violent Taliban, is a possibility that the US is looking at. The Hague Conference brought out clearly that the US will offer an “honourable” form of reconciliation to those Taliban fighters who renounce violence in Afghanistan as part of a revamped strategy to tackle the deepening insurgency. This makes a distinction between those who joined Taliban out of desperation and those who joined out of conviction. The White Paper made a note of exploiting differences among the insurgents “to divide Taliban’s true believers from less committed fighters.” Dennis Blair, now Director of National Intelligence, has indicated something similar. He said that roughly 2/3rd of Taliban are primarily concerned with regional issues and hence can be defeated or co-opted by the Karzai government. This can boost its ability to provide security and services beyond Kabul. But the remaining 1/3rd of the group is under the leadership of Mullah Omar and will be a tough case, because they want power in Afghanistan.
Splitting the Taliban is seen as a tactic in the overall US strategy of defeating Taliban. One way of doing this is to exploit “fractures” or fissures within the Taliban. The US, by working with other Afghans, hopes to assimilate Taliban foot soldiers into the political system. Obama in his interview to NYT suggested that he might do something similar to what was had done in Iraq – peace agreements with Sunni militias in Iraq. However, the situation is much more complex in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Splitting the Taliban is not easy. Not only is doing deals with Taliban more complex but could prove destabilising for Afghanistan. Firstly, as some analysts have brought out, unlike in Iraq, there is a sovereign government in Afghanistan and if at all any deal is done, it should be done by the Karzai government and not the US. This could otherwise prove to be what India did in Sri Lanka in the late 1980s. Second, given that Taliban controls the entire southern belt of Afghanistan, it appears to be on the winning side and no Taliban will be willing to enter into a deal with Karzai or the US at this time. And in the case of Afghanistan, it has been known that tribal groups shift their allegiance depending which side is winning. Third, a deal with Afghan Taliban may not bring much positive results as long as effective command & control comes from Pakistan. In the last few years, when Pakistan has done peace agreements with Taliban, it has been after failure on the part of Pakistan army. Thus, the Taliban has always gained greater control. There is no reason why the results should be different this time. Lastly, the US risks making the same mistake as it did during the 1980s, pumping money to militia groups which, over a period of time, become dangerous and out of control.
Instead of doing deals with these militia groups and Taliban, it might be prudent for the US to strike a deal with Iran, replacing US reliance on Pakistan. The US would be able to use the Iranian port of Chabahar and the Indian-built Zaranj-Delaram highway, which links up to the ring road to Kandahar and Kabul.
Lack of good intelligence is seen as another serious issue. In this regard, Dennis Blair stated that lack of solid intelligence and understanding of Afghanistan at the level of intelligence agencies is be a serious flaw. This intelligence imbalance would hamper Obama Administration’s efforts, especially as it shifts from one theatre to another.
The other issue is whether the Obama administration, given the economic difficulties, will be able to sustain the extended commitments and for how long.
Lastly, should the US be engaged in such activities and is there ground support for the US to engage in such activities? In fact, it has been the presence of US and other foreign troops that has created strong resentment and the resultant growth of radical militia groups in Pakistan.
The new strategy emphasises more on training and thereby increasing the size as well as strengthening of the Afghan Security Forces – the Afghan Army and Police. Every American unit will be partnered with an Afghan unit; this will accelerate as well as strengthen the process of creating a more effective Afghan force (Army of 134,000 and Police of 82,000) by 2011. This is being complimented with civilian activities in fighting corruption, narcotics trade that give way to criminality and funding of insurgency. Besides interdiction, for which Iran has agreed to cooperate, the US has to think of other programmes like crop substitution and alternative livelihood programmes.
While Obama recognises that the US alone will not be able to achieve all these objectives, it is important that the US engages Iran, Russia, China, Japan and India in this regard. Iran has come on board partially, extending help in tackling the huge opium trade in the region, while emphasising its opposition to US and other foreign troops there. Russian position has been that there is a need to combine anti-terror measures with socio-economic measures to rebuild Afghanistan. Russia has expressed its willingness to participate in this effort.
How different is Obama strategy from the strategy followed over the last eight years? Increasing the civilian component and nation-building activity is a new element. Even with such addition, is it significantly different? Despite being a strong critic of Bush’s policies, Obama’s AfPak strategy appears to be a repeat of what President Bush had done in Iraq.
However, be it old or new, what is of concern is the US’ short-sighted policies, be it vis a vis terrorism or WMD proliferation. The US sidelines some of these important goals for minor, but quicker gains vis a vis certain other national security objectives. The way WMD proliferation was sacrificed for the sake of Pakistan’s support against the Soviets in the 1980s is a classic case. This short-sightedness is visible even now - in not going after other terror groups like LeT, JeM, which will in the future be critical threats to US security. Until and unless the US is attacked, they do not see the danger some terrorist groups pose. These approaches have a significant impact on other important bilateral relationships.
One case in point is Indo-US counter-terrorism cooperation. What constitutes terrorism for India has not been considered terrorism by the US. India has been the victim of cross-border terrorism from Pakistan in Kashmir and elsewhere in the north-east, whereas the US looks at Pakistan as a necessary link to prosecute the war against the Taliban and al Qaeda. The US has adopted very short-term approach in dealing with these issues and it will be a folly if India follows the US line. The US needs to formulate long-term strategies which ensure that American policies do not create the conditions that directly or indirectly encourage terrorism. Overlooking terrorism in some parts of the world because it inconveniences other American interests, or pursuing the war on terrorism in an insensitive manner can create problems in the long run.
Matters have become further complicated due to the Indo-Pakistan issues and Pakistan’s continued reliance on cross-border terrorism as state policy. Pakistan had also believed that it can support Kashmiri insurgents against India but that they would not turn against other countries or even Pakistan. Today, Pakistan is faced with this monster and the government appears to be not in full control of the situation. Additionally, Pakistan always made a distinction between terrorism directed against India and terrorism against the US and other western nations. Pakistan was prudent enough to make sure that several of the terrorist groups under its control did not act against US interests, but the terrorist groups grew under the leadership of Al Qaeda and did not appreciate the need to take orders from Pakistan anymore. The September 11 terrorist attacks in the US was one such case. Hence, be it for India or the US, there has to be a clear recognition that Pakistan remains the culprit. And accordingly, India and the US have to take appropriate actions.
Lastly, while there is acknowledgment that Pakistan is the root cause, the calls for constructive diplomacy between India and Pakistan suggests that the Obama administration is still of the view that Kashmir issue is key and resolution of the Kashmir problem will let Pakistan cooperate with the US on war on terror. That explains the Obama Administration’s keenness to mediate and seek a solution to the Kashmir problem. Obama’s comments during interviews to Time magazine in October and December 2008 and the reported consideration (earlier) of former President Bill Clinton as a special envoy on Kashmir had created major stir in the Indian political and policy circles. Obama in his interview said, “We should probably try to facilitate a better understanding between Pakistan and India and try to resolve the Kashmir crisis so that they (Pakistan) can stay focused not on India, but on the situation with those militants.” Some analysts in India have tended to believe that a Kashmir-specific pro-active policy need not necessarily be bad, given Obama’s pro-India statements.
The issue, however, is complicated as Obama believes that solving Kashmir as a pre-requisite for ensuring Pakistan’s support in the war on terror against Taliban and al Qaeda. Linking Afghanistan to the resolution of Kashmir dispute, as brought out in Obama’s interview to Time magazine, is problematic. Such an inclination of linking Afghanistan’s security with terrorism in Kashmir could prove dangerous and India needs to maintain a close watch. The US must retain its attention on the real problem – Pakistan, instead of getting diverted into Kashmir.
Tuesday, April 7, 2009
Sri Lanka Presents India Five Challenges
This analysis on Indian Challenges vis a vis Sri Lanka appeared first on the ORF website.
While most people in India would not be unhappy to see the Tamil Tigers, and particularly their boss, Vellupillai Prabhakaran, get their comeuppance, the situation does present some complications. New Delhi’s boilerplate declarations about a ‘peaceful solution acceptable to all’ mask the serious challenges that India faces as Colombo prepares for the final push against the Tigers.
New Delhi faces five challenges. First, it is deeply concerned over the spill over effects of the ethnic conflict in terms of the refugee inflow into the Indian mainland and the political ramifications in Tamil Nadu and other parts of India. Escalation of the conflict has resulted in the exodus of more than 20,000 Sri Lankan Tamil refugees into India in the last two years. But this has tapered off over the last few months. It appears for the time being that Tamil civilians who are caught in the conflict are staying put in Sri Lanka as they are in restricted camps set up by the Sri Lankan government. Increased vigil on the India-Sri Lanka coastlines is also dissuading some. However, this situation may change if Colombo does not come out with a political solution once the military operations are over.
The second serious challenge is LTTE operations in and around India. LTTE activities in the Palk Bay are one cause for concern for India as Indian fishermen are often caught in the crossfire between the Sri Lankan Navy and the Sea Tigers. Another issue is that of LTTE sleeper cells in Tamil Nadu and possibly elsewhere. Most importantly, if the LTTE is defeated in Sri Lanka’s North East, they might want to continue the fight from Tamil Nadu, where they have a support base. This could, without doubt, have spillover effects on nascent Tamil nationalist movements in Tamil Nadu.
Third, the impact on Tamil Nadu politics could be significant. LTTE sympathisers, especially those active in Tamil Nadu politics, have already exploited the situation. Fear of agitation by these groups has meant that the Indian government has so far sent only relief and medical supplies to Sri Lanka. Despite requests from the Sri Lankan government for defense items, India has not supplied anything, though the Indian position has been to quietly support the Rajapakse Government. While it may be too early to say what effect the anger and resentment in Tamil Nadu will have on New Delhi, it could affect the formation of the next coalition government in Delhi. The loser in such coalition-building exercise would have an interest in stoking tensions.
The fourth challenge is of other countries meddling in Sri Lanka. India’s refusal to supply defence items to Colombo has forced it to look to Pakistan and China. Increasing defence cooperation between these countries would have adverse security implications for India. Pakistan has emerged as a major supplier of defence items, including tanks and light weapons. Additionally, Pakistani pilots are thought to have flown some of the precision strikes against the LTTE leadership. Pakistan has also been seeking to exploit the presence of the Muslim population in Sri Lanka’s East, building mosques in the region and activating fundamentalist groups there.
The increasing Chinese links with Sri Lanka are also not in Indian security interests. China is engaged in a series of infrastructure and port development projects in Sri Lanka. Of most consequence is the development of the Hambantota port, where China could possibly set up listening-posts that could be activated in times of conflict in the future. The second aspect relates to China’s defence cooperation with Sri Lanka. The warehouse of the Chinese arms supplier, Norinco, in Galle is a case in point. Sri Lanka has a credit line and its forces are permitted to take items from the warehouse as and when they need it. Lastly, there is a trilateral partnership between Sri Lanka, Pakistan and China, which is detrimental to Indian interests. The commonality of defence equipment among them has increased defence interaction between them.
Because of the election season in India, it is unlikely that New Delhi will take major initiatives. Post-election coalition politics is also likely to affect Indian options. However things turn out in New Delhi, the next Indian administration will have some serious challenges to face in Sri Lanka.
Wednesday, January 28, 2009
Chinese Defence White Paper: Highlights
This analysis on the Chinese defence White Paper first appeared on the ORF website.
China released its latest defence white paper titled, “China’s National Defense in 2008” on January 21, 2009. While categorical and specific about the threats and challenges that China faces today, it says that there are “long-term and complicated threats” that are more general. The long-term challenges cover all aspects: “existence security” and development security, traditional security threats and non-traditional security threats, and domestic security and international security which the report sees as interdependent in nature. The specific challenges that are highlighted include Taiwan, East Turkistan and Tibet, all issues of Chinese national integration. Ministry of Defense Spokesman Colonel Hu Changming, while releasing the report stated that the separatist moves by these three forces “form a major security threat to the unity of the nation and a challenge to our security organs,” and in the case of Taiwan, the issue is further complicated by US arms sales, which China opposes vehemently.
The white paper outlines that China is “pursuing an independent foreign policy of peace and a national defense policy solely aimed at protecting its territory and people, and endeavouring to build, together with other countries, a harmonious world of enduring peace and common prosperity.” The report also makes the point that while major powers are increasing the level of cooperation and drawing on each other’s strengths, they continue “to compete with and hold each other in check.” Identifying the challenges and difficulties, it says that there is an intensification of struggle for strategic resources, strategic locations and strategic dominance, along with hegemonism and power politics continuing with new power blocs emerging.
China continues to reiterate that its defence policy is purely defensive in nature, although it contradicts itself to state that it implements a military strategy of active defense.[1] According to the report, China formulated a military strategic guideline of active defense keeping in tune with the changes in international security as well as the concepts of warfare. One China scholar, Andrew Scobell, describes the Chinese strategic culture as a result of the “interplay between Confucian and Realpolitik strands.”[2] He in fact has coined the term “Cult of Defense” in which the Chinese elites believe that their country is pacifist, non-expansionist and purely defensive, but simultaneously be able to justify any use of force, including offensive and pre-emptive strikes and consider them defensive in nature. The aspect of offensive operations is another evidence of the continued relevance of Sun Tzu’s in the Chinese military strategy.[3]
Some of the key aspects highlighted in the white paper are informationization, training and jointness.
According to the report, informationization of the Chinese defense and armed forces is a key goal for China, for which it actively promotes the RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs) with Chinese characteristics. Making national defense building an “organic part of its social and economic development,” China is making efforts to balance between social & economic development and the military needs and in fact making the military and civilian forces compatible with and beneficial to each other, particularly in peacetime. China also has strategized plans to “lay a solid foundation” in its endeavour towards “national defense and armed forces building,” complete mechanization process and make significant progress towards informationization by 2020, and achieve a scale of modernisation of their forces by the middle of the century.[4] As part of reforming the PLA, China believes that it is essential to accelerate the processes of mechanization and informationization, improve training under conditions of informationization, advance innovation in military theory, technology, organisation and management, continuously increase core military capability of winning local wars under conditions of informationization as well as strengthening the capability to conduct MOOTW (military operations other than war). MOOTW has been introduced as an important “form of applying national military forces”; this would particularly be important under the concept of local wars in an informationalized scenario.
Training has been given particular emphasis in augmenting the overall fighting capabilities of the forces. In this regard, China reiterates the need to intensify strategic- and operational-level command post training and training in conditions of informationization, night training, integrated exercises for logistical and equipment support, on-base training and simulated training, web-based training, training with opposing players and training complex electromagnetic environments. The training evaluation mechanism as well as the standards of training is reported to have been improved. Training for jointness and on informationized platforms is seen as the key.
Logistics reform is another area that has been highlighted in the white paper. Upgradation of the logistical support and deepening the logistics reform are important objectives in this regard. Carrying it to the next level, the Jinan (Military) Theater in April 2007 formally adopted the joint logistics system based on the integration of tri-service logistical support. The leadership clearly sees the crucial importance of this in achieving tri-service integration and jointness in their operations. Maintaining that integrated joint operations are the way of the future, the PLA has established an army equipment system with high mobility and three-dimensional assault, a naval equipment system with integrated sea-air capabilities for offshore defensive operations, an air force equipment system with integrated air-land capabilities for both offensive and defensive operations, a surface-to-surface missile equipment system for the Second Artillery Force with both nuclear and conventional missiles, and an electronic information equipment system featuring systems integration and joint development. The white paper states that progress has been achieved in the field of command and control systems for integrated joint operations, which has improved the capability of battlefield information support in a significant manner. Main battle weapon systems are believed to have been informationized to a great extent, with particular focus on rapid detection, target location, friend-or-foe identification and precision strikes.[5]
China has also focused on the upgradation of weapons and equipment systems, with emphasis on MOOTW. PLA has been building new types of submarines, destroyers, frigates and aircraft, forming a preliminary weaponry and equipment system with second-generation equipment as the core and the third generation as the backbone. According to the report, the submarine force has underwater anti-ship, anti-submarine and mine-laying capabilities, as well as some nuclear counterattack capabilities. The surface ship force has developed a surface striking force represented by new types of missile destroyers and frigates, and has maritime reconnaissance, anti-ship, anti-submarine, air-defense, mine-laying and other operational capabilities. The aviation wing has developed an air striking force represented by sea-attack aircraft, and possesses reconnaissance, anti-ship, anti-submarine and air-defense operational capabilities. The Marine Corps has developed an amphibious operational force represented by amphibious armoured vehicles, and possesses amphibious operational capabilities.[6] Lastly, the coastal defense force is represented by new types of shore-to-ship missiles and possesses high coastal defense operations capability. China has also been building new ship bases, berthing areas, supply points, docks and airfields. Recently, a new naval base was discovered in Sanya on Hainan Island, which could house a large fleet of surface warships, and also serve as an underground base for submarines. The location is indeed critical as it will let China extend a greater influence in the South China Sea area besides allowing it greater access to the critical Straits of Malacca, while enabling China to have a larger naval presence closer to important sea lanes.[7] This development has certainly upped the ante for several countries including Japan, South Korea, India and the US. Housing of nuclear and non-nuclear submarines in Sanya, so close to the ASEAN region will also go against the 1996 Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty.
As a rising superpower, China can be expected eventually to seek sufficient capabilities for a sea control strategy, but clearly, China is decades away from such capabilities. The continued significance of an aircraft carrier[8] in the PLA’s strategic thinking comes out essentially from its objectives of sea control and sea denial as also the recognition that air superiority is essential in future combat, besides for power projection purposes, which was evident when PLA officials told visiting US Commanders that “there is no more prominent and visible signal of a nation’s resolve and might than an aircraft carrier coming into a port.”[9]
Similar has been the efforts made by the ground forces, moving from regional defense to trans-regional mobility, making its units small, modular and multi-functional and has stepped up the development of aviation, light mechanised and information countermeasure forces, prioritised the development of operational and tactical missile, ground-to-air missiles, in order to improve capabilities for air-ground integrated operations, long distance manoeuvres, rapid assaults and special operations. In a similar manner, the Air Force has been improving its equipment and weapon systems, with the development of new types of fighters, air and anti-missile defense weapons, and command automation systems, which will increase the air forces’s capability to undertake both offensive and defensive operations. Lastly, the most important arm of the PLA, the Second Artillery Force too has kept up with upgradation, logistical reforms and innovations, suited to informationized warfare.
While China reiterates that it is separatism – Taiwan, East Turkistan and Tibet -- that is the major challenge, its concepts of warfare and capability upgradation go well beyond meeting these challenges. The report once again highlights the Chinese intention to become a global power by the middle of the century.
[1] Mao’s People War and Deng Xiaoping’s local war concepts continue to be guiding factors in China’s military strategy even as it modernizes its forces. The white paper states, “China is striving to make innovations in the content and forms of people’s war, exploring new approaches of the people in participating in warfare and support for the front, and developing new strategies and tactics for people’s war in conditions of informationization.” Themes like active defense and local wars also have been modified keeping in tune with the changes in modern warfare. Even while modernizing its warfare concepts, China continues to emphasize the “people” aspect, saying that “China always relies on the people to build national defense and the armed forces, combines a lean standing force with a powerful reserve force.” Significant changes were brought in the Chinese military strategy after the 1991 Gulf War where the PLA recognised the importance of fighting a ‘modern war under high technology conditions.’ See, Y. Ji, “The Revolution in Military Affairs and the Evolution of China’s Strategic Thinking,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 21, no. 3, December 1999, p. 353, cited in Dennis Woodward, “The People’s Liberation Army: a Threat to India?,” Contemporary South Asia, vol. 12, no. 2, June 2003, p. 231.
[2] Andrew Scobell, “China and Strategic Culture” (Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College: Carlisle, PA, May 2002), available at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub60.pdf.
[3] Sun Tzu in his Art of War stated, “Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; ability to defeat the enemy means taking the offensive.” See, Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Foreword by James Clavell (London: Hodder and Stoughton Ltd, 1981), p. 23.
[4] Chinese military is the world’s largest military force, with the largest standing army (approx. 2.25 million strong), with well-established five wings – PLA Army, PLA Navy, PLA Air Force, Second Artillery Corps and PLA Reserved Force. Chinese defence expenditure for 2008 stood at 417.77 billion yuan, which is a rise of 62.379 billion yuan from the previous year’s actual spending, a 17.6 per cent increase. China is the world’s fourth largest military spender after the US, UK, and France, but in PPP terms (which is more relevant), China stands second at $188.2 bn after the US which spends $528.7 bn. Consistent with global changes taking place in defence science & technology and weaponry, Chinese military has maintained the pace in its modernisation too. Yet, China believes that it will be able to lay a strong foundation only by 2010.
[5] These have become of particular focus to the Chinese since the first Gulf War. Some of their tanks, artillery pieces, ships and aircraft are believed to be informationized, new types of informationized platforms are being developed and the ratio and number of precision-guided munitions are also on the rise. China, since 1991, has been in the process of development/procurement of precision-guided weapons, improvement of command and control structures as well as the non-conventional methods of warfare like electronic warfare, use of ultra-sonic weapons, laser weapons, stealth weapons, ultrahigh frequency weapons, and electromagnetic guns. The PLA is also believed to be designing a three-tier (land, sea and air) defence system for “outer detection and implicit warning, intermediate interception, and inner denial, including the lethal use of force against intruders.” See, Kenneth Lieberthal, “How Domestic Forces Shape the PRC’s Grand Strategy and International Impact,” Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills (Eds.), Strategic Asia 2007-08 (Washington D.C.: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2007), p.61.
[6] China has improved its amphibious capabilities in the recent years, with Beijing conducting more than a dozen such exercises in the last decade or so, with several exercises focusing on a Taiwan scenario. Given the logistics-intensive nature of these operations, and the need to have air and sea superiority, the probability of the Chinese venturing into amphibious operations against the Taiwanese is unlikely. However, the fact remains that China has significantly beefed up its capabilities in this regard.
[7] The new satellite images that are available now reveal cave openings around the Sanya base that can house up to at least eight submarines. It is also believed that there is space for a supported underground structure that could have more than 20 submarines. See, Richard Fisher, Jr., “China’s Naval Secrets,” Asian Wall Street Journal, May 05, 2008, available at http://www.strategycenter.net/printVersion/print_pub.asp?pubID=185. See also, “Japan urges greater Chinese transparency on military plans,” AFP, May 31, 2008, available at http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5gjnjcMWGDOTstNWHZOU8dwzg7nYw.
[8] There were media reports towards the middle of 2007 that China had given contracts to few Chinese companies for the development of systems and components for the aircraft carrier. Further, towards the end of the year, there was another media report, citing Xu Guangyu, an analyst and director of the government-backed China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, saying that it has almost been decided that the Chinese navy will build aircraft carriers. See, “China: Construction of An Aircraft Carrier,” ABC Radio Australia, July 11, 2007, available at http://www.abc.net.au/ra/connectasia/stories/s1975537.htm and http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20071111/news_1n11chinashp.html. Earlier, in 1997, Hong Kong media had reported Chinese plans to acquire a smaller aircraft carrier, rather than a large carrier. Later in 1999, the media reported that the Chinese leadership had essentially sanctioned Y 250 million for two carrier, estimated to be completed by 2009, with a displacement of 48,000 tons and could carry 24 Su-27Ks. However, it appears that these were speculations made on the basis of the arrival of a partially finished ex-Soviet carrier, the ‘Varyag’ at a Dalian shipyard. See, Sibapada Rath, “China’s Tryst with Aircraft Carrier,” Naval Despatch, December 2005, p. 37.
[9] Tim Johnson, “Aircraft Carriers on Horizon for China?,” November 11, 2007, available at http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20071111/news_1n11chinashp.html.
China released its latest defence white paper titled, “China’s National Defense in 2008” on January 21, 2009. While categorical and specific about the threats and challenges that China faces today, it says that there are “long-term and complicated threats” that are more general. The long-term challenges cover all aspects: “existence security” and development security, traditional security threats and non-traditional security threats, and domestic security and international security which the report sees as interdependent in nature. The specific challenges that are highlighted include Taiwan, East Turkistan and Tibet, all issues of Chinese national integration. Ministry of Defense Spokesman Colonel Hu Changming, while releasing the report stated that the separatist moves by these three forces “form a major security threat to the unity of the nation and a challenge to our security organs,” and in the case of Taiwan, the issue is further complicated by US arms sales, which China opposes vehemently.
The white paper outlines that China is “pursuing an independent foreign policy of peace and a national defense policy solely aimed at protecting its territory and people, and endeavouring to build, together with other countries, a harmonious world of enduring peace and common prosperity.” The report also makes the point that while major powers are increasing the level of cooperation and drawing on each other’s strengths, they continue “to compete with and hold each other in check.” Identifying the challenges and difficulties, it says that there is an intensification of struggle for strategic resources, strategic locations and strategic dominance, along with hegemonism and power politics continuing with new power blocs emerging.
China continues to reiterate that its defence policy is purely defensive in nature, although it contradicts itself to state that it implements a military strategy of active defense.[1] According to the report, China formulated a military strategic guideline of active defense keeping in tune with the changes in international security as well as the concepts of warfare. One China scholar, Andrew Scobell, describes the Chinese strategic culture as a result of the “interplay between Confucian and Realpolitik strands.”[2] He in fact has coined the term “Cult of Defense” in which the Chinese elites believe that their country is pacifist, non-expansionist and purely defensive, but simultaneously be able to justify any use of force, including offensive and pre-emptive strikes and consider them defensive in nature. The aspect of offensive operations is another evidence of the continued relevance of Sun Tzu’s in the Chinese military strategy.[3]
Some of the key aspects highlighted in the white paper are informationization, training and jointness.
According to the report, informationization of the Chinese defense and armed forces is a key goal for China, for which it actively promotes the RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs) with Chinese characteristics. Making national defense building an “organic part of its social and economic development,” China is making efforts to balance between social & economic development and the military needs and in fact making the military and civilian forces compatible with and beneficial to each other, particularly in peacetime. China also has strategized plans to “lay a solid foundation” in its endeavour towards “national defense and armed forces building,” complete mechanization process and make significant progress towards informationization by 2020, and achieve a scale of modernisation of their forces by the middle of the century.[4] As part of reforming the PLA, China believes that it is essential to accelerate the processes of mechanization and informationization, improve training under conditions of informationization, advance innovation in military theory, technology, organisation and management, continuously increase core military capability of winning local wars under conditions of informationization as well as strengthening the capability to conduct MOOTW (military operations other than war). MOOTW has been introduced as an important “form of applying national military forces”; this would particularly be important under the concept of local wars in an informationalized scenario.
Training has been given particular emphasis in augmenting the overall fighting capabilities of the forces. In this regard, China reiterates the need to intensify strategic- and operational-level command post training and training in conditions of informationization, night training, integrated exercises for logistical and equipment support, on-base training and simulated training, web-based training, training with opposing players and training complex electromagnetic environments. The training evaluation mechanism as well as the standards of training is reported to have been improved. Training for jointness and on informationized platforms is seen as the key.
Logistics reform is another area that has been highlighted in the white paper. Upgradation of the logistical support and deepening the logistics reform are important objectives in this regard. Carrying it to the next level, the Jinan (Military) Theater in April 2007 formally adopted the joint logistics system based on the integration of tri-service logistical support. The leadership clearly sees the crucial importance of this in achieving tri-service integration and jointness in their operations. Maintaining that integrated joint operations are the way of the future, the PLA has established an army equipment system with high mobility and three-dimensional assault, a naval equipment system with integrated sea-air capabilities for offshore defensive operations, an air force equipment system with integrated air-land capabilities for both offensive and defensive operations, a surface-to-surface missile equipment system for the Second Artillery Force with both nuclear and conventional missiles, and an electronic information equipment system featuring systems integration and joint development. The white paper states that progress has been achieved in the field of command and control systems for integrated joint operations, which has improved the capability of battlefield information support in a significant manner. Main battle weapon systems are believed to have been informationized to a great extent, with particular focus on rapid detection, target location, friend-or-foe identification and precision strikes.[5]
China has also focused on the upgradation of weapons and equipment systems, with emphasis on MOOTW. PLA has been building new types of submarines, destroyers, frigates and aircraft, forming a preliminary weaponry and equipment system with second-generation equipment as the core and the third generation as the backbone. According to the report, the submarine force has underwater anti-ship, anti-submarine and mine-laying capabilities, as well as some nuclear counterattack capabilities. The surface ship force has developed a surface striking force represented by new types of missile destroyers and frigates, and has maritime reconnaissance, anti-ship, anti-submarine, air-defense, mine-laying and other operational capabilities. The aviation wing has developed an air striking force represented by sea-attack aircraft, and possesses reconnaissance, anti-ship, anti-submarine and air-defense operational capabilities. The Marine Corps has developed an amphibious operational force represented by amphibious armoured vehicles, and possesses amphibious operational capabilities.[6] Lastly, the coastal defense force is represented by new types of shore-to-ship missiles and possesses high coastal defense operations capability. China has also been building new ship bases, berthing areas, supply points, docks and airfields. Recently, a new naval base was discovered in Sanya on Hainan Island, which could house a large fleet of surface warships, and also serve as an underground base for submarines. The location is indeed critical as it will let China extend a greater influence in the South China Sea area besides allowing it greater access to the critical Straits of Malacca, while enabling China to have a larger naval presence closer to important sea lanes.[7] This development has certainly upped the ante for several countries including Japan, South Korea, India and the US. Housing of nuclear and non-nuclear submarines in Sanya, so close to the ASEAN region will also go against the 1996 Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty.
As a rising superpower, China can be expected eventually to seek sufficient capabilities for a sea control strategy, but clearly, China is decades away from such capabilities. The continued significance of an aircraft carrier[8] in the PLA’s strategic thinking comes out essentially from its objectives of sea control and sea denial as also the recognition that air superiority is essential in future combat, besides for power projection purposes, which was evident when PLA officials told visiting US Commanders that “there is no more prominent and visible signal of a nation’s resolve and might than an aircraft carrier coming into a port.”[9]
Similar has been the efforts made by the ground forces, moving from regional defense to trans-regional mobility, making its units small, modular and multi-functional and has stepped up the development of aviation, light mechanised and information countermeasure forces, prioritised the development of operational and tactical missile, ground-to-air missiles, in order to improve capabilities for air-ground integrated operations, long distance manoeuvres, rapid assaults and special operations. In a similar manner, the Air Force has been improving its equipment and weapon systems, with the development of new types of fighters, air and anti-missile defense weapons, and command automation systems, which will increase the air forces’s capability to undertake both offensive and defensive operations. Lastly, the most important arm of the PLA, the Second Artillery Force too has kept up with upgradation, logistical reforms and innovations, suited to informationized warfare.
While China reiterates that it is separatism – Taiwan, East Turkistan and Tibet -- that is the major challenge, its concepts of warfare and capability upgradation go well beyond meeting these challenges. The report once again highlights the Chinese intention to become a global power by the middle of the century.
[1] Mao’s People War and Deng Xiaoping’s local war concepts continue to be guiding factors in China’s military strategy even as it modernizes its forces. The white paper states, “China is striving to make innovations in the content and forms of people’s war, exploring new approaches of the people in participating in warfare and support for the front, and developing new strategies and tactics for people’s war in conditions of informationization.” Themes like active defense and local wars also have been modified keeping in tune with the changes in modern warfare. Even while modernizing its warfare concepts, China continues to emphasize the “people” aspect, saying that “China always relies on the people to build national defense and the armed forces, combines a lean standing force with a powerful reserve force.” Significant changes were brought in the Chinese military strategy after the 1991 Gulf War where the PLA recognised the importance of fighting a ‘modern war under high technology conditions.’ See, Y. Ji, “The Revolution in Military Affairs and the Evolution of China’s Strategic Thinking,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 21, no. 3, December 1999, p. 353, cited in Dennis Woodward, “The People’s Liberation Army: a Threat to India?,” Contemporary South Asia, vol. 12, no. 2, June 2003, p. 231.
[2] Andrew Scobell, “China and Strategic Culture” (Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College: Carlisle, PA, May 2002), available at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub60.pdf.
[3] Sun Tzu in his Art of War stated, “Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; ability to defeat the enemy means taking the offensive.” See, Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Foreword by James Clavell (London: Hodder and Stoughton Ltd, 1981), p. 23.
[4] Chinese military is the world’s largest military force, with the largest standing army (approx. 2.25 million strong), with well-established five wings – PLA Army, PLA Navy, PLA Air Force, Second Artillery Corps and PLA Reserved Force. Chinese defence expenditure for 2008 stood at 417.77 billion yuan, which is a rise of 62.379 billion yuan from the previous year’s actual spending, a 17.6 per cent increase. China is the world’s fourth largest military spender after the US, UK, and France, but in PPP terms (which is more relevant), China stands second at $188.2 bn after the US which spends $528.7 bn. Consistent with global changes taking place in defence science & technology and weaponry, Chinese military has maintained the pace in its modernisation too. Yet, China believes that it will be able to lay a strong foundation only by 2010.
[5] These have become of particular focus to the Chinese since the first Gulf War. Some of their tanks, artillery pieces, ships and aircraft are believed to be informationized, new types of informationized platforms are being developed and the ratio and number of precision-guided munitions are also on the rise. China, since 1991, has been in the process of development/procurement of precision-guided weapons, improvement of command and control structures as well as the non-conventional methods of warfare like electronic warfare, use of ultra-sonic weapons, laser weapons, stealth weapons, ultrahigh frequency weapons, and electromagnetic guns. The PLA is also believed to be designing a three-tier (land, sea and air) defence system for “outer detection and implicit warning, intermediate interception, and inner denial, including the lethal use of force against intruders.” See, Kenneth Lieberthal, “How Domestic Forces Shape the PRC’s Grand Strategy and International Impact,” Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills (Eds.), Strategic Asia 2007-08 (Washington D.C.: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2007), p.61.
[6] China has improved its amphibious capabilities in the recent years, with Beijing conducting more than a dozen such exercises in the last decade or so, with several exercises focusing on a Taiwan scenario. Given the logistics-intensive nature of these operations, and the need to have air and sea superiority, the probability of the Chinese venturing into amphibious operations against the Taiwanese is unlikely. However, the fact remains that China has significantly beefed up its capabilities in this regard.
[7] The new satellite images that are available now reveal cave openings around the Sanya base that can house up to at least eight submarines. It is also believed that there is space for a supported underground structure that could have more than 20 submarines. See, Richard Fisher, Jr., “China’s Naval Secrets,” Asian Wall Street Journal, May 05, 2008, available at http://www.strategycenter.net/printVersion/print_pub.asp?pubID=185. See also, “Japan urges greater Chinese transparency on military plans,” AFP, May 31, 2008, available at http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5gjnjcMWGDOTstNWHZOU8dwzg7nYw.
[8] There were media reports towards the middle of 2007 that China had given contracts to few Chinese companies for the development of systems and components for the aircraft carrier. Further, towards the end of the year, there was another media report, citing Xu Guangyu, an analyst and director of the government-backed China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, saying that it has almost been decided that the Chinese navy will build aircraft carriers. See, “China: Construction of An Aircraft Carrier,” ABC Radio Australia, July 11, 2007, available at http://www.abc.net.au/ra/connectasia/stories/s1975537.htm and http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20071111/news_1n11chinashp.html. Earlier, in 1997, Hong Kong media had reported Chinese plans to acquire a smaller aircraft carrier, rather than a large carrier. Later in 1999, the media reported that the Chinese leadership had essentially sanctioned Y 250 million for two carrier, estimated to be completed by 2009, with a displacement of 48,000 tons and could carry 24 Su-27Ks. However, it appears that these were speculations made on the basis of the arrival of a partially finished ex-Soviet carrier, the ‘Varyag’ at a Dalian shipyard. See, Sibapada Rath, “China’s Tryst with Aircraft Carrier,” Naval Despatch, December 2005, p. 37.
[9] Tim Johnson, “Aircraft Carriers on Horizon for China?,” November 11, 2007, available at http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20071111/news_1n11chinashp.html.
Tuesday, January 27, 2009
Obama and India
This analysis on Obama and India appeared first on the IPCS website.
Now that Barrack Hussein Obama has been sworn in as the 44th President of the United States of America, what does it mean for India? Three factors are likely to determine how relations between the US and India will be under Obama.
Generally, Democrats have tended to be more interventionist than the Republicans, as they believe that the US should play a role in regional conflicts to both resolve such conflicts and to protect human rights during these conflicts. During the Clinton Presidency, the US militarily intervened in a number of regional conflicts including in Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, Yugoslavia, Congo, Liberia, Albania, Iraq, Afghanistan and Yemen. Obama appears to want to continue with that trend. Susan Rice, a key Obama advisor and Obama's nominee as UN Ambassador, stated in her confirmation hearing that the Obama Administration will continue to see the promotion of democracy and human rights around the world as an important goal.
The pro-interventionist stance of the Democrats has tended to be a problem in Indo-US relations. In the India context, this would involve the Obama Administration wanting to intervene and seek to solve the Kashmir problem. Obama's recent comments in interviews to Time magazine in October and December 2008 and the reported consideration of former President Bill Clinton as a special envoy on Kashmir are indicative of this pro-interventionist stance that India will witness increasingly in the coming years. Obama had said that the US "should probably try to facilitate a better understanding between Pakistan and India and try to resolve the Kashmir crisis so that they (Pakistan) can stay focused not on India, but on the situation with those militants." Some analysts have tended to believe that a Kashmir-specific pro-active policy need not necessarily be bad, given Obama's pro-India statements. It should be remembered that his pro-India stance in the recent past had more to do with seeking the support of the Indian-American community. The concern however is that Obama believes that finding a solution to the Kashmir issue is almost a pre-requisite for getting Pakistan's support for the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), particularly in Afghanistan. New Delhi needs to be cautious of the US tendency of linking up Afghanistan's security with terrorism in Kashmir.
Obama's tough line against Pakistan might be heartening to Indian policy makers. The US has pledged huge military/financial aid to Pakistan, though this is conditional on Pakistan's cooperation on the war against terror. The Obama Administration, in its new foreign policy agenda document has made it clear that while the new administration "will increase nonmilitary aid to Pakistan," Pakistan will be held "accountable for security in the border region with Afghanistan." Earlier, Joe Biden, in his capacity as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, had introduced a legislation proposing to triple non-military aid to Pakistan in the next five years. The legislation authorised US$7.5 billion over next five years, mainly for building schools, roads and clinics. The bill, however, called for greater accountability and effective cooperation from Pakistan in fighting the Taliban and Al Qaeda.
The second issue which could act as "spoiler" is nuclear non-proliferation. While the Democrats and Republicans have both adopted strong non-proliferation measures, the Democrats have tended to be much more rigid "non-proliferation ayatollahs." The policies during the Clinton Presidency are a pointer of this. India's Pokhran tests in 1998 proved to be a major issue for the Clinton Administration and it invoked a series of technological and economic sanctions on India. India not being a member of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) continues to be a major issue for the Democrats. Despite being a member of NPT, China has consistently violated the treaty and engaged in proliferation activities, especially with Pakistan, but the US appeared willing to overlook the issue because China is an NPT-member state.
The new foreign policy agenda document of the Obama Administration stated that it "will crackdown on nuclear proliferation by strengthening the NPT," while working simultaneously on nuclear disarmament. What is more important is how the US deals with states that are members of certain security architectures, yet engage in proliferation.
Thirdly, Indo-US relations will to a great extent depend upon how the US engages with China. Democrats have tended to have a more than favorable approach towards China, with Clinton's presidency being a case in point. A close Sino-US partnership, with South Asia being jointly 'managed' by the US and China, remains an unappealing thought, a US-China clash will have wider security consequences throughout Asia and will affect India also. We need neither. Lastly, how Russia is viewed by the Obama Administration will have serious consequences. Russia remains an important power in the emerging Asian strategic framework and it is important that both India and the US recognize this reality and adjust their policies accordingly.
Now that Barrack Hussein Obama has been sworn in as the 44th President of the United States of America, what does it mean for India? Three factors are likely to determine how relations between the US and India will be under Obama.
Generally, Democrats have tended to be more interventionist than the Republicans, as they believe that the US should play a role in regional conflicts to both resolve such conflicts and to protect human rights during these conflicts. During the Clinton Presidency, the US militarily intervened in a number of regional conflicts including in Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, Yugoslavia, Congo, Liberia, Albania, Iraq, Afghanistan and Yemen. Obama appears to want to continue with that trend. Susan Rice, a key Obama advisor and Obama's nominee as UN Ambassador, stated in her confirmation hearing that the Obama Administration will continue to see the promotion of democracy and human rights around the world as an important goal.
The pro-interventionist stance of the Democrats has tended to be a problem in Indo-US relations. In the India context, this would involve the Obama Administration wanting to intervene and seek to solve the Kashmir problem. Obama's recent comments in interviews to Time magazine in October and December 2008 and the reported consideration of former President Bill Clinton as a special envoy on Kashmir are indicative of this pro-interventionist stance that India will witness increasingly in the coming years. Obama had said that the US "should probably try to facilitate a better understanding between Pakistan and India and try to resolve the Kashmir crisis so that they (Pakistan) can stay focused not on India, but on the situation with those militants." Some analysts have tended to believe that a Kashmir-specific pro-active policy need not necessarily be bad, given Obama's pro-India statements. It should be remembered that his pro-India stance in the recent past had more to do with seeking the support of the Indian-American community. The concern however is that Obama believes that finding a solution to the Kashmir issue is almost a pre-requisite for getting Pakistan's support for the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), particularly in Afghanistan. New Delhi needs to be cautious of the US tendency of linking up Afghanistan's security with terrorism in Kashmir.
Obama's tough line against Pakistan might be heartening to Indian policy makers. The US has pledged huge military/financial aid to Pakistan, though this is conditional on Pakistan's cooperation on the war against terror. The Obama Administration, in its new foreign policy agenda document has made it clear that while the new administration "will increase nonmilitary aid to Pakistan," Pakistan will be held "accountable for security in the border region with Afghanistan." Earlier, Joe Biden, in his capacity as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, had introduced a legislation proposing to triple non-military aid to Pakistan in the next five years. The legislation authorised US$7.5 billion over next five years, mainly for building schools, roads and clinics. The bill, however, called for greater accountability and effective cooperation from Pakistan in fighting the Taliban and Al Qaeda.
The second issue which could act as "spoiler" is nuclear non-proliferation. While the Democrats and Republicans have both adopted strong non-proliferation measures, the Democrats have tended to be much more rigid "non-proliferation ayatollahs." The policies during the Clinton Presidency are a pointer of this. India's Pokhran tests in 1998 proved to be a major issue for the Clinton Administration and it invoked a series of technological and economic sanctions on India. India not being a member of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) continues to be a major issue for the Democrats. Despite being a member of NPT, China has consistently violated the treaty and engaged in proliferation activities, especially with Pakistan, but the US appeared willing to overlook the issue because China is an NPT-member state.
The new foreign policy agenda document of the Obama Administration stated that it "will crackdown on nuclear proliferation by strengthening the NPT," while working simultaneously on nuclear disarmament. What is more important is how the US deals with states that are members of certain security architectures, yet engage in proliferation.
Thirdly, Indo-US relations will to a great extent depend upon how the US engages with China. Democrats have tended to have a more than favorable approach towards China, with Clinton's presidency being a case in point. A close Sino-US partnership, with South Asia being jointly 'managed' by the US and China, remains an unappealing thought, a US-China clash will have wider security consequences throughout Asia and will affect India also. We need neither. Lastly, how Russia is viewed by the Obama Administration will have serious consequences. Russia remains an important power in the emerging Asian strategic framework and it is important that both India and the US recognize this reality and adjust their policies accordingly.
Monday, January 5, 2009
The Nuclear Deal: Implications for India and Global Nuclear Regime
This essay on India-US Nuclear Deal appeared first on the IPCS website.
It should be abundantly clear that the Indo-US nuclear deal is more than just about nuclear energy for India. The agreement has several strategic connotations, including with regard to China.
The Deal Itself
US President George W. Bush signed the legislation on the Indo-US nuclear deal into law on October 8, 2008. The law, now titled, “United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Non-proliferation Enhancement Act,” is a product of the March 2006 agreement between India and the US on civil nuclear cooperation based on the joint statement between President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on July 18, 2005. The agreement was a direct consequence of the US’ recognition of India as a major pole of power in the coming century, as “an anchor of stability in Asia and an engine of global economic growth.”[1] More importantly, the agreement is a result of India’s strong non-proliferation record despite not being a party to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT).[2] The deal also undoubtedly recognises India’s “de-facto” status as a nuclear weapon state.[3]
The Indo-US civilian nuclear cooperation agreement was a broad framework agreement, and not one dealing with specifics. The current agreement is rather a facilitating agreement to engage in nuclear commerce, and therefore, after the operationalisation of the deal, both India and the US will have to sign more specific agreements. However, if the two countries have to engage in nuclear commerce, a few conditions had to met, including change in US domestic laws, an NSG waiver and an India-specific safeguards agreement with the IAEA. While the US-India nuclear agreement was not designed to put restrictions on India’s strategic programme, the US wanted to ensure that no technology or fuel transferred for India’s civilian programme could be used for its military programme. These elements had also to be inserted into an India-specific IAEA Safeguards Agreement. Only after these conditions were met would India be allowed to do business with the US or any other country in the nuclear arena. India also had to put in place a new export control mechanism before the two countries could proceed with the agreement. Accordingly, India harmonised its export control laws with that of the NSG and the MTCR Guidelines, although India is not a member of either of them. Similarly, India’s “Weapons of Mass Destruction and their Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities) Act, 2005,” entered into force in June 2005 and brought about more stringent non-proliferations regulations and tighter export control measures and it also showed India’s commitment to non-proliferation.[4]
The path to the final agreement included many steps, each of which was controversial in India and/or the US, though usually for different reasons. Following the July 2005 statement to engage in civilian nuclear cooperation, President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh signed a Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement in March 2006, during Bush’s visit to New Delhi. Accordingly, in May 2006, a separation plan was announced by the Indian government, separating its military and civilian facilities.[5] The plan was immediately opposed: as per this separation plan, eight plants would be left outside international safeguards. In addition, the Fast Breeder Reactors (FBRs) located at Kalpakkam were not offered for safeguards, as the Fast Breeder Programme is at the R&D stage and the technology will take time before it matures. This came under sharp criticism from the non-proliferation activists in the US who argued that large number of facilities outside the safeguards will make available for India “significant additional nuclear weapons production capacity.”[6] Upon finalization of this separation plan, the US agreed to build into the bilateral 123 agreement fuel supply assurances, help negotiate with the IAEA an India-specific Safeguards Agreement, help develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to “guard against any disruption of supply,” and in case disruption occurs, the US and India would put in place alternatives, countries like France, Russia and UK who might be able to restore fuel supply to India.
After the separation plan was agreed upon, the Hyde Act was signed into law by President Bush in December 2006. The Hyde Act, considered the parent act of the 123 agreement, provides the legal basis for nuclear commerce between India and the US, since India is not party to the NPT. The Hyde Act came under sharp criticism because of certain clauses that said that India will work with the US in containing Iran’s nuclear programme and that India and the US will work together on a Fissile Materials Control Treaty. However, these are more by way of advisories than binding commitments. Nuclear testing has been another issue debated during the passage of the Hyde Act. The BJP, the main opposition party in the Indian parliament, focused on the right to test as a serious issue, arguing that the deal would prevent India from conducting future tests. This is a false claim: nothing in the deal says that India cannot test. There may be consequences if India tests, but even this has been minimised because under the conditions of the deal, the US will have to take into consideration whether India was forced to test because of circumstances such as nuclear tests by India’s neighbours. Moreover, if India conducts a test, it will have to face some international opposition irrespective of the signing the deal or not.
Whatever be the controversy surrounding the Hyde Act, the 123 agreement that was signed in August 2007 makes it abundantly clear that the Indo-US nuclear deal will not impact in any manner India’s strategic weapons programme. The agreement also makes no mention of India’s nuclear testing. The agreement also states clearly that the US will work with other countries in helping alter the NSG rules to facilitate nuclear trade with India. However, the agreement, for a period of 40 years and extendable by another 10 years, can be terminated by either party after giving a one-year notice. Upon termination of the agreement, the US retains the right to take back “any nuclear material, equipment, non-nuclear material or components transferred.” The understanding is that the “right of return” will impact on the bilateral relations significantly, and therefore a consultative mechanism has been put in place that will “give special consideration to the importance of uninterrupted operation of nuclear reactors of the party (country) concerned with respect to the availability of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as a means of achieving energy security.”[7]
Once the 123 Agreement was finalised, the next processes involved an India-specific IAEA Safeguards Agreement, which was secured in July 2008 and a waiver of NSG rules that came about in September 2008. Thereafter, the agreement was sent to the US Congress for approval, where despite enjoying bipartisan support to strengthening US relations with India, the agreement faced a lot of opposition from the strong non-proliferation lobby. While supporters of the deal like Senators Richard Lugar and Christopher Dodd have stated that the deal is in the long-term interests of the United States, those opposing it cited the deal as seriously undermining the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Senator Dodd highlighted some of the “compelling geopolitical reasons” like India’s geographic proximity to China, Pakistan and Afghanistan, as reasons to strengthen this relationship, while Senator Lugar emphasised the importance of strengthening US partnership with an India that shares democratic values and which could “exert increasing influence on the world stage.”[8]
However, even people like Strobe Talbott, former Deputy Secretary of State under President Clinton, who have worked hard for a closer partnership between India and the US maintained that the Bush Administration has given away too much and made “an India exception” to the NPT.[9] He worried that the “India exception” will be taken as a precedent by several other countries who may want to work out a similar deal for their allies/friends. A case in point is China wanting to do a similar deal for Pakistan. Robert Einhorn, former Assistant Secretary of State for Non-proliferation, and another critic of the deal also maintained that the Bush Administration gave away too much and that India has managed to get it all – “acquiring the ability to import uranium and nuclear reactor technology, obtaining recognition for India’s status as a nuclear power, and preserving all of India’s strategic options, particularly the ability to increase substantially its production of plutonium for nuclear weapons.”[10] Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association called the deal a “non-proliferation disaster.” As for the US administration’s claims about the utility of the deal, Kimball said that the deal does not bring India into the non-proliferation framework, as it has made a “country-specific exemption from core nonproliferation standards that the United States has spent decades to establish.”[11] Congressman Howard Berman, another vehement critic of the deal, wanted to introduce amendments to the deal stating in unambiguous terms that the US will terminate nuclear trade with India if India resumes nuclear testing; and that the President is required to review and implement applicable export control authorities for US nuclear exports to other nuclear supplier nations that continue nuclear trade with India.[12] However, this was withdrawn after Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice gave an assurance that it is the “highest priority” for the US to get an assurance to ban the export of enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technology to countries like India that are not party to the NPT at the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) meeting in November 2008. Several Senators also criticised the fact that there was hardly any debate on such an important issue as this and the hasty manner in which the deal was passed in the Congress. Another vehement critic, Senator Byron Dorgan stated that India was being rewarded for wrong behaviour.[13]
President Bush, however, using his overriding powers, killed thorny conditionalities and stated clearly that “The legislation does not change the terms of the 123 Agreement as I submitted it to the Congress.”[14] He went on to clarify that India’s right to reprocessing and fuel assurance commitments remain the same, as recorded in the 123 Agreement.[15] In the final steps towards operationalisation of the agreement, President Bush had to make two sets of certifications that (1) that conclusion and implementation of the agreement is consistent with US obligations under the NPT; and (2) that it is the policy of the US to work with members of the NSG to restrict transfers of enrichment and reprocessing technology. These certifications have now been made through a Memorandum to the Secretary of State (October 21) and the two countries will shortly exchange diplomatic notes as per Article 16 (1) of the 123 Agreement that brings the agreement into force.
Implications for India
It should be abundantly clear that the agreement is more than just about nuclear energy for India. The agreement has several strategic connotations, including with regard to China.
Firstly, the agreement is an outcome of the US’ recognition that India is a major power in the 21st century and its role in the emerging Asian strategic framework. If this century is going to be an Asian century, as is widely predicted, the major powers would be US, China, Russia, Japan and India. Hence, it is strategically important for the US to have a strengthened and comprehensive relationship with India. It should also be noted that both the US and India have concerns with the rising China and more specifically its military modernisation which would have a bearing on the way China conducts business with the rest of the world.
Second, if the US wishes to take this relationship to higher plane, the continuing technology controls placed on India will be a major stumbling block. All said and done, it is the trade in strategic goods and technology and not perceived common interests alone that will make this relationship an enduring one.[16] This is the second imperative on which the nuclear agreement with the US is to be looked at. However, many Indian analysts have contested this saying that the agreement is a way of bringing India into the non-proliferation order.
Third, the Indo-US nuclear agreement is in India’s interest. It gets India out of the nuclear apartheid of the last three decades. The deal recognizes India as a nuclear power, which has been a great concern to the non-proliferation ayatollahs of Washington.
Four, impact of nuclear disarmament on Indo-US nuclear deal. Impact on the nuclear deal and civilian nuclear cooperation if the global community agrees to a time framework to rid the world of nuclear weapons, which remains highly impossible, will be minimal. The nuclear deal, dealing with civilian aspects of nuclear programme will not be hampered by a universal disarmament plan.
Analysts have been concerned of implications for the Iran-India gas pipeline. Firstly, the Iran- India pipeline remains independent of the Indo-US nuclear deal. Given India’s increasing demand for energy, India must look at every option of energy including nuclear energy. The US position vis a vis Iran has become controversial due to Iran’s alleged pursuance of a nuclear weapons programme. India also may not like to see a nuclear Iran in its neighbourhood.
Impact on India’s military programme. India’s opposition party, the BJP, while criticizing the deal on the issue of nuclear testing, also raised concern that the deal puts a cap on India’s strategic nuclear arsenal. The deal was perceived as curtailing on India’s sovereign decision to decide on the size of its nuclear arsenal. The fact is that India already has indigenous uranium reserves (reserves of 78,000 metric tons of uranium (MTU)) to pursue its strategic weapons programme; hence the Indo-US nuclear deal will not in any manner hamper its military programme.[17]
Lastly, the impact is more in terms of the emerging Asian security framework. If India has to rise above the South Asian cocoon and take its rightful place in the world stage, it is the US that can help India get there. Russia too is interested in seeing a stronger India sit at the high-table with other major players, but Russia has little capacity to help India in this regard. But, China has consistently played a less than supportive role, as was seen at the recent NSG meeting.[18] China has little interest in seeing another power emerging in Asia, and it does not want India to build closer ties with the United States or other Asian powers that could be detrimental to Beijing’s own regional and global role.[19] It appears deliberate that Beijing has not categorized India as a challenge or threat, though it does consider India as a “future strategic competitor” that might join any anti-China grouping. As a matter of fact, China had undertaken an internal study in 2005 and the recommendations are revealing. It recommended that China undertake measures to keep the current strategic leverage in terms of territory, P-5 membership, or the Nuclear Club; hold on to diplomatic advantages through its special relationship particularly with India’s neighbouring countries; as also maintain the economic lead over India.[20]
Fears were also raised about possible loss of autonomy in the India’s foreign policy arena. Is it a valid concern? The Left parties in India were of the view that India cannot afford to be subservient to any nation.[21] But India is not a puppet nation which can be dictated to according to the whims and fancies of other countries. India’s vote on Iran at the IAEA in September 2005 triggered much of the controversy surrounding India’s foreign policy autonomy debate.[22] But it must be noted that majority of the opposition to the deal has been political, be it the Left parties or the BJP. If BJP was in power, they are likely to have agreed to a similar deal with the US. As far as the Left parties are concerned, they will have a myopic view and will see any agreement with the US as against India’s interests.
Implications for Global Nuclear Regime
Finally, how does the Indo-US nuclear agreement affect the global nuclear regime? Firstly, it is claimed that the deal would undermine US efforts to dissuade countries like Iran and North Korea from pursuing nuclear weapons. Several fierce opponents of the deal, including Edward Markey and Barbara Lee have said that making an India-specific exemption is seen as “creating incentives for other countries to withdraw from the NPT.”[23] It was argued that the US is adopting double standards on the issue of non-proliferation. The issue was probably best posed by Robert Einhorn, in an interview, when he stated that the US has obviously double standards in “not treating India the same way we treat NPT cheaters like North Korea and Iran.”[24] He went on to state that in the Bush Administration’s view, it is not the weapons that is necessarily dangerous, but the regime that is in control of those weapons. Einhorn disagrees with such an approach which focuses on the nature of the regime. He argues that while the US does not perceive it as a threat when a “good country” acquires nuclear weapons, it should also be borne in mind that the good country could be surrounded by a “not so good country” that might follow suit, which could be threatening to the US. Hence, he argues that it is not good to make a differentiation between good and bad proliferation. Second, a so-called good country could become bad, threatening or unstable and irresponsible. Lastly, the threat of nuclear materials or technology leakage exists even in a so-called good country and today’s good country can become tomorrow’s bad country.
The second impact relates to the spiral effect that the Indo-US nuclear agreement could have on the global nuclear regime. Pakistan has been making noises about its increasing energy needs and thereby the necessity for a similar deal with the US. Although the US, especially President Bush has been categorical in rejecting these demands as early as in July 2005, Pakistan’s all-weather friend China might want to come to Pakistan’s rescue. China could push for a similar deal with Pakistan, arguing, as Strobe Talbott puts it, for “equal treatment” for Pakistan, negating the special considerations and exceptions made for India.[25] Will that be in the interest of the US and more importantly India?
The third impact relates to the future of the nuclear regime itself and how the Indo-US nuclear deal has strengthened or weakened the regime. Is a dying non-proliferation regime in India’s interest? Obviously not. On the other hand, critics in India argued that the deal was a way of getting India into global nuclear regime through back door. Clearly, both these extreme positions are wrong, and the truth lies somewhere in between these positions. The deal will neither hurt the non-proliferation regime nor was it designed to trick India into the NPT.
Another issue relates to how the deal is viewed in the Islamic world. Pakistan being the only Islamic country that has a bomb, there could be demand from Muslim countries that Pakistan be treated equal and be given such a deal.[26] Though the US might say no, China in its efforts to strengthen its friendship with Pakistan in addition to creating a favourable influence among the Islamic countries could opt for a similar deal for Pakistan.
Several analysts believe that the Indo-US nuclear agreement has also set a precedent for several other countries aspiring to develop nuclear technology. Most recently, Israel was seen citing the Indo-US civil nuclear agreement as a model for developing its nuclear power option. It said that the Indo-US agreement has set the precedent for Israel to seek changes in the NSG rules and help construct its first nuclear power plant in the Negev desert.[27]
Lastly, does Indo-US nuclear deal contribute to arms race in Asia? The argument made by some of the analysts have been that in light of the infusion of foreign fuel and technology into India for its civilian nuclear programme, materials and technology would be available for its military programme thereby leading to the expansion of India’s strategic weapons programme. China and Pakistan will look at this development with some concern. Both these countries could further expand their own weapon programmes in reaction to the Indian programme. If China is seen expanding its weapons programme, Russia and thereafter the US could expand their arsenals too.
Conclusion
The Indo-US nuclear deal has been the logical conclusion of a vision for US-India relations as framed by President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. It is an opportune moment for India to get out of the South Asia cocoon and sit at the high table as a major power shaping the emerging Asian security architecture. The US has helped India reach the high table, but how India makes use of that seat and shapes that architecture is up to New Delhi. India may also consider using this high-chair and influence US actions/ policies vis-a-via Russia. In fact, India and the US need to leverage the mutual suspicion between Russia and China. Although tactical in nature, Sino-Russian relationship does have the potential to emerge as a potent strategic force if the current trend in international politics continues for the foreseeable future. In fact, there are several commonalities between Russia, US and India – terrorism, WMD proliferation and a stable Asian security order. The US has to shed its biases about Russia and exploit the Russian wariness of China to its fullest in order to build a cooperative security framework in Asia. The high-chair may be of no use if India continues to be reactive in its foreign and security policies.
The spiral effect that the Indo-US nuclear deal could have on the global proliferation regime is yet to be validated. It should be noted that irrespective of the deal, China and Pakistan continue with the process expanding their military arsenal. The Indo-US nuclear deal will only help them in so far as they use it as justification.
[1] Merle D. Kellerhals Jr., “Congress approves US-India Civil Nuclear Accord,” October 02, 2008, available at http://www.america.gov/st/peacesec-english/2008/October/20081002094758dmslahrellek0.3916284.html.
[2] While the Indo-US nuclear deal has been in clear recognition of India’s non-proliferation record, those lawmakers in the US who were against the deal questioned India’s track record. Senator Barbara Boxer, California Democrat, for instance, was quick to cite the September 18 the Washington Post story that highlighted leakage of sensitive nuclear blueprints by the Indian Department of Atomic Energy. A report by Institute of Science and International Security (ISIS) authored by David Albright and Susan Basu questioned India’s illicit procurement activities with regard to its nuclear programmes. See, Aziz Haniffa, “Lawmakers Question India’s Non-proliferation Track Record,” Rediff News, September 19, 2008, available at http://www.rediff.com/news/2008/sep/19ndeal2.htm; and David Albright and Susan Basu, “India’s Gas Centrifuge Program: Stopping Illicit Procurement and the Leakage of Technical Centrifuge Know-How,” Institute of Science and International Security (ISIS), March 10, 2006, available at http://www.isis-online.org/publications/southasia/indianprocurement.pdf. Other opponents as well as some Indian analysts noted that although India may not have engaged in proliferating any nuclear material or technology, the fact that it conducted nuclear tests in 1974 (although declared as a Peaceful Nuclear Explosion, PNE) and in 1998 is in clear violation of global non-proliferation objectives. See, Kelly Motz and Gary Milhollin, “Seventeen Myths about the Nuclear Deal: An Analysis of Nuclear Cooperation with India,” Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, June 13, 2006, available at http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/india/Seventeen_Myths.htm. This report also talked about India smuggling heavy water from the USSR, China and Norway in the 1980s, allowing India to use its reactors to make plutonium for bombs. India’s largest nuclear capable missile, Agni, was also cited as stolen/ illicitly procured technology (the design of an American space launcher from NASA) for peaceful purposes and diverted to military purposes.
[3] There are critics who stress that the deal does not recognise India as a Nuclear Weapon State.
[4] This piece of legislation was also in recognition of the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 that called upon states to establish stringent export control measures on the transfer, shipment, re-transfer and trans-shipment of materials or technology that may be used in the development, manufacture, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. See, United Nations Security Council, “Resolution 1540,” April 28, 2004, available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/328/43/PDF/N0432843.pdf?OpenElement. Also see, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “The Weapons of Mass Destruction and Their Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities) Act, 2005,” no. 21 of 2005, June 6, 2005, available at http://meaindia.nic.in/actsadm/30aa08.pdf.
[5] According to the separation plan, India has put 14 of the 22 thermal power reactors in operations under the civilian list. They include: TAPS 1, TAPS 2, RAPS 1, RAPS 2, KK 1, KK 2, RAPS 5, RAPS 6, RAPS 3, RAPS 4, KAPS 1, KAPS 2, NAPS 1 and NAPS 2. The facilities identified under the civilian category will be offered for the IAEA safeguards. However, the decision as to which facilities come under civilian or military category was solely an Indian one and based on Indian determination. In terms of future reactors, it is up to India to determine which category they belong to (except, of course, imported reactors, which will all be under safeguards). See, Ministry of External Affairs, “Implementation of the India-United States Joint Statement of July 18, 2005: India’s Separation Plan,” May 11, 2006, available at http://meaindia.nic.in/treatiesagreement/2006/11ta1105200601.pdf.
[6] Arms Control Association, “The US-India Nuclear Deal: A Critical Assessment,” Arms Control Association Press Briefing, Prepared Remarks of Daryl G. Kimball, February 15, 2006, available at http://www.armscontrol.org/events/20060215_Kimball_Prepared_Remarks. Also brought into issue was the fact that infusion of foreign fuel will free up India’s current stock for its weapons programme and thereby aid expansion of India’s nuclear weapons programme. This, according to Kimball, was in gross violation of Article I of the NPT, which stipulates that states shall “not in any way” assist the nuclear weapons programs of others.
[7] If the right to return is exercised at some stage, it is necessary under the agreement, to “compensate promptly that Party for the fair market value thereof and for the costs incurred as a consequence of such removal.” See, Text of the 123 Agreement titled, “Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of India and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy,” August 01, 2007, available at http://meaindia.nic.in/cgi-bin/db2www/meaxpsite/coverpage.d2w/coverpg?sec=pr&filename=pressrelease/2007/08/03pr01.pdf.
[8] Foster Klug, “Senate debates US-India Nuclear Deal,” The Associated Press, October 01, 2008, available at http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5hjHnPz7XX0WpdjPiswhHLvaXj0pAD93HPTU83.
[9] “The Indo-US Nuclear Deal,” interview of Strobe Talbott and Robert Einhorn by Meenakshi Ahmed, Seminar, 2006, available at http://www.india-seminar.com/2006/560/560%20interview.htm.
[10] “The Indo-US Nuclear Deal,” interview of Strobe Talbott and Robert Einhorn by Meenakshi Ahmed, Seminar, 2006, available at http://www.india-seminar.com/2006/560/560%20interview.htm.
[11] Glenn Kessler, “Senate backs far-reaching nuclear trade deal with India,” The Washington Post, October 02, 2008, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2008/10/01/ST2008100103654.html. In another statement on the same issue, Kimball went on to say that even “India’s so-called separation plan is not credible from a nonproliferation perspective.” See, Arms Control Association, “Statement of Daryl G. Kimball, Arms Control Association Executive Director, on the US-Indian Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation,” October 01, 2008, available at http://www.armscontrol.org/node/3363.
[12] Arms Control Association, “Statement of Daryl G. Kimball, Arms Control Association Executive Director, on the US-Indian Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation,” October 01, 2008, available at http://www.armscontrol.org/node/3363.
[13] Foster Klug, “Senate debates US-India Nuclear Deal,” The Associated Press, October 01, 2008, available at http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5hjHnPz7XX0WpdjPiswhHLvaXj0pAD93HPTU83. Similarly, Ambassador Robert Grey, former Representative at the Conference on Disarmament stated that the US was doing a bad deal with India as far as non-proliferation issue was concerned. He added, “This is a bad deal that we are getting into here in terms of nonproliferation. We created the nonproliferation regime, we got it through the international community. We supported it consistently over successive administrations, both Republican and Democrat. Now we have reversed course. We are opening a hole with this agreement with India that you could drive a truck through.” See, Dan Robinson, “US-India Nuclear Deal Poised for Approval by House of Representatives, Senate,” VOA News, September 27, 2008, available at http://www.voanews.com/english/2008-09-27-voa6.cfm.
[14] The White House, “Statement by the President on the Occasion of Signing H.R. 7081,” October 08, 2008, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/10/20081008-3.html.
[15] President Bush clarified these two issues by stating that “The Agreement grants India advance consent to reprocessing which will be brought into effect upon conclusion of arrangements and procedures for a dedicated reprocessing facility under IAEA safeguards. In addition, the legislation does not change the fuel assurance commitments that the US Government has made to the Government of India, as recorded in the 123 Agreement. See, The White House, “Statement by the President on the Occasion of Signing H.R. 7081,” October 08, 2008, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/10/20081008-3.htm.
[16] Several analysts have brought out this fact that it is the trade in strategic goods that will take the bilateral relations to a higher level. For instance, Varun Sahni, in an essay states, “access to dual-use technology” will be the “litmus test” of this strategic relationship between India and the US. See, Varun Sahni, “Limited Cooperation Between Limited Allies,” in Sumit Ganguly, Brian Shoup and Andrew Scobell (eds.), US-Indian Strategic Cooperation into the 21st Century: More than Words (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 178.
[17] Ashley Tellis, in his report, Atoms for War makes it abundantly clear that India’s quest for a large nuclear arsenal was never hindered due to shortage of uranium, rejecting the arguments of critics who had maintained that through Indo-US nuclear deal, India will be able to get additional uranium from outside that will free up the indigenous material for its military programme. See Ashley Tellis, Atoms for War: US-Indian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation and India’s Nuclear Arsenal, 2006, available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/atomsforwarfinal4.pdf.
[18] Some Indian analysts have tended to believe that the Chinese opposition to the Indo-US nuclear deal is not so much India-centric. One of the China watchers in Delhi, Jabin Jacob notes that the opposition is rather US-centric, the US position on Taiwan conflict. See, Jabin T. Jacob, “Indo-US Nuclear Deal: The China Factor,” IPCS Special Report 14, March 2006, available at http://www.ipcs.org/IPCS-Special-Report-14.pdf.
[19] Mohan Malik, “India-China Competition Revealed in Ongoing Border Disputes,” PINR Report, October 09, 2007, available at http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_printable&report_id=695&language_id=1.
[20] Mohan Malik, “India-China Competition Revealed in Ongoing Border Disputes,” PINR Report, October 09, 2007, available at http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_printable&report_id=695&language_id=. The study, undertaken on the behest of Chinese leadership’s “Foreign Affairs Cell,” had incorporated inputs from China’s South Asia specialists like Cheng Ruisheng, Ma Jiali, Sun Shihai, among others.
[21] According to them, the deal will have following major implications: a) it will seriously compromise India’s strategic autonomy; b) it will promote nuclear weaponisation and create a spiralling nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan; c) it will jeopardise India’s energy independence and security; and d) it will push India deeper into an unequal strategic partnership with the US with serious all-round implications for India’s foreign policy as well as internal policies. See, Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) Liberation, Editorial, “Indo-US Nuclear Deal: CPI(M) Joins Congress to Script a Spurious “Sense of the House,” September 2006, available at http://www.cpiml.org/liberation/year_2006/September/editorial.htm.
[22] Matters became complicated with some of the comments from US Congressmen like Tom Lantos, who stated in the House International Relations Committee, that “India had to choose between the “ayatollahs” of terror and the United States.” See, Ninan Koshy, “India and the Iran Vote in the IAEA,” Foreign Policy in Focus, October 27, 2005, available at http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/2907.
[23] See, Lalit K. Jha, NDTV, “Debate on Indo-US Nuclear Deal in US House: Who Said What,” September 28, 2008, available at http://www.ndtv.com/convergence/ndtv/story.aspx?id=NEWEN20080066943 and Dan Robinson, “US-India Nuclear Deal Poised for Approval by House of Representatives, Senate,” VOA News, September 27, 2008, available at http://www.voanews.com/english/2008-09-27-voa6.cfm. During the debate in the House, Edward Markey stated, “Flashing a green light to India sends a dangerous signal to all of those countries because these policies are interconnected. The Bush Administration argues that breaking the nuclear rules for India will not lead to broken rules for anyone else, but they are wrong. Like the financial crisis that is now gripping the globe, this disastrous nuclear deal will come back to haunt us because there is no bailout for a nuclear bomb.” See, Markey Decries House Approval of US-India Nuclear Deal,” September 27, 2008, available at http://markey.house.gov/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=3454&Itemid=125.
[24] “The Indo-US Nuclear Deal,” interview of Strobe Talbott and Robert Einhorn by Meenakshi Ahmed, Seminar, 2006, available at http://www.india-seminar.com/2006/560/560%20interview.htm.
[25] China may not push for a similar deal with Pakistan, as the US has done for India. During the visit of Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari to Beijing in October 2008, some senior Pakistan and Western officials commented that China in effect has agreed privately to follow a “step-by-step” approach in assisting Pakistan’s quest for nuclear energy, rather than a formal civil nuclear agreement on the lines of the Indo-US nuclear deal. China has already installed a 325-MW nuclear power reactor at Chashma, Punjab province, and additionally China plans to install a second power reactor of the same capacity there, expected to be completed by 2011. Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi stated that Chashma III and Chashma IV reactors would provide Pakistan with an additional 680 megawatts of generating capacity. Qureshi did not elaborate on the kind of assistance that Chin may provide in this regard, although it is assumed that China will introduce grandfather clause into its earlier agreements with Pakistan. Prior to joining NPT in 1992, China had signed an agreement with Pakistan (December 31, 1991) to build the Chasma nuclear power reactor in the Punjab province. See, Farhan Bokhari, “China Aiding Pakistan’s Nuclear Ambitions,” CBS News, October 16, 2008, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/10/16/world/main4527309.shtml; “China to Help Pakistan Build Two More Nuclear Power Plants,” CNN, October 18, 2008, available at http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/10/18/pakistan.china.nuclear.ap/; “Pakistan Gets Confirmation on Chinese Reactor,” Nuclear Engineering International, March 1992, p. 7; and Robert Shuey and Shirley A. Kan, “Chinese Missile and Nuclear Proliferation: Issues for Congress,” CRS Issue Brief, September 29, 1995, p. 9, cited in “China’s Nuclear Exports and Assistance to Pakistan,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, updated November 14, 2003, available at http://www.nti.org/db/china/npakpos.htm#3.
[26] This idea was well-articulated by Strobe Talbott in an interview to Seminar. See, “The Indo-US Nuclear Deal,” interview of Strobe Talbott and Robert Einhorn by Meenakshi Ahmed, Seminar, 2006, available at http://www.india-seminar.com/2006/560/560%20interview.htm. Islamic countries are not one huge monolith, and one should keep in mind the Saudi-Iran rivalry in mind.
[27] Amit Baruah, “Now, Israel Wants NSG Rules Changed,” Hindustan Times, August 28, 2007, available at http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/FullcoverageStoryPage.aspx?id=9a7f3e9c-db05-4333-beb1-ccece17c6658_Special&MatchID1=4858&TeamID1=1&TeamID2=5&MatchType1=1&SeriesID1=1224&MatchID2=4862&TeamID3=9&TeamID4=8&MatchType2=2&SeriesID2=1225&PrimaryID=4858&Headline=Now%2c+Israel+wants+NSG+rules+changed.
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