India’s emerging space assets and nuclear-weapons capabilities - my essay in the latest Nonproliferation Review

In the latest issue of The Nonproliferation Review (Volume 26, 2019 - Issue 5-6), I published an essay examining the linkages between India’s emerging space assets and nuclear-weapons capabilities. This is a special issue on South Asia, The Shifting South Asian Nuclear Landscape, put together by Prof. Sumit Ganguly and has several other interesting essays including one on future of deterrence in South Asia, Pakistan's nuclear future and the Sino-Indian nuclear dynamics.

In this essay, I argue that the relationship between India’s nuclear and space programmes has waxed and waned. Three phases can be identified that the relationship went through. There was a period in the early days of both the programmes when the relationship was close, signified by the fact that they were even headed by the same leadership, Dr. Vikram Sarabhai. For a variety of reasons that included growing maturity of both programmes but also political decisions about the need to separate the two programmes to reduce international concerns, the programmes became autonomous of each other for a period of time. More recently, over the last two decades, there has been greater collaboration between the two programmes though the nature of the cooperation is very different from what it was in the first phase. In this essay, I outline these three stages chronologically and conclude with some thoughts about how the relationship is likely to evolve.

For the full essay, click here.



It is a long essay and I concluded with the following:

Evolution of the relationship between India’s nuclear and space sectors has gone through multiple stages, partly as a consequence of domestic factors such as bureaucratic politics, technology development as well as due to international conditions such as the state of India’s relations with the global nuclear regime. In the current space, both the maturing of India’s technological capabilities in both the nuclear and space sectors and the evolution of India’s nuclear weapons programmes as well as the changed relationship between India and the global regime has led to a synergistic relationship in which India’s space programme provides significant support to India’s nuclear weapons programme. This is likely to continue for a period of time because India’s nuclear programme is still growing and it has not reached completion. For example, India still does not have a fully developed deterrence capability against China because it does not have any delivery system that can cover all of China. Moreover, the growing Chinese nuclear and space capabilities will require India to undertake further efforts before India can have a satisfactory deterrence relationship with China.

At the same time, the evolution of India’s nuclear weapons programme has changed the relationship between the nuclear and space programmes in at least two ways. First, the development of India’s missile systems outside the ISRO means that the Indian nuclear programme no longer has to depend on the space programme for this particular requirement. The DRDO has come a long way from its early efforts and is now fully capable of developing the delivery vehicles that India’s nuclear weapons programme needs. Second, the growth and complexity of India’s nuclear weapons establishment means that it needs other service support to fully exploit the delivery capability that India has developed. For example, it makes little sense to have delivery capabilities without advanced command and control systems to manage the delivery capability and ensure that it is used appropriately, which requires support from space-based communication and command systems. Similar reasons apply for intelligence and target acquisition, which are also space-based. Therefore, as the Indian nuclear weapons programme becomes more sophisticated, it also requires additional support from India’s space capabilities. What this suggests is that as India’s nuclear weapons programme continues to develop, we should expect a closer and more synergistic relationship between India’s nuclear and space programmes.

India’s Space Program: The Commercial Domain - The Diplomat, May 10, 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I write on the Indian space programme, focusing on the commercial aspects of it. The establishment of a new private institution has spotlighted New Delhi's ongoing efforts to build out the commercial aspect of its space programme.

In the beginning of March this year, the Indian Cabinet cleared the establishment of a private institution, the Newspace India Limited (NSIL), under the Department of Space. While the development may not have received as much international attention as some of the other space- and defense-focused developments in India, it bears careful watching as it is in line with New Delhi’s ongoing efforts to build out the commercial aspect of its space program.

India’s focus on the commercial aspect of its space program in general and moves such as the establishment of NSIL are not entirely new or surprising. This follows from the Narendra Modi government’s plan to make space a major industry focus under the government’s Vision 2030 announced in this year’s interim budget. The 10-point agenda in Vision 2030 included making India “the launchpad of the world and placing an Indian astronaut in space by 2022.”

For the full essay, click here.



With respect to NSIL itself, the new entity has been set up with a paid-up capital of around $1 million. NSIL will function under the directorship of Radhakrishnan Durairaj and Suma Devaki Ram, who have been Indian Space Research Association (ISRO) directors of launch services and operations respectively. They also serve on the management team of Antrix.

The new institution is the second commercial arm of the ISRO after the Antrix Corporation, which was set up in 1992 primarily to facilitate ISRO’s commercial launch of foreign satellites. The major goal for the NSIL will be to facilitate the transfer of ISRO technologies to private industries as well as aid in marketing space-based products and spin-off technologies.

Reports citing official documents suggest that in order to facilitate transfer of technology, NSIL will take license from ISRO before sub-licensing them to the commercial players. The technology transfer envisaged through the NSIL will include India’s small satellite program, the small satellite launch vehicle (SSLV) program and the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV). This would mean that services including launching of satellites can be undertaken by private entities once the license is procured by the NSIL.

Speaking to Times of India, Dr. Sivan, head of the ISRO, said that the NSIL will essentially become the connecting link for ISRO with commercial players to aid in technology transfer for a fee. As he put it: “We wanted a mechanism to transfer the technologies of our new projects like SSLV and even lithium-ion cells. With this company, ISRO will be able to smoothly transfer these technologies after charging fees. Once companies start mass production of small satellites and launchers, ISRO will be charging them for using its launch services.” In another interview, he had stated that he expected a demand for 2-3 SSLV rockets per month.

A January 2019 notice on the ISRO website had already shortlisted ten domestic industries for the technology transfer with regard to lithium-ion cell technology. The ISRO had already decided to transfer the PSLV rocket to the private sector more than a decade ago, though this has not yet been accomplished. The NSIL can possibly help do this quicker. On the regulatory aspects, the ISRO Chairman added that a separate “space law” is being readied, which will soon be with the Indian cabinet for its approval. It will manage all aspects of the regulation of space ventures and will “also have provisions related to the accountability of manufacturers for its space components.”

The ISRO has a proven track record in launching small satellites with the success of the PSLV. The development of the SSLV will give India a further boost in this segment. SSLV will offer an even more cost-effective option than the existing PSLV. The Chairman and Managing Director of Antrix, Rakesh Sasibhushan has said that with the SSLV, they expect to hit “a much lower cost than the PSLV” and that they were “also looking at a large increase in our revenues.” Besides the cost factor, the SSLV can also be assembled in 3-4 days as against the 40 days for a normal size rocket (Other reports suggest 15 days to assemble the SSLV).

The first test flight of SSLV is scheduled for July-August this year. ISRO has plans to launch two defense satellites of 120 kg each during the first test slight itself. The SSLVs will carry payloads between 300-500 kgs to Low Earth Orbit, thus eyeing a specific market that has not been tapped into much as yet.

ISRO’s approach to privatization and commercial engagements has come a long way, driven by the need to stay competitive at a time when there are fast emerging competitors including China and foreign commercial players who have been eyeing the global commercial space. The competition is likely to be stiff, especially in the small satellite segment given the global trend to break the big satellite constellation into smaller ones. Small satellites offer many advantages, the cost to manufacture and launch being a major consideration. ISRO’s opening to bring commercial entities into India’s space trajectory is likely to have several spin-off benefits, including for national security purposes.

IRNSS: India's Own Satellite Navigation System, a short essay of mine on the July 01 launch of India's satellite-based navigation system...

Here's a short essay of mine on India's new satellite-based navigation system to be launched on July 01, 2013...

India's own satellite-based navigation system, similar to the well-known American Global Positioning System (GPS), is being readied. The first satellite of the seven satellite constellation is to be launched on July 01, 2013 aboard a XL-size Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) - C22 from the Satish Dhawan Space Centre near Sriharikota. The Indian system is called the IRNSS for 'Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System'. Previously, PSLV XLs were used for some of the other important missions, including Chandrayaan-1 and RISAT-1.

For the full post, click here.

The American GPS-system is of much larger scale covering the entire globe using 24 satellites in addition to several networked ground stations. IRNSS, on the other hand, is being undertaken on a much smaller scale. The Indian system is intended as an independent regional system providing "position accuracy better than 10m over India and the region extending about 1500 kms around India."

The IRNSS, with a total of seven satellites, placed at a height of about 36,000 kms, and using two microwave frequency bands, L5 and S, will relay information 24x7 for two types of services: Standard Positioning Service (SPS) for general use and Restricted Service (RS) meant for special authorised users - military and other government actors. Three satellites will be placed in the geostationary equatorial orbit, matching earth's rotation and the other four (pair of two) will be placed in two inclined geosynchronous orbits. Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) Chairman K Radhakrishnan says (according to The Hindu) that the coverage, if necessary, could be improved with an addition of four more satellites.

Cost has been an important consideration. For nine years, the ISRO has been exploring ways to develop a navigation system for India. The IRNSS project, involving a cost of Rs. 1,420 crores, was approved by the government in June 2006.

The significance of IRNSS cannot be underplayed. Navigation systems, once used by the most powerful militaries around the world, are also being used by civilians through their smart phones. In addition, many militaries are using them for a wide range of applications. India's ability to develop its own system without having to rely on any external source will go a long way in securing itself. An ISRO official has said that "It will be our own system. It will make us independent in the area of navigation. At the moment we depend on US' GPS or Russia's GLONASS system. They can block signals anytime if they want."

The US-managed GPS became available for large-scale use a decade ago or so, although the importance of location precision technologies in the military arena with an emphasis on accumulating hard power has prompted many countries, particularly in Asia, to develop their own versions of GPS and other space-based navigation systems. Some of the proven and more popular systems include the Chinese Beidou, Russian Glonass and Japanese Quazi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS) that is making slow progress.

China's Beidou satellite navigation system, that launched its first navigation satellite in 2000, plans to have a full global coverage by 2020. China has already launched 16 satellites and four experimental ones onto space as part of the Beidou system. Ye Peijian, chief commander of Chang'e-3, China's lunar probe mission, recently stated that Beidou will have an additional 40 satellites, enhancing the coverage capabilities.

In spite of the sovereignty and territorial disputes, including recent flare-ups with several Southeast Asian countries, China has been successful in selling its system in many countries in the region. Among other countries, Thailand, Laos and Brunei have already subscribed to the Beidou navigation system. Pakistan and Sri Lanka in South Asia have also opted for the Chinese navigation system.

In terms of the Chinese domestic market, growth for the Beidou system has been at a slow pace. By 2015, China expects to capture a domestic market share of 15-20 per cent, predicted to go up to 70-80 per cent by 2020. The forecast is that it potentially will have a market worth 22 bn yuan. Meanwhile, China has plans to create strategic industries around the navigation system, evincing interest among the business community to invest big time in this area. The Chinese central government is expected to make a total investment of 7 bn yuan, and according to official figures, it has already invested 3.5 bn yuan to strengthen industry presence in the space arena. China foresees that with the entry of industry, Beidou system will spur economic growth in a big way.

Russia's GLONASS was a response to the US' GPS, and the GLONASS is run by Russia's space forces. It has a 24 satellite-constellation, with 21 in operation and 3 as back-ups. Placed at an altitude of 19,000 km, each of the satellites orbit the earth in 11 hours and 15 minutes. The satellites are positioned in a manner to allow at least five satellites to be in view at any given time. India entered into a pact with Russia on satellite navigation collaboration way back in 2005 although it took them another six years to sign an agreement for India to receive military signals from Russia. In fact, though there have been several agreements signed in this regard, the Russian government has been unwilling to part with "precision codes" (which provides data to navigate up to one metre).

Japan is set to be making progress with a few important decisions taken this year. Japan is developing the navigation system in order to enhance the GPS navigation signals and data availability in the Asia-Pacific region. Speaking to the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, Japanese space officials are believed to have said that currently, data is available only 90 per cent of the time in Japan whereas the QZSS will improve it to a 99.8 per cent level, in addition to improving the accuracy.

The first Quazi-Zenith satellite, Michibiki, was launched on September 11, 2010. Earlier in 2013, the Cabinet Office decided to expand the Japanese satellite system, ordering an addition of three satellites, making it a four-satellite constellation. The government sanctioned a $526 mn contract with Mitsubishi Electric for building the additional satellites, to be launched by 2017. Two will be positioned in inclined orbits, whereas a third one will be placed at geostationary equatorial orbit. The government has reportedly sanctioned another contract worth $1.2 bn, with "a special-purpose company led by NEC Corp." This contract obligates NEC Corp. to operate QZSS for 15 years, including design, verification and maintenance of the ground system for the QZSS. Japan has plans to invest in seven satellites by the next decade although the first four constellation system is set to be in operation by 2018.

Given the growing importance of location data for a variety of purposes including in the civilian, disaster management and military domain, India cannot be lagging behind. A decision by the ISRO to involve Indian industry in developing communication satellites and PSLVs will lighten the burden on the ISRO while helping to refocus their attention on some big science projects and remote sensing satellites. This move will also step up the process of establishing a much-needed strategic industry around outer space.