The Sino-Indian Clash: Russia in the Middle - The Diplomat, 25 June 2020

Once again, I am lagging with my blog updates. A couple of weeks ago, I wrote a piece for The Diplomat on the Sino-Indian border clash and how Russia has positioned itself on the same. Clearly, the Sino-Indian clash puts Russia in an awkward position.

In the midst of a border crisis with China, Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh is away in Moscow. At the same time, India’s foreign minister joined his Russian and Chinese counterparts online for an Russia-India-China (RIC) meeting. The Sino-Indian crisis potentially puts Russia in a difficult position, having to choose between its traditional partners in India, which also represents a lucrative arms market, and its new but much more powerful friend in the east, China.

For the full essay, click here.



The ostensible reason for Singh’s visit to Russia was to attend the rescheduled Victory Day Parade. The annual parade commemorating the end of World War II was supposed to be held on May 9, but was postponed due to the pandemic. A 75-member tri-service Indian military contingent participated in the parade.

The Chinese defense minister was also in Moscow to attend the same parade. However, the Indian side made it clear that there would be no meeting between the two ministers. All negotiations between India and China on the border crisis are taking place bilaterally either through diplomatic channels or through local military commanders. The fact that the RIC meeting was an online affair also helps to ensure that Russia is not forced to mediate between the two sides.

Indian anger at China is palpable. In fact, Indian Foreign Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar in his speech at the RIC pointedly stated that “the challenge today is not just one of concepts and norms, but equally of their practice. The leading voices of the world must be exemplars in every way.”

India’s interests in Russia are obvious. A significant part of Indian military equipment comes from Russia. In the midst of the crisis with China, the Indian Air Force has asked for 33 new fighter aircraft including 21 MiG-29s and 12 Su-30 MKIs from Russia. This is an old acquisition plan, but it has been pushed for accelerated delivery. The deal is worth over 60 billion Indian rupees ($793 million) and is expected to be approved by the Ministry of Defense in the coming days. In addition, India had already ordered 272 Su-30 MKIs spread over a 10 to 15-year time frame.

Meanwhile, India has also asked Russia for the expedited delivery of the S-400 anti-missile system. The two sides signed a contract for the S-400s in 2019. The original delivery was scheduled for 2021. There were reports that because of COVID-19, the delivery would be delayed. Singh was expected to seek an expedited delivery of the system.

Singh was also seeking assurances that the spare parts supply for Russian equipment that India already has in its arsenal will not be delayed during any crisis with China. Specifically, he was referring to the issue of spare parts for Russian-origin fighter aircraft (including the Su-30MKIs and MiG-29s of the Air Force and the MiG29Ks of the Indian Navy), the T-90 battle tanks for the Army, and the Navy’s Kilo-class submarines.

The Sino-Indian clash puts Russia in an awkward position as a recent analysis in The Wall Street Journal by Yaroslav Trofimov and Thomas Grove pointed out. There is growing recognition in Moscow about pressure from Beijing. But as the report pointed out, Russia is also stuck with China because of pressure from the West. Russia’s difficulties in improving relations with Europe have left Moscow with few options.

In the current crisis, Russia appears to have little interest in mediating between China and India. As Konstantin Kosachev, a senior lawmaker and chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Russian Federation Council, told the Indian media that Russia should not interfere in the India-China dispute and that these should be dealt with through bilateral channels.

At the recent RIC meeting, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov also maintained that India and China do not need any help in resolving their bilateral issues. Although Russia might want to keep its head down in the current crisis, Russian reactions are also being closely watched by the Indian public. Russia has a reservoir of support in India because of its traditional support, including during the 1971 India-Pakistan War. This support glosses over the fact that Russia was neutral during the 1962 Sino-Indian War because it occurred simultaneously with the Cuban missile crisis. Russia’s relations with China had become increasingly rocky – in fact, closer Soviet relations with India were one factor in the Sino-Soviet rift – but the need for Beijing’s support during the Cuban missile crisis forced Moscow to be neutral. That removed an important leg of India’s diplomatic strategy at the time. Almost 60 years later, New Delhi is probably worried that history will repeat and Russia might lean toward China simply by staying neutral.

What Does Trump’s Kashmir Storm Mean for US-India Relations?, The Diplomat, 26 July 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I wrote on Trump's statements on Jammu and Kashmir and see if this would have any significant lasting impact on U.S.-India relations. I argue that while the controversy risked being added to the list of issues both sides are having, thus far the fallout has been managed relatively well.

While attention ahead of Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan’s visit to Washington focused on a list of expected discussion points and deliverables, ultimately the trip was dominated by the fallout from an unexpected controversy that emerged during his meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump. While responding to Khan’s request for U.S. assistance to resolve the issue of Kashmir, Trump said that India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi had also asked Trump to mediate the Kashmir dispute.
For the full post, click here.



The Pakistani government was understandably gleeful. In India, meanwhile, there was consternation, with opposition parties raising the issue in the Parliament and demanding that Modi clarify whether he had indeed asked Trump to mediate. Nonetheless, overall, India has thus far managed the issue quite well and prevented another challenge from being added to the list New Delhi and Washington both face.

India’s long-standing position has been that Kashmir is a bilateral issue that needs to be negotiated directly between India and Pakistan. India had always refused overt third-party involvement in the Kashmir dispute especially in terms of any mediation between India and Pakistan. India’s External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar reiterated that position and stated that India had not indeed asked for any mediation. India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) also put out a statement rebutting Trump’s assertion that Modi had asked him to mediate.

This unexpected kerfuffle briefly threatened to put a dent in U.S.-India relations, which is already facing a number of other difficulties. For instance, India’s decision to buy the S-400 air defense missile from Russia puts India afoul of the U.S. Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), even though India felt that the capabilities that it was acquiring with the missile were too important for it to give in to the U.S. objections about buying the missile.

Similarly, the worsening tensions between the United States and Iran and Washington’s demands that India comply with the U.S. sanctions on Tehran have not gone down well in New Delhi because India sees Iran as strategically important to flank Pakistan. Finally, the U.S. efforts to find a way out of Afghanistan led Washington to once again seek Pakistan’s help, much to India’s discomfort. India has been left out of the discussions on the future of Afghanistan and it feels abandoned by the United States. In addition, Trump’s withdrawal of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) on India and the tariff war between the two countries are not helping either.

Indian unhappiness with Washington is only one part of the problem. In Washington itself, there is are still doubts about the balance of obligations and whether the American strategic bet on India is worthwhile. Though these are as yet murmurs, the fact that even some of the strongest supporters of closer U.S.-India relations are now expressing doubt about India’s commitment should be worrisome to New Delhi.

Coming on top of these growing mutual doubts, Trump’s gaffe could potentially have proved to be quite damaging. But New Delhi has reacted with surprising maturity. That suggests that this will not lead to any lasting negative fallout.

Though the Indian foreign minister was firm in rejecting Trump’s assertion that he was asked to mediate, the response was also quite measured. While India’s opposition parties raised a ruckus in the Parliament on the issue, the Indian government did not panic.

The government could have taken a much stronger stance in the Parliament in order to pacify the domestic opinion in India, but it may have felt it did not need to given political dynamics. Despite the noise, the Indian opposition is in a considerably weak state. They are yet to recover from the drubbing they received in the recent general elections. The main opposition party, the Indian National Congress, is grappling with internal problems and is currently leader-less and direction-less. Despite a lot of pre-election chatter about regional parties coming together to form a national alternative to the BJP, nothing has come of it and many regional parties suffered serious setbacks in the elections. The comfortable domestic political situation might be one reason why the government felt little need to go overboard in criticizing the Trump statement.

Another factor is the general state of U.S.-India relations itself. With a number of issues already rocking the relationship, New Delhi probably did not want to fuel any further controversy in the relationship. Though India is trying to maintain some level of stable relationships with all the major powers, including Russia and China, there is probably a recognition that India also has to maintain its closeness to the United States.

Finally, there is also probably acceptance that Trump will be Trump and that India should discount some of Trump’s antics in the interest of the relationship. It helped that within hours of Trump’s statement, the U.S. State Department discounted Trump’s statement about India seeking mediation. Other U.S. leaders such as the Congressman Brad Sherman also publicly castigated Trump for the statement. The U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs too came out with a statement supporting the Indian point of view. Not only that, Representative Eliot L Engel, chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, “reaffirmed that in order for dialogue to be meaningful, Pakistan must first take concrete and irreversible steps to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure on Pakistan’s soil.”

Since all of these statements, coming from various sources beyond just the president himself, clarified that Trump’s statement was not U.S. policy, New Delhi probably felt confident that it need not worry that Trump’s statement had presaged any change in the U.S. policy on Kashmir.

U.S.-India relations do face some challenges. But the mature handling in New Delhi of this unexpected controversy during Khan’s visit to Washington has ensured that another item was not added to the list of grievances on both sides.

Where Would India Fit in a Missile Defense Partnership in the Indo-Pacific? - 24 January 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I examined India's evolving missile defense choices and partnerships. This was done in the backdrop of the US Missile Defense Review (MDR) which identified as a partner in the Indo-Pacific. In this piece, "Where Would India Fit in a Missile Defense Partnership in the Indo-Pacific?," I analyse as to how India was compelled to appreciate the utility of missile defense to what the different options for India are, whether it should be an indigenous system or something that is developed in partnership with other countries such as the US.

Last week, U.S. President Donald Trump announced the 2019 Missile Defense Review (MDR), outlining the rapidly evolving threats and the U.S. measures and capabilities that are required to protect the homeland, bases abroad and U.S. allies and partners around the world. The document, the latest among a series of strategy documents released under the Trump administration, bears noting in terms of what it means for India and the wider Indo-Pacific.

The Indo-Pacific factors significantly in the MDR. There is a mention of threats such as North Korea, Iran, Russia, and China, the advancements in missile defense and anti-satellite (ASAT) advancements in a few countries that could negatively impact the United States, and references to the importance of working with U.S. allies and partners including Japan, South Korea, Australia, and India.

The references to these like-minded states in particular bears noting. Both Japan and South Korea are already working with the United States in developing their respective missile defense shields which are also “increasingly interoperable” with U.S. systems. Australia also plays an important role in strengthening the regional missile defense cooperation through a trilateral engagement with the United States and Japan. Where does India fit into this emerging missile defense partnership in the Indo-Pacific?

For the full essay, click here.



India is no stranger to this conversation: It has been trying to manage growing missile threats in its neighborhood for about two decades now. China-Pakistan collaboration in this regard has been a significant driver in pushing New Delhi in developing certain limited missile defense capabilities. In the early 1990s, proliferation of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles such as the M-9 and M-11 from China to Pakistan pushed India to explore missile defense options. India had learned to live with China’s inventory of long-range missiles, but Pakistan was always a more prominent and unpredictable rival for India, and thus India has felt compelled to respond with greater swiftness.

India’s missile defense options included both indigenously developing missile defense technology as well as procuring it from the outside. At the time, this effort represented a major shift in India’s policy on missile defenses: India had vociferously criticized the U.S. “Star Wars” missile defense programs of the 1980s. A changing missile threat perception along with a strategic reorientation toward the U.S. enabled these policy shifts in India.

In recognition of this fact, the MDR makes a pointed reference to the “advanced and diverse range of ballistic and cruise missile capabilities in South Asia.” The review further notes that this is a potential area of cooperation between India and the United States especially given the convergence of strategic interests between the two sides and sees this as “a natural outgrowth of India’s status as a Major Defense Partner and key element of our Indo-Pacific Strategy.”

There is certainly some indication of a greater weight being placed on India in Washington’s calculations about how it deals with U.S. alliances and partnerships in the region. To take just one example, the United States had, just a few months ago, granted India a “Strategic Trade Authorisation-1 (STA-1)” status, that was previously given only to Japan and South Korea in Asia. But in reality, though India has a growing interest in missile defenses, whether it will be able to partner with the United States is open to question.

For instance, interestingly, this comes in the backdrop of India’s decision to buy the Russian S-400 air defense system for $5 billion. The Indian decision to proceed with the S-400 systems is indicative of the scale of the missile threats in India’s neighborhood. But it also means it is unclear whether India will look to the United States for BMD systems: a U.S. and Russian defense system could be complicated in terms of interoperability, though some analysts argue that it is a sensible option to have different radars and different encryption systems to deal with an array of threats.

Another problem is that India’s DRDO is already developing its own two-tiered BMD system. In addition, at the lower end, India is purchasing the U.S.-Norwegian NASAMS-2 system, as well as the Indo-Israel MRSAM (a land version of the Barak-8 naval system). Given all this, whether or not there is space for further operational cooperation with the United States within the Indian ballistic missile defense architecture remains to be seen.

Japan-India Maritime Exercise 2018: Operational Clarity, Strategic Confusion? - October 16, 2018

In the latest piece for The Diplomat, I wrote on the just-concluded Japan-India Maritime Exercise JIMEX 2018, the third in the series between India and Japan. I argue that while New Delhi’s desire to cultivate closer defense ties with Tokyo is clear, its overall strategic approach is much less so.

Despite India’s ambiguous tone from time to time on the Indo-Pacific strategic concept and the Quad, the revival of the India-Japan maritime exercise underlines the growing concern in the two capitals about the threats to the freedom of navigation and respect for international rules of the road in the Indo-Pacific. JIMEX-18 also reflects the growing comfort level and sophistication of India-Japan military ties, which are informed by the closer strategic vision shared by Prime Ministers Narendra Modi and Shinzo Abe.

But whether or not this represents India’s broader strategic alignment with states such as the United States and Japan as part of an effort to balance against China and ensuring a free and open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) as envisioned by Washington is less clear.



For more, click here.



From October 7 to 15, India and Japan held the third edition of the Japan-India Maritime Exercise (JIMEX) in Visakhapatnam, in southern India. While the exercise is indicative of better bilateral defense ties between the two sides, the strategic message by New Delhi is less clear.

In recent years, interactions between the Indian and Japanese militaries have grown tremendously. The two navies have been coordinating anti-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden. Japan is also a permanent participant in the Malabar series of naval exercises since 2015, which originally started between the Indian and U.S. navies in 1992. The Malabar 2018 trilateral exercises were held off Guam in June.

The JIMEX series is designed to create better interoperability, ensure better understanding, and share best practices between the two navies. JIMEX-18, the third one in the series, is taking place after a gap of five years and is demonstrative of the worsening maritime scenario in the Indo-Pacific and the greater coincidence of interests between New Delhi and Tokyo especially in the defense and security arena. The last JIMEX took place off the Chennai coast in December 2013.

Despite India’s ambiguous tone from time to time on the Indo-Pacific strategic concept and the Quad, the revival of the India-Japan maritime exercise underlines the growing concern in the two capitals about the threats to the freedom of navigation and respect for international rules of the road in the Indo-Pacific. JIMEX-18 also reflects the growing comfort level and sophistication of India-Japan military ties, which are informed by the closer strategic vision shared by Prime Ministers Narendra Modi and Shinzo Abe.

But whether or not this represents India’s broader strategic alignment with states such as the United States and Japan as part of an effort to balance against China and ensuring a free and open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) as envisioned by Washington is less clear.

In that sense, the JIMEX exercises are another example of the apparent inconsistent Indian approach to the Indo-Pacific that is likely to confuse both India’s partners as much as China. On the one hand, the fact that it was restarted after five years appears to suggest that India is intent on partnering with other countries to dealing with challenges that China’s rise poses.

More broadly, over the last several months, India has sent several signals to this effect. It signed the COMCASA (Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement) with the United States, and conducted bilateral maritime exercises with Australia, in addition to joining the Australian-led multilateral Pitch Black air combat exercise for the first time and the India-Singapore joint naval exercise SIMBEX.

However, over the last few months, India has also taken steps that can only create concerns among the same potential partners. For one, after the Wuhan Summit between Modi and Xi, India’s approach to China appears to have considerably softened, as indicated by Prime Minister Modi’s Shangri-La Dialogue keynote speech back in June. In addition, India has also refused to allow Australia to join the Malabar exercises – despite Australia expressing a keen desire to do so. That would have brought India together with other key potential players in the Indo-Pacific.

India also attended the Senior-Level official meeting of the Quad in June, but it seemed quite lukewarm about the idea. Most recently, India has signed a deal with Russia for the S-400 anti-aircraft systems and Indian government oil companies announced that it was buying more oil from Iran in November, both of which will raise tensions with the United States, a key partner.

Thus, despite restarting the JIMEX exercise, India’s approach continues to show incoherence. To be sure, it is not uncommon for states to hedge their bets. But Indian political and bureaucratic leaders need to consider the effect of such mixed signaling and aim for more consistent policy or if there is an underlying logic to it, explain it better to India’s partners and observers.

Modi-Putin Summit: What’s on the Agenda for India-Russia Defense Ties? - October 4, 2018

In last week's column, I wrote on the Modi-Putin Summit, which took place on 5 October. In the "Modi-Putin Summit: What’s on the Agenda for India-Russia Defense Ties?," I focus as to how both India and Russia remain focused on defence trade to keep the relations on an even keel.

As Putin arrives in New Delhi, there is both excitement and uneasiness around the visit and what might come of it. There is excitement on both sides about a couple of important defense deals and there are plans to strengthen and streamline civil nuclear cooperation between the two countries. But there is also anxiety in New Delhi about the growing Russia-China ties and what that could mean for India.



On October 5, Russian President Vladimir Putin is to hold the India-Russia annual summit meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in New Delhi. The last summit meeting took place in St. Petersburg in 2017, and Putin and Modi met last for an informal summit in Sochi in May this year.

The summit process between India and Russia started way back in 2000 and since then, the relationship has been elevated to a “Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership.” The India-Russia strategic partnership is important for a number of reasons, but the two countries also face significant challenges. The relationship in the last few years have undergone some big changes, not all of them positive. The key question therefore is to see if the age-old bilateral relationship is sturdy enough to withstand some of the current turbulence.

As Putin arrives in New Delhi, there is both excitement and uneasiness around the visit and what might come of it. There is excitement on both sides about a couple of important defense deals and there are plans to strengthen and streamline civil nuclear cooperation between the two countries. But there is also anxiety in New Delhi about the growing Russia-China ties and what that could mean for India.

On the other hand, Moscow remains anxious about India’s changing strategic orientation, particularly its relationship with the United States, and New Delhi’s defense trade diversification policy, among other issues. Russia has failed to appreciate the Indian strategic calculation behind its closer strategic engagement with the United States and other partners such as Japan and Australia.

From India’s perspective, Russia remains an important strategic partner for a number of different reasons. The historical character of the bilateral relationship aside, there are several strategic factors that impinge on the Russia-India dynamic. For one, Russia remains the only partner that is still willing to give India critical technologies, such as a nuclear submarine. Two, the emerging Russia-China strategic relationship has important security consequences for India. Even as India is diversifying its defense trade partners, Russia still dominates the Indian defense inventory to the tune of about 70 per cent. This raises worries in India because of the changing nature of the Russia-China defense relationship.

To take just one example, Russia’s sale of Su-30 and especially the Su-35 fighter puts India’s security at some risk. Russia’s sale of advanced Kilo-class submarines is another instance. These are illustrations of the important changes in the Russia-China security dynamics because Beijing for a long time was not given access to the best and most modern Russian technology and there was no technology transfer. The Russia-China oil and gas deals over the last few years also is a testament to this new closer partnership.

On the other hand, there are positive elements also in India-Russia relationship. Civil nuclear cooperation and defense and technology collaboration will dominate the Putin-Modi Summit meeting. The two sides are believed to be formalizing an action plan on nuclear cooperation. The two sides are also expected to sign an agreement for the purchase of the advanced S-400 Triumf air defense systems worth more than $5 billion.

This deal has been under threat because of the US’ CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) legislation, which seeks to sanction any country that does significant business with Russia in the defense or intelligence domains. Even though U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis has sought an exemption for India, and the U.S. Congress has given the U.S. administration the authority to waive CAATSA, it is up to the president to decide on whether such a waiver will be granted.

Irrespective of how the CAATSA sanctions may play out, India appears quite certain that it wants the S-400 because of the technological superiority of the system. India has explored a financial mechanism where India can make the payment in rupees rather than in U.S. dollars. Though the United States has not indicated how it will react to the S-400 deal, Washington has been somewhat understanding because India over the last few years has diversified its defense procurement and reduced its dependency on Russia to some extent, which is one of the conditions for gaining a CAATSA waiver.

Russia, for its part, appears quite confident that the deal will go through. Igor Korotchenko, head of the Moscow-based Centre for Analysis of World Arms Trade noted that “the U.S. won’t impose sanctions on them because they don’t want the Indians to refuse to purchase American weapons in the future.”

There are reports suggesting that there may be an agreement also for the sale of four frigates to India. Under the deal, two of the advanced Talwar-class frigates will be directly purchased from Russia’s Yantar Shipyard and delivered in two years’ time, while the next two will be built at the Goa Shipyard. Although of an earlier previous generation, the Indian Navy already operates six of the Talwar-class frigates. Defense analysts add that the newer frigates will be equipped with the Brahmos missiles.

There is also the possibility of Russia-India cooperation on Amur-class submarine. Andrei I Baranov, Deputy Director General for Foreign Activities at Rubin Design Bureau which builds these submarines, promised that India will be able to have 80 percent indigenization. The potential for collaboration to jointly develop Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) is also a possibility.

Such defense deals and nuclear energy cooperation should keep the India-Russia relationship afloat for the time being. But they will not assuage New Delhi’s long terms concerns about the increasingly close Russia-China strategic partnership.

What’s Next for the India-Russia Strategic Partnership? - June 16, 2018

I wrote a second piece this week for The Diplomat on what’s next for the India-Russia strategic partnership.

When Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Russian President Vladimir Putin had an “informal” meeting in Sochi in late May, the two leaders discussed a number of bilateral issues such as military and defense cooperation and international issues relevant to both India and Russia. The meeting once again put the attention on the strategic partnership between New Delhi and Moscow, which continues to be significant, but also faces a number of challenges.

For the full essay, click here.



Many of the areas of convergence were unsurprisingly on display during the meeting at Sochi. In terms of outlook, the two leaders endorsed and emphasized the importance of their Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership for global peace and stability and the role of the two in shaping “an open and equitable world order.” Both Modi and Putin underlined the need to develop “a multipolar world order” while increasing consultations and coordination including on the Indo-Pacific, even though the two sides differ in their characterization. Foreign Minister Lavrov, while speaking to the media on the informal summit, talked about it as the Asia-Pacific region, a formulation preferred by China, whereas the Indian Ministry of External Affairs referred to it as the Indo-Pacific region. Putin and Modi also reiterated the importance of continuing their work together in platforms such as the United Nations, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (BRICS), and G-20.

Issue-wise, cooperation in the energy and economic sectors dominated the two leaders’ discussions. The progress seen in the bilateral trade – about 20 percent in 2017 and about 40 percent in the first few months of 2018 – was highlighted by both sides. In an effort to keep up the momentum, the NITI AAYOG and the Russian Ministry of Economic Development will be engaged in an annual strategic economic dialogue.

Nevertheless, it is the civil nuclear energy and defense cooperation that will dominate the relationship. The technical aspects for the construction of the fifth and sixth units of the Kudankulam nuclear power plant (NPP) have been finalized by Rosatom. During a recent visit to the NPP manufacturing site in Rostov sponsored by Rosatom, I was able to witness the progress of these including the units that will be transported to Kudankulam.

More fundamentally, while the two leaders highlighted the tried and tested nature of their partnership, in truth India-Russia ties have been lately going through a rough patch. For more than a decade now, the bilateral relationship has been characterized by increasing strains.

Several factors have contributed to it. For one, in the wake of the Ukraine crisis in 2013, it is clear that Russia wanted China’s support because China’s opinion carries greater weight globally than India’s. This is evident in the continued strategic outreach efforts made by Russia towards China, further reflected in a number of strategic agreements between Moscow and Beijing. The manner in which Putin in 2013 rapidly wrapped up an agreement on natural gas sale to China for 30 years – negotiations that had been dragging on for a decade – was a reflection of Moscow’s eagerness to work with China. This was over and above the earlier deals in 2009 and 2013 for the sale of oil on a long-term basis.

But far more consequential is the Russian sale of weapons systems to China that have direct security implications for India. Moscow’s sale of Su-30 30MKK/MK2 fighters and especially the Su-35 are likely to have an immediate and tangible impact on the Sino-Indian military balance and India’s security. Then there is the sale of S-400 long-range anti-aircraft missiles, which China is reportedly already deploying, though it seems like India may get the same system too.

Second, India’s efforts at diversifying its defense procurement and thus bringing in other partners such as the United States, Israel, and France has also impacted the relations. In the absence of a strong bilateral economic and trade relationship, India-Russia relations must have a robust defense ties and any downgrading of those ties could have adverse impact on the overall state of India-Russia ties. Till a few years ago, India’s largest defense trade partner was Russia, but Israel and the United States have overtaken Russia in the last few years.

Even so, India’s defense inventory continues to be dominated by Soviet/Russian systems, to the tune of close to 70 percent. Also, when it comes to certain critical platforms such as nuclear submarines, Russia’s importance cannot be understated. Therefore, as India engages in the process of diversifying its defense trade partners, perception management and explaining the rationale and imperative to Russia will go a long way in assuaging Moscow’s concerns about India’s leanings.

Third and possibly the most significant has been India’s growing proximity to the United States. Driven by fear of China, India has grown strategically closer to Washington in recent years, though lately New Delhi’s foreign policy leaning may appear a lot more confused. Prime Minister Modi’s Shangri-La Dialogue speech earlier this month in Singapore was a good reflection of this.

These three developments have dampened bilateral relations between India and Russia. For India, the critical question is whether Russia will stand by India in any dispute with China. Moscow’s stand during last year’s Doklam crisis did not inspire much confidence in New Delhi. On the other hand, New Delhi understands that it cannot afford to drive Moscow into Beijing’s hands. Any strategic partnership between Russia and China does not augur well for India. Whether India can do much about this is unclear, but New Delhi is definitely trying.

Russia deployed advanced anti-missile systems close to North Korean border, says reports

It is reported that Russia has deployed its advanced anti-missile systems close to the North Korean border. One of the blogpages citing an MSM report said that the Russian military has deployed its S-400 Triumf system in the Far East. Russia's Chief of the General Staff, Nikolai Makarov, has reportedly told reporters on a trip with President Dmitry Medvedev to Mongolia about the deployment.



The report noted that these systems were tasked to shoot down any missiles that could possibly drift into Russian territory from North Korea. This appeared a plausible situation given the fact that the Russian naval port of Vladivostok is just 93 miles away North Korea. Additionally, in 2006, one of the strayed North Korean missile had reportedly fallen into Russian waters near the port of Nakhoda.

However, there are analysts based in Moscow who are not convinced that Russia has placed these anti-missile systems in the Far East. In fact, Mikhail Barabanov, one of the Russian security analysts went on to suggest that either the General is engaged in a PR exercise or the reporters did not comprehend clearly what the General was saying.

If the Russian military has actually deployed these anti-missile systems to the North Korean borders, it may suggest that there is a sense of wariness and concern on the part of Russia about the North Korean missile- and nuclear-related activities, a similar position held by the US. However, the West does not appear convinced about such concerns on the part of Moscow. However, a more acceptable justification for them may be, if the deployment is linked to the US positioning of missile defence components in Eastern Europe or the US National Missile Defence system including interceptor missiles at Fort Greely, Alaska and Vanderbilt Air Force Base, California. There may be additional concerns on the Obama Administration's plans to set up missile defence bases in Israel and Turkey, and may be in the Balkans too, instead of Poland and the Czech Republic in the face of opposition from Russia. While Israel already hosts a mobile radar system at Negev Desert, one is not certain as to how Turkey will respond to the US proposal.