India’s Defense Chief Opposes Aircraft Carrier Plans - The Diplomat, 14 May 2020

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I write on the Indian military debate about the Navy's plans for a third aircraft carrier. The piece looks at the CDS General Bipin Rawat's comments that reiterated doubts about acquiring a third carrier.

Last week, India’s Chief of Defense Staff General Bipin Rawat said in an interview to an Indian newspaper that the Indian military is not an expeditionary force and should not be deploying forces around the globe. He said that Indian forces have “to guard and fight only along our borders, and, of course, dominate the Indian Ocean Region.” He went on to add that the military services should not seek large imports “by misrepresenting our operational requirements.” He targeted the Indian Navy’s carrier plans, saying that because carriers, as surface vessels, can be “knocked off by missiles,” the Navy should invest more in submarines.

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Rawat’s statements have several implications. Most importantly, it calls into question the Indian Navy’s and the Air Force’s acquisition plans. These are particularly important at a time when China has been both putting pressure on the Sino-Indian border and venturing into the Indian Ocean Region. Rawat’s comments could also bring back concern within the Navy and the Air Force about the Army’s dominance within the Indian military and potentially lead to intensified interservice rivalry among the three services. The creation of the chief of defense staff (CDS) post was meant at least partly to create greater synergy among the services and greater jointness, but that could be at risk if the two smaller services feel the CDS is being partial to the Army.

Clearly, the economic impact and the financial implications of the COVID-19 pandemic is going to be significant. The Indian defense budget allocation over the last two years has been the lowest since the early 1960s, but the COVID-19 impact is likely to lead to further slashing the defense budget. This in turn will affect major defense procurements, particularly for the Navy and Air Force. Both are services that require capital-intensive investment in acquisitions that take longer term planning and a lot of lead time. They are not going to be happy about the CDS’s comments.

This issue has clearly been on Rawat’s mind for some time, and possibly has been under debate within the government too; the CDS was repeating earlier comments. In February this year, Rawat said that the Indian Navy’s request for a third aircraft carrier may not be approved any time soon because the priority is to strengthen the submarine fleet. The CDS cited cost as the major factor for this pushback. Rawat of course has to prioritize the military’s acquisition, depending on the available funds, but cutting down on aircraft carriers is likely not going to be easy. The Indian Navy is already pushing back.

Sources in the Indian Navy are reported to have said that the service is certain about its plans for a third aircraft carrier. They added that “the third aircraft carrier is an operational necessity. It is not that an aircraft carrier can be bought off the shelf. Even if all permissions are given today, it will take 15 years for the carrier to be inducted.” Admiral Karambir Singh, chief of the Indian Navy, previously stated that he was convinced that “the country needs three aircraft carriers, so that two are operational at all times. And it should be 65,000 tonnes with electromagnetic propulsion,” probably a misquoted reference to the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) with which the Navy plans to equip future aircraft carriers. Navy sources have also argued that shore-based aircraft operations, as indicated by the CDS, will be limited in terms of range.

India currently has one operational aircraft carrier, the INS Vikramaditya, which can host around 30 aircraft. The second, INS Vikrant, is still being built at the Cochin shipyard in south India, and is expected to be operational only by 2022, though even that is likely an optimistic timeline.

But Rawat’s emphasis on dominance in the Indian Ocean Region also cannot be addressed adequately if he plans to shrink the naval budget. Both Prime Minister Narendra Modi and External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar have emphasized an ambitious agenda for the Indian Ocean Region. To play an effective role in this vast maritime space, India would need a much higher number of ships. A falling naval budget would not permit this. India’s declining submarine fleet has been an additional matter of concern. With only 13 operational submarines, many of which are old, India cannot match the more capable navies in the Indo-Pacific, such as those of China and Japan. Unless India adds to its submarine fleet quickly, it may move down to the level of Pakistan, which has just eight operational submarines.

But the budget woes are unlikely to ease. The CDS and the Army leadership are also likely come under pressure to seriously think about downsizing the Army. With a strength of around 1.4 million personnel, the Indian Army is the world’s largest land force, followed by North Korea and China. China, in its attempt at modernizing its military, reduced the size of its Army by half and is now increasing its emphasis on the People’s Liberation Army Navy and Air Force. Pensions and salaries are becoming the biggest burden on the military budget and crowding out capital investments and much of this is the result of India’s massive army. The CDS is right in arguing for budget prioritization, but this might lead to calls for pruning the Army.

The Russia-China military exercise: Implications for Asian Military Balance - September 13, 2018

I write for the #ObserverResearchFoundation #Raisina Files on the ongoing #Russia-#China military exercise and the possible implications for Asian military balance.



Russia is hosting this week its largest war games, Vostok-2018. This is considered by the far the largest war games that Russia has held since the end of the Cold War. The Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu had said that Vostok-2018 (East-2018), scheduled to take place in Russia’s central and eastern military districts, will see the participation of almost 300,000 troops, over 1,000 military aircraft, two of Russia’s naval fleets, and all its airborne units. Shoigu also said that this “will be the biggest military exercise since 1981.” He added that “it will be unprecedented in terms of geographic scope and the strength of command and control centers and forces due to participate.” Justifying the Vostok-2018, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said that this is “essential” as it has to have the capability and capacity to defend itself under the prevailing international situation, which Moscow characterises as “often aggressive and unfriendly toward our country.” In addition to the Russian armed forces, Vostok-2018 will see the participation of the Chinese and Mongolian militaries. China said that it will send “about 3,200 troops, along with more than 900 pieces of weaponry and 30 fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters.” Russian analysts say that the Russia-China partnership is a “de facto military alliance, purposefully not codified to maintain ambiguity.”

More critically, the Russia-China military drills in September will demonstrate their growing closeness at a time when the US has referred to Russia and China as two “revisionist powers” that are “attempting to erode American security and prosperity.”

The strengthened strategic engagement between Russia and China especially in the defence and security sectors has important implications for the Asian military balance. To give only one example, India, one of Russia’s closest partners, will be increasingly worried about what Moscow’s growing closeness to Beijing will mean for the future of the India-Russia relationship.

For the full essay, click here.



For long, Russia has remained concerned about NATO’s eastward expansion and the military exercises are a way of possibly deterring any military action its close neighbourhood. The war games also come in the backdrop of the increasingly worsening political and strategic ties between Russia and the West, primarily driven by the Russia’s Crimea annexation in 2014. The accusations of the Russian election meddling in the US and Europe have not helped the situation. Since the Ukraine crisis, Russia has sought stronger strategic partnership with China. Speaking about the Chinese participation in Vostok-2018, the Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said that it is a sign of the expanded partnership between the two sides. Though China has come out and said that the war games are not targeted at any particular country, suspicions abound among the NATO states, especially those close to Russian borders. In a press statement, NATO’s acting Deputy spokesperson, Dylan White noted that they “fit into a pattern we have seen over some time: a more assertive Russia, significantly increasing its defence budget and its military presence.”

Since 2009, Russian has held periodic military exercises, usually every four years. However, since the Crimean annexation, NATO has been far more concerned about these war games. For instance, last year’s Zapad-2017 exercise covered a vast area from Belarus’ and Russia’s western borders up into the Arctic.. Although Moscow claimed only 12,000 troops took part in it, Western countries put the number at around 100,000. Similarly, Russia’s 15-day war games in the North Caucus region, bordering Georgia, also led to concerns in Georgia and other countries.

Russia has its own concerns about NATO exercises involving East European countries, many of which simulate defense against a Russian attack. Earlier this summer, 19 countries came together in the Sabre Strike exercise, which took place in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland and simulated a scenario of a Russian attack. In yet another show of strength among the western allies, 13 countries including the UK came together recently to conduct the Noble Partner exercises in Vaziani, outside Georgia’s capital Tbilisi. This is the fourth time that Georgia was hosting the Noble Partner exercise. Even though Georgia is not a NATO member, it contributes to the NATO Response Force and NATO has justified these exercises saying that there is a genuine Russia threat, especially for Eastern Europe member states. Russia on the other hand criticised these exercises saying that the US-led west is creating “Russophobia” and that these exercises could possibly bolster “militarist sentiments” and exacerbate the tensions.

The inevitability of these exercises by Russia and the NATO members (four non-NATO member countries – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Ukraine – also do take part in these exercises) are understandable given the state of hostile relations between the two sides. But these exercises also increase the possibilities of accidental conflict and aggravate the already-tense political relationships. But more critically, the Russia-China military drills in September will demonstrate their growing closeness at a time when the US has referred to Russia and China as two “revisionist powers” that are “attempting to erode American security and prosperity.” Though Russia continues to be somewhat suspicious and wary of China’s growing military might, the so-called tactical relationship between Moscow and Beijing seems to be becoming a lot more strategic. As some experts have pointed out, “while there is still a lot of distrust between Moscow and Beijing, Moscow sees no other choice but to work with China, especially as relations with the US remain unstable and Chinese financial support is needed to mitigate the effects of Western sanctions.” China has stated that its participation will consolidate “the China-Russia comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination, deepening pragmatic and friendly cooperation between the two armies, and further strengthening their ability to jointly deal with varied security threats, which are conducive to safeguarding regional peace and security.” Other experts have pointed out, Russia did not want China to get the wrong impression that these exercises were aimed at Beijing. Chinese military source were also reported to have said that they are looking forward to learning from Russia’s recent military experience in Syria as “The PLA is the only major military force that has no real battle experience and it is very eager to get its hands on some real lessons.”

The strengthened strategic engagement between Russia and China especially in the defence and security sectors has important implications for the Asian military balance. To give only one example, India, one of Russia’s closest partners, will be increasingly worried about what Moscow’s growing closeness to Beijing will mean for the future of the India-Russia relationship.