tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16531350381824360322024-02-19T12:24:47.304+05:30Raji's Indian Security PageRajihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12428075941644054406noreply@blogger.comBlogger426125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1653135038182436032.post-68899941337979257062021-01-26T23:08:00.026+05:302021-04-12T12:57:43.917+05:302020 - A challenging year yet a satisfying year, professionally<div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial;">2020 has remained a challenging year for the world around and I was no exception. Personally, it was a trying year with a lot of dislocations. Nevertheless, it has been a satisfying year, professionally speaking. </span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><span style="clear: left; float: left; font-family: arial; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="2048" data-original-width="2048" height="401" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjrBiwEONbO3Bu-X2hdBCfqHVePHaZha8U6akEbZGj6XS5gG2_JU1aIgOtnbQzye8aGfwY273b4tFmcKP63CrnbZd3ug0bx8Gv9epZ0Q5uH4esXMrDZhZ9-26_8qsE51OrNjM7YAMKdZWRD/w401-h401/Ek8yRjSVkAAaJcq.jpeg" width="401" /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial;">In March 2020, I was offered to join the </span><a href="https://perthusasia.edu.au/" style="font-family: arial;">Perth USAsia Centre</a><span style="font-family: arial;"> as part of their </span><a href="https://perthusasia.edu.au/blog/perth-usasia-centre-appoints-new-indo-pacific-fell" style="font-family: arial;">inaugural </a><span style="background-color: white; font-family: arial;"><a href="https://perthusasia.edu.au/blog/perth-usasia-centre-appoints-new-indo-pacific-fell">Indo-Pacific Fellow</a> programme for a period of nine months. While I represented India, there were colleagues, one each from Australia, Japan, Indonesia and Vietnam. It was a very fulfilling experience. As part of the fellowship, I did a number of essays <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ONqyXt--reg&list=LL&index=32&t=1750s">and</a> <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kXd2yzMohMw&list=LL&index=83&t=718s">webinars</a>: <a href="https://perthusasia.edu.au/getattachment/Our-Work/Towards-a-Quad-Plus-Arrangement/PU-160-Quad-0421b-WEB.pdf.aspx?lang=en-AU">Towards A Quad-Plus Arrangement?</a>; <a href="https://perthusasia.edu.au/getattachment/a56d4210-6d06-484e-a4a8-cf5f09ddaab6/PU-173-V9-India(2)-WEB.pdf.aspx?lang=en-AU">Uneasy Contradictions Continue in India's Strategic Engagements</a>; </span><a href="https://perthusasia.edu.au/getattachment/Our-Work/Analysis-Briefs-vol-16/PU-188-V16-Raji-WEB.pdf.aspx?lang=en-AU" style="font-family: arial;">Countering ChineseAssertiveness: India’sChanging Posture in the Indian Ocean</a><span style="font-family: arial;">; and a forthcoming one, looking at how India-Australia relations will continue to get stronger in the face of an aggressive China. </span></div><div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span lang="EN-US" style="line-height: 18.5467px;">I got a peer reviewed journal article, "<a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10736700.2019.1717144">India's Emerging Space Assets and Nuclear-Weapons Capabilities</a>" published in <i>The Non-proliferation Review</i> in March 2020. </span><span>In this article, I argue that o</span><span>ver the last five decades, India’s nuclear and space programs have gone through several phases, from collaboration to divorce to supportive. An interplay of two factors determined the nature of the relationship. One was the state of India’s nuclear-weapon program. The second was international conditions, especially India’s relationship with the nuclear-nonproliferation regime. In the early decades, because of the rudimentary nature of India’s nuclear and space programs, the relationship was collaborative, since the rocket technology being developed was a necessary adjunct to the nuclear-weapon program. Subsequently, as India’s rocketry capabilities and nuclear-weapon program began to mature and concerns about international sanctions under the non-proliferation regime began to grow, the two programs were separated. The Indian rocketry program was also divided, with the civilian-space and ballistic-missile programs clearly demarcated. After India declared itself a nuclear-weapon state in 1998 and the programs matured, the relationship has become more supportive. As the two programs mature further, this relationship is likely to deepen, as the nuclear-weapon program requires space assets to build a robust and survivable nuclear deterrent force. </span></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span><span style="background-color: white; font-family: arial;"><br /></span></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="background-color: white;">In May 2020, the Office of Principal Scientific Adviser to the Government of India and the Department of Science and Technology invited me to be part of the process of formulating India's new </span><span style="background-color: white;">Science, Technology, and Innovation Policy (</span><span class="il" style="background-color: white;">STIP</span><span style="background-color: white;"> </span><span class="il" style="background-color: white;">2020</span><span style="background-color: white;">). </span><span lang="EN-US" style="line-height: 18.5467px;">As part of the <span class="il">STIP</span> <span class="il">2020</span> policy drafting exercise, 21 thematic groups (TGs) were constituted and I was asked to be a <a href="http://thesciencepolicyforum.org/thematic-groups/">member and Co-Chair of the <b>TG-</b></a></span><b><span lang="EN-US" style="line-height: 18.5467px;"><a href="http://thesciencepolicyforum.org/thematic-groups/">Strategic Technologies</a></span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="line-height: 18.5467px;">. It was such an honour and privilege for me to part of this exercise, discussing and coming up with recommendations on India's strategic technologies. The report should be out within a few months, I guess. </span></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: arial; line-height: 18.5467px;"><br /></span></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: arial; line-height: 18.5467px;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><span><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;"><span style="text-align: justify;"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhb1xR1In5OSIgoe2XkgTh8Mbks_glrdQgkddunjdqi8Fl6MT5DozRcMnItyu8QboSxidyj80wzv6RAqHlVgyFpffSMeqaNag5swbsWuVZFdabrfImOXknqybgvMrQKfaB6qh2Umv_vbP3C/s2048/Raji+WEF+India+Summit.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1365" data-original-width="2048" height="133" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhb1xR1In5OSIgoe2XkgTh8Mbks_glrdQgkddunjdqi8Fl6MT5DozRcMnItyu8QboSxidyj80wzv6RAqHlVgyFpffSMeqaNag5swbsWuVZFdabrfImOXknqybgvMrQKfaB6qh2Umv_vbP3C/w200-h133/Raji+WEF+India+Summit.jpg" width="200" /></a></div><div style="text-align: center;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;"><span style="text-align: justify;"><br /></span></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;"><span style="text-align: justify;">In October 202, I was invited to be part of the Editorial Board of </span><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/toc/fasi20/current" style="text-align: justify;">Asian Security</a><span style="text-align: justify;">. It is one of the top ranking journals on various aspects of national and international security in Asia. I am honoured and delighted to be joining the journal in this capacity. </span></div></span></div></div></span></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-US" style="line-height: 18.5467px;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span><span lang="EN-US" style="line-height: 18.5467px;">In November 2020, I was part of the Bloomberg-Intelligence Squared US debate, "That's Debatable - Is A U.S.-China Space Race Good for Humanity?". The debate was aired on November 7, 2020 and it is available at: </span></span>https://www.intelligencesquaredus.org/debates/us-china-space-race-good-humanity<span>. American theoretical physicist, Prof. Michio Kaku and I argued against the motion, and Prof. Avi Loeb and Bidhushi Bhattacharya argued for the motion, and so well-moderated by John Donvan. This was so much fun and we won</span> the debate. </span></div><span style="font-family: arial;"><div class="css-1dbjc4n r-xoduu5" style="-webkit-box-align: stretch; -webkit-box-direction: normal; -webkit-box-orient: vertical; align-items: stretch; background-color: #15202b; border: 0px solid black; box-sizing: border-box; color: white; display: inline-flex; flex-basis: auto; flex-direction: column; flex-shrink: 0; margin: 0px; min-height: 0px; min-width: 0px; padding: 0px; position: relative; white-space: pre-wrap; z-index: 0;"></div></span><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial;">I thought I will highlight some of my professional activities here but I have updated my blog with most of these developments on a reasonably regular basis. </span></div></div></div></div>Rajihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12428075941644054406noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1653135038182436032.post-30219932631601684032021-01-07T22:16:00.008+05:302021-01-12T09:49:29.017+05:30India-Russia Relations Face More Trouble - The Diplomat, 31 December 2020<span style="font-family: inherit;">In my last essay for the year, I wrote a short <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/12/india-russia-relations-face-more-trouble/">essay</a> on India-Russia relations for <a href="https://thediplomat.com/">The Diplomat</a>. The immediate context of course was the cancelled annual bilateral summit, a first in two decades. Was Covid-19 the reason or did the China factor influence the decision? </span><div><br /><div><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEghHLVCmQoB2m5uEFMVPrQjKEaFLvZFL5yVlzG-dCARqGv4PUka28jDIeZ7rmNe24Anhbye9JIuILhPREwoKwJ_jqWHFzOeJoxwgfMqSRlJZUbVTEDEhaQ-0oDim8CowKBiqDjJx_W31_aD/s600/thediplomat-2020-12-31-3.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="419" data-original-width="600" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEghHLVCmQoB2m5uEFMVPrQjKEaFLvZFL5yVlzG-dCARqGv4PUka28jDIeZ7rmNe24Anhbye9JIuILhPREwoKwJ_jqWHFzOeJoxwgfMqSRlJZUbVTEDEhaQ-0oDim8CowKBiqDjJx_W31_aD/s320/thediplomat-2020-12-31-3.jpg" width="320" /></a></div><div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;">India and Russia have gone through several ups and downs in their decades-old bilateral relationship. The two appear at present to be going through a tricky phase. The two-decade old India-Russia annual summit was cancelled for the first time. A news report in India </span><a href="https://theprint.in/diplomacy/india-russia-annual-summit-postponed-for-1st-time-in-two-decades-amid-moscows-unease-with-quad/572160/" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">suggested that</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"> the postponement was the result of “severe reservations on New Delhi joining the Indo-Pacific initiative and Quad.” India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) spokesperson responded by </span><a href="https://mea.gov.in/response-to-queries.htm?dtl/33333/Official_Spokespersons_response_to_a_media_report_regarding_the_IndiaRussia_Annual_Summit" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">saying</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;">, “The India-Russia Annual Summit did not take place in 2020 because of the COVID pandemic. This was a mutually agreed decision between the two Governments. Any imputation otherwise is false and misleading. Spreading false stories on important relationships is particularly irresponsible.” The Russian side also responded with a </span><a href="https://twitter.com/AshaDwarakanath/status/1341800928823939074/photo/1" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">statement</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"> saying that it is in “close touch” with its counterparts in India to finalize new dates for the summit, “postponed due to epidemiological reasons.” </span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">But such denials are unlikely to entirely remove speculation about the state of bilateral relations, especially considering that India has taken part in a large number of bilateral and multilateral talks virtually, even if the pandemic has prevented physical meetings. </span><div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">For the full essay, click <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/12/india-russia-relations-face-more-trouble/">here</a>. </span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">Moreover, overall speculation about difficulties in the relationship is not exactly new. There has been a lot of it, especially because of comments from senior Russian officials, such as Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, on India’s Quad and Indo-Pacific policy. Russian officials have repeatedly criticized the idea of the Indo-Pacific and the Quad, arguing that it is meant to contain China. Lavrov </span><a href="https://thewire.in/diplomacy/russia-indo-pacific-criticism-double-down" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">publicly stated</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> so at the annual Raisina Dialogue in New Delhi in January 2020. More recently, Lavrov </span><a href="https://www.mid.ru/web/guest/evropejskij-souz-es/-/asset_publisher/6OiYovt2s4Yc/content/id/4470074?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_6OiYovt2s4Yc&_101_INSTANCE_6OiYovt2s4Yc_languageId=en_GB" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">returned to the theme</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">,</span><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> saying at the general meeting of the Russian International Affairs Council in Moscow on December 8 that “India is currently an object of the Western countries’ persistent, aggressive and devious policy as they are trying to engage it in anti-China games by promoting Indo-Pacific strategies, the so-called ‘Quad’ while at the same time the West is attempting to undermine our close partnership and privileged relations with India.”</span></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">Indian officials and public commentators are increasingly miffed at this lack of sensitivity to Indian concerns about China, especially coming after China’s intrusion in Ladakh this year, which led to a bloody clash and Indian casualties. Even the normally cautious Indian foreign ministry was forced to respond, with the MEA spokesperson</span><a href="https://mea.gov.in/media-briefings.htm?dtl/33329/Transcript_of_Virtual_Weekly_Media_Briefing_by_the_Official_Spokesperson_11th_December_2020" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> stating</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> that India has always had an independent foreign policy based on its own national interests, that India’s Indo-Pacific approach was not directed at any particular country, and that India stands for a free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific. He also </span><a href="https://thewire.in/diplomacy/india-pulls-focus-to-independent-foreign-policy-in-response-to-lavrovs-anti-china-camp-claim" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">added</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">,</span><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> for good measure, that “India’s relationship with each country is independent of its relations with third countries. We hope that this is well understood and appreciated by all our partners.” </span></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">All of this is coming at a time when the India-China relationship is in one of its worst phases. India’s External Affairs Minister Dr. S Jaishankar while speaking at an Australian think tank, the Lowy Institute, </span><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WCClGHqh1-8" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">commented</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> that India and China are “at the most difficult phase of our relationship” in the last three or four decades and that the relations between the two were “</span><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BA52q7LWQSA" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">very significantly damaged</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">” over the past year. </span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">These damages are unlikely to be undone easily. It took several decades to rebuild relations after the 1962 Sino-Indian border war, but the progress made since 1988 has been entirely lost with the current Galwan clash, provoked by China in an effort to unilaterally change the status quo on the border. </span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">Russian comments have led to some criticism in India of Moscow’s position and are increasingly eroding public support that the relationship always had. But there are contrarian voices too. In fact, Rahul Gandhi, leader of India’s main opposition party, the Indian National Congress, criticized the government’s decision to cancel the annual summit with Russia in a tweet </span><a href="https://twitter.com/RahulGandhi/status/1341726740603781120" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">saying</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">, “Russia is a very important friend of India. Damaging our traditional relationships is short-sighted and dangerous for our future.” It should be noted, of course, that it was the Congress-led UPA government that joined the Quad the first time, back in 2007. It was the same UPA government that has also strengthened the strategic partnership with the United States, including by signing the U.S.-India civil nuclear deal. </span></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">While Russia’s dependence on China is understandable considering its worsening relations with the West, Moscow cannot expect India to ignore its national security concerns regarding China. And as I have </span><a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/the-sino-indian-clash-russia-in-the-middle/" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">written</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> previously, a China-India crisis invariably puts Russia in a tight spot, with difficult choices between India, a traditional partner and also a lucrative defense market, and its newfound but mighty partner, China. For India, it will be increasingly difficult to see China as a partner. Finding common ground and partnering with a neighbor that has aggressively pursued a salami slicing strategy at India’s expense will be difficult. In order to build appropriate diplomatic and defense response against its aggressive eastern neighbor, India will need to partner with like-minded states that have also borne the brunt of Chinese aggressive behavior. Moscow will either have to understand this reality or risk further hurting its ties with India. </span></span></div></div></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><br /></span></div></span></div></div></div>Rajihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12428075941644054406noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1653135038182436032.post-78457101833284078262020-12-28T22:24:00.000+05:302020-12-28T22:24:02.112+05:30India-Vietnam Virtual Summit Strengthens Partnership - The Diplomat, 28 December 2020<span style="font-family: inherit;">In my latest column for <a href="https://thediplomat.com/">The Diplomat</a>, I <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/12/india-vietnam-virtual-summit-strengthens-partnership/">looked</a> at the recently-concluded India-Vietnam virtual summit meeting and how the strategic necessity of dealing with an aggressive China brings India and Vietnam closer together. </span><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjGPXcQtJj76TDbBmq7djeqsksa62wa9HuKqJKdpWCAAhBhpCVRgZamxhC5PECSIPUj0W28PxfBA5309OCdlLzBndmW069HWAFtx4WzLYEj2ZaS10GrmctqsdmILkjACqkNHfec2y_tgrIb/s2048/1608559650_Epwt7PSVQAQs5Fv.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="674" data-original-width="2048" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjGPXcQtJj76TDbBmq7djeqsksa62wa9HuKqJKdpWCAAhBhpCVRgZamxhC5PECSIPUj0W28PxfBA5309OCdlLzBndmW069HWAFtx4WzLYEj2ZaS10GrmctqsdmILkjACqkNHfec2y_tgrIb/s320/1608559650_Epwt7PSVQAQs5Fv.jpg" width="320" /></a></div><span style="font-family: inherit;">Earlier last week, India and Vietnam held a virtual summit between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Vietnamese counterpart Nguyen Xuan Phuc. India and Vietnam have held a number of meetings and consultations this year leading up to the summit.</span></div><div><div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">For the full post, click <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/12/india-vietnam-virtual-summit-strengthens-partnership/">here</a>. </span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;">Modi, during his remarks at the summit, </span><a href="https://mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/33323/English_Translation_of_Prime_Ministers_opening_remarks_at_the_IndiaVietnam_Virtual_Summit" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">lauded</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"> Vietnam’s important role in India’s Act East Policy and as an “important partner of our Indo-Pacific Vision.” He highlighted the “long-term and strategic view” of the India-Vietnam relationship and the breadth and depth of their bilateral ties. He also underlined the importance of their shared purpose of “peace, stability and prosperity” for the Indo-Pacific region.</span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;">The two leaders also </span><a href="https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/33325/List_of_Outcomes_India__Vietnam_Virtual_Summit_December_21_2020" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">signed</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"> a joint vision document, “India-Vietnam Joint Vision for Peace, Prosperity and People.” The document is meant to drive the future of the India-Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, based on their “deep-rooted historical and cultural bonds, shared values and interests, and mutual strategic trust and understanding between the two countries.” The two countries also signed a “Plan of Action for period 2021-2023 for further implementation of Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” in order to strengthen their bilateral partnership with a clear agenda for the next two years, as well as seven other agreements that cover a number of important areas of cooperation including defense, nuclear safety and radiation protection, petro-chemicals, clean energy, and U.N. peacekeeping.</span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;">The fact that India and Vietnam have been at the receiving end of the China’s aggressive behavior in the South China Sea and on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) has made the partnership even stronger. Given China’s aggressive behavior in South China Sea, which has remained a significant challenge for Vietnam, the </span><a href="https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/33324/India++Vietnam+Joint+Vision+for+Peace+Prosperity+and+People" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">joint vision document</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"> devoted attention to it. The very first paragraph of their “joint vision” highlighted a “shared commitment to international law” and agreement to “work towards achieving a peaceful, stable, secure, free, open, inclusive and rules-based region.”</span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">With this strategic factor in mind, the focus on defense cooperation was inevitable. The joint statement laid emphasis on the implementation of the high speed guard boat (HSGB) manufacturing project with the Vietnam Border Guard Command. The project is being implemented through a $100 million defense line of credit already extended by India to Vietnam. The project, according to the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) would involve also “handing over of one completed HSGB to Vietnam; launch of two HSGBs manufactured in India; and keel-laying of seven HSGBs to be manufactured in Vietnam.”</span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;">The joint vision document from the summit also recognized the importance of enhanced bilateral defense partnership in the context of the changing geopolitical and geoeconomic environment in the region and beyond. The document </span><a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1682468" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">highlighted</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"> how a strengthened defense and security collaboration between India and Vietnam could be “an important factor of stability in the Indo-Pacific region.” To this end, the two sides agreed to augment military-to-military exchanges, training, and capacity building engagements between the two militaries including the coast guard. India and Vietnam also agreed to step up defense industry partnerships, taking advantage of the Indian credit lines already extended to Vietnam. More importantly, the two countries also decided to formalize their partnership by further institutionalizing defense exchanges through a number of programs including mutual logistics support, regular ship visits, joint exercises, and exchanges in military science and technology. The document also identified the decision to work through institutionalized dialogue structures in dealing with traditional and non-traditional security threats in some of the technology domains such as outer space and cyber space as well as a range of threats such as health security, natural disasters, terrorism, and transnational crimes through strengthened legal cooperation. </span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;">This iteration comes against the backdrop of Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh’s bilateral meeting with his Vietnamese counterpart General Ngo Xuan Lich in November, which </span><a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1676523" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">emphasized</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"> defense collaboration as “a key pillar of Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” between the two countries. In addition to defense industry collaboration, the two sides </span><a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1676523" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">concluded</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"> an “</span><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;">Implementing Arrangement for cooperation in the field of Hydrography between National Hydrographic Office, India and Vietnam Hydrographic Office” at the earlier virtual defense ministers meeting. The sharing of hydrographic data will help in developing navigational charts by both countries. The two countries also agreed to produce an institutionalized framework agreement for industry collaboration soon. India also agreed to step up the scope and level of training extended to Vietnam military personnel in the Indian defense training institutions.</span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;">Vietnam has remained interested in the acquisition of a range of weapons and platforms from India, including the Akash air defense system and the Brahmos supersonic cruise missiles. These two systems have been on the India-Vietnam </span><a href="https://thediplomat.com/2018/12/can-india-break-into-vietnams-defense-market/" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">defense trade agenda</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"> for a long time but have not materialized yet. The possible sale of Brahmos systems to Vietnam was initially problematic from a Russian perspective, but those issues have reportedly been </span><a href="https://thewire.in/security/india-vietnam-brahmos-missile" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">resolved</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;">.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">While there has been historically strong strategic affinity between India and Vietnam, these bonds have become stronger, driven by the strategic necessity of dealing with an aggressive China that has been questioning the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both countries.</span></div></div></div>Rajihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12428075941644054406noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1653135038182436032.post-35665886843147631722020-12-18T22:32:00.000+05:302020-12-18T22:32:00.439+05:30India-Iran-Uzbekistan Pursue Central Asian Connectivity - The Diplomat, 18 December 2020<span style="font-family: inherit;">In my column for <a href="https://thediplomat.com/">The Diplomat</a> this week, I <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/12/india-iran-uzbekistan-pursue-central-asian-connectivity/">looked</a> at India-Iran-Uzbekistan plans for Central Asian connectivity. The region has its fair share of great power politics, but the Iranian port of Chabahar has the potential to shift some of the regional dynamics in India's favor. </span><div><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgM_qkK6JDjPzjNoWCCgWb39bs0M13PW7mY-P7ISP0H67Nl8YIWkbIpdJD62U1FIU_KrIOHeEbcy1GiiJ8AkZbvlE-Rtvv9zsuRQTbsr6-8zC5NfdPJDLcGQk1bdaVoAasv69opHGFgci9v/s600/thediplomat-2020-12-18-7.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="239" data-original-width="600" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgM_qkK6JDjPzjNoWCCgWb39bs0M13PW7mY-P7ISP0H67Nl8YIWkbIpdJD62U1FIU_KrIOHeEbcy1GiiJ8AkZbvlE-Rtvv9zsuRQTbsr6-8zC5NfdPJDLcGQk1bdaVoAasv69opHGFgci9v/s320/thediplomat-2020-12-18-7.jpg" width="320" /></a></div><div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;">India, Iran, and Uzbekistan have held their first trilateral meeting for possible joint use of Chabahar port. The </span><a href="https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/33295/First+Trilateral+Working+Group+Meeting+between+India+Iran+and+Uzbekistan+on+joint+use+of+Chabahar+Port" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">meeting</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"> was chaired jointly by India’s Secretary of Shipping Sanjeev Ranjan, Uzbekistan’s Deputy Minister of Transport Davron Dehkanov, and Iran’s Deputy Transport Minister Shahram Adamnejad. Using Chabahar port for trade and transit purposes as well as strengthened regional connectivity were the key agenda items at the meeting. India’s keenness to explore this option comes from its desire to extend connectivity into Eurasia. Double landlocked Uzbekistan has also been interested in using the port for transit facilities into the Indian Ocean and as a means to expand its trade and transit options. That Uzbekistan has already developed rail connectivity into Afghanistan as a means to link with Iranian railway lines reflects Tashkent’s seriousness. Other Central Asian states like </span><a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-uzbek-iran-dec-14-trilateral-meet-on-chabahar-port-to-push-connectivity-in-eurasia/articleshow/79691604.cms" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">Kazakhstan</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"> have also been interested in exploring such options. </span></div><div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">For the full post, click <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/12/india-iran-uzbekistan-pursue-central-asian-connectivity/">here</a>. </span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">Given the geostrategic location of Central Asia, the region is also witnessing a fair share of great power competition. While the region is viewed as Russia’s immediate backyard and Moscow has traditionally maintained a dominant role in relations with Central Asia, China has steadily strengthened its footprint. India has also been pursuing both geopolitical and economic ties with the region. </span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">Chabahar has the potential to shift some of the regional dynamics in India’s favor. First, it could prove to be a gateway to Central Asia and Eurasia, which can, most importantly, avoid Pakistan. A year ago, the Trump administration exempted India from sanctions for the development of the port because of the benefits it potentially had for both India and Afghanistan. A Trump administration official </span><a href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/us-gives-narrow-exemption-to-india-from-sanctions-on-chabahar-for-afghan-aid-official/articleshow/72884455.cms" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">said</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">, “We have provided a narrow exemption for the development of Chabahar that allows for the construction of the port and rail line that allows for the export of refined oil products to Afghanistan.” </span></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">This week’s trilateral meeting is </span><a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/india-pushes-connectivity-initiatives-in-eurasia-through-uzbekistan-iran/articleshow/79725177.cms" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">reported</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> to be an outcome of last week’s India-Uzbekistan bilateral summit between India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev. This is clearly an effort at exploring an alternate option for Central Asia to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). India has long historic connections to Central Asia, but its relations with the region waned for a number of reasons, most importantly the partition of the Indian subcontinent and the creation of Pakistan, which blocked Indian access to the region. Since coming to office, Modi has made fresh efforts to </span><a href="https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13603-uzbekistans-significance-in-indias-central-asia-policy.html" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">re-establish</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> linkages with the region, calling Central Asia a part of the country’s extended neighborhood. </span></span></div></div></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">But lack of physical connectivity has proven to be a major hurdle in building trade and economic ties. Modi became the </span><a href="https://www.orfonline.org/research/pm-modis-well-timed-visit-to-central-asia/" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">first</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> Indian leader to travel to all five Central Asian republics – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan – in 2015. In addition to energy security cooperation, India and Central Asia have both shunned Islamic terrorism and extremist ideology. Fighting cross-border terrorism has become an important common issue shaping their agenda. India has also been stepping up </span><a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/blogs/et-commentary/pm-modis-central-asia-tour-brings-region-back-into-focus/" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">defense cooperation</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> with the region, with a defense attaché posted in each of the Indian missions in Central Asia. Among the Central Asian republics, Uzbekistan has emerged as one of the more proactive players in its engagement with India. The two countries signed a civil nuclear agreement in January 2019, under which Uzbekistan agreed to supply India with </span><a href="https://m.economictimes.com/news/defence/india-inks-deal-to-get-uranium-supply-from-uzbekistan/articleshow/67596635.cms" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">uranium</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">. </span></span></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">Regional connectivity and infrastructure projects have also been high on Uzbekistan’s </span><a href="https://thediplomat.com/2018/04/connecting-asia-uzbekistan-looks-to-capitalize-on-central-asias-transport-potential/" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">agenda</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">. Seeing Chabahar port as a connectivity solution for Uzbekistan is not new either. In fact, in June 2018, following an earlier meeting between Modi and Mirziyoyev on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit, then-Indian Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale </span><a href="https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/india-uzbekistan-to-route-their-trade-though-chabahar/article24127666.ece" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">said</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> the two leaders were keen to use Chabahar port as an additional connectivity route. </span></span></span></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></span></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">Not surprisingly, at last week’s bilateral summit meeting between India and Uzbekistan, infrastructure and connectivity projects figured prominently. The two countries signed </span><a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-uzbekistan-sign-nine-pacts-at-virtual-summit-set-to-widen-counterterror-partnership/articleshow/79684014.cms" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">nine agreements</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> including on counterterrorism and infrastructure-related issues. Both Modi and Mirziyoyev agreed to pursue connectivity projects via the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). INSTC is a multi-modal infrastructure initiative spanning around 7,200 km. It encompasses a network of ship, rail and road routes for transporting freight between India, Iran, Afghanistan, Central Asia, Azerbaijan, and Europe, with the goal of creating transport linkages among major cities including Astrakhan, Baku, Bandar Abbas, Moscow, and Mumbai. Feasibility studies undertaken so far has shown significant reduction of transportation costs, to the tune of </span><a href="https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/lead-article-iran-deal-spells-good-tidings-for-india/article7085906.ece" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">$2,500 per 15 tons of cargo</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">. India is “</span><a href="https://theprint.in/diplomacy/india-iran-uzbekistan-hold-trilateral-meet-discuss-ways-for-joint-use-of-chabahar-port/566772/" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">pitching for</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">” Uzbek participation in the INSTC connectivity project. </span></span></span></span></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></span></span></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">India’s push with the trilateral arrangement for Uzbekistan to use Chabahar port is important in the context of expanding bilateral, trilateral, as well as broader regional cooperation. But more significantly, it is a geopolitical move aimed at countering growing Chinese influence in the region. India has capacity issues in this regard compared to China, but New Delhi is planning on cashing in on existing projects to expand its reach and linkages so that the Central Asian republics have an alternative to China’s BRI. </span></span></span></span></span></div></div>Rajihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12428075941644054406noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1653135038182436032.post-52028017505504531172020-12-15T10:56:00.002+05:302020-12-15T10:56:23.922+05:30Assessing the British Proposal on Space Security - The Diplomat, 10 December 2020<span style="font-family: inherit;">In my column for <a href="https://thediplomat.com/">The Diplomat</a> last week, I <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/12/assessing-the-british-proposal-on-space-security/">looked</a> at the recent UK proposal on space security governance. That the UK proposal emphasizes a bottom-up approach and stresses trust-building are important. It is a critical first step. </span><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg07b4Py9tcdtjn1FCOjPW1LwaMgKqkNoL_fp09P5ek1tAIDAfWEDJHGuYnloIKvJfEgdtAFaaXYV-_vDXd4Y12p_v56KWZ0gZXELYOuYEEmfywDzy4G58Avz_m9VkcqbSolWsBqrBh_9Tw/s1280/Space-Security-1280x720.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="720" data-original-width="1280" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg07b4Py9tcdtjn1FCOjPW1LwaMgKqkNoL_fp09P5ek1tAIDAfWEDJHGuYnloIKvJfEgdtAFaaXYV-_vDXd4Y12p_v56KWZ0gZXELYOuYEEmfywDzy4G58Avz_m9VkcqbSolWsBqrBh_9Tw/s320/Space-Security-1280x720.jpg" width="320" /></a></div><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;">Space security issues have potentially serious consequences. The consequences of either a deliberate or even an accidental conflict in space are too horrible to contemplate. A day without the utility provided by outer space is difficult to even conceive and yet the actions of states might lead the world in that direction sooner than later. Unless states take measures to restrain some kinds of activities in space, access to space will not be safe, secure,</span><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"> or guaranteed. </span></span></div><div><div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">For the full post, click <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/12/assessing-the-british-proposal-on-space-security/">here</a>. </span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">Because of the highly competitive and contested nature of major power relations today, even peaceful applications and technological developments such as On-Orbit Satellite Servicing or technologies to tackle space debris are viewed with much suspicion. There are also more specific space security threats – the return of anti-satellite (ASAT) testing, and cyber and electronic warfare in space, for example. Any satellite service disruption or damage will have a wide-ranging impact, one that cannot be contained to the security or economic sectors alone, and one that cannot be limited geographically either given the significant global dependence on space. Space is truly a global commons. </span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">All of this suggests we need new rules of the road. There have been recent efforts including the Russia-China sponsored draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT), originally proposed in 2008 (with a revised text introduced in 2014); the 2010 EU-initiated International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (ICoC), the U.N. Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on transparency and confidence building measures (TCBMs) in 2013, and the 2018-19 GGE on further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS). None of these have led to a favorable conclusion. </span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">The biggest challenge facing the development of an outer space regime is a lack of consensus among major powers. These are essentially political impediments and therefore that much harder to overcome than practical issues. Major power relations are characterized by a serious lack of trust and confidence in each other. And therefore, what we need in the first instance are measures that would strengthen confidence. </span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;">The United Kingdom has also made a recent </span><a href="https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/C.1/75/L.45/Rev.1" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">proposal</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"> — “Reducing Space Threats through Norms, Rules and Principles of Responsible Behaviors” — aimed at looking at problems in space through a bottom-up approach. The proposal, in one of its operational clauses:</span></div></div></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><br /></span></span></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">encourages Member States to study existing and potential threats and security risks to space systems, including those arising from actions, activities or systems in outer space or on Earth, characterize actions and activities that could be considered responsible, irresponsible or threatening and their potential impact on international security, and share their ideas on the further development and implementation of norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviors and on the reduction of the risks of misunderstanding and miscalculations with respect to outer space.</span></span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">It further calls on the U.N. secretary general to get views from member states in a substantive report to be submitted to the General Assembly at the 76th session scheduled for September 2021 for additional discussion. The plan is to include this in the provisional agenda of the General Assembly’s session, under the item, “Prevention of an arms race in outer space,” with a sub-item entitled, “Reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviors.” </span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">One of the key features of the U.K. proposal is to focus on a behavior-based approach, since debates focused on an object-based approach have not gone very far. The U.K. proposal is not prescriptive in suggesting a particular type of outcome or a particular format. Thus, this proposal provides room for greater flexibility and certain amount of maneuvering among member states as they debate the threats and challenges and possible ways forward. </span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">Even though there is no particular preference for a specific format as an outcome, it is important to look at this as a process that would lay stress on trust-building as a key driver. Given the high level of disagreements among major space powers, this is a sensible approach. In this regard, transparency and confidence building measures (TCBMs) offer a good first step between recognizing the functional need of regulating space and the negotiation of a binding instrument. There has been any number of debates on the need for and effectiveness of binding and non-binding instruments, but these discussions have not led to any meaningful outcome. TCBMs are certainly not a substitute for legal measures but they can be effective tools in bringing about openness, transparency, and information sharing, which are badly required to raise the level of political confidence between key great powers. TCBMs are essentially a bridge that can provide opportunities for countries to talk to each other and work on building greater trust in each other. This is a recognition that political issues have become the biggest hindrance in developing new rules of the road for outer space activities. </span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">A few measures that could be considered in this regard include pre-launch notifications (already contained in the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation) and ASAT test guidelines and rules for intentional orbital breakups. Others include the UNIDIR proposal (no debris, low debris, and notification) and pledges like “Not the First to Act beyond the scope of Article 51” because many developing countries worry that the right to self-defense under U.N. Charter Article 51 may be used as an excuse for space weaponization. </span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">While an end goal of developing more binding agreements for space security must be pursued, reaching a political consensus to commit to legal instruments appears to be difficult in today’s political and security environment. Revising or reforming the 1967 Outer Space Treaty is problematic precisely due to the current political impediments. Therefore, states need to first invest a great deal in developing mutual trust. The U.K. proposal provides an alternative to the PPWT or the EU ICoC, both of which have run into their own problems. The bottom-up approach emphasized in the U.K. proposal, letting member states to identify threats and challenges from their national security perspectives, is a welcome step.</span></div></span></span></div>Rajihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12428075941644054406noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1653135038182436032.post-17937762312555762792020-12-09T10:34:00.000+05:302020-12-09T10:34:04.042+05:30Countering Chinese assertiveness: India’s changing posture in the Indian Ocean - Indo-Pacific Analysis Brief, Perth USAsia Centre, 4 December 2020In my third Analysis Brief as an Indo-Pacific Fellow at the Perth USAsia Centre, I <a href="https://perthusasia.edu.au/getattachment/Our-Work/Analysis-Briefs-vol-16/PU-188-V16-Raji-WEB.pdf.aspx?lang=en-AU">looked</a> at India's changing Indian Ocean strategy in order to address China's growing footprint in the region. <div><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgoQYo89xRutDyQExhCvWH8Cq2S8qfRbkPFDsTQpZRAT4YBQATMFhsS1UjxoMQ6dIudNZ96ixkiRMfqNBdurZZqFjuB_o4utAooB7lnWioqi_UhOqY2_KruU5acYd5XpbXwvpel7hjcPlXC/s718/EoXoQhvXUAIyrgl.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="718" data-original-width="596" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgoQYo89xRutDyQExhCvWH8Cq2S8qfRbkPFDsTQpZRAT4YBQATMFhsS1UjxoMQ6dIudNZ96ixkiRMfqNBdurZZqFjuB_o4utAooB7lnWioqi_UhOqY2_KruU5acYd5XpbXwvpel7hjcPlXC/w274-h320/EoXoQhvXUAIyrgl.png" width="274" /></a></div><div><div>Note: The paper contains endnotes, which I have not been able to incorporate here. So, please check out the main page of the article, the link for which is given <a href="https://perthusasia.edu.au/getattachment/Our-Work/Analysis-Briefs-vol-16/PU-188-V16-Raji-WEB.pdf.aspx?lang=en-AU">here</a>. </div><div><div><br /></div><div>Major Takeaways are: </div><div><br /></div><div>→ The Indian Ocean region is becoming increasingly contested as Chinese
presence expands. In recognising the threat posed by China, India has shifted its
perceptions and priorities in the region. </div><div>→ A large concern is the security of sea lines of communication in the Indian
Ocean, which many Asian countries use as a trade corridor. </div><div>→ China has demonstrated an objective to become a key player in the region with
increased presence and activities, including in India’s Economic Exclusion Zone. </div><div>→ India has become more active in protecting its interests in the region by calling
for cooperation with external powers and enhancing its capabilities in the Indian
Ocean to overcome capacity constraints. </div><div>→ Cooperation between like-minded powers in the region is challenging due
to divergences in individual perspectives, approaches and outlooks. Closer
coordination is needed between these powers to build greater synergy. </div><div><br /></div><div>The Indian Ocean is once again at the centre of major geopolitical competition. China’s growing
footprint and influence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has made the contest for power and
control in the region between China and the US and its partners significant. The Indian Ocean
sea lines of communication (SLOCs) are important for many Asian countries because it is both
an energy and trade corridor, making these countries sensitive to any vulnerabilities. Now,
undersea cables add to these vulnerabilities.1 </div><div><br /></div><div>India has long been wary of power-plays in the Indian Ocean but
finds itself with few options today but to participate in securing a
free and open Indo-Pacific. </div><div><br /></div><div>In the process, India appears to be willing to reconsider some of its old concerns about external
actors in the Indian Ocean. On the other hand, there are also some questions about the terms of
engagement between India and its partners about the focus of their common efforts. Resolving
these could lead to greater synergy and easier cooperation. </div><div><br /></div><div>For the full brief, click <a href="https://perthusasia.edu.au/getattachment/Our-Work/Analysis-Briefs-vol-16/PU-188-V16-Raji-WEB.pdf.aspx?lang=en-AU">here</a>. <br /><div><br /></div><div><b>Growing Chinese presence is cause for concern</b></div></div><div>India’s stakes in the IOR are obvious, despite India’s lack of attention to the maritime front.
From a security perspective, since independence, India has not faced any significant maritime
threat. Much of the Indian maritime security focus was in terms of the relatively minor naval
threat from Pakistan and non-traditional threats including piracy and terrorism. While these
concerns remain, they have been overtaken by worries about China as an emerging IOR power,
with a growing footprint in the region. </div><div><br /></div><div>Darshana Baruah argues that China’s growing Indian Ocean presence is not just about contesting
India’s strategic role in the IOR, but it is part of a determined agenda to “emerge as a key player
in the IOR” which feeds into “China’s larger objective of becoming a global maritime power2
.”
The PLA Navy’s growing strength means that it is shaping up to be a formidable force to reckon
with. This is complemented by China’s growing maritime ties with countries in the IOR and
increasing naval presence in the region. </div><div><br /></div><div>India has multiple concerns about China in the Indian Ocean. One, already alive, is Chinese
activities in India’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Speaking earlier this year, Indian Navy Chief
Admiral Karambir Singh said that both Chinese research vessels and fishing boats have been
seen in Indian Ocean, including in the Indian EEZ. </div><div><br /></div><div>This is a long brief but I concluded the Brief with the following thoughts. </div><div><br /></div></div><div>Australia’s participation at the 2020 Malabar naval exercises is a clear recognition of India’s
changing attitude towards foreign navies in the Indian Ocean. It is a step towards fulfilling Modi’s
call for cooperation with like-minded strategic partners, fuelled by India’s changing posture
towards China. </div><div><br /></div><div>It is also an indication of the increasing synergistic approach among the major Indo-Pacific
powers – Australia, India, Japan and the United States. The expanded Malabar exercises
demonstrate the common strategic endeavour among the four to develop cogent responses to
the many security challenges in the Indo-Pacific including China. The naval exercises could go
a long way in creating greater confidence and interoperability among the four navies, which will
be key in ensuring a stable, secure and prosperous Indo-Pacific. </div><div><br /></div><div>But cooperation with such partners will also require some common terms of understanding,
most basically of the relationship between the ‘Indian’ and ‘Pacific’ components of the IndoPacific. Even though the concept of Indo-Pacific has gained greater traction over the last couple
of years, there have been differences in the understanding of what constitutes the Indo-Pacific. </div><div><br /></div><div>The geographical limits of the Indo-Pacific in particular has been a topic of considerable debate.
India, Japan and France have similar perceptions that the term ‘Indo-Pacific’ covers the area
from the eastern shores of Africa to the west coast of America. Others, especially the US, appear
more focused on the Pacific component. The Pacific powers, including Japan, the US, Australia,
and New Zealand, appear to be more focused on countering China’s power in the Pacific and
South China Sea, whereas Indian worries have been around China’s expansion into the Indian
Ocean. There clearly needs to be better coordination between these two sets of concerns. Only
when there is better coordination between these two sets of focus areas would it be possible to
consider burden-sharing between the partners. </div><div><br /></div><div>Hopefully, a clearer enunciation of India’s Indian Ocean strategy
will also translate into efforts for coordination between India and
its partners in dealing with maritime challenges, especially those
posed by China. </div><div><br /></div><div>There is a precedent for cooperation, though, at a smaller scale: India has worked with others to
cooperate in anti-piracy operations. These, of course, included China also. Cooperating to deal
with the security challenge posed by China in the Indo-Pacific will be at an entirely different scale
and seriousness. This would require a sustained dialogue involving the different partners to
evolve some sort of division of labour and burden sharing in order to effectively monitor China’s
naval activities in all theatres of the Indo-Pacific. This could lead to arrangements in which India
bears a greater burden in the Indian Ocean, while others bear a similar burden in the eastern
waters. Other minilaterals in the Indo-Pacific are exploring such options of burden sharing in
order to address capacity gaps – the India-France-Australia trilateral is a case in point. </div><div><br /></div><div>There is little doubt that China’s growing naval capacity affects all Indo-Pacific powers. New
Delhi appears to recognise the difficulties involved and thus appears more keen to cooperate
with other maritime powers in maintaining security in the Indian Ocean region. This is a good
first step to greater Indo-Pacific cooperation, but further coordination is clearly needed.</div></div>Rajihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12428075941644054406noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1653135038182436032.post-52002289362424275372020-12-07T16:45:00.000+05:302020-12-07T16:45:01.654+05:30Why the India-Sri Lanka-Maldives NSA-level Talks Matter - The Diplomat, 4 December 2020<span style="font-family: inherit;">In my first column for The Diplomat in December, I <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/12/why-the-india-sri-lanka-maldives-nsa-level-talks-matter/">looked</a> at the increasing strategic relevance of the India-Sri Lanka-Maldives NSA-level talks. I argue that the nature of bilateral political relations in the Indian Ocean region has an impact on the quality of subregional engagements such as the NSA-level talks held in Colombo. </span><div><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiP9KPQYV0j8pM_1CZu80JmO-kyz5KtZTtxieoBM3IESireO-ZJUXlOokVkl34SkVZZnY90zdO2bPIpEC5LUJY43OZNamNbsE7_ZuoalYWP4kOYUl7D_bi2y3iIZg8f9py2bH7Jsl7Gx5zg/s600/thediplomat-2020-12-04-10.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="400" data-original-width="600" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiP9KPQYV0j8pM_1CZu80JmO-kyz5KtZTtxieoBM3IESireO-ZJUXlOokVkl34SkVZZnY90zdO2bPIpEC5LUJY43OZNamNbsE7_ZuoalYWP4kOYUl7D_bi2y3iIZg8f9py2bH7Jsl7Gx5zg/s320/thediplomat-2020-12-04-10.jpg" width="320" /></a></div><div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">Last week, Colombo hosted an India-Sri Lanka-Maldives trilateral maritime security dialogue. The meeting saw the revival of the national security advisor (NSA)-level dialogue among the three countries, which began almost a decade ago in 2011. That the meeting took place six years after the last edition in 2014 is significant. Both Sri Lanka and the Maldives are rcritical maritime neighbors to India in the Indian Ocean region and there have been continuous efforts by both India and China to win friends and favors in Colombo and Male.</span></div><div><div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">For the full post, click <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/12/why-the-india-sri-lanka-maldives-nsa-level-talks-matter/">here</a>. </span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">The NSA-level talks are also a demonstration of the Indian intent to push subregional diplomacy, which has been gaining traction in India’s foreign policy in the last few years. The Modi government has made efforts to engage in subregional diplomacy as a useful track following the near-complete halt in regional diplomacy in South Asia under the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). </span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">For the Colombo trilateral, the Indian side was represented by National Security Advisor Ajit Doval whereas the Maldives sent its defense minister, Mariya Didi, and Sri Lanka was represented by Defense Secretary Maj. Gen. (retd) Kamal Gunaratne. Mauritius and the Seychelles were also present virtually at the level of senior officials. With the goal of encouraging meaningful maritime cooperation in the Indian Ocean region, India, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives discussed a number of areas for possible collaboration such as maritime domain awareness (MDA), humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), joint military exercises, capacity building, maritime security threats, marine pollution, and maritime underwater heritage. The Heads of Delegations </span><a href="http://www.defence.lk/Article/view_article/2654" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">decided</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> that they would meet periodically to maintain the momentum of the dialogue and to ensure timely execution of the decisions taken at the NSA-level meetings. According to the joint statement, a decision was also made to institute deputy NSA-level working group meetings biannually for cooperation at the operational level. </span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">So far, there have been several iterations of the trilateral meetings at the NSA-level. The first, hosted by the Maldives, was held in Male in 2011, following which Sri Lanka hosted the second edition. The third was held in New Delhi in 2014, which was attended also by Mauritius and the Seychelles as “guest countries.” </span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">Following the first trilateral meeting, the India-Maldives “DOSTI” joint coast guard exercise in 2012 added Sri Lanka and was held as a trilateral exercise. The India-Maldives DOSTI exercises have been going on since 1991 and are aimed at </span><a href="https://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/19436/Trilateral+Joint+Coast+Guard+Exercises++DOSTI+XI" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">strengthening</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> capabilities of the three partners in the area of search and rescue operations, combating piracy and armed robbery, damage control, and casualty evacuation at sea. India and Sri Lanka also have held bilateral naval exercises called </span><a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/india-and-sri-lanka-complete-bilateral-naval-exercise/#:~:text=An%20Indian%20defense%20ministry%20statement,built%20in%20India%2C%20to%20the" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">SLINEX</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> since 2005. The latest iteration, the eighth, was held off Trincomalee in Sri Lanka in October 2020. India’s official </span><a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1665683" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">statement</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> on the exercise noted that the synergistic approach developed by the two navies for “seamless coordination” was in evidence when the two navies came together in September 2020 to assist MT New Diamond, a Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC), that caught fire off the East Coast of Sri Lanka. </span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">While broader maritime security, anti-piracy, and HADR are important components of the growing India-Sri Lanka-Maldives strategic narrative, the real worry for India is growing Chinese activism in the Indian Ocean region. China’s efforts at cultivating the Indian Ocean littoral states have been a concern for New Delhi. In response, New Delhi has pursued many paths to build rapport with these neighbors, including bilateral, trilateral, and minilateral conversations in the region. </span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">While India is a resident Indian Ocean power and has its own advantages, there are </span><a href="https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/strengthening-delhis-strategic-partnerships-in-the-indianocean" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">capacity gaps</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> in India’s ability to play a sustained or dominant role. Meanwhile, China has the economic and military wherewithal to expand its military presence in the Indian Ocean and has been developing serious </span><a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/chinas-new-network-indian-ocean-bases" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">inroads</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> into the region through bases and other strategic networks. It is these that India is most concerned about and to which it is </span><a href="https://perthusasia.edu.au/getattachment/Our-Work/Analysis-Briefs-vol-16/PU-188-V16-Raji-WEB.pdf.aspx?lang=en-AU" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">responding</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">. </span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">While India is stepping up its efforts in naval modernization, these are capital intensive and time-consuming projects. The small budget allocations for the Indian Navy are not helpful either. Therefore, India has also entered into a series of partnerships with like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific, such as Australia, Japan, and the United States, to offset the growing Chinese influence as well as to enhance India’s own capabilities. The logistic agreements that India has signed with a number of countries — including the United States, Australia, France, South Korea, Singapore, and Japan — in recent years are a demonstration of the Indian intent to enhance the geographical reach of the Indian Navy, and also to strengthen the combined capability mix that is available to deal with China’s aggressive maneuvers in the Indian Ocean region. It is also an important tool for messaging both to its friends and foes. </span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">Meanwhile, even as India pursues a neighborhood first approach, it has also acknowledged the limitations of regional groupings such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which came to a grinding halt a few years ago. Modi had reached out to the SAARC nations when he came to office in 2014 but the bonhomie did not last long. Therefore, India has energized other regional groupings such as </span><a href="http://nkibrics.ru/posts/show/5a51fa076272695d471e0000" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">BIMSTEC</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> and subregional arrangements such as the </span><a href="https://www.orfonline.org/research/indias-evolving-subregional-strategy/" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">BBIN</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> and India-Sri Lanka-Maldives trilateral. While the subregional initiatives have primarily focused on connectivity and similar issues, India is also exploring the possibility of engaging in </span><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><a href="https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/ORF_OccasionalPaper_271_Subregional.pdf" style="box-sizing: border-box;">subregional security cooperation</a></span></span>. </span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">But subregional initiatives are not free from the state of bilateral relations with these countries. As K. Yhome </span><a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/india-evolving-subregional-approach-security-cooperation/" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">explained</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> in a recent essay, the nature and framework of bilateral political relations will have an impact on these subregional initiatives. The case of the NSA-level trilateral maritime dialogue between India, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives is a case in point. The talks were stalled from 2014 primarily because of India’s poor relations with Maldives under then-President Abdulla Yameen. India, as a big state, has to be mindful of the needs and aspirations of its much smaller neighbors and has to be able to adapt to meet their requirements. </span></span></div></div></div></div>Rajihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12428075941644054406noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1653135038182436032.post-87489831960617942282020-12-07T16:34:00.003+05:302020-12-07T16:34:28.511+05:30SITMEX: India-Singapore-Thailand Complete Second Trilateral Maritime Exercises - The Diplomat, 27 November 2020<span style="font-family: inherit;">In my column for <a href="https://thediplomat.com/">The Diplomat</a> last month, I <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/11/sitmex-india-singapore-thailand-complete-second-trilateral-maritime-exercises/">looked</a> at the India-Singapore-Thailand Trilateral Maritime Exercises that were just concluded. I argue that China’s growing economic might and its aggressive military posturing have provided India, Singapore and Thailand strategic rationale to combine their efforts. </span><div><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjYkXsbSLXBL-H6jE9Bpx-CXD2Ob7vahdHEKoX8_pei34lSksMvd7BX-ZO0RJZb7jBZOKgeDRgtLc4GPO7OU8XykKdohRU5y6NZan7lC7L2TIDdXnq6AdCzHdtEZHe-jb08E0-MTEtjlcsq/s300/download+%25282%2529.jpeg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="168" data-original-width="300" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjYkXsbSLXBL-H6jE9Bpx-CXD2Ob7vahdHEKoX8_pei34lSksMvd7BX-ZO0RJZb7jBZOKgeDRgtLc4GPO7OU8XykKdohRU5y6NZan7lC7L2TIDdXnq6AdCzHdtEZHe-jb08E0-MTEtjlcsq/s0/download+%25282%2529.jpeg" /></a></div><div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">India, Singapore and Thailand recently concluded their trilateral naval exercise SITMEX-20. This is the second edition of SITMEX. Hosted by the Republic of Singapore Navy from November 21-22, the exercise was held in the Andaman Sea. This represents a growing number of naval engagements that India has been holding with various navies, including those in Southeast Asia. But it also indicates the growing willingness of regional navies to look to India as a maritime partner, as well as the increasing comfort level in coming together at the regional level rather than look to just the U.S. in dealing with a rising China. That these exercises were held in spite the challenges imposed by COVID-19 pandemic suggests the importance attached by the three navies to these exercises and also the seriousness of the threats they mutually face.</span><div><div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">For the full post, click <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/11/sitmex-india-singapore-thailand-complete-second-trilateral-maritime-exercises/">here</a>. </span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">This particular trilateral exercise is relatively new. The </span><a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1585542" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">first edition</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> was held in the Andaman Sea only last year, in September 2019. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi had announced the trilateral exercise at his keynote address at the 2018 Shangri La Dialogue in Singapore. At the inaugural edition of the exercise, the Indian Navy was represented by the guided missile destroyer INS Ranvir, missile corvette INS Kora, Offshore Patrol Vessel Sumedha and P8I long-range maritime reconnaissance aircraft. </span></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">Indian Ministry of Defense </span><a href="https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetailm.aspx?PRID=1674839" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">said</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> that the second edition of the exercise was being conducted “as a ‘non-contact, at sea only’ exercise in view of COVID-19 pandemic,” emphasizing this as being indicative of the “growing synergy, coordination and cooperation in the maritime domain between the three friendly navies and maritime neighbors.” The statement added that the three navies would engage in a series of “exercises including naval maneuvers, surface warfare exercises and weapon firings.” The stated goals of these exercises were to strengthen “mutual interoperability” and to understand and assimilate “best practices” between the three navies. </span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">The Indian Navy ships participating in the exercise include the indigenously-built ASW (anti-submarine warfare) corvette Kamorta and missile corvette Karmuk. Singapore sent its Formidable-class frigates, Intrepid and the Endeavour, an Endurance-class LST (landing ship tank). Thailand was represented by a Chao Phraya-class frigate, the Kraburi. </span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">Explaining the importance of the exercise, the commander of SITMEX 20 Task Force and commanding Officer of RSS Intrepid, Lieutenant Colonel Oh Zongbo </span><a href="https://defpost.com/singapore-india-and-thailand-conclude-trilateral-maritime-exercise/" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">said</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> that the SITMEX “serves as a useful exercise for the three like-minded navies to enhance our inter-operability in maritime operations. The ability to execute and conduct these operations together is a testament to the long-standing ties and trust that we have established with one another.” After the SITMEX concluded, the Singapore Navy joined the Indian Navy for a bilateral naval exercise, SIMBEX 20, in the Bay of Bengal from November 25 to 27. </span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">The military exercises with Singapore and Thailand also demonstrate the increasingly strategic nature of engagements that India has developed with the countries in Southeast Asia. From a “Look East” policy in the early 1990s (which itself was not very successful) that focused on economic issues to an “Act East” policy initiated by Modi in 2014, bilateral relations in the region as well as the regional context have been transformative. Even though these exercises have been shortened on account of the pandemic, the fact that the navies of the three countries decided to go ahead with the exercise is a clear reflection of the similarity of views between India, Singapore and Thailand. This could mean that the three navies may continue to strengthen these exercises in terms of scope of the maneuvers, expansion of the geographical areas of their exercise, and greater sophistication in terms of their overall objectives of SITMEX. </span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">Singapore, of course, has been one of India’s stronger security partners in the region. Defense relations between the two began with the signing of their first </span><a href="https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Singapore_24_12_2018.pdf" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">Defense Cooperation Agreement</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> in 2003. Since then, the two have signed several more agreements for greater military-to-military interactions. Given that Singapore is a small island nation, India has been a good partner, offering training to the Singapore Armed Forces at its military training facilities like the air force and artillery firing ranges. Their main naval interaction, SIMBEX, has continued now for more than 20 years. The importance of freedom of navigation and open seas, in line with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as well as respect for international law, have been often-repeated themes in their bilateral discussions. </span></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">India-Thailand bilateral relations are not as deep, but they have also picked up pace over the last decade with a number of high-level political visits and institutional </span><a href="https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Thailand_Brief_Dec_2018.pdf" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">mechanisms</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">.</span><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> These include periodic Foreign Office Consultations, India-Thailand Joint Commission Meetings (which are held at the foreign ministers level) and defense cooperation mechanisms that have seen military exercises between the armies and the air force of the two countries. In addition to the annual army and air force exercises, the two countries also hold bi-annual coordinated maritime patrolling by the two navies. Given the slowly brewing tension between Thailand and China, it is likely that Thailand will reach out to countries such as India to hedge against possible longer-term trouble in relations with Beijing. Such moves are also backed by growing popular opposition to Chinese high-handedness across the region. The </span><a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/05/will-the-milk-tea-war-have-a-lasting-impact-on-china-thailand-relations/" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">Milk Tea Alliance</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">, which grew from online squabbles between Chinese and Thai netizens represents “deep-seated reservations about the relationship among Thai people.” The so-called Milk Tea Alliance also quickly expanded, with support pouring in from other countries such as Taiwan, the Philippines, and Hong Kong. </span></span></div></div></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">China’s growing economic might and its aggressive military power have provided India, Singapore and Thailand strategic rationale to combine their efforts. Increasing concerns about American commitment to the region have spurred such efforts and they will likely continue. </span></span></div></span></span></div></div></div>Rajihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12428075941644054406noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1653135038182436032.post-79002602804390778582020-12-07T16:24:00.004+05:302020-12-07T16:24:54.690+05:30Contradictions Grow Amid Another BRICS Summit - The Diplomat, 19 November 2020<span style="font-family: inherit;">In an earlier column for <a href="https://thediplomat.com/">The Diplomat</a> in November, I <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/11/contradictions-grow-amid-another-brics-summit/">wrote</a> on the 2020 BRICS Summit and the contradictions therein. I argued that the group has always been diverse in terms of economic, political, and security interests. The question, therefore, is it anything more than an ineffective talkshop? </span><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjcD8wMkrW0L40JgCFIyjZ6MkM25y_LA6N1AC4JtG0Xv5dLTsDVbzi7dfn91M2on4mwPvaA5GS3qw0YCmJlRnmuD_YbC-4whowhfIpu6qJ9zfe1-AEmBfmFmsnvSxULRYI0Si3ACtBw_Bjm/s300/download+%25281%2529.jpeg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="168" data-original-width="300" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjcD8wMkrW0L40JgCFIyjZ6MkM25y_LA6N1AC4JtG0Xv5dLTsDVbzi7dfn91M2on4mwPvaA5GS3qw0YCmJlRnmuD_YbC-4whowhfIpu6qJ9zfe1-AEmBfmFmsnvSxULRYI0Si3ACtBw_Bjm/s0/download+%25281%2529.jpeg" /></a></div></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">BRICS, the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa grouping, met virtually on November 17 for its 12th summit meeting. Prior to the meeting, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) released a statement saying that the meeting would </span><a href="https://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/33197/12th+BRICS+Summit#:~:text=1.,held%20in%20a%20virtual%20format." style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">discuss</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> intra-BRICS cooperation around counterterrorism, energy, trade, health, and ways to mitigate the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. Each of the five leaders stressed various aspects of cooperation in the face of the pandemic and the resultant economic slowdown. </span></span><div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">For the full post, click <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/11/contradictions-grow-amid-another-brics-summit/">here</a>. </span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">Chinese President Xi Jinping </span><a href="https://infobrics.org/post/32262" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">talked</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> about “global epidemiological security” and said that “the BRICS countries firmly believe in the primacy of international law” and considered the World Health Organization to be the leading institution in addressing the pandemic. He added that once the pandemic is taken care of, focus must shift to economic recovery. Here, he argued “China can once again lead the way.” Citing how China’s “economy already bounced back from its low point earlier this year,” he said, “its new development paradigm of dual circulation where domestic and international circulation mutually reinforce one another will help stimulate the global economy” as well as “repair the damage done by some countries’ protectionist policies.” He concluded by saying that there will be “hiccups along the way” but “the trust-based relations between the BRICS countries could serve as a very stabilizing factor during this unprecedented transition in global political and economic affairs as the world begins to embrace new models.” </span></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">Xi’s statements on the primacy of international law and trust-based relations within BRICS are bound to be taken with more than a little skepticism given China’s punitive economic actions against many of its neighbors and even partners further away. Such statements from China are not new. At the BRICS Foreign Ministers meeting last week, Wang Yi, China’s foreign minister, </span><a href="https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/brics-should-jointly-deal-with-the-challenges-of-covid-19-pandemic-chinese-fm-wang/article32527520.ece" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">said</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> that the BRICS countries should come together in addressing the challenges of the pandemic and global economic recovery, and foster multilateralism and seek “political settlement of hot-spot issues.” </span></span></div></div></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi also spoke about the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the reform process that has been initiated by his government to get the economy back on track. Modi </span><a href="https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/33200/English+translation+of+Prime+Ministers+opening+remarks+at+the+12th+BRICS+Virtual+Summit" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">highlighted</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> the need for reform of multilateral institutions such as the IMF, WHO and WTO, but his particular emphasis was on terrorism, which he characterized as “the biggest problem today.” Modi said that the group must ensure that “countries that support and help terrorists are also held to account.” </span></span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">It is doubtful that the other members of BRICS necessarily share India’s view of the terrorism problem, but that is not the sole difficulty. The BRICS summit is also taking place at a time when India and China have squared off at their border, a temporary line called the Line of Actual Control (LAC). BRICS, as a multilateral platform, cannot address bilateral issues and hence, it was, understandably, not expected to address that particular issue. And given that the summit was held virtually, the possibility of informal bilateral meeting on the sidelines of the summit was nonexistent. </span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">The group itself has always been diverse in terms of economic, political, and security interests. These have only grown over the last two decades as </span><a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/4-reasons-why-india-support-the-brics/" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">Abhijnan Rej</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> highlighted recently. China has emerged as the world’s second largest economy, while Brazil, Russia, and South Africa are nowhere near the indicators that brought them into the grouping initially. </span></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Politically, too, the group is diverse, with few common political interests other than singing the song of multilateralism. Even that rhetoric may not hold for long given the yawning gap between China’s rhetoric of multilateralism and its unilateral aggressive behavior on the ground. </span></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">China and Russia have an anti-American political goal for the grouping, which sits very uneasily with Indian interests, considering India has invested significantly in building and nurturing its bilateral ties with </span><a href="https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/brics-summit-goa-india-brazil-russia-china-south-africa-3095585/" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">the United States</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> as well as engaging in strategic minilaterals such as the Quad and various trilaterals in the Indo-Pacific. </span></span></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">That India works with China in the BRICS format, when the aim of India’s Quad and other such minilaterals are to restrict and restrain China’s aggressive and bullying behavior, adds to the growing array of contradictions. Certainly, BRICS cannot be a military and security grouping given the significant differences between each of the players, most notably between India, China, and Russia. The success of groupings such as BRICS will depend on the health of bilateral ties among those within the group. India-China relations in the backdrop of the Galwan conflict do not suggest that all is well on the bilateral front or even in the regional context. </span></span></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">India’s aim in engaging with BRICS may be an effort to demonstrate that it retains strategic autonomy and that it engages with all major powers irrespective of these incongruences. In this respect, it may serve a limited domestic political agenda. But as contradictions keep piling up, questions about the future of BRICS as anything other than an ineffective talkshop are bound to grow. </span></span></span></div><div><br /></div>Rajihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12428075941644054406noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1653135038182436032.post-61496621358202429572020-12-07T15:52:00.000+05:302020-12-07T15:52:08.698+05:30India-China Talks on the Standoff: Cautious Optimism? - The Diplomat, 12 November 2020<span style="font-family: inherit;">In my column for <a href="https://thediplomat.com/">The Diplomat</a> last month, I <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/11/india-china-talks-on-the-standoff-cautious-optimism/">looked</a> at the India-China talks on the continuing stand-off in Ladakh and if there was any room for optimism. Reports vary about the details of the latest talks, but there seems to be some optimism for an agreement. </span><div><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhtIAievnbz92PsLRQZ97_DgE2m-0j6UKHqV3SseAUj6tKRGJ3T46MPqtrYvBTx1mTFkKo1nlsKs6hziVrSz6PWjqZUKAtmgW12qJcwbQn_HrN1MQZGB_FMclrW0v1cQ1FqugcCt8KQxyXa/s300/thediplomat-2020-11-12-6.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="145" data-original-width="300" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhtIAievnbz92PsLRQZ97_DgE2m-0j6UKHqV3SseAUj6tKRGJ3T46MPqtrYvBTx1mTFkKo1nlsKs6hziVrSz6PWjqZUKAtmgW12qJcwbQn_HrN1MQZGB_FMclrW0v1cQ1FqugcCt8KQxyXa/s0/thediplomat-2020-11-12-6.jpg" /></a></div><div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">Indian and Chinese military forces have been engaged in a military standoff in Ladakh for more than six months now. Several rounds of military and diplomatic talks had yielded no progress. But there was cautious optimism in New Delhi after the eighth round of corps commander-level talks between India and China, held on November 6. There are increasing hints that some agreement may be reached. According to one report in the Indian media, the two sides </span><a href="https://bharatshakti.in/ladakh-standoff-breakthrough-in-india-china-talks-imminent/" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">reportedly</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> “agreed to restoring status quo ante” on the Line of Actual Control (LAC). According to sources quoted in the report, “all that remains is for both sides to formalize the sequencing of steps required to achieve the objective.” </span></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">But this is the most optimistic of the reports, though earlier reports about the November 6 meeting also claimed that progress had been made. On the same day that these more optimistic reports appeared, Indian Army Chief General M.M. Naravane, speaking at a public event in Delhi, </span><a href="https://www.news18.com/news/india/military-commanders-of-india-china-holding-talks-for-disengagement-in-ladakh-situation-stable-for-now-naravane-3068093.html" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">said</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">, “We are hopeful of reaching an agreement which is mutually acceptable and is really beneficial in keeping with the overarching policy guidelines.” There remains understandable caution, as he also added that the border troops are fully equipped with appropriate clothing and weapons and that the forces face “no shortages whatsoever.” </span></span><div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">For the full post, click <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/11/india-china-talks-on-the-standoff-cautious-optimism/">here</a>. </span></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">In earlier reports on the November 6 meeting, an official </span><a href="https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/no-signs-of-de-escalation-in-ladakh-as-india-china-border-tensions-continue-1739086-2020-11-08" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">said</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> that India “want[s] complete de-escalation. Reduction of troops from some areas and de-induction of weapons is not a viable option and is not what we have proposed.” Chief of Defense Staff General Bipin Rawat also </span><a href="https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/india-won-t-accept-shift-in-lac-situation-can-spiral-into-larger-conflict-cds-general-bipin-rawat-on-ladakh-standoff-1738511-2020-11-06?utm_source=recengine&utm_medium=web&referral=yes&utm_content=footerstrip-4&t_source=recengine&t_medium=web&t_content=footerstrip-4&t_psl=False" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">maintained</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> that the any change in the status quo “is not acceptable to India” and that one cannot rule out the “situation getting out of hand and spiralling into a larger conflict.” </span></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">India’s official statement was also along the same lines and did not mention “restoring status quo ante.” The statement simply </span><a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetail.aspx?PRID=1671156" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">said</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> that “the two sides had a candid, in-depth and constructive exchange of views on disengagement along the Line of Actual Control in the Western Sector.” The statement further added that the two sides would “earnestly implement the important consensus reached by the leaders of the two countries, ensure their frontline troops to exercise restraint and avoid misunderstanding and miscalculation.” </span></span></div></div></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">Other Indian media reports also suggested some progress, though not that the two sides had agreed to restore the status quo ante. According to one of these reports, an Indian Army officer </span><a href="https://indianexpress.com/article/india/8th-meeting-of-senior-military-commanders-chinas-proposal-a-step-forward-india-considering-it-7034547/" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">said</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> that “China’s latest proposal is better than their previous proposals.” </span></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">There is also disagreement in the reports about the sequencing of steps for a withdrawal of forces. Some media reports said that India and China have agreed to a </span><a href="https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-china-agree-on-3-step-disengagement-plan-in-pangong-lake-area-in-ladakh-report/story-SJHjnyWZheF7bchclCE2fI.html" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">three-point disengagement</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> agenda which included pulling back of tanks and anti-personnel carriers within a day as the first step. A second step would involve the withdrawal of 30 percent of troops on both sides every day for three days around the northern bank on the Pangong Tso. This reportedly would push the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) east of Finger 8. The third step would include withdrawal of frontline troops on both sides in the southern bank of Pangong Tso, as well as areas around Chushul and Rezang La The three-step disengagement process is to be enforced through a joint verification mechanism, which includes both delegation meetings as well as the use of drones. </span></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">Another </span><a href="https://bharatshakti.in/ladakh-standoff-breakthrough-in-india-china-talks-imminent/" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">report</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">, however, suggested that China would pull back from the Pangong Tso area first. China “has apparently agreed to go back to Finger 8 and remove all temporary structures and deployments the PLA had put up between Finger 4 and Finger 8 since May,” according to this report. The area between Finger 4 and 8 could be kept as a “no-patrolling” area, with neither side permitted to patrol. But there is no agreement to this effect, yet. The second step would be disengagement of heavy armor and artillery. Currently, the deployment of tanks in close proximity, T-72 Indias on the Indian side and Type-99s on the Chinese side, in the Chushul sector, is seen by both sides as risky. </span><a href="https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/ladakh-standoff-india-china-finalising-phased-disengagement-plan/article33074294.ece" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">Other reports</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> have said that these are all still proposals, which will be taken up in the next round of talks. It should be noted too that only </span><a href="https://bharatshakti.in/ladakh-standoff-breakthrough-in-india-china-talks-imminent/" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">one report</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> has talked about both sides agreeing to restoring the status quo ante. </span></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">Even if the current tensions were to be resolved in the near term, India’s security perceptions about China are forcing India to undertake some force restructuring to maintain constant vigilance along the LAC, especially in the western sector. In addition to the 3 Infantry Division that is responsible for the LAC in eastern Ladakh, the Northern Command has </span><a href="https://bharatshakti.in/india-planning-another-division-for-permanent-deployment-in-ladakh/" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">decided</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> to deploy another division of around 10,000 troops in Ladakh on a longer-term basis. </span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">Whether these optimistic reports will be borne out remains to be seen. On both sides, there are likely to be worries about the risks involved in withdrawing from positions that they now hold, which carries with it the risk that the other side may renege and attempt to occupy these positions. Trusting each other may still be the biggest hurdle. </span></div></div>Rajihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12428075941644054406noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1653135038182436032.post-52240410681639922542020-12-07T15:41:00.003+05:302020-12-07T15:41:26.410+05:30Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Set to Enter Into Force - The Diplomat, 5 November 2020<span style="font-family: inherit;">In my column for <a href="https://thediplomat.com/">The Diplomat</a> in November, I <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/11/treaty-on-the-prohibition-of-nuclear-weapons-set-to-enter-into-force/">looked</a> at the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons that is set to enter into force in January 2021. But the key question I asked is if it will matter. </span><div><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhPzYG5qZ0oHaQBOtms0a6GCQTWmCGcBy3KNsuikO6jtdbIGLOE6swKqSbGm2TcO3SCfUPWW2Jph5tDu1JmPifBrd9BfCTivwN3EyvE75zfKXc5vxqdDXRetT5ImAFddqxush6R5h4sdazI/s300/thediplomat-2020-11-04-11.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="200" data-original-width="300" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhPzYG5qZ0oHaQBOtms0a6GCQTWmCGcBy3KNsuikO6jtdbIGLOE6swKqSbGm2TcO3SCfUPWW2Jph5tDu1JmPifBrd9BfCTivwN3EyvE75zfKXc5vxqdDXRetT5ImAFddqxush6R5h4sdazI/s0/thediplomat-2020-11-04-11.jpg" /></a></div><div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">The </span><a href="http://undocs.org/A/CONF.229/2017/8" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> (TPNW), or the Nuke Ban Treaty, is set to enter into force soon. In 2016, the U.N. General Assembly, through resolution 71/258, decided to hold a conference for the negotiation of the treaty. The conference took place in March 2017. The treaty was subsequently adopted by a vote with 122 states in favor (with one vote against and one abstention) at the United Nations on July 7, 2017 and was opened for signature by the U.N. Secretary General on September 20, 2017. When Honduras ratified the treaty in late October, it reached the requisite </span><a href="https://twitter.com/INakamitsu/status/1320157510096007168?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1320157510096007168%7Ctwgr%5Eshare_3&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fnews.un.org%2Fen%2Fstory%2F2020%2F10%2F1076082" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">50 ratifications</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">, and is set to </span><a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/10/1076082" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">enter into force</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> on January 22, 2021. </span></span><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">For the full post, click <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/11/treaty-on-the-prohibition-of-nuclear-weapons-set-to-enter-into-force/">here</a>. </span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">The TPNW contains provisions that prohibit states from participating in any nuclear weapons-related activities including development, testing, possession, stockpile, use, or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Signatories are </span><a href="https://www.un.org/disarmament/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/tpnw-info-kit-v2.pdf" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">required</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> “to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited under the TPNW undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.” </span></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">While this is commendable on its own, the efficacy of the treaty is questionable because none of the current nine nuclear-armed states support the treaty or have signed it. The United States in a recent letter sent to signatories of the TPNW stated that the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council — the P-5 countries, who also happens to be the five nuclear weapons states recognized by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) — and NATO allies “stand unified in our opposition to the potential repercussions” of the treaty. In fact, the only NATO country that took part in the negotiations was </span><a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/05/nato-and-frameworks-nuclear-non-proliferation-and-disarmament/4-nato-npt-and-tpnw" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">the Netherlands</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> but due to its NATO commitments, it voted against the treaty when it came up for adoption. </span></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">The letter from the United States went on to add that the TPNW also “turns back the clock on verification and disarmament and is dangerous” to the NPT. Urging the signatories to walk out of the treaty, the letter further </span><a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/us-urges-countries-to-withdraw-from-un-nuke-ban-treaty/2020/10/21/21918918-13ce-11eb-a258-614acf2b906d_story.html" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">said</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> that while these states have the sovereign right to determine whether to become parties to and ratify the treaty, “we believe that you have made a strategic error and should withdraw your instrument of ratification or accession.” </span></span></div></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">The day when the treaty was opened for signature at the U.N., the United States, the United Kingdom, and France issued a joint statement slamming the treaty, </span><a href="https://thediplomat.com/2018/11/the-dangerous-naivety-of-ican/" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">saying</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> it “risks undermining the existing international security architecture which contributes to the maintenance of international peace and security,” and that all states “share a common responsibility to protect and strengthen our collective security system in order to further promote international peace, stability, and security.” </span></span></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">Countries like India, which have opposed the treaty. also made their positions clear. While responding to a query on the Indian position on the treaty, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) spokesperson </span><a href="https://www.mea.gov.in/media-briefings.htm?dtl/28628" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">said</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> that it “did not participate in the negotiations… Also, none of the other States possessing nuclear weapons participated in the negotiations.” It had also voted against a U.N. General Assembly resolution in 2019 welcoming the adoption of the treaty. Earlier in 2016, it abstained from voting on the U.N. General Assembly resolution that gave the formal mandate for states to start the treaty negotiations. </span></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">Much of </span><a href="https://www.icanw.org/region-asia" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">Asia and the Middle East</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> also remains outside of the TPNW. Ratification of the treaty by just 50 state parties still means that there is a sizeable number of countries that remain outside the TPNW. The International Campaign for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) has engaged in an effort to name and shame states that are not party to TPNW, but how effective that effort will be remains to be seen. </span></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">Without the support of the </span><a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/where-will-australia-stand-banning-weapons-mass-destruction" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">nuclear armed states</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">,</span><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> it may not be possible to promote nuclear disarmament. Beyond nuclear-armed states, even those states such as </span><a href="https://thediplomat.com/2018/11/the-dangerous-naivety-of-ican/" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">Japan</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> that are under the extended U.S. nuclear umbrella may be somewhat reluctant to support the TPNW. While prestige may remain a factor in countries’ decision to pursue nuclear weapons, security considerations may not entirely be absent. These considerations should not be allowed to prevent progress on nuclear disarmament, of course, but treating such concerns as serious may help move the conversation in a more helpful direction than simply preaching or castigating such states. </span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">There are also complications that arise from the relationship of the TPNW to the NPT. The NPT also includes obligations toward nuclear disarmament, though these obligations have not been seriously addressed by the nuclear weapon states. Some believe that the nuke ban treaty undermines the importance of the NPT as the foundation of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Gustavo Zlauvinen, president-designate of the 2020 Review Conference for the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) raised questions about the effectiveness of the TPNW saying that it cannot challenge the “legitimacy of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).” </span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">In a recent interview to Kyodo News, he </span><a href="https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2020/10/1fb0bcf3cd40-nuclear-ban-pact-should-not-erode-validity-of-npt-confab-chief.html" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">said</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">, “You can’t have nuclear disarmament without the nuclear weapon states in that system. And that’s why, for the time being, the only treaty that has been accepted by at least five nuclear weapon states, that includes obligations on nuclear disarmament, is the NPT.” He added that there exists a “huge difference” between the NPT and the TPNW and that the TPNW should not “erode the validity and the legitimacy of the NPT.” He also feared that this will be “another issue of contention” at the upcoming review conference. Maintaining the significance of the NPT as the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime, he added that “I believe that once the TPNW reaches numbers similar to the NPT, and obviously includes the signature and ratifications of nuclear weapon states, then probably we can talk about that new treaty being another pillar of the regime.” </span></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">Although the TPNW is the realization of a long and dedicated struggle by civil society activists and some states, the history of previous such efforts are not encouraging. For example, the International Campaign to Ban Land Mines (ICBL) has done stellar work that led to the Land Mine Ban Treaty and for greater endorsement of the treaty globally, with the aim of banning landmines and cluster munitions. While the </span><a href="http://www.icbl.org/en-gb/the-treaty/treaty-status.aspx" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">Mine Ban Treaty</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> is often showcased as one of the more successful treaties with only 32 states outside the treaty, many critical states including the U.S., Russia, China, India, Iran, and Pakistan remain outside. Their refusal to adhere to the treaty undermines its effectiveness, and there has been little pressure on these states to change their minds. This experience suggests the need for some caution about the TPNW. Addressing the critical problem of nuclear disarmament should fare better than that example. </span></span></span></div><div style="color: black; font-family: Times; font-size: medium;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #333333; font-family: "Noto Serif", serif; font-size: 18px;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><br /></span></span></div></span></div></div>Rajihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12428075941644054406noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1653135038182436032.post-50118209505665509062020-12-07T15:10:00.003+05:302020-12-07T15:10:50.154+05:30India and the US Are Expanding Their Space Cooperation - The Diplomat, 30 October 2020<span style="font-family: inherit;">In my column for <a href="https://thediplomat.com/">The Diplomat</a>, I <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/india-and-the-us-are-expanding-their-space-cooperation/">looked</a> at the expanding US-India space cooperation. I argue that Space Situational Awareness (SSA) is a very specific subfield, but an increasingly important one for safeguarding space operations, and that is slowly gaining traction in the US-India context. </span><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgVeCGGoodL5bdMkOpW5Jd36iygRfIaJqfrBiVK4H8DsYG8mgYd58j1qR3hYBMYU9XGGOS_f15tMsbRC29cM_YeeTXCfLHaX0HbWUlsrkWonrps4_5cvRyheLIjatR64c3UTW8EWca39rQC/s686/K4bmLei5YpDnRFKvsuDe4B.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="453" data-original-width="686" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgVeCGGoodL5bdMkOpW5Jd36iygRfIaJqfrBiVK4H8DsYG8mgYd58j1qR3hYBMYU9XGGOS_f15tMsbRC29cM_YeeTXCfLHaX0HbWUlsrkWonrps4_5cvRyheLIjatR64c3UTW8EWca39rQC/s320/K4bmLei5YpDnRFKvsuDe4B.png" width="320" /></a></div><span style="font-family: inherit;">The third India-U.S. 2+2 strategic dialogue, with the foreign and defense ministers of the two countries, has just concluded. The </span><a href="https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-the-third-u-s-india-22-ministerial-dialogue/" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;">joint statement</a><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">issued at the end of the dialogue is a remarkable and significant one. Space cooperation has usually not featured prominently in discussions between the two sides, yet the joint statement noted the agreement among the four ministers to start cooperation on a specific agenda within the broad space domain – Space Situational Awareness (SSA). The importance of SSA cannot be overemphasized given its utility in ensuring safe, secure, and sustainable use of outer space.</span></div><div><div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">For the full post, click <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/india-and-the-us-are-expanding-their-space-cooperation/">here</a>. </span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">As important as space has become, it is also crowded and congested with more than 80 countries active in way or another in this domain. In addition, private companies have plans to launch <a href="https://www.theverge.com/2020/8/26/21401455/satellite-mega-constellations-astronomy-spacex-amazon-oneweb-bright-internet-space" style="box-sizing: border-box;">thousands of satellites</a> for broadband and communication purposes. This will make space traffic management a nightmare in the coming years. The first step is awareness of the space environment. SSA is simply that: awareness about the space environment, which can help ensure safety of space missions by giving collision avoidance information, information about space weather, and related natural phenomenon in space. Unless states are able to develop a clear picture of the space environment that they operate in, space assets could be in danger from both intentional threats and natural hazards. SSA is an effort at collating data on orbiting satellites, old rocket bodies, and other space debris, predicting re-entry of space objects into the atmosphere, and monitoring any threats to spacecrafts and satellites. The overall goal is to generate the ability to monitor, understand, and predict the physical space environment.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">There are good reasons for India and the United States to develop a collaborative mechanism to start sharing SSA data. Both are major spacefaring nations with significant investment in space; their societies and militaries are dependent on space for a number of critical functions. Therefore, any disruptions of their space assets would result not only in social and economic disruption but interference in the effectiveness of their militaries as well.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">SSA involves collection and analyses of data to convert them into actionable information to deal with threats to space assets. <a href="https://iislweb.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Lal_GallowaySymposium2018.pdf" style="box-sizing: border-box;">A report</a> by Bhavya Lal <em style="box-sizing: border-box;">et al</em> for the Washington D.C.-based IDA Science & Technology Policy Institute divided the space traffic system into six components. This includes the data collection component “which refers to civil, military and commercial sensors, whether ground- or space-based,” the data processing part, and the data products component, “such as conjunction or collision warnings” so that operators can avoid collisions. Then there’s the oversight and coordination component, which “includes regulations, policies, guidelines, standards, and best practices.” The fifth component is data sharing, which “spans the entire continuum of the space traffic system.” The last component is external factors, “the combination of environmental and operational realities that are driving changes both on the technical and coordination sides.” </span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">This is obviously a complicated set of capabilities that are better handled cooperatively. India has been in the space business for about five decades now but it has developed only limited SSA capabilities. Many other players including China and Japan also do not have extensive capabilities in this regard. As of today, the United States has the largest <a href="https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ASPJ/journals/Volume-27_Issue-5/SLP-Baird.pdf" style="box-sizing: border-box;">network</a> – the Space Surveillance Network – which has maintained among the most comprehensive coverage so far, though its coverage of the southern hemisphere is a bit weak. The U.S. is followed by Russia, which has the second largest network and has better coverage of the southern hemisphere. The EU also has a fairly detailed SSA network.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">With India’s space program expanding in its scope and sophistication, India’s civil space organization, the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) has established a dedicated SSA department at the ISRO headquarters. Prior to this, without a dedicated SSA department, India did not show much interest in collaborating with other countries or their space agencies. But other major space players such as the United States and Japan have been keen to work with India on SSA.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">Until now, the ISRO relied on limited data from the North America Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) for tracking space debris as well as checking on the active and passive satellites in orbit. But this has been insufficient because this did not give India access to full or real-time data because India was not part of the NORAD network. The ISRO could only access the two-line element (TLE) data set, which is a specific format used by NORAD and provided free to the ISRO as well as other space players. TLE provides data on space objects that are orbiting the earth at a particular point in time. But the fact that the ISRO cannot access real-time NORAD data imposes limitations in terms of <a href="http://www.indiandefensenews.in/2019/09/isro-initiates-project-netra-to.html" style="box-sizing: border-box;">accuracy and precision of data</a> acquired and delay in tracking objects in space. </span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">The urgency and the need for India to monitor and track space objects and space debris became particularly evident after India’s anti-satellite (ASAT) test in March 2019. This possibly led to the establishment of the ISRO’s <a href="https://www.isro.gov.in/update/03-aug-2019/foundation-stone-of-space-situational-awareness-control-centre-chairman-isro" style="box-sizing: border-box;">Space Situational Awareness and Management Directorate</a> at the ISRO Headquarters, which is an important step as India’s space program grows. India’s decision to establish its own dedicated SSA capabilities also comes from the growth in the number of satellites and counter-space capabilities such as ASATs. India today operates a combination of communication satellites including GSATs and INSATs, navigation satellites (IRNSS constellation), and a series of surveillance satellites such as CARTOSAT and RESOURCESAT series.</span></div></div></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">As for its SSA capabilities, the ISRO started a new initiative called Project NETRA (Network for Space Object Tracking and Analysis) that will keep track of satellites in Low Earth Orbit to prevent them from being hit by space debris or space weather incidents. The ISRO is also in the process of establishing several observation facilities that would include radars, telescopes, data processing centers, and a control center. These are <a href="http://www.indiandefensenews.in/2019/09/isro-initiates-project-netra-to.html" style="box-sizing: border-box;">meant to</a> “spot, track and catalogue objects as small as 10 cm, up to a range of 3,400 km and equal to a space orbit of around 2,000 km.” According to reports quoting ISRO Chairman Dr. Sivan, <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/science/isro-initiates-project-netra-to-safeguard-indian-space-assets-from-debris-and-other-harm/article29497795.ece" style="box-sizing: border-box;">NETRA</a> will become part of the global efforts at “tracking, warning about and mitigating space debris.” NETRA is to eventually track objects in GEO or geostationary orbit, at 36,000 km. </span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">According to Sivan, India’s SSA capabilities will include a long-range telescope in Leh, a radar in India’s northeast, and a Multi-Object Tracking Radar (MOTR) in Sriharikota, in southern India. As for <a href="https://swfound.org/media/206344/india-ssa-perspective-mrunalini-d.pdf" style="box-sizing: border-box;">telescopes</a>, India has a number of optical-infrared observatories including at Bangalore, Pune, Mt. Abu, Nainital, and Hanle. MOTR has been in use already for carrying out space debris proximity analysis in powered and orbital phases during satellite launch, re-entry prediction of debris, and TLE catalogue building. In June this year, the ISRO signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Aryabhatta Research Institute of Observational Sciences (<a href="https://www.republicworld.com/technology-news/science/isro-signs-mou-witharies-for-cooperation-in-space-situationalawareness.html" style="box-sizing: border-box;">ARIES</a>) for collaboration in SSA and Astrophysics. In fact, a telescope that belongs to the ARIES Devasthal Observatory was used for tracking the Indian GSAT-6A satellite. </span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">These are fairly limited SSA capabilities that can be expanded in collaboration with others like the United States, France, and Japan to develop better coverage and more comprehensive SSA systems. India can also take advantage of the amateur astronomer community in building up its capabilities. </span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">Even though late in the day, the ISRO’s steps to establish an SSA Directorate are important. In addition to establishing a certain amount of self-sufficiency in its ability to track and monitor the space environment, it also showcases India as a responsible stakeholder in the space arena. These are baby steps, but SSA is a very challenging problem. As Moriba Jah <a href="http://link-springer-com-443.webvpn.fjmu.edu.cn/referenceworkentry/10.1007%2F978-3-030-22786-9_103-1" style="box-sizing: border-box;">explains</a>, the absence of standardization and a common “lingua franca” so as to “minimize redundancy and confusion” are issues that need to be addressed. SSA systems themselves will probably need to be adapted with newer applications such as rendezvous and proximity operations, satellite servicing and refueling, inspection, and space-based manufacturing. Another set of challenges will be tracking small satellite constellations that are set to grow exponentially in the coming years. Thus, the SSA challenges will continue to grow manifold. </span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">This also makes international collaboration a necessity. India-U.S. SSA collaboration is a good starting point that can be expanded to include other like-minded partners such as Japan, France, and Australia.</span></div>Rajihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12428075941644054406noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1653135038182436032.post-86065781220986025622020-12-07T14:28:00.000+05:302020-12-07T14:28:17.088+05:30Chinese Misbehavior Increases Support for Taiwan - The Diplomat, 24 October 2020<span style="font-family: inherit;">In my October column for <a href="https://thediplomat.com/">The Diplomat</a>, I <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/chinese-misbehavior-increases-support-for-taiwan/">looked</a> at how China's misbehaviour has increased support for Taiwan. I argue that Beijing’s pressure on Taiwan and on other countries is generating greater sympathy and support for Taiwan. </span><div><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi1MvqKNAB92L_sDmaLLTMkVwuPMsDJudMo3WYcPGRit2JFF8FfFN2QF65fN3uJkgvODpskjWPskLR6eGFBiWzY5eYNfjmPCI6Inq2M8hnWEz_TcortlC7-0pjlFiOMoe8vVVc_u8BF1seI/s600/thediplomat-2020-04-23-1.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="400" data-original-width="600" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi1MvqKNAB92L_sDmaLLTMkVwuPMsDJudMo3WYcPGRit2JFF8FfFN2QF65fN3uJkgvODpskjWPskLR6eGFBiWzY5eYNfjmPCI6Inq2M8hnWEz_TcortlC7-0pjlFiOMoe8vVVc_u8BF1seI/s320/thediplomat-2020-04-23-1.jpg" width="320" /></a></div><div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">As China’s relations with many countries in the region and outside deteriorate, sympathy for Taiwan and its plight is growing. While there is little to indicate that any country is considering dramatic shifts to their Taiwan policy, China’s aggressive behavior is generating growing concerns about a conflict across the Taiwan Strait. There is also increasing public sympathy for Taiwan in many countries in the region, especially in Southeast Asia and India, because most have now experienced some form of coercion from China. This provides a fertile ground should there be considerations of any shifts in policy toward Taiwan in any of these countries. Equally, China’s sensitivity about Taiwan provides a ready handle for others to retaliate for unfriendly Chinese behavior. </span></div><div><div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">For the full post, click <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/chinese-misbehavior-increases-support-for-taiwan/">here</a>. </span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;">Some of these growing concerns are a result of Chinese behavior toward Taiwan itself. Repeated </span><a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/beijing-ditches-median-line-as-tensions-rise-in-the-taiwan-strait/" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">military exercises</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"> in the vicinity of Taiwan and efforts to pressure Taiwan militarily have been growing. According to Taiwan’s defense minister, the PLA has engaged in 49 military aircraft sorties across the Taiwan Strait median line in 2020, the highest number since 1990. The minister, who made a </span><a href="https://focustaiwan.tw/cross-strait/202010070024" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">statement</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"> in the parliament, said that the Chinese military “conducted 1,710 aircraft sorties and 1,029 military vessel sorties into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ) this year.” The minister added that, countering these moves, Taiwan’s military undertook around “3,000 military aircraft sorties to intercept and monitor the Chinese aircraft and vessels.” There is even some </span><a href="http://www.businessworld.in/article/China-aims-to-exhaust-Taiwan-s-defence-budget-by-repeated-incursions-Report/09-10-2020-329540/" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">concern</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"> that China might be doing this as a tactic to force Taiwan to waste its resources. </span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;">In response to these Chinese moves, the United States has stepped up its diplomatic and military support to Taiwan. In August this year, the U.S. Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar traveled to Taiwan. This was “the </span><a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/us/articles/2020-08-09/azar-leads-highest-level-us-delegation-to-taiwan-in-decades" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">highest-level visit</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"> by an American Cabinet official since the break in formal diplomatic relations between Washington and Taipei in 1979.” The discussions during the visit focused on COVID-19, the impact on global health, and Taiwan as a possible supplier of medical equipment and technology to deal with the pandemic. In September, another high-level U.S. visit took place with </span><a href="https://taiwantoday.tw/news.php?unit=2,6,10,15,18&post=185444" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">Keith Krach</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;">, under secretary of state for economic growth, energy, and the environment. Krach was also accompanied by a U.S. delegation that included Robert A. Destro, assistant secretary of the department of democracy, human rights, and labor. </span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;">More recently, the U.S. has also agreed to a major arms package for Taiwan worth almost </span><a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/10/21/us-state-dept-approves-1-8bn-in-potential-arms-sales-to-taiwan" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">$2 billion</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;">. The total package may increase to as much as </span><a href="https://in.reuters.com/article/usa-taiwan-arms/u-s-state-department-approves-1-8-billion-in-potential-arms-sales-to-taiwan-pentagon-idINKBN27706Y" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">$5 billion</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;">. The military package includes sensors, missiles, and artillery, all designed to boost Taiwan’s capacity to defend itself from China. China has threatened unspecified retaliation against the United States for such arms transfers, but it is unlikely that the United States will stop making them. </span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;">Support for Taiwan is growing at the popular levels in countries like India. This was in no small measure the result of </span><a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/china-brazenly-issues-taiwan-guidelines-for-indian-media/" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">Chinese heavy-handedness</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;">, such as its recent “instruction” to Indian journalists that they should observe the “One China” principle. This was triggered by reports and advertisements in the Indian media regarding Taiwan’s National Day. Far from winning any compliance, the Indian media dismissed and laughed off Chinese efforts. The Indian government was less than amused. The spokesperson of India’s foreign ministry rejected the Chinese statement </span><a href="https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/indian-media-is-free-says-in-mea-response-to-chinese-embassys-note-to-press-on-taiwan/article32806814.ece#!" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">saying</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;">, “there is free media in India, that reports on issues that they see fit.” The growing sympathy in India toward Taiwan, including at official levels, is most clearly the result of the Sino-Indian confrontation at the border this summer. There was even reportedly </span><a href="https://www.firstpost.com/india/india-taiwan-consider-trade-deal-as-both-spar-with-china-beijing-asks-new-delhi-to-abide-by-one-china-policy-8938051.html" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">considerations</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"> in the Indian government of </span><a href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/government-considers-trade-talks-with-taiwan-as-both-spar-with-china/articleshow/78762162.cms" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">starting free trade talks</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"> with Taiwan, though this appears to have been </span><a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/india-has-no-plans-to-launch-dialogue-on-trade-deal-with-taiwan/articleshow/78795382.cms" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">shelved</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"> for the time being. The contrast between India’s attempts to curtail its China trade while seeking greater trade with Taiwan is stark. As in the Indian case, sympathy toward Taiwan has also grown in Southeast Asia as a result of crude Chinese pressures. The so-called “</span><a href="https://forsea.co/the-milk-tea-alliance-how-thailand-taiwan-and-hong-kong-are-supporting-each-others-fight-for-democracy/" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">Milk Tea Alliance</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;">” is one reflection of this phenomena. </span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;">The increasing salience of the Taiwan issue is reflected in the </span><a href="http://globaltaiwan.org/2020/10/vol-5-issue-20/#MichaelMazza10212020" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">growing debate in the United States</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"> about the appropriate level of commitment to Taiwan. There is also some </span><a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/taiwan-flashpoint-what-australia-can-do-stop-coming-taiwan-crisis" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">concern</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"> in Australia about the potential impact of U.S. involvement in Taiwan on Australia. There are, equally, </span><a href="https://scholars-stage.blogspot.com/2020/09/why-i-fear-for-taiwan.html" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">concerns</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"> about whether Taiwan itself is doing enough to defend itself. </span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;">Much of the new attention and support that Taiwan is getting is clearly the consequence of both the Chinese actions in the Taiwan Strait as well as its unrelenting pressures on other countries, even those far from China. China recently engaged in a spat with Sweden after the country banned Huawei from its 5G network. China responded by asking Sweden to “</span><a href="https://www.news24.com/fin24/companies/ict/watch-china-to-sweden-drop-huawei-ban-or-face-fallout-20201022" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">correct its wrong decision</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;">” or face consequences for Swedish businesses. Just a few days earlier, the Chinese ambassador to Canada held out a not-so-veiled </span><a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-chinese-envoy-says-canadas-acceptance-of-hong-kong-refugees/" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">threat</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"> to the 300,000 Canadians living in Hong Kong if Canada continued to grant asylum to democracy activists from Hong Kong. China’s unusually foolish behavior and its growing pressure on Taiwan is likely to continue to garner greater sympathy for Taiwan, a democracy that has successfully fought the coronavirus epidemic which originated in China. </span></div></div></div></div>Rajihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12428075941644054406noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1653135038182436032.post-18863699094716047332020-12-07T13:41:00.003+05:302020-12-07T13:41:37.983+05:30Sino-Indian Competition in the Indian Ocean Region Intensifies - The Diplomat, 16 October 2020<span style="font-family: inherit;">In my third column for The Diplomat, I <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/sino-indian-competition-in-the-indian-ocean-region-intensifies/">looked</a> at the Sino-Indian competition in the Indian Ocean Region. As competition intensifies in the Region, India loses touch with Sri Lanka and solidifies relations with the Maldives. </span><div><br /></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiJool2v2TDzMGImZht8rAsB5H2M2hJaUELmJzhYwrt4WjIfdmvbw5Hh1ejpfmxS1SApNOEmRCKLCe7B2Ly2X6H5uP_broAYv2mXkkxsiBaR_hHMqSAIs32lBMYuS6BCIpbY8OQFunOHBPk/s300/thediplomat-2020-10-15-34.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="225" data-original-width="300" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiJool2v2TDzMGImZht8rAsB5H2M2hJaUELmJzhYwrt4WjIfdmvbw5Hh1ejpfmxS1SApNOEmRCKLCe7B2Ly2X6H5uP_broAYv2mXkkxsiBaR_hHMqSAIs32lBMYuS6BCIpbY8OQFunOHBPk/s0/thediplomat-2020-10-15-34.jpg" /></a></div>India has recently faced some stiff competition from China for influence in its South Asian neighborhood. China’s increasingly visible footprint in Sri Lanka since the return of the Rajapaksas has made India’s position a little shaky. While New Delhi’s relations are being put to the test in one Indian Ocean state, India has had better luck with the Maldives, another key state in the region. </span><div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">For the full post, click <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/sino-indian-competition-in-the-indian-ocean-region-intensifies/">here</a>. </span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">With the Rajapaksas back in office, Sri Lanka appears to be once again on the verge of rebuilding a stronger Sri Lanka-China relationship. Last week, a group of senior officials led by top foreign policy official Yang Jiechi, a member of the Chinese Communist Party’s Politburo and the director of the Central Committee’s Foreign Affairs Commission, its top policymaking body, visited Sri Lanka. The visit was part of a four-nation tour by Chinese officials, which included visits to the UAE, Algeria and Serbia. </span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;">In a statement, Sri Lanka’s foreign ministry </span><a href="https://www.dailynews.lk/2020/10/08/local/230877/chinese-delegation-colombo-today" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">reportedly</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"> lauded this “first ever Chinese visit in the South Asian region since the global coronavirus epidemic,” and looked forward to strengthening cooperation between Sri Lanka and China, “in the areas of combating the global pandemic and revival of economic relations.” The high-powered delegation met with both President Gotabaya Rajapaksa and Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa in Colombo. </span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;">Since the Rajapaksas returned to power, China-Sri Lanka relations have been warming up. Following Mahinda Rajapaksa’s landslide victory, China welcomed him as the prime minister and pledged complete support, <a href="https://www.newindianexpress.com/world/2020/aug/11/china-greets-old-friend-mahinda-rajapaksa-on-his-massive-win-in-sri-lanka-elections-2181666.html" style="box-sizing: border-box;">stating that</a> “</span><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;">Beijing</span><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"> looks forward to advancing its strategic cooperative partnership with Colombo.” After he took office, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian </span><a href="https://www.tamilguardian.com/content/china-congratulates-old-friend-rajapaksa-assuming-office%C2%A0" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">stated</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"> during a press briefing that two countries enjoyed a “traditional friendship” and that the two have been advancing their “strategic cooperative partnership based on sincere mutual assistance and ever-lasting friendship.” </span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">China’s influence in Sri Lanka will remain a cause of concern for India. The Rajapaksas have been generally perceived as close to China. The fact that the Hambantota Port development was given to China by Mahinda Rajapaksa during his previous term in office as president continues to be a sore point for India. While this has been worrying enough, that the Sri Lankan government signed the Hambantota Port to China on a 99-year lease is even more of a concern in New Delhi.</span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;">With China giving high-profile attention to Sri Lanka, Colombo is slowing down some of its planned projects with India and Japan. Reports have </span><a href="https://thewire.in/south-asia/sri-lanka-india-modi-rajapaksa-china" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">suggested</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"> that China believes that Colombo must maintain some distance from New Delhi and Tokyo. Accordingly, Sri Lanka has decided to pause or slow down some of the development projects involving India and Japan, such as a </span><a href="https://economynext.com/sri-lanka-halts-japan-funded-colombo-light-rail-project-71199/" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">Japanese-funded light rail project</span></a><span style="font-family: inherit;"> and </span><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;">the </span><a href="https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/india-colombo-port-east-container-terminal-project-in-trouble-1696926-2020-07-04" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">East Container Terminal</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"> </span><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;">(ECT) project in Colombo, which is backed by both Japan and India. In the latter case, this came despite the fact that the three countries signed an MoU for the project more than a year ago. Since the recent change in political dispensation in Colombo, there is no assurance that these projects will go through. </span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;">In contrast, India appears to have got a bit of a breather in the Maldives. In fact, the Maldives may be one of a couple shining spots for India in its immediate neighborhood. India has been pitching a number of economic, connectivity and capacity-building projects in the Maldives. While many of the recently announced projects are economic in nature, the Indian objective is to limit China’s footprint in India’s backyard. Earlier in the week, the EXIM Bank of India entered into a </span><a href="https://indianexpress.com/article/india/greater-maldives-connectivity-project-6721899/" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">line of credit agreement</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"> for $400 million for the Greater Male Connectivity Project. This is reportedly the largest of the infrastructure projects in the Maldives, connecting Villingili, Gulhifalhu and Thilafushi islands. This comes in addition to $100 million that India has promised for the project, which involves the construction of a 6.7-kilometer bridge and causeway network linking Male with the other three atolls. It is reported to be second most important connectivity project in the Maldives, after the China-Maldives Friendship Bridge linking the airport island of Hulhule with the capital’s island.</span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;">India announced its assistance for the project in a virtual meeting between External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and Maldives Foreign Minister Abdulla Shahid in August. Thanking India for this assistance, the Maldivian foreign minister </span><a href="https://twitter.com/abdulla_shahid/status/1315555021887434752" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">tweeted</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;">, “The Greater Male Connectivity Project will lead to greater possibilities. It is the gateway to a more developed & economically resilient nation.” The current assistance package comes in addition to a previous </span><a href="https://www.thehindu.com/business/Economy/delhi-male-ink-400-mn-pact-for-connectivity/article32837664.ece" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">line of credit of $800 million</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;">, which is one of the largest loan packages that India has given to any nation in its neighborhood.</span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;">Earlier in July, India also gave the Maldives a symbolic check providing assistance for nine projects, through the High Impact Community Development Projects (HICDP) scheme. India has signed <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/india-to-extend-substantial-financial-package-for-maldives-to-restrict-chinese-moves-in-southern-neighbourhood/articleshow/77342724.cms" style="box-sizing: border-box;">several bilateral </a></span><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;">MoUs</span><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"> for the construction of fish processing and bottled water plants, and the establishment of tourism zones</span><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;">. Prior to this, New Delhi had offered Male $400 million through an extended currency swap arrangement in order to deal with its liquidity crisis. India is also reported to have granted the Maldives </span><a href="https://www.livemint.com/news/india/india-hands-over-symbolic-cheque-to-maldives-govt-for-nine-projects-under-hicdp-11595946240419.html" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">$1.4 billion</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"> in budgetary aid to negate the adverse economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. </span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">Things have turned around for India in the Maldives since the 2018 elections, when Ibrahim Mohamed Solih was elected president. But another change in political dispensation could just as easily sour relations with India. So, while things are still working in its favor, India is trying to do its best to bring Male under its wing. Whether these aid and assistance efforts can maintain a positive role for India in Male over the longer term is unclear. But for the time being, the Maldives remain a relative success story for Indian diplomacy. More importantly, the course of events suggests that competition with China has forced India to up its diplomatic game in the region. </span></div></div></div>Rajihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12428075941644054406noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1653135038182436032.post-36310997943745716542020-12-07T13:12:00.001+05:302020-12-07T13:12:26.387+05:30India and France Partner for Expedition to Venus - The Diplomat, 8 October 2020<span style="font-family: inherit;">In this post, I <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/india-and-france-partner-for-expedition-to-venus/">look</a> at the India-France space collaboration, looking at a niche area of Venus exploration. This is an article I did for <a href="https://thediplomat.com/">The Diplomat</a> in October. I argue that India has long valued France’s partnership on issues ranging from defense and space exploration to civil nuclear power generation. </span><div><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><br /></div><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjLDPvXlxNYLXyZMcNQ6GytmTcBgD33khmD6jRou2kDxSxk37zoFKTPg9ro36F-KnVa86Xmn-_Cva9byYY9RJEM3uLmU_qf4AoHtmMpBRxZsk_3nAsKp26GmdxwEboduioZ5b-2KR2WD-fn/s300/download.jpeg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="168" data-original-width="300" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjLDPvXlxNYLXyZMcNQ6GytmTcBgD33khmD6jRou2kDxSxk37zoFKTPg9ro36F-KnVa86Xmn-_Cva9byYY9RJEM3uLmU_qf4AoHtmMpBRxZsk_3nAsKp26GmdxwEboduioZ5b-2KR2WD-fn/s0/download.jpeg" /></a></div><div><br /><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">After the success of its first interplanetary mission to Mars in September 2014, India has now set its eyes on a mission to Venus. The Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO), India’s civilian space agency, will be undertaking the mission in 2025. According to </span><a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/science/isro-to-launch-its-venus-mission-in-2025-france-to-take-part-french-space-agency/articleshow/78410437.cms" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">reports</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">, France has agreed to be part of the mission, the first time a French payload will be carried on an Indian space exploration mission. The French space agency, Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales (CNES), is reported to have </span><a href="https://www.businessinsider.in/science/space/news/isro-to-launch-venus-mission-in-2025/articleshow/78420140.cms" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">confirmed</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> this in a statement last week, saying that it “will coordinate and prepare the French contribution.” ISRO’s Venus instrument, VIRAL (Venus Infrared Atmospheric Gases Linker) has been co-developed by Russian and French agencies. </span></span><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">For the full post, click <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/india-and-france-partner-for-expedition-to-venus/">here</a>. </span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;">Last week’s announcement appears to be a follow-up to the </span><a href="https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/29597/IndiaFrance+Joint+Vision+for+Space+Cooperation+New+Delhi+10+March+2018" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">March 2018 India-France Joint Vision for Space Cooperation</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;">, which identified Mars and Venus as possible areas of future cooperation. The statement said the ISRO and CNES would work together in exploring the solar system and beyond, including joint work on the autonomous navigation of rovers on the Moon, Mars and other planets; aero-braking technologies for planetary exploration; modelling of the atmospheres of Mars and Venus; and inflatable systems for the exploration of Venus.</span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;">In November 2018, ISRO issued an “</span><a href="https://www.isro.gov.in/sites/default/files/ao_venus.pdf" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">Announcement of Opportunity</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"> (AO) to international science community for Space-Based Experiments to Study Venus,” seeking international proposals for science payloads for its Venus mission. The AO provided the details of the Indian payloads on the Venus mission which include an S-band synthetic aperture radar (SAR), advanced radar for topside Ionosphere and subsurface sounding, ultraviolet (UV) imaging spectroscopy telescope, thermal camera, cloud monitoring camera, Venus atmospheric spectropolarimeter, airglow photometer, radio occultation experiment, Ionospheric electron temperature analyzer, mass spectrometer and a plasma wave detector. ISRO stated that the satellite will weigh around 100 kilograms with about 500 watts of power. </span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;">Though other countries have conducted missions to Venus, there is still a lot of exploration left to do. According to the ISRO, the Indian interest in pursuing the Venus mission is to gain greater understanding of surface/subsurface features and resurfacing processes; atmospheric chemistry, dynamics and compositional variations; and interaction with solar radiation/solar wind on Venus. Venus is generally considered </span><a href="https://www.gizbot.com/news/isro-partners-with-french-space-agency-for-venus-mission-set-for-2025-070321.html" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">uninhabitable</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"> “due to its volatile and acidic clouds,” but recent discovery of </span><a href="https://www.gizbot.com/news/life-on-venus-scientists-discover-evidence-that-could-hold-microbial-life-069980.html" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">phosphine</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"> is an indicator of possible microbial life on the planet. </span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">The recently announced partnership between India and France on the Venus mission comes against the backdrop of a long-standing and robust cooperation between the ISRO and CNES. India has long valued France as an important strategic partner and the two nations are engaged in many other sectors, including civil nuclear power and defense. France has cooperated with and aided the Indian space program since the 1960s. In March 2018, during the visit of the French President Emmanuel Macron to India, the two countries signed the India-France Joint Vision for Space Cooperation, identifying nine specific areas of cooperation including space situational awareness (SSA), high-resolution earth observation, satellite navigation, and space transportation systems. The two nations also pledged to work together to maintain space as a safe, secure and sustainable domain. In the context of Indian and French interest in maritime security in the Indo-Pacific region, SSA and high resolution earth observation satellites could also mean the two countries will likely pursue maritime domain awareness (MDA). </span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;">ISRO and CNES are also working together on India’s first crewed space mission, Gaganyaan, scheduled for launch in 2022. The mission was </span><a href="https://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/gaganyaan-project-france-to-help-isro-in-the-human-space-programme-118090600434_1.html" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">announced</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"> by Jean-Yves Le Gall, president of CNES, on the sidelines of the 2018 Bengaluru Space Expo organized by the Confederation of Indian Industry and Antrix, the commercial arm of ISRO. France has reportedly agreed to train Indian flight surgeons, essentially Indian Air Force doctors working on aviation medicine and those responsible for the astronauts’ health before, during and after the space mission. These doctors are to undergo a critical </span><a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/science/france-to-train-indian-flight-surgeons-for-gaganyaan-mission/articleshow/73489473.cms?from=mdr" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">two-week period of training</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;">. </span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;">All this is made possible because of India’s and, in particular, ISRO’s comfort in doing business with France. This comes from the fact that France enjoys great confidence as a reliable partner of India. The fact that the two countries share a common strategic vision for the Indo-Pacific region only helps to cement their partnership further. India has traditionally had a well-recognized aversion to the concept of “alliance” in international politics, but Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi overcame this when he referred to France as an ally during a speech in Paris, when he </span><a href="https://www.business-standard.com/multimedia/video-gallery/general/for-me-infra-means-alliance-between-india-france-pm-modi-89698.htm" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">said</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit;"> that for him “infra” meant something other than short-hand for infrastructure: “I would like to say that for me it is IN+FRA, which means the alliance between India and France.” France’s recent steps in supporting what India considers its core interests, such as the Indian position on Jammu and Kashmir at the United Nations Security Council, are a testament to the close strategic partnership between India and France. The fact that France, unlike the United States, has no negative baggage in Indian perceptions from the Cold War period helps. Moreover, Paris stood alone in supporting India’s decision to go nuclear in 1998, unlike other partners like Australia and Japan, which further reinforces Indian confidence in France as a long-term, reliable partner. </span></div></div></div>Rajihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12428075941644054406noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1653135038182436032.post-1052302906660619142020-12-07T12:52:00.001+05:302020-12-07T12:52:27.054+05:30Australia-Japan-India Trilateral Sets Sights on Supply Chain Resilience - The Diplomat, 2 October 2020In my first article for <a href="https://thediplomat.com/">The Diplomat</a> in October, I <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/australia-japan-india-trilateral-sets-sights-on-supply-chain-resilience/">looked</a> at the Australia-Japan-India trilateral which has its eyes on supply chain resilience as the first concrete agenda driving their cooperation. I argue that China's assertive behaviour is the glue that holds the trilateral together. <div><br /><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: "Noto Serif", serif;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: "Noto Serif", serif;"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhxRgC-HuKHa90SybR_lAw1Bu8VHiHEFOGMdOulsExDpIDOuaUrV1TvXYojznK8JFviFr2ZGSPxULTrF5Y6SU01xqIVcOYdzTGk9LJrsB7pWhIITgDt7eg6HAU4vFBXtjuilT7QAPxj-TS0/s300/thediplomat-2020-10-01-8.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="169" data-original-width="300" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhxRgC-HuKHa90SybR_lAw1Bu8VHiHEFOGMdOulsExDpIDOuaUrV1TvXYojznK8JFviFr2ZGSPxULTrF5Y6SU01xqIVcOYdzTGk9LJrsB7pWhIITgDt7eg6HAU4vFBXtjuilT7QAPxj-TS0/s0/thediplomat-2020-10-01-8.jpg" /></a></div>Recently, the trade ministers of Australia, Japan and India agreed to develop a supply chain resilience program for the Indo-Pacific region. The announcement, which followed a </span><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: "Noto Serif", serif;">video conference between Australia’s Simon Birmingham, Japan’s Kajiyama Hiroshi and India’s Piyush Goyal in in early September, came amid a growing recognition in all three nations of the dangers of excessive economic reliance on China. While the details of the initiative remain sketchy, the three countries have tasked their respective bureaucracies with looking for ways to develop an initiative that would strengthen alternate supply chains in an effort to counter China’s control of the trade of essential supplies. The initiative is being planned for launch next year. It is meant to be an inclusive initiative and the three countries are looking to extend it into Southeast Asia.</span><div><div><br /></div><div>For the full post, click <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/australia-japan-india-trilateral-sets-sights-on-supply-chain-resilience/">here</a>. </div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: "Noto Serif", serif;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: "Noto Serif", serif;">The idea of the </span><a href="https://thediplomat.com/2015/06/india-australia-japan-hold-first-ever-trilateral-dialogue/" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: "Noto Serif", serif;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">Australia-Japan-India</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: "Noto Serif", serif;"> (AJI) trilateral is not itself new. The three countries had their first trilateral dialogue in June 2015. The meeting saw the participation of then Indian Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar, Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Akitaka Saiki and Peter Varghese, the secretary of Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Predictably, a dominant theme in the discussions was maritime security and freedom of navigation, which continues to be the case five years later. In fact, the three nations’ shared concerns on the maritime front have only increased due to China’s recent assertive behavior in the region. While the Indo-Pacific region has an alphabet soup of minilaterals and formal arrangements, the AJI trilateral appears to be one of the strongest, despite some challenges. A recent report on the trilateral by the </span><a href="https://perthusasia.edu.au/getattachment/Our-Work/Australia,-Japan-and-India-A-trilateral-coalition/PU-175-AJI-Book-WEB(2).pdf.aspx?lang=en-AU" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: "Noto Serif", serif;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">Perth USAsia Centre</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: "Noto Serif", serif;"> highlights the potentials of the trilateral, as well as some of the challenges that still persist. Nevertheless, the decision to form a trilateral supply chain initiative is an indicator of the actionable agenda that could be pursued by the AJI in the coming years.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: "Noto Serif", serif;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: "Noto Serif", serif;">China’s behavior has provided the glue that binds the trilateral together. For all the rhetoric about its peaceful rise, China’s behavior since the beginning of 2020 has antagonized many. China’s actions have forced the AJI trilateral to acknowledge the danger of economic over-dependence on China. As such, supply chain diversification and resilience has become an important issue for all three countries. Commenting on the initiative, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has stated the need to reshape global supply chains “based on trust and stability.”</span></div><div><span style="font-family: "Noto Serif", serif;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: "Noto Serif", serif;">Reducing dependence on China is not going to be easy for India in the short term. At the same time, difficulties with China have reached a point where opinion is shifting in New Delhi. Indian elite opinionmakers have made it amply clear that India will need to bite the bullet, even if it means going through some hard times. India is still not considering complete economic decoupling, of course, but a significant reduction in terms of its reliance on China. Because India exports mostly primary commodities, China can easily replace India, but it is going to be difficult for India to overcome its dependence on China This is not a challenge unique to India, but it forces India and other countries to consider together what steps to take to diversify their economies away from a heavy reliance on China.</span></div></div></div><div><span style="font-family: "Noto Serif", serif;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: "Noto Serif", serif;">India would also like to take advantage of the general interest that many countries have in moving their manufacturing out of China, but this is easier said than done. For instance, even though many industries leaving China may want to come to India – and though India may be even keener to attract them – India still faces many challenges, including problems of land acquisition, outdated labor laws, an uncertain tax regime and growing domestic conflicts, to name just a few. In contrast, Vietnam is emerging as a major destination for businesses leaving China. </span></div><div><span style="font-family: "Noto Serif", serif;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: "Noto Serif", serif;">Discussing these measures together with like-minded partners may help in setting up alternatives to these nations’ economic dependence on China Each country in the AJI trilateral recognizes that alone, they are no match for China’s economic power. Alone, each is much more vulnerable because of their dependence. But together, they might be able to find some solutions. Whether this will work is yet to be seen, but a beginning is being made.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: "Noto Serif", serif;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: "Noto Serif", serif;">Another area that is high on the agenda for the AJI is maritime security and ensuring freedom of the seas in the Indo-Pacific. This is not all about navies and formal security collaboration, but will also involve the important notion of “norm entrepreneurship,” as identified in the Perth USAsia Report. The trilateral will thus try to promote respect for international law, and a free, open, rules-based and inclusive Indo-Pacific. The hope is that eventually the three nations can think in terms of doing joint military exercises or even coordinated patrols in the Indo-Pacific. India has resisted such steps for a long time, but China’s aggressive actions on the borders and elsewhere are likely to make New Delhi more amenable to considering bolder steps.</span></div></div>Rajihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12428075941644054406noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1653135038182436032.post-7833344526320441522020-11-30T23:08:00.002+05:302020-11-30T23:08:17.360+05:30What Are India’s Plans for Directed Energy Weapons? - The Diplomat, 24 September 2020<span style="font-family: inherit;">I am about two months behind in updating my blog. There were some formatting issues which I have managed to finally take care of, and am hoping to bring my blog up to date. </span><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">In one of my last columns for The Diplomat in September, I <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/what-are-indias-plans-for-directed-energy-weapons/">looked</a> at Directed Energy Weapons (DEWs). While DEWs are yet to be deployed by any country's military, they are widely seen as a critical part of future warfare. </span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjIvt9CtvAB0UVDOYwZRJUyeGMIrH-QexiYiHQ7U6BtDgVunaAMsTkD_h9QnF2PEBp-9qgFlyPJB2I2t5q28kx2qa_9hO4b1hO96kZJaMYW3y1l7oBKZppf-bRyUZ-gRi48gBh3CIO8GK2B/s300/thediplomat-2020-09-23-9.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><img border="0" data-original-height="199" data-original-width="300" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjIvt9CtvAB0UVDOYwZRJUyeGMIrH-QexiYiHQ7U6BtDgVunaAMsTkD_h9QnF2PEBp-9qgFlyPJB2I2t5q28kx2qa_9hO4b1hO96kZJaMYW3y1l7oBKZppf-bRyUZ-gRi48gBh3CIO8GK2B/s0/thediplomat-2020-09-23-9.jpg" /></span></a></div><span style="font-family: inherit;">India's Defense <span style="box-sizing: border-box;">Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) announced earlier this month that it plans to develop directed energy weapons (DEWs) using high-energy lasers and microwaves. DEWs are emerging military technologies that are yet to be deployed by any military force but are seen as critical in future warfare. According to media </span><a href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/drdo-plans-star-wars-style-weapons-for-battles-of-future/articleshow/78096712.cms#:~:text=NEW%20DELHI%3A%20The%20Defence%20Research,contactless%20conflicts%20of%20the%20future." style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">reports</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">, India has developed a national plan with short, medium and long term goals to develop a series of DEW variants with up to 100 kilowatts of power. This is being planned in a collaborative mode, to eventually partner with and benefit from the domestic private sector. While India is still in the early stages of developing this technology and nowhere near possessing an operational capability, advances in such technologies will have implications for both national and regional security. </span></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">For the full story, click <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/what-are-indias-plans-for-directed-energy-weapons/">here</a>. </span></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">Development of DEWs is seen as particularly important in the context of India's worsening security environment, especially its ties with China. </span>The continuing military confrontation in eastern Ladakh is a reminder of the challenges that China poses to India. Beijing’s growing military power, including in space, cyber and electronic warfare domains, can inflict significant damage on its adversaries, including India. China is also developing DEW technologies. Indeed, India is probably developing its own DEWs as a response. </span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">Delivering the 12th <span style="box-sizing: border-box;">annual Air Chief Marshal L.M. Katre memorial lecture in August 2019, Dr. G. Satheesh Reddy, the head of the DRDO </span><a href="https://eurasiantimes.com/drdo-building-directed-energy-weapons-which-can-dismantle-ariel-targets-without-a-shot-being-fired/" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">said</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">, “DEWs are extremely important today. The world is moving towards them. In the country too, we are doing a lot of experiments. We have been working in this area for the past three to four years to develop 10-kW and 20-kW [weapons].” In August 2017, the DRDO is </span><a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-gets-a-step-closer-to-laser-weaponry-as-drdo-successfully-tests-laser-system/articleshow/61954646.cms" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">reported</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> to have tested a 1-kilowatt laser weapon at Chitradurga in the South Indian state of Karnataka, on a target 250 meters away. Then Defense Minister Arun Jaitley is believed to have been present for the test. This is far from being a usable weapon, of course: in addition to the limited distance of the target, the laser also reportedly took 36 seconds to create a hole on the target metal sheet. The Centre for High Energy Systems and Sciences and Laser Science & Technology Centre, two DRDO laboratories, are working on the project. </span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">In 2018, while responding to a question in the Indian Parliament on the DRDO’s major technological developments, the minister of state for defense stated that the DRDO has </span><a href="https://pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1519137" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">developed</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> a vehicle-mounted high-power laser-directed energy system for use against drones. The anti-drone system will supposedly be eventually manufactured in large quantities through the involvement of the Indian private sector.</span> <span style="box-sizing: border-box;">Two </span><a href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/drdo-plans-star-wars-style-weapons-for-battles-of-future/articleshow/78096712.cms#:~:text=NEW%20DELHI%3A%20The%20Defence%20Research,contactless%20conflicts%20of%20the%20future." style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">models</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> have been developed in this regard: the first can be fielded on a trailer and has a 10-kilowatt laser to target aerial targets within a 2-kilometer range, whereas the second is believed to be a compact tripod-mounted system, mounted with a 2-kilowatt laser designed to operate at a rage of 1 kilometer. Officials cited in one </span><a href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/drdo-plans-star-wars-style-weapons-for-battles-of-future/articleshow/78096712.cms#:~:text=NEW%20DELHI%3A%20The%20Defence%20Research,contactless%20conflicts%20of%20the%20future." style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">report</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> claim that these have been displayed to the armed forces and other relevant agencies and note that these are capable of taking out mini-drones by jamming the command and control systems or by damaging the on-board electronic systems. This system is capable of detecting and jamming micro-drones to a distance of up to 3 kilometers and engaging a target within a range of 1-1.25 kilometers.</span> </span></div></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">India is <span style="box-sizing: border-box;">also reported to have developed a system called KALI, or “kilo ampere linear injector,” a linear electron accelerator for targeting long-range missiles. Once a missile launch is detected, </span><a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/government-refuses-information-on-kali-5000-citing-national-security/articleshow/50234073.cms" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">KALI</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> is supposed to “quickly emit powerful pulses of Relativistic Electrons Beams (REB)” that can damage electronic systems on-board. KALI has been developed by the DRDO and the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC). It was first proposed in 1985 by the then-BARC Director Dr. R. Chidambaram. Work on the project is reported to have begun in 1989. At a BARC Foundation Day </span><a href="http://www.barc.gov.in/presentations/dirspeech.html" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">speech</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> in 2004, the BARC director said that a “high power pulse electron accelerator KALI-5000 has been commissioned at an energy of 650 keV and an electron beam power of 40 GW. High power microwaves having frequency in the range of 3-5 GHz and power 1-2 GW have been generated.” Despite this acknowledgement of the existence of such a system, there is very little information in the public domain. The government has not divulged any information, even in parliament. For instance, more than a decade later, in 2015, while responding to a question in parliament as to whether there are any plans to induct KALI 5000 in the Indian military, Defense Minister Manohar Parikkar simply </span><a href="https://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/govt-refuses-to-divulge-information-on-kali-5000-project-115121800798_1.html" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">stated</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">, “The desired information is sensitive in nature and its disclosure is not in the interest of national security.”</span></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">While </span><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">details are sketchy, the technological roadmaps for the next decade developed by the Indian defense establishment in </span><a href="https://www.mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/TPCR13.pdf" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">2013</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> and </span><a href="https://www.mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/tpcr.pdf" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">2018</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> articulated some of the military’s requirements. Media reports </span><a href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/drdo-plans-star-wars-style-weapons-for-battles-of-future/articleshow/78096712.cms#:~:text=NEW%20DELHI%3A%20The%20Defence%20Research,contactless%20conflicts%20of%20the%20future." style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">said</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> that according to Phase I of the roadmap,the Indian Army and the Indian Air Force require a minimum of 20 “tactical high-energy laser systems” that are capable of destroying “small aerial targets” and electronic warfare systems at a range of 6-8 kilometers. In Phase II, the demand is to have laser systems that have a range of over 20 kilometers to target “soft-skinned” vehicles and forces from both land and air.</span></span></div><div><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">But</span> India’s DEW technological capabilities are still in the nascent stage, and are not yet comparable to the more powerful systems of countries like the U.S., Russia and China. While the effectiveness of these weapons remains unknown because of the lack of open source information, it is quite likely that these will mature in the coming decade. </span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">Of course, <a href="https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/CSBA_ChangingTheGame_ereader.pdf" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">these systems</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;"> bring their own advantages and disadvantages. Laser weapons, for instance, have the capability to be focused precisely, which allows for effective targeting. On the other hand, though microwaves cannot be aimed like lasers, their ability to damage electronic systems without causing casualties opens up other options. In fact, a report produced by the U.S. Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (</span><a href="https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/CSBA_ChangingTheGame_ereader.pdf" style="box-sizing: border-box;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">CSBA</span></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">) details many illustrative scenarios as to how these weapon systems could be effectively used in contactless warfare in the future.</span></span></div><div><br /></div>Rajihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12428075941644054406noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1653135038182436032.post-47635344172677791452020-09-18T00:03:00.004+05:302020-11-30T15:32:04.556+05:30Rise of the Minilaterals: Examining the India-France-Australia Trilateral - The Diplomat, 17 September 2020<p style="text-align: left;">In this week's <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/rise-of-the-minilaterals-examining-the-india-france-australia-trilateral/">column</a> for <a href="https://thediplomat.com/">The Diplomat</a>, I look at the rise of the minilaterals, wherein I examine the India-France-Australia Trilateral. The India-France-Australia trilateral is only the latest of the many minilaterals that are taking shape in the Indo-Pacific region. </p>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhf8trb1GWnDQN1Jnpj3_bTURTVzJObGb4B8OixYHqHRe-GMu26xCNaY_Fy9ZMBvr6zYhDMshz3Qi6mGswZVc_xkjX5Sz9zrcueKnPXg04LBNYadzhZhmhjP7irfiNvIiCi5xG8kWY-xI__/s1024/thediplomat-2020-09-17-6.jpg" style="display: block; padding: 1em 0; text-align: center; "><img alt="" border="0" width="320" data-original-height="576" data-original-width="1024" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhf8trb1GWnDQN1Jnpj3_bTURTVzJObGb4B8OixYHqHRe-GMu26xCNaY_Fy9ZMBvr6zYhDMshz3Qi6mGswZVc_xkjX5Sz9zrcueKnPXg04LBNYadzhZhmhjP7irfiNvIiCi5xG8kWY-xI__/s320/thediplomat-2020-09-17-6.jpg"/></a></div>
<p style="text-align: left;">Last week, India, France, and Australia held their first trilateral meeting. The senior officials’ meeting, held in a virtual setting, was co-chaired by Vardhan Shringla, India’s foreign secretary; François Delattre, secretary-general of the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs; and Frances Adamson, secretary of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT).</p>
For the full post, click <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/rise-of-the-minilaterals-examining-the-india-france-australia-trilateral/">here</a>.
<p style="text-align: left;">The Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), in a <a href="https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/32950/1st+Senior+Officials+IndiaFranceAustralia+Trilateral+Dialogue">statement</a>, said that the trilateral meeting was an effort at strengthening cooperation among the three countries in the Indo-Pacific region. The statement also noted that the three countries plan to meet on an annual basis. Tweeting about the meeting, the MEA <a href="https://twitter.com/MEAIndia/status/1303662770014035969">said</a>, “We agreed to build convergences in our approach to the Indo-Pacific region and to explore ways to strengthen trilateral cooperation, particularly in the maritime domain.” </p>
<p style="text-align: left;">An Australian readout of the meeting was similar to the Indian statement, while the French readout was more explicit in emphasizing the importance of international law, peace, and security in the Indo-Pacific. The French statement <a href="https://in.ambafrance.org/The-Indo-Pacific-1st-Trilateral-Dialogue-between-France-India-and-Australia">said</a> that the meeting “helped underscore the goal of guaranteeing peace, security and adherence to international law in the Indo-Pacific by drawing on the excellence of bilateral relations between France, India and Australia.” The French ambassador in India also <a href="https://twitter.com/FranceinIndia/status/1303643020160503808">tweeted</a>, saying that “Together we will uphold our values and interests!”</p>
<p style="text-align: left;">While none of the readouts mention China per se, China is clearly the key reason for the emergence of this and a number of other minilaterals in the region. The India-France-Australia trilateral is only the latest of the many minilaterals that are taking shape in the Indo-Pacific region. India, which traditionally did not join these exclusive small groups, has shown greater interest and capacity in the last few years. There is also an India-Australia-Indonesia trilateral that is taking shape. In fact, Indian media reports <a href="https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-australia-france-hold-1st-senior-officials-dialogue-in-backdrop-of-chinese-aggression/story-AeSwpbchpOYuFwYtU0uwHO.html">note</a> that India, Australia, and Indonesia are getting ready for two virtual meetings in the coming weeks between the foreign and defense ministries of the three countries in order to enhance broader regional strategic cooperation as well as maritime security in the Indo-Pacific region. </p>
<p style="text-align: left;">There is also the <a href="https://www.policyforum.net/the-indian-triangle/">India-Japan-Australia</a> trilateral, another significant group, which had its first meeting in <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2015/06/india-australia-japan-hold-first-ever-trilateral-dialogue/">2015</a>. There is already an <a href="https://www.mofa.go.jp/s_sa/sw/page3e_001038.html#:~:text=On%20June%2028%2C%20from%209,Prime%20Minister%20of%20Japan%2C%20Mr.&text=Narendra%20Modi%2C%20Prime%20Minister%20of,of%20the%20G20%20Osaka%20Summit.">India-U.S.-Japan</a> trilateral. Since 2015, Japan has also participated with India and the United States in India’s Malabar series of naval exercises as a <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/02/will-india-now-finally-invite-australia-to-the-malabar-exercise/">permanent partner</a>. </p>
<p style="text-align: left;">Indeed, even the idea of the India-France-Australia trilateral is not new. The need for such initiatives has been discussed in track 2 and track 1.5 formats and experts and officials have long made the case for elevating these conversations to an official level. In 2018, Carnegie India, the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, and the National Security College of the Australian National University came together to explore the potential areas of cooperation as well as the extent of possibilities under such a framework. In an <a href="https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/emmanuel-macron-india-france-relations-paris-delhi-canberra-axis-malcolm-turnbull-narendra-modi-5167221/">op-ed</a> in May 2018, C. Raja Mohan, Rory Medcalf, and Bruno Tertrais (representing the three think tanks that had organized one such track 1.5 forum) detailed the “striking convergence of security interests, defense capabilities and maritime geography” that bring Delhi, Canberra, and Paris together. They argued that the three “respect a rules-based order informed by the sovereign equality of nations and the need to guard against coercion and interference, whether from states or from terrorism.” Thereafter, French President Emmanuel Macron during his visit to Australia spoke of “the Paris-Delhi-Canberra axis” that should be strengthened as “an established regional structure, reflecting an Indo-Pacific ‘geo-strategic reality in the making.’” </p>
<p style="text-align: left;">At the inaugural India-France-Australia trilateral, the three officials <a href="https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/32950/1st+Senior+Officials+IndiaFranceAustralia+Trilateral+Dialogue">took stock</a> of the prevailing and future economic and strategic challenges and possible ways of cooperation in addressing the challenges of COVID-19 and beyond. Maritime security and securing the marine global commons were particularly identified as important issues for trilateral and broader regional cooperation through regional institutions such as ASEAN, the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), and the Indian Ocean Commission. That India has concluded logistics agreements with both France and Australia brings their cooperation around maritime security issues a bit closer to reality.</p>
<p style="text-align: left;">According to the <a href="https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/32950/1st+Senior+Officials+IndiaFranceAustralia+Trilateral+Dialogue">MEA</a>, the three leaders also focused on trends, challenges, and priorities in regional and global multilateral institutions and discussed ways to review, strengthen, and reform multilateralism. This assumes particular importance in the context of the functioning of institutions such as the World Health Organization (WHO) especially in the initial weeks of the COVID-19 pandemic The fact that the WHO was influenced heavily by a single power, China, which some argue has resulted in the current global health crisis, will remain a constant reminder of the trends and challenges in multilateralism and multilateral institutions.</p>
<p style="text-align: left;">The India-France-Australia trilateral meeting was also a result of the deepening bilateral relations among the three countries across multiple sectors, and aimed at “synergizing their respective strengths to ensure a peaceful, secure, prosperous and rules-based Indo-Pacific Region.” In fact, this was part of a set of <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/France/Report/section?id=committees%2freportsen%2f024452%2f73276">recommendations</a> made by the Australian Senate Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Committee to “explore the India France Australia trilateral dialogue to enhance strategic cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.” Related <a href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-france-australia-hold-first-trilateral-dialogue-with-focus-on-indo-pacific/articleshow/78023030.cms">issues</a> such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, maritime domain awareness, the blue economy, and marine biodiversity were also discussed at the meeting. Given the increasing Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean and the South Pacific, one area that could gain greater attention from the three countries is maritime surveillance to monitor the Chinese naval activities in these waters. The three could work out some burden sharing in this regard to step up vigilance on these waters. </p>
<p style="text-align: left;">Commenting on the rationale for the India-France-Australia trilateral, Abhijnan Rej, The Diplomat’s security and defense editor, <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/an-india-australia-france-trilateral-dialogue-is-overdue/">wrote</a> that against the backdrop of “recent American unpredictability” U.S. allies in the region are looking to create “a more networked architecture involving a range of often-overlapping minilateral arrangements and consultative mechanisms.” Given this strategic rationale, the India-France-Australia trilateral is a natural fit for all three because of their stake in ensuring a free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific order. France, via its overseas territories, <a href="https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/asia-and-oceania/the-indo-pacific-region-a-priority-for-france/">has</a> 8,000 defense personnel, 1.5 million French citizens, and 93 percent of its maritime economic exclusive zone in the Indo-Pacific, making it a legitimate stakeholder, with huge stakes in the Indo-Pacific region. </p>
<p style="text-align: left;">The other important rationale for many of these trilaterals has to do with capacity issues. The Indo-Pacific region has several capable navies and yet their ability to match up to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/chinas-third-aircraft-carrier-takes-shape-with-ambitions-to-challenge-us-naval-dominance/2020/09/16/d1068f8c-f674-11ea-85f7-5941188a98cd_story.html">China</a> on their own is <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/09/02/trump-promised-350-ship-navy-china-actually-built-it/">questionable</a>. The individual capacities of these countries have remained inadequate to protect their vital security interests, and therefore there is a stronger case to be made for these kinds of minilaterals. </p>
<p style="text-align: left;">Given these factors, this trilateral is likely here to stay. While the U.S. will remain an important source of support for these minilateral conversations in the Indo-Pacific, the fact that New Delhi, Paris, and Canberra can also discuss various strategic issues without Washington present in the room may also be appealing to these countries from time to time. </p>
Rajihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12428075941644054406noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1653135038182436032.post-35398003649848715932020-09-17T12:04:00.004+05:302020-11-30T15:40:30.349+05:30Nuclear Policy Expert Raji Rajagopalan On Manels And How To Fix Them - Ungender Blog Post - 9 September 2020<p>Pallavi Pareek of <a href="https://www.ungender.in/">Ungender</a> did a conversation with me around Manel issues on 1 September and here is a <a href="https://www.ungender.in/interview-problem-of-manels-how-to-fix-them-rajeshwari-rajagopalan/">blog post</a> written by Rajkanya Mahapatra. </p>
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<p>Currently the Head of the Nuclear and Space Policy Initiative at the Observer Research Foundation, Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan is a foreign policy expert with 20 years of experience. She’s previously worked with the National Security Council Secretariat and the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses in New Delhi. Rajeswari has authored four books, including Nuclear Security in India, Uncertain Eagle: US Military Strategy In Asia, and more.</p>
<p>In conversation with, Pallavi Pareek, Founder and CEO, Ungender, Rajeswari discusses the deep-rooted problem of manels, what should we do to fix them, insights from her own journey of navigating and growing in a male dominated space, and more.</p>
<p><b>Pallavi: </b>Today, we’re going to be talking about a topic that has bothered us at Ungender ever since the Covid-19 lockdown started. As everyone started to work-from-home, folks brought their offline conversations (webinars, panel discussions, learning sessions) online. At some point, this issue that we were observing became a problem – the problem of all-male panels. I’d like to share some numbers that we’ve gathered at Ungender in the last six months – in the 95 webinars we took note of, there were a total of 715 men and 23 women. Why do you think it’s important to talk about manels?</p>
<p><b>Rajeswari:</b> Absolutely, I think this has become a challenge, it’s not just an issue anymore because we do not lack women in any field, whether it is healthcare, infrastructure or urbanization. You’ve so many women working in non traditional security threats and hard security issues, especially younger women. So, why is it that they are not represented? Why is it that they do not have a voice out there? I think this has always been an issue.</p>
<p>Under the lockdown situation, one would think that people would find more flexible arrangements, so as to bring women into these panels, so their voices are heard and their perspectives are out there. But, we’re actually seeing the continuation of the same old trend. This is a reflection of the same sort of blindness towards the bias that has existed in society for a very long time.</p>
<p>I spoke to some of the manel organizers in the last few months, and to many it didn’t even occur that they were doing anything wrong at all. They’re not even conscious of the fact that they don’t have any women on the panel, and there is anything wrong about it. In fact, they said, “No, oh, I didn’t even think about it in those terms. We just wanted foreign policy experts and we just looked at these names and put it together.” That’s it. They’re not even making an effort to go out and find diverse voices, genders and get different kinds of perspectives.</p>
<p>Recently, a TV channel had a discussion on China, and the panel had only men and there was a lot of hue and cry on Twitter. I asked, “Could you not find any woman to be a part of this discussion on China?” The anchor said, “Oh, we tried to bring in some women but there were timezone issues.” I thought that was the most lame excuse, to even suggest that. Some of these men who were part of this panel were not even top experts. You have many women who are much more capable. They have a lot more substantive expertise on the subject but clearly they’re not a part of this internal circle. I think there is a need for us to call out manels and social media platforms are an effective medium. It’s time for us to do that in a sustained fashion.</p>
<p><b>Rajeswari’s Journey In The Male-Dominated Field Of Security Studies</b></p>
<p><b>Pallavi:</b> How has it been for you – navigating a field that’s predominantly dominated by men?</p>
<p><b>Rajeswari:</b> Yeah, it may be slightly better because when I came to do my MPhil and PhD at JNU, I did see a number of women, both faculty and students. The international relations field, of course, was still dominated by men. There were some role models like Professor Urmila Phadnis and Professor Surjit Mansingh. There was a little bit of comfort seeing those women out there and realizing that it was not going to be a lonely journey. After my MPhil, I joined IDSA (Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis), a Ministry of Defense funded Think Tank, based in Delhi. At IDSA, there were no women at the leadership level but there were a lot of women scholars. So again, that gave me a sense that you have a certain number of peers who are women who have been going through the same set of issues.</p>
<p>I think as you go up, you start recognizing these problems. At least in the earlier days for me, I accepted what we see as a problem today as something that was natural and not as an extension of the patriarchal society and the system that I’d been a part of. Men dominated certain fields, like international relations, space, nuclear, and some of the technology fields.</p>
<p>As one gets older, there’s a tendency in all of us to question male dominance, and ask why is it that women can’t talk or write about these issues. I started questioning this in the middle of my career when I started attending professional meetings.</p>
<p>For instance, when I wanted to make a comment or ask a question to the panel – first, I would note, and then, say. There have been situations when men who make the same point as I did, were quoted and tagged to say, “Oh, Mr. So and So said that,” but what I said was exactly the same thing. Your voice is completely ignored. Initially, I felt irritated when I came out of these meetings and discussions. But I also need to recognize some of the really good mentors that I’ve had who’ve been men, who’ve encouraged me and given me a lot of space and freedom to work on whatever it is that I wanted.</p>
<p>There was General VP Malik. He was the Army Chief during the Kargil War. He was also my boss when I came to ORF. I worked with Brijesh Mishraa who was the National Security Advisor. I worked briefly with him. It was not a day-to-day operation, but the meetings I had with him were fantastic. Dr. Raja Mohan was a big figure in the field of IR and Security studies. The leadership within ORF has been tremendous. The founding director, Chairman RK Mishra. The current chairman, Mr. Sanjay Joshi, Dr. Samir Saran. I think the leadership at ORF has been extremely encouraging. They give you the space for you to choose what you want to do. But despite all of this, I wouldn’t say that it has always been easy.</p>
<p><b>Why Organisers Need To Do Better</b></p>
<p><b>Pallavi:</b> Thank you for sharing, Raji. Every time someone says, “Why are you after men?” It’s about all male panels. Right now, it’s about men, eventually it’s about bringing diversity across the board. When the world is for everyone, why isn’t everyone a part of the discussion? What can organisers as well as individuals participating in these manels do about this problem?</p>
<p><b>Rajeswari:</b> I think there are important reasons as to why this should change. We’re not looking at manels, or even wanels. People are questioning me on Twitter, they’re saying, “why don’t you go and organise a panel for all women?” That’s not the point. All I’m saying is – we need to have inclusive conversations, we need to have diversity, we need to have a balance on these panels.</p>
<p>When you ignore women in panels or discussions, you’re actually ignoring their entire body of work. I think it’s fairly important you give women that exposure, especially younger women who are entering the field. If you don’t give them that exposure, the opportunity to be part of these conversations, create, and understand from each other, have a shared perspective on issues – it’s a disservice to people. So, that’s one issue.</p>
<p>Second, there’s a need for diverse opinions and perspectives on any issue that you may be discussing. You can’t assume that a set of men have all the answers, whether it is on China, defense planning, nuclear policy or any other issue. On any particular issue, unless, you have age, gender, demography, all of the different aspects represented there, you will have a very one-sided perspective in any discussion.</p>
<p>Today’s webinars and panels are all looking at contemporary policy issues. Why should women not be a part of those conversations? Women represent 50% of the population, why should they not have that voice? It doesn’t matter whether they are able to provide a solution or not. Men, so far, have not provided solutions to a number of different problems.</p>
<p><b>How To Tackle The Problem Of Manels</b></p><b>
Pallavi:</b> Why should we not move on from the problem of manels? What are the implications, you think, if we move on like this? There are so many organisations now, including us, who are curating a list of leaders from different segments. People are nominating not just themselves but folks from other under-represented communities. Why is it important to keep talking about manels?
<p><b>Rajeswari:</b> Absolutely. We’re all influenced by the environment that we’re in and that obviously influences us at every every step of the way. There are some positive and negative influences that come our way. So, unless you’re able to shape a positive environment for the next generation of people, you’re going to be sustaining this unhealthy practice into the future as well. Manels are a serious enough problem and calling them out in a sustained fashion is what is needed.</p>
<p>One of the first things we need to do is sensitise leadership in institutions. I’m proud of the fact that ORF took a decision many years ago not to do manels. We are also always encouraging younger people to be part of the panels and discussions. I think ORF has been one of the few organisations that has always been welcoming and sensitive to the fact that you need to have diversity of every kind on the panels otherwise you are going to have a very skewed discussion on any subject.</p>
<p>Like I said, it’s (calling out manels) for the future generations because the environment that we are in is not conducive for young women who are coming into the IR and security field.</p>
<p>I see a much bigger number than when I joined but unless those women find a conducive atmosphere where they are able to talk, publish, write, speak at conferences, and have that interaction with others in a formal setting, they are not going to be able to grow well in this field. That’s a disservice again, being done to the next generation. That in itself should be a good enough reason for us to continue this calling out manels.</p>
<p>So when you said you were putting a list together. From what I can recall, two young professionals, Khushi Singh Rathore and Rohan Mukherjee actually put together a list of female experts in IR and security studies and that list runs up to about 400 names. There is no dearth of women in any field. You need to give them a platform and exposure.</p>
<p><b>Pallavi:</b> Do you think organisers follow some guidelines before they organise a panel? Shouldn’t it start with figuring out how many people are needed on a panel and then what are the different perspectives that need to be represented and included in that conversation?</p>
<p><b>Rajeswari:</b> I think most panels when they’re getting organised, they (men) will start with their network. These are mostly organised by men at the senior level, they know their peers, and they know their friends. So, your peers are also mostly men, you don’t interact, go out, make that effort to interact and expand your peer group. So in a sense, your peers are again men, you call them and they come.</p>
<p>Wouldn’t it be better if the first step is to analyse and see how many people and what kind of representations are needed? They’re (manel organisers) not asking themselves these questions.</p>
<p><b>The Missing Women And Manels </b></p>
<p><b>Pallavi:</b> I can tell you from the data we’ve gathered, repeat offenders like TiE and CII feature some people again and again. Do you think credibility checks are done? How come the same set of people know everything or are able to speak on just about any topic?</p>
<p><b>Rajeswari:</b> Absolutely. You said it. Many times, when you’re looking at the names of possible women panellists – often the following comments come from men – “well, I think she’s just about okay”, “she’s kind of below average,” “she’s not that great,” “she’s not this…not that.” But when it comes to men, we don’t even discuss any criteria, whether they’re good, bad or ugly – the question does not arise at all. We need to get more sensitive about the need for inclusion.</p>
<p>It’s important to target the next generation. I’ll give you two instances: in one case when I was talking to some of the organisers who I had called out on Twitter – with great difficulty this one woman wrote back to me saying, “We have so many women behind the team working on this.” I said, “You made the point. Why are those women behind the scene working on it? And these are professionals, working on space issues, why are they not part of the discussion? Why are they behind the scenes helping with things?” The second instance concerned a repeat offender. When I called out the men, they came out and said, “we had two women last week.” This response was given by younger people. I was actually shocked to see that even the younger generation hasn’t recognised the problems associated with these skewed discussions.</p>
<p><b>Pallavi:</b> I know a lot of women are constantly questioned if they’re qualified to be in a certain place or not. Such questions leave a deep psychological impact. How do you think that can be addressed?</p>
<p><b>Rajeswari: </b>So, as a woman, I think we always tend to question ourselves, doubt our capabilities in a very, very critical and harsh fashion passion. I think we need to get over that. I would say, whatever path you choose, you need to be very clear about why you are choosing that path in your career as it will stay with you for the next 30 years of your life. You need to be passionate about what you do. There’s no shortcut to hard work and if you have the courage and conviction, plus the hard work, it helps you in building that confidence. It’s very important because people will always try and pull you down.</p>
<p>There have been so many instances where people have put me into clichéd boxes and thought I will not be working on a certain subject as I’m not capable of working on hard military security issues. The fact is that you need to develop that self confidence and that’ll come from conviction. You will also need to have a support group to lean on because the field can get lonely from time to time. So having that support group in your line of work is absolutely essential. Finding a good mentor can be very helpful, someone who can give you that sense of self-confidence.</p>
Rajihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12428075941644054406noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1653135038182436032.post-77368696528224198312020-09-11T18:29:00.001+05:302020-11-30T16:49:34.087+05:30Washington Watching as Beijing’s Space Power Grows -The Diplomat, 10 September 2020<p>In this week's column for <a href="https://thediplomat.com/" target="_blank">The Diplomat</a>, I looked at the latest U.S. Defense Department report on Chinese military power that recounts Beijing’s growing space and counterspace capabilities. </p>
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<p>The U.S. Department of Defense last week released its annual <a href="https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-FINAL.PDF" target="_blank">report on China’s military power</a>. The report details all aspects of China’s military including land, naval, air, space and information domains. The report identifies a few areas such as shipbuilding, land-based conventional ballistic and cruise missiles, and integrated air defense systems where China has “achieved parity with – or even exceeded – the United States.” </p>
<p>According to the report, China has also made impressive strides in critical sectors such as cyber and space. Since President Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, there has been greater focus on overall military capabilities and the PLA has devoted more attention to space and information capabilities. The last Chinese <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-07/24/c_138253389.htm" target="_blank">Defence White Paper</a> (2019) identified space as “a critical domain of international strategic competition.” The 2019 White Paper also identified the important role that space will play in “improv[ing] the capabilities of joint operations command to exercise reliable and efficient command over emergency responses, and to effectively accomplish urgent, tough and dangerous tasks.” </p>
<p>With China emerging as a global power, it is only natural to expect it to develop a range of space and counterspace capabilities. However, Beijing’s emphasis on developing these <a href="https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-FINAL.PDF" target="_blank">capabilities</a> to “paralyze the enemy’s operational system of systems” as well as “sabotage the enemy’s war command system of systems” means others have to take note. This, Beijing believes, can enable it to disrupt and deny any space-based advantage that an advanced military like the U.S. may have. The Pentagon’s report highlights PLA writings that have noted “the effectiveness of IO and cyberwarfare in recent conflicts and advocate targeting C2 and logistics networks to affect” an adversary in times of conflict. The report also cites “authoritative PLA sources” who have called for “the coordinated employment of space, cyber and EW as strategic weapons” in order to create significant disruptions in an adversary’s command and control as well as logistics networks. </p>
<p>Worryingly, the U.S. report states that China has plans to use a combination of these capabilities on assets beyond military ones to include “political and economic targets with clear ‘awing effects’ – as part of its deterrence.” This would entail the PLA’s possible use of its cyber warfare capabilities “to collect data for intelligence and cyberattack purposes; to constrain an adversary’s actions by targeting network-based logistics, C2, communications, commercial activities, and civilian and defense infrastructure; or, to serve as a force-multiplier when coupled with kinetic attacks during armed conflict.” </p>
<p>With the goal of being a “world-class military power,” China has gone about advancing its space power, both in terms of institutional reorganization and development of space and counterspace capabilities. The military modernization and reorganization undertaken by China since 2015 is worth noting. In terms of institutional architecture, the most significant development is the creation of the PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF), a theater command-level organization designed to combine “the PLA’s strategic space, cyber, electronic, and psychological warfare missions and capabilities.” The U.S. report adds that the PLASSF’s Network Systems Department, which controls information warfare, has identified the U.S. as the “current major target.” The PLASSF is an institutional innovation to bring about greater synergies in functions that were previously spread across a number of departments. Under the reorganization, the PLASSF is directly under the Central Military Commission and is responsible for extending support to the entire PLA. China’s 2019 Defence White Paper clearly outlined the goals of the PLASSF as “seeking to achieve big development strides in key areas and accelerate the integrated development of new-type combat forces, so as to build a strong and modernized strategic support force.” </p>
<p>The U.S. Department of Defense’s report details the structure and functions of some of the key institutions under the PLASSF. The PLASSF houses two near-independent departments – the Network Systems and the Space Systems Departments – that are responsible for an entire range of capabilities and missions involving space, cyber and electronic warfare technologies. The Space Systems Department, for instance, has the complete responsibility for almost all of the PLA space operations including space launch and support, space surveillance, space information support, space telemetry, tracking and control, and space warfare. While it is not clear where the counterspace capabilities fit and which institution is responsible for it, China is clear on the role of space in future conflicts to enable “long-range precision strikes and in denying other militaries the use of overhead command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems.” </p>
<p>Unlike many other space powers, China’s space program has historically been under the PLA, and it continues to play a critical role in developing China as a major space power Today, China has fielded a large fleet of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), communication and navigation satellite constellations which is enabled by strengthened launch capabilities. China has been also active in its human spaceflight and lunar exploration missions, plus a debut Mars mission in 2020. China has additionally gone about developing a larger space ecosystem that has resulted in diversification to include several sub-sectors beyond the military, to the political, defense-industrial and commercial arenas. It is not clear if this was a deliberate decision by the PLA or not, but it could possibly help in strengthening China’s overall space competitiveness. China is also thought to have developed “quick response” small satellite launch vehicles to cater to the growing small satellite market. This capability could be helpful to China “to rapidly reconstitute low Earth orbit space capabilities,” which could come into play during conflicts should Beijing have the need to launch a large number of satellites to replace satellites that are damaged or increase the number of satellites in a particular orbit for better services. </p>
<p>While China’s development of space capabilities has been impressive, it has also pursued counterspace capabilities in a focused manner. Beijing has an array of counterspace capabilities including direct ascent and co-orbital anti-satellite weapons, offensive cyber and electronic warfare capabilities such as satellite jammers, as well as directed energy weapons that can target an adversary’s system and create disruptions or denial of services, thereby cutting off “an adversary’s access to and operations in the space domain during a crisis or conflict.” According to the U.S. report, China has expanded its space surveillance capabilities which aids Beijing in keeping a watch on “objects in space within their field of view and enable counterspace actions.” China has demonstrated its ground-based ASAT capability which is capable of targeting satellites in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) but the report notes that China possibly has plans to expand its ASAT capabilities to destroy satellites in geosynchronous Earth orbit, targets that are much farther away. </p>
<p>Over the last few years, a number of open-source <a href="https://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/electronic-and-cyber-warfare-in-outer-space-en-784.pdf" target="_blank">reports</a> have detailed <a href="https://swfound.org/media/206970/swf_counterspace2020_electronic_final.pdf" target="_blank">growing</a> <a href="https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2020-05/China_Space_and_Counterspace_Activities.pdf" target="_blank">Chinese</a> <a href="https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/200330_SpaceThreatAssessment20_WEB_FINAL1.pdf" target="_blank">counterspace</a> capabilities. The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency report of 2019 also highlighted these growing threats. China is known to be engaged in testing certain dual-use technologies in space that could be used for counterspace activities as well. For example, China’s “Roaming Dragon” system, fitted with a robotic arm, is supposed to be used for space debris removal missions but can very well be used for counterspace missions. In fact, Chinese scholars have <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1982526/china-militarising-space-experts-say-new-junk-collector" target="_blank">stated</a> that the “Roaming Dragon” could be engaged in debris removal activities during peacetime but at times of conflict, “they could be used as deterrents or directly against enemy assets in space.”</p>
<p>The U.S. report also outlines China’s efforts at espionage to steal U.S. military technology including space technology. According to the report, a number of U.S. criminal indictments have been handed down involving Chinese nationals, naturalized U.S. citizens, permanent resident aliens from China, and U.S. citizens since 2015, for attempts at “procuring and exporting controlled items to China.” Some of the sensitive, dual-use technology or military-grade equipment in these cases have included radiation hardened integrated circuits, monolithic microwave integrated circuits, accelerometers, gyroscopes, syntactic foam trade secrets and space communications technologies, among others. The report listed some recent cases including one in October 2019 when a Chinese national was sent to prison for 40 months for “conspiring to export military- and space-grade technology illegally” from the U.S. to China. The individual is reported to have worked with others in China “to purchase radiation-hardened power amplifiers and supervisory circuits used for military and space applications.” </p>
<p>China’s achievements in the space domain are indeed impressive but the increasingly contested geopolitics make space yet another arena for competition and rivalry. China’s actions will be closely watched and, in many respects, will fuel further rivalries in the Indo-Pacific.</p>Rajihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12428075941644054406noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1653135038182436032.post-22554843971030503722020-09-10T18:31:00.004+05:302020-11-30T16:50:53.049+05:30Manel Chat With with Dr. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, Head, Nuclear & Space Policy Initiative, ORF with Ungender - 1 September 2020<p>On 1 September, I did a conversation with Ms. Pallavi Pareek from Ungender on why we need to address the issue of Manels and why it is important to have inclusion, balance and diveristy in our panels, industry boards and management. </p>
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<p>The conversation can be found <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kS4mgPi-Lm4">here</a>. </p>
<p>This is the not the full transcript but a mere preview of some of the issues we discussed. </p>
<p>Manels are also a reflection of the blindness towards this bias. For instance, in the past few months, I have spoken to many of these Manel organisers and it doesn’t even occur to them that they are doing anything wrong. They are just not conscious of the fact that they don’t have any women on the panel and that there is something so wrong about it. </p>
<p>Recently, you have also been seeing so many Manels on TV shows – be it discussions on China or Pakistan… there is so much of women expertise on the subject and yet you see dozens of men. There was one discussion on one of the Indian TV channels had 12 men speaking on China and they are not even the top experts on the subject whereas you have equally good or even more substantial women who are China experts but why are they absent? The worst is that the person came out defending with the silliest of arguments saying time zone issues etc. one would have thought that with the lockdown and everything taking place in the virtual space, it might be easier for women to be part of many of these conversations. But sadly, that is just not the case. </p>
<p>This is because many of these meetings/ conferences are organised by senior men and they simply call their friends and peers whom they know already because it is also a small clique. They just have not made the effort to reach out to women, expand their circle of their peers. </p>
Rajihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12428075941644054406noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1653135038182436032.post-86704674305071120282020-09-04T08:51:00.001+05:302020-11-30T16:51:17.326+05:30How China Strengthens the Quad - The Diplomat, 4 September 2020In this week's column for <a href="https://thediplomat.com/">The Diplomat</a>, I <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/how-china-strengthens-the-quad/">wrote</a> on the future of the Quad, looking at the challenges to the group because of Abe's sudden resigning and a possible political change in the US following the November elections. Despite some minor headwinds, I argue that Chinese belligerence further strengthens the motivation for Australia, India, Japan, and the United States to keep the Quad together. <br />
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The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or the Quad has regained strength in the face of an aggressive China. The foreign ministers of the four countries – Australia, India, Japan, and the United States – are scheduled to meet in <a href="https://www.indiatoday.in/news-analysis/story/upcoming-quad-in-person-ministerial-meet-in-delhi-a-big-signal-1717674-2020-09-02">Delhi</a> for a face-to-face meeting in late September. That New Delhi is playing host to the Quad ministerial meeting amid the COVOD-19 pandemic is particularly noteworthy. The countries are reacting to increased bullying by China. The grouping has gained greater traction since early 2020 because of Beijing’s role in the COVID-19 pandemic and the manner in which it has attempted to hijack multilateral institutions, such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). The four countries are also concerned about global supply chain problems, recognizing the vulnerability of their dependence on China. The upcoming in-person foreign ministers meeting appears, at the least, aimed at sending a strong message to China about the resoluteness of the Quad. <br />
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For the full essay, click <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/how-china-strengthens-the-quad/">here</a>. <br /><span class="fullpost"><br />
That said, the Quad does face some minor headwinds, which are likely to be easily overcome, due to political changes in both Japan and the United States.<br />
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Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s sudden resignation was a blow to the Quad because Abe was one of the major proponents of this minilateral initiative, even if his departure does not shift Japan’s policy. Under <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/a3767107-1c5a-4d61-96ca-5cf48eb8126c">Abe’s leadership</a>, Japan had become a driving force for the Quad. His strategic vision and determined leadership in the face of China’s belligerent behavior will be missed by Japan’s Quad partners. Although Abe was not successful in changing Japan’s pacifist constitution, he has been <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/japans-shinzo-abe-to-step-down-leaving-behind-a-rich-strategic-legacy/">instrumental</a> in bringing important changes to Tokyo’s approach to regional and global security. <br />
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For New Delhi, Abe was a reliable pillar of support. Takenori Horimoto <a href="https://thewire.in/diplomacy/shinzo-abe-legacy-new-delhi-japa-india-strategic-ties-quad">says</a> that the big push for Japan to build closer relations with India happened in 2004-05 because of anti-Japan protests taking place in China, leading Tokyo to reduce the risks to its investments by moving to other countries. Thus, although India-Japan ties had been gaining momentum even before Abe came into office, the Abe-Modi dynamic helped a great deal. It led to strengthened military and security ties, including military exercises across all the branches of the military, and a civil nuclear agreement. With Abe leaving office, it remains to be seen how bilateral India-Japan relations as well as Japan’s broader strategic engagement in the Indo-Pacific will play out with a new leader in office. <br />
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Second, the coming presidential elections in the United States in November also raises some concerns about a possible change in leadership. While Joe Biden and the Democrats are not against the Quad or the free and open Indo-Pacific strategy, a change in the political powers that be could introduce short-term policy turbulence. It will take a few months for a new administration to settle into office before addressing some of the political and strategic issues in the Indo-Pacific region. That said, China’s aggressive behavior will invariably draw any administration’s attention. A Biden administration may <a href="https://www.hudson.org/research/16002-beyond-2020-indo-pacific-strategy-under-a-democrat-white-house">differ</a> from the Trump administration more in terms of style and rhetoric than actual policy when it comes to China. Indeed, the two parties are competing over who is harsher on China.<br />
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Set against these small challenges is China’s behavior, which serves to promote the Quad. India and Australia, the other two Quad parties, have recently faces even greater aggression from Beijing.<br />
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Since early May, China has crossed into Indian territory and engaged in violent clashes, including the one at Galwan in June that resulting in the deaths of 20 Indians and an unknown number of Chinese troops. Since then, there have been several military and diplomatic discussions between India and China, but with no progress. Over the past few days, there has been further activity, with India reportedly occupying areas south of the south bank of Pangong Tso (Lake); the military talks that followed, as usual, have been <a href="https://twitter.com/dperi84/status/1301157007873859584">inconclusive</a>. China <a href="https://twitter.com/MFA_China/status/1301167813801906176">claimed</a> that India violated the consensus and crossed the Line of Actual Control (LAC). In India, both the <a href="https://www.mea.gov.in/response-to-queries.htm?dtl/32919/Official_Spokespersons_response_to_a_media_query_on_the_recent_developments_in_the_IndiaChina_Border_Areas">foreign ministry</a> and <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetailm.aspx?PRID=1649940">army</a> put out statements blaming China. The expectation appears to be that the border confrontation will escalate further. India, for good measure, has also <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1650669">banned</a> another 118 Chinese apps. <br />
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Similarly, Australia has been under strident Chinese attack almost from the beginning of 2020. China has been using coercive trade practices to target Australia for asking for an independent investigation into the origin of the novel coronavirus. In the latest move, China targeted <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/subscribe/news/1/?sourceCode=TAWEB_WRE170_a&dest=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.theaustralian.com.au%2Fbusiness%2Feconomics%2Fchina-fires-new-trade-shots-with-barley-import-suspension%2Fnews-story%2F1fef7706b0f4c64ab593976f2f872df5&memtype=anonymous&mode=premium">Australian barley</a> in response to Prime Minister Scott Morrison’s announcement of a new Australian legislation that would “tear up” the Belt and Road Initiative agreements with the state of Victoria that run into billions of dollars. A few days earlier, China targeted <a href="https://twitter.com/MikeSmithAFR/status/1299148656231104512">Australian beef</a> <a href="https://twitter.com/JDWilson08/status/1299152493650173952">exports</a>. Prior to this, it was the Australian wine that was banned by China. But Jeffrey Wilson of the Perth USAsia Centre <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-08-23/australia-china-agriculture-trade-tensions-analysis/12585884">says</a> it is not that the Chinese government cares about wine, beef, or barley, but “the real game is to create societal splits that pressure the Government to change foreign policy toward China.” <br />
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China’s crude attempts to put pressure on other countries have met with increasingly stiff resistance, of which the Quad is a clear manifestation. In India, there have even been <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/view-its-time-to-give-military-angle-to-quad/articleshow/76655121.cms">suggestions</a> for the Quad to assume a military role. Thus, whatever minor headwinds the Quad faces are likely to be easily overcome by the rapidly changing attitudes in the region because of China’s unrelenting pressure on others. <br />
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</span>Rajihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12428075941644054406noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1653135038182436032.post-76207168776023303322020-08-28T23:12:00.000+05:302020-08-28T23:12:22.448+05:30India-Vietnam Relations: Strong and Getting Stronger - The Diplomat, 28 August 2020In this week's column for <a href="https://thediplomat.com/">The Diplomat</a>, I <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/india-vietnam-relations-strong-and-getting-stronger/">wrote</a> on India-Vietnam relations. I argue that with China as a shared concern, India and Vietnam continue to deepen their relationship. <br />
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Earlier this week, India and Vietnam held the 17th meeting of their bilateral Joint Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technological Cooperation. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) in a <a href="https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/32912/17th_IndiaVietnam_Joint_Commission_Meeting">statement</a> said that the meeting was co-chaired by External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and Vietnam’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Pham Binh Minh via video conference.<br />
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It appears that <a href="https://twitter.com/DrSJaishankar/status/1298225931853561857">both</a> sides have been <a href="https://twitter.com/FMPhamBinhMinh?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1298240248615333888%7Ctwgr%5E&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Ftimesofindia.indiatimes.com%2Findia%2Findia-vietnam-agree-to-add-new-momentum-to-ties%2Farticleshow%2F77749035.cms">pleased</a> with outcomes of the meeting and the pace of the relationship. Jaishankar was particularly appreciative of Vietnam’s positive leadership of ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) this year, especially at a time when the region is battling the COVID-19 pandemic. Both sides reportedly also <a href="https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-vietnam-meeting-discusses-china-s-destabilising-actions/story-paRUZjoMdiS709T8F5LgVJ.html">discussed</a> China’s aggressive behavior in their respective neighborhoods.<br />
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For the full article, click <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/india-vietnam-relations-strong-and-getting-stronger/">here</a>. <br />
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At the meeting, the two sides took stock of the state of the India-Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and agreed to step up their defense and economic partnership. The two sides put special emphasis on areas such as civil nuclear energy, space, marine sciences, and emerging technologies. India and Vietnam also agreed to strengthen their strategic partnership “in line with India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) and the ASEAN’s Outlook on Indo-Pacific to achieve shared security, prosperity and growth for all in the region.”<br />
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<a href="https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Indo_Feb_07_2020.pdf">IPOI</a> is an initiative launched by Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the East Asia Summit in Thailand in November 2019. The initiative is centered around seven pillars including maritime security; maritime ecology; maritime resources; capacity building and resource sharing; disaster risk reduction and management; science, technology, and academic cooperation; and trade connectivity and maritime transport. India has called on Vietnam to partner on one of the seven pillars of the IPOI.<br />
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Both India and Vietnam have maintained close relations with frequent <a href="https://www.indembassyhanoi.gov.in/page/india-vietnam-relations/">meetings</a> between senior officials from both countries. For instance, Pham Sanh Chau, Vietnam’s ambassador to India, recently <a href="https://eurasiantimes.com/vietnam-seeks-comprehensive-strategic-partnership-with-india-after-china-deploys-nuclear-capable-bombers/">met</a> with Indian Foreign Secretary Harsh Shringla, and briefed him about the recent tensions following China’s deployment of an H-6J bomber to Woody Island, part of the disputed Paracel Islands. The ambassador conveyed Vietnam’s determination to further the bilateral Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with greater energy and vigor. <br />
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Earlier, on August 4, Pranay Verma, India’s ambassador to Vietnam, had a <a href="https://www.indembassyhanoi.gov.in/event_detail/?eventid=355#:~:text=Ambassador%20Pranay%20Verma%20met%20the,Communist%20Party%20of%20Vietnam%2C%20H.E.&text=Tran%20Quoc%20Vuong%20on%204,cooperation%20between%20India%20and%20Vietnam.">meeting</a> with Tran Quoc Vuong, Politburo member and permanent member of the Party Central Committee’s Secretariat, who again emphasized the need for closer ties between New Delhi and Hanoi. Vuong was particularly <a href="https://eurasiantimes.com/vietnam-seeks-comprehensive-strategic-partnership-with-india-after-china-deploys-nuclear-capable-bombers/">appreciative</a> of India’s stand on the South China Sea issue, and reiterated Vietnam’s firm stand that all the claimant states must resolve the sovereignty and territorial disputes through dialogue and peaceful means, and by respecting international law including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. <br />
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Vietnam is also keen for India to expand its presence in oil and gas exploration in the South China Sea and has firmly maintained that the areas fall well within Vietnam’s economic zone. India has on many occasions <a href="https://e.vnexpress.net/news/news/india-vietnam-concur-on-east-sea-oil-and-gas-cooperation-3962835.html">explained</a> that it will continue to maintain its oil and gas exploration tie-ups with Vietnam in Vietnamese waters. A recent virtual <a href="https://vnexplorer.net/vietnam-india-seek-to-boost-cooperation-post-covid-19-a202050686.html">meeting</a> of the Vietnam Trade Office in India and the Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India (ASSOCHAM) identified several additional areas for cooperation between India and Vietnam. <br />
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At the recent Joint Commission meeting, India also reiterated its development and capacity assistance for Vietnam through quick impact projects (QIP), Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) and e-ITEC initiatives, Ph.D. fellowships and proposals in the area of water resource management in Vietnam’s Mekong Delta region, Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and digital connectivity. The <a href="https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/32912/17th_IndiaVietnam_Joint_Commission_Meeting">MEA</a> in its press release stated that India has already approved 12 QIPs for implementation in Vietnam: seven in water resource management in Vietnam’s Mekong Delta Region and five linked to construction of educational infrastructure in Vietnam. Research and training are also important in the bilateral agenda and this has translated to a couple of MoUs between the Sushma Swaraj Institute of Foreign Service (SSIFS), New Delhi and Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam, Hanoi, and the National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi and Scientific Research Institute of Sea and Islands, Hanoi.<br />
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Defense ties between India and Vietnam are also gathering traction. India earlier gave Vietnam a $100 million line of credit for the procurement of 12 high-speed patrol boats. An Indian private sector firm, Larsen & Toubro (L&T) is developing the boats. In February this year, J.D. Patil, director and senior executive vice president of defense and smart technologies at L&T, <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/lt-to-deliver-first-high-speed-patrol-boat-to-vietnam-in-september/article30813056.ece">stated</a> that they will be delivering the first boat this September. “Five boats will be built by L&T while the remaining will be built in Vietnam. We are trying to finish the boats by mid 2021,” Patil told The Hindu.<br />
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India has also given Vietnam another $500 million line of credit for buying defense equipment from India. Discussions are on currently to identify the systems that Vietnam may be interested in buying from India. According to defense sources quoted in the <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/lt-to-deliver-first-high-speed-patrol-boat-to-vietnam-in-september/article30813056.ece">media</a>, Hanoi is interested in India’s Akash surface-to-air systems and Dhruv advanced light helicopters. Defense analysts <a href="https://thewire.in/security/india-vietnam-brahmos-missile">argue</a> that especially in the wake of the Galwan clash, India must proceed with both the Brahmos and the Akash missile systems and not continue being coy on account of China’s reactions. Discussions on the possible sale of Brahmos have been going on for a few years now. Reportedly, disagreements with <a href="https://thewire.in/security/india-vietnam-brahmos-missile">Russia</a> (the missile was jointly developed with Russia) on the sale have been resolved. <br />
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Keeping in mind the strategic challenges in the Indo-Pacific region, primarily those posed by China, India and Vietnam have decided to work in close coordination at multilateral institutions such as the U.N. Security Council, where both India and Vietnam are elected to be non-permanent members in 2021. The two also decided to continue the momentum in regional strategic platforms such as those under ASEAN. This will be in continuation of the already vibrant <a href="https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Indo_Feb_07_2020.pdf">conversations</a> between India and ASEAN. For instance, in December 2019, India hosted the Delhi Dialogue-XI with ASEAN countries under the theme “Advancing Partnership in the Indo-Pacific.” In February 2020, India, Australia, and Indonesia hosted the 4th East Asia Summit Conference on maritime security issues. There are a number of platforms and venues that have been created at track 1 and 1.5 levels in recent years to create and sustain linkages between India and ASEAN countries on the Indo-Pacific theme. Vietnam’s leadership of ASEAN may make it easier for India and ASEAN to cooperate more on regional security issues. Some of the big powers within ASEAN like Indonesia are also likely to take stronger positions against China given the sustained harassment and naval intrusions by China in Indonesia’s Natuna islands earlier in the year. <br />
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</span>Rajihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12428075941644054406noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1653135038182436032.post-11980151972372337502020-08-21T09:59:00.001+05:302020-08-21T09:59:27.615+05:30India-Japan Defense Ties to Get a Boost With Modi-Abe Virtual Summit - The Diplomat, 20 August 2020In this week's column for <a href="https://thediplomat.com/">The Diplomat</a>, I <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/india-japan-defense-ties-to-get-a-boost-with-modi-abe-virtual-summit/">looked</a> at the upcoming virtual summit meeting between India and Japan. I argue that despite some disappointments on both sides, the India-Japan relationship looks set to further deepen in the face of an aggressive China. <br />
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Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Japanese counterpart Shinzo Abe will meet for a virtual summit in September. This will be Modi’s second virtual summit this year, after one with the Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison in June. According to Indian media <a href="https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/at-india-japan-summit-next-month-modi-and-abe-to-sign-off-on-key-military-pact/story-9VXsAWZCVzrAKtOtf8pKMM.html">reports</a>, citing India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), the two sides are expected to sign an important military logistics agreement, the Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA). While this remains an important milestone moment for New Delhi and Tokyo, it also remains key for both countries to take stock of what has been accomplished so far. <br />
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For the full essay, click <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/india-japan-defense-ties-to-get-a-boost-with-modi-abe-virtual-summit/">here</a>. <br />
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India and Japan missed their planned <a href="https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2020/jan/03/dates-of-india-japan-summit-will-be-finalised-very-soon-mea-2084224.html">2019 summit</a> because of protests against the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) in Guwahati, in the northeastern Indian state of Assam, where the meeting was supposed to be held. Although the Modi government was reportedly keen to shift the meeting venue to Delhi, the Japanese side insisted that the focus of the 2019 summit was on Japanese investment in India’s Northeast infrastructure development and therefore, as a Japanese diplomat <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/india-japan-guwahati-summit-cancelled/article30294202.ece">said</a>, “The venue is the message.” Since then, India and Japan have been trying to reschedule the summit, but the COVID-19 pandemic further delayed their plans. <br />
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The current summit meeting comes against the backdrop of Chinese aggression against both countries, along the Sino-Indian border and the East China Sea. The Abe government is reportedly also keen to explore the possibility of shifting some Japanese manufacturing to India as part of its efforts to shift such operations out of China. This is part of a concerted effort of several countries to shift their manufacturing out of China in order to reduce their dependency on Beijing. The two leaders are also <a href="https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/at-india-japan-summit-next-month-modi-and-abe-to-sign-off-on-key-military-pact/story-9VXsAWZCVzrAKtOtf8pKMM.html">reportedly</a> working to strengthen the Quad agenda in this regard. <br />
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The ACSA should also boost the geographical reach and influence of both countries’ militaries. India has so far signed such logistics agreement with the <a href="https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/India_US_brief.pdf">United States</a>, <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-south-korea-seal-logistics-pact/article29354781.ece">South Korea</a>, and <a href="https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/32728/List_of_the_documents_announcedsigned_during_India__Australia_Virtual_Summit">Australia</a>. Such logistics agreements are meant to simplify the processes involved in using each other’s facilities. It took India more than a decade to sign the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) with the U.S. on account of several <a href="https://www.hindustantimes.com/comment-newspaper/lemoa-will-boost-india-s-logistics-capacity/story-kxdkNYKKZ8zhljJs812zvJ.html">misperceptions</a>, but since its signing in 2016 it has become easier for India to negotiate such deals with other countries. Probably to maintain some semblance of balance, India is negotiating a similar agreement with Russia. The Russian agreement is named differently, the <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/three-military-logistics-support-agreements-on-the-anvil/article28734687.ece">Agreement on Reciprocal Logistics Support</a> (ARLS).<br />
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The India-Japan ACSA got a big push during the last summit in Japan in October 2018. India’s MEA in a statement at the time <a href="https://www.mea.gov.in/outoging-visit-detail.htm?30543/IndiaJapan+Vision+Statement">said</a>, “The two leaders welcomed the joint exercise between each of the three services and the commencement of negotiations on the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA), which will enhance the strategic depth of bilateral security and defense cooperation.” The inaugural 2+2 dialogue, the India-Japan Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting, also <a href="https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/32131/Joint+Statement++First+IndiaJapan+2432+Foreign+and+Defence+Ministerial+Meeting">noted</a> “the significant progress” made in the negotiations of ACSA and their desire “for early conclusion of the negotiations” which would “further contribute to enhancing defense cooperation between the two sides.” <br />
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The India-Japan ACSA would provide the two militaries with access to each other’s military facilities for repair and replenishment of provisions as well as overall improve the scope and sophistication of military-to-military cooperation. In fact, the India-Japan ACSA is reported to be <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/three-military-logistics-support-agreements-on-the-anvil/article28734687.ece">broader</a> in scope, encompassing overall defense cooperation between the two countries, with logistics as one important leg in the expanding defense partnership. Japan could get access to India’s key naval bases, including in the Andaman and Nicobar islands, close to the Malacca Straits, a key international sea lane. The agreement will also enhance India’s own operational reach, most specifically for the Indian Navy. India could gain access to Japanese bases such as in Djibouti. Some of the agenda items for broader India-Japan defense cooperation could include stepping up defense trade and technology cooperation under existing mechanisms, such as the Joint Working Group on Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation (JWG-DETC). There is already cooperative research work being done on areas such as unmanned ground vehicle (UGV)/robotics under this framework, but it could be expanded to an entire range of existing and emerging technologies. <br />
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It is also possible that Japan would like to see more discussion on the Japanese-built US-2 amphibious aircraft, which India has been soft-pedaling for a while now. Capacity-building for better maritime security and maritime domain awareness (MDA) are also high on the agenda for India and Japan. Establishment of the Information Fusion Center – Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) by India in December 2018 has been deemed an important step in this regard and Japan will have a <a href="https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2019/dec/26/five-big-navies-to-post-liaison-officers-in-india-for-info-exchange-on-ior-2081062.html">liaison officer</a> at the IFC-IOR. Other Indo-Pacific powers such as Australia, France, and the United States will also have their officers at this center. <br />
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While ACSA and the defense agenda are forward-looking in furthering cooperation between India and Japan, there are also some difficulties in the relationship. Japan seems to have been considerably disappointed with the Indian decision to walk out of the regional trading agreement, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). The fact that Abe was not even informed before New Delhi made the announcement appears to have been a jolt to the Abe administration. Japan was counting on India to be a powerful player within the RCEP to push back on China’s aggressive economic agenda. Tokyo is also possibly disappointed about the lack of enthusiasm in New Delhi about pursuing the defense trade agenda, with the US-2 being a case in point. On the other hand, although India was keen on considering the Soryu-class submarine, Japan has been somewhat <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2015/04/11/japan-unlikely-to-join-indian-sub-tender/">cautious</a>, and indeed has not <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/industry/2020/01/22/india-makes-initial-bid-selections-for-7-billion-submarine-project/#:~:text=NEW%20DELHI%20%E2%80%94%20India%20on%20Tuesday,worth%20more%20than%20%247%20billion.">bid</a> for India’s submarine contract.<br />
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Nevertheless, Japan has remained a steadfast partner to India. For instance, after the Galwan Valley clash in mid-June, the Japanese ambassador to India strongly supported India, <a href="https://twitter.com/EOJinIndia/status/1278943913777061888">tweeting</a> that “Japan opposes any unilateral attempts to change the status quo.” This suggests that the pressure from China will continue to strengthen India-Japan ties, despite some disappointments on both sides. <br />
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</span>Rajihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12428075941644054406noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1653135038182436032.post-41094191712535503552020-08-12T23:14:00.000+05:302020-08-12T23:14:58.464+05:30Indian Frustration With China Grows - The Diplomat, 12 August 2020In this week's column for <a href="https://thediplomat.com/">The Diplomat</a>, I <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/indian-frustration-with-china-grows/">write</a> on the Indian frustration in dealing with China. I argue New Delhi’s responses to Beijing’s efforts — such as raising the Kashmir issue at the U.N. — are becoming increasingly harsh. <br />
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Since August 2019, China has consistently raised the Kashmir issue at the United Nations Security Council. Last week, on August 5, China again sought a discussion on Kashmir under the “Any Other Business” category in the UN Security Council. This was the third time that China has done this, following earlier efforts in August 2019 and January 2020. <br />
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Indian responses to such efforts, as well as Chinese comments, are becoming harsher, a possible indication that the Indian government is losing patience with Beijing. <br />
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For the full essay, click <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/indian-frustration-with-china-grows/">here</a>. <br />
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Kashmir has not been on the U.N. Security Council’s agenda since 1971. China resurrected the Jammu and Kashmir issue in the Security Council in August 2019 following the Indian decision to nullify Article 370, the special status given to the state of Jammu and Kashmir under the Indian Constitution. China has continued to describe the Indian action to remove the special status of Jammu and Kashmir and bifurcate the state into two union territories as affecting its territorial claims in the Ladakh region. In August 2019, China said the Indian decision was “unacceptable.” India rejected China’s criticisms, saying the decision was an internal matter with no impact on its external borders. China has persisted. <br />
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After last week’s UNSC meeting, India’s Permanent Representative at the UN in New York <a href="https://twitter.com/ambtstirumurti/status/1291086174648500224">tweeted</a>, “Another attempt by Pakistan fails!” Although the tweet did not name China, Indian officials elsewhere explicitly named China as responsible. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) in a statement <a href="https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/32874/Press_Statement_by_MEA_on_UNSC">said</a>:<br />
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We have noted that China initiated a discussion in the UN Security Council on issues pertaining to the Indian Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir. This was not the first time that China has sought to raise a subject that is solely an internal matter of India. As on such previous occasions, this attempt too met with little support from the international community. We firmly reject China’s interference in our internal affairs and urge it to draw proper conclusions from such infructuous attempts.<br />
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Unnamed Indian officials pointed out that the United States and France have been especially notable in rebutting Chinese attempts. They have https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/sino-pakistans-unsc-attempt-on-kashmir-fails/articleshow/77400944.cms the Indian press that the United States took the lead in in challenging China’s actions and was followed by other UNSC members as well. <br />
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Indian responses to Chinese comments have become angrier. For example, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1804251.shtml">stated</a> that Beijing pays close attention to the Kashmir issue and that “any unilateral change to the status quo in the Kashmir region is illegal and invalid.” The spokesperson added that the issue has to be “and peacefully resolved through dialogue and consultation between the parties concerned.” Wang added that “China sincerely hopes that the two sides can properly handle differences through dialogue, improve relations and jointly safeguard peace, stability and development of the two countries and the region.” <br />
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Despite that slightly gentler tone, India <a href="https://www.mea.gov.in/response-to-queries.htm?dtl%2F32871%2FOfficial_Spokespersons_response_to_a_media_query_on_Chinese_MFA_spokespersons_comment_on_Indian_Union_Territory_of_Jammu_and_Kashmir">responded</a> harshly, stating that “The Chinese side has no locus standi whatsoever on this matter and is advised not to comment on the internal affairs of other nations.” This kind of response is becoming more common among Indian officials, a possible reflection of the frustration that New Delhi is feeling with Chinese behavior. During a recent <a href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/china-shouldnt-view-us-through-us-lens-that-would-be-a-great-disservice-says-s-jaishankar/articleshow/77307398.cms">interview</a>, Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar pointedly stated that “the state of the border and the future of our ties… cannot be separated,” in essence suggesting that the standoff at the border will affect the bilateral relationship. <br />
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This is a link that India has been made before, but not (as starkly) in the recent past. For example, during President Xi Jinping’s visit to India in September 2014, Prime Minister Narendra Modi made this link in response to a border confrontation that was ongoing during that state visit. Modi <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/news/resources/Full-text-of-Modis-speech-at-the-press-briefing-with-Xi-Jinping/article11142090.ece">said</a> publicly, with Xi at his side, that he had “raised our serious concern over repeated incidents along the border. We agreed that peace and tranquility in the border region constitutes an essential foundation for mutual trust and confidence and for realizing the full potential of our relationship.” He went on to add that “peace and stability in our relations and along our borders are essential for us to realize the enormous potential in our relations,” explicitly making the linkage between the border and peaceful bilateral cooperation. <br />
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India is also stepping up its strategic partnership with like-minded Indo-Pacific partners. This is prompted by a number of factors, including the pandemic and Chinese military pressure in Ladakh, rather than just China’s antics at the UNSC, but there appears to be an effort to signal further linkages. Tweeting about his conversation with U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Jaishankar <a href="https://twitter.com/DrSJaishankar/status/1291563801972678657">stated</a> that he also “(D)iscussed meeting in the Quad format in the near future.” A day later, the minister had a virtual <a href="https://twitter.com/DrSJaishankar/status/1291707026947444736">meeting</a> with Pompeo, Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne and others.<br />
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There is little doubt that frustration is growing among officials in New Delhi at the intransigence from Beijing, both in terms of the Ladakh confrontation but also about bilateral relations more broadly. Even if the current problems are resolved, Sino-Indian ties are unlikely to swing back to normal for some time. <br />
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</span>Rajihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12428075941644054406noreply@blogger.com0