Global Nuclear Security: Moving Beyond the NSS, an ORF-Global Policy Volume - August 2, 2018

Global Nuclear Security: Moving Beyond the NSS, an ORF-Global Policy Volume looks at the way ahead in strengthening nuclear security policies and practices following the conclusion of the Nuclear Security Summit process two years ago. This volume, a collaborative effort between the Embassy of the Netherlands and ORF was based on a project over a year and the publication was released on August 2, 2018.



For the full video of the release of the publication and the panel discussion that followed thereafter, click here.

For access to the full volume, which is available in PDF and e-pub formats, click here.

There has been a renewed effort to strengthen old international rules and regimes on nuclear security as well as to establish new ones. The Netherlands and India share concerns on nuclear security, given the threats both countries have to contend with. The Netherlands hosted the Nuclear Security Summit in March 2014, and is currently the international coordinator for the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. India is planning to host a WMD Terrorism Summit before the end of 2018, a commitment the Indian Prime Minister made at the 4th Nuclear Security Summit (NSS).

This volume brings together four Indian scholars and four Dutch scholars to examine the issue of nuclear security from multiple perspectives, including theoretical and policy prisms. The primary objective of this volume is to understand and share Indian and Dutch knowledge, views and expertise related to global nuclear security issues generally, and specifically to continue the conversation after the 4th (and final) NSS.



Contents

Global Nuclear Security:Time for a Proactive Approach - Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan and Allard Wagemaker

Nuclear Security: An Overview - R. Rajaraman

Bilateralism and Nuclear Security - Huib Pellikaan and Niels van Willigen

Mischief under the Nuclear Umbrella: Dynamics and Implications - Nicolas Blarel

India’s Contribution to Global Nuclear Security - Reshmi Kazi

Role of Export Controls for Nuclear Security in India - Rajiv Nayan

Evolving a Global Nuclear Security Regime: Future Institutions and Mechanisms - Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan

What’s Next for India’s New Space Ambitions? - August 24, 2018

In this week's column for the Diplomat, I write on India's upcoming human space mission. New Delhi looks to be deepening its focus on this domain, and for good reasons. On August 15, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced in his Independence Day speech that India will undertake its first manned space mission by 2022. He promised that as India celebrates its 75th year of its independence, there will be an Indian astronaut aboard Gaganyaan, as the Indian manned space vehicle is named, “unfurl[ing] the Tricolor in space.”

The feat would not be without significance for India. A successful mission will make India the fourth country to put humans into space. The only Indian who has been to space is Rakesh Sharma, an Indian Air Force pilot, who flew on a Soyuz T-11 for almost eight days in 1984.



Leaders from the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) used to say that manned space missions was not a priority. But the policy change regarding the human space flight mission is welcome and it is important to rekindle public imagination and get the young generation interested in space in particular and science in general.

For the full article, click here.



Until now, the ISRO has been busy with more practical applications in outer space that had direct developmental benefits. But in at least one area – satellite fabrication – the Indian private sector is increasingly active, thus reducing to some extent the pressure on ISRO.

ISRO Chairman, Dr. Sivan, has stated that Gaganyaan will be a “national project and not just ISRO’s”, addressing the obvious criticism that is bound to arise about this being a prestige project with little direct benefit. The astronauts who will go up on Gaganyaan will conduct various experiments in space, although ISRO has not yet provided any details.

Despite manned space flights not being a priority, some research has gone on within ISRO, though without any major financial allocation for this. In December 2013, then Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre (VSSC) Director S Ramakrishnan had said that “it would take 10 years for India to undertake human space flight.” The UPA government had sanctioned 1.45 billion rupees ($20.68 million) for pre-launch undertakings. ISRO is also reported to have developed certain critical technologies for the mission and had used about 600 million rupees from its internal R&D budget.

Following the formal announcement by Modi, ISRO hopes that there will be additional funding. There is no cost estimation for the manned space mission, but reports citing internal sources suggest that it will be around 100 million rupees to 120 million rupees.

Dr. Sivan has hinted that the program would be developed entirely by means of indigenous technology and that it will create an additional 15,000 jobs over the next few years. Former ISRO officials have suggested that the mission could use the GSLV Mk III, which is currently India’s heaviest rocket. The GSLV Mk III was previously used to test an early model of the crew module in the Crew module Atmospheric Re-entry (CARE) test (December 2014), meant to validate the functioning of parachute based deceleration system and to understand the re-entry aerothermodynamics.

Regarding astronaut training for the mission, Sivan indicated that the Institute of Aerospace Medicine (IAM) in Bangalore will be used. Separately, senior officials within the Department of Space have suggested that there could be foreign collaboration for this as well.

ISRO has four years to develop all the critical technologies for this mission, but it appears that much of the mission is still in the conceptual stages. Some of the critical technological tests that ISRO needs to prepare are the Crew Module System, Crew Escape System, and Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS), but it appears that there remains much more work to be done in this respect.

Indeed, of these, India has so far tested only the Crew Escape System and the crew module re-entry (CARE). The CARE mission undertaken in December 2014 saw the separation of the crew module from the launch vehicle at an altitude of 126 kilometers and it made a re-entry into the Earth’s atmosphere at an altitude of 80 kilometers. In July this year, the ISRO conducted a successful technology demonstration of the Crew Escape System, essentially an emergency escape system to pull out the astronauts from the launch vehicle in case of a launch abort.

Apart from that, the latest annual report (2017-18) of the Department of Space indicates that many other sub-systems of ECLSS such as Thermal and Humidity Control System (THCS), CO2 and Odor Removal System (CORS) and Cabin Pressure Control System (CPCS) are being “integrated into Cabin Environment Simulation Chamber simulating the Crew cabin volume and integrated tests are in progress.”

Amid the focus on the details and future prospects, it is important to keep in mind that India’s human space mission is important for a few different reasons. For one, in terms of space technology, this is the obvious next step. India cannot afford not to develop the technological capacity for manned space flight because that will represent a major drawback in Indian space capabilities. Even if the direct benefits of such advancement may not be as great in the short-term, this is a necessary longer-term investment.

Second, there is a competitive aspect to space advancement that is important too. While India was able to develop its own space program so far without reference to others, space is increasingly an arena of competition. India’s quest to undertake human space flight and its earlier Moon and Mars missions are also important in the context of global governance of outer space. These missions prove the growing sophistication of India’s space program and ensures a seat at the high table of global governance of outer space. This is a significant objective too.

Of course, there is a national security aspect too. India is concerned about the budding arms race in outer space and the emerging trends in weaponizing outer space. India will want to ensure that it has the technological capacity if the current trends continue, and manned missions is one possible aspect of this.

Finally, though there is substantial public support for the space program, these kinds of spectacular operations will ensure continued enthusiasm for a vital Indian technology success story. When there are large demands on the national exchequer from various sections, it is necessary to ensure that such support continues. As a corollary, such missions will also help in motivating India’s youth to focus on space and science, which is an example of the inter-generational impact of this initiative that cannot be ignored.

Should Rising China-Nepal Military Ties Worry India? - 20 August 2018

In this week's column for the Diplomat, "Should Rising China-Nepal Military Ties Worry India?," I analyse the growing China-Nepal military ties and what it might mean for India's security. New Delhi’s concerns are growing, and perhaps understandably so.



There has been no shortage of references recently to the fact that China and Nepal are about to conduct a second round of joint military exercises, titled Sagarmatha, in Chengdu in Sichuan, China, next month. The two countries held their first joint military exercise, Sagarmatha Friendship 2017, for 10 days in Kathmandu in April last year.

Often neglected in a focus on headlines alone is the fact that it has been reported that there will be no more than 15 personnel taking part in this edition of the exercise. Nonetheless, even as the scale and sophistication of the China-Nepal joint military exercise is nowhere comparable to the kind that India holds with Nepal, it still raises hackles in New Delhi.

For the full essay, click here.



India does the Surya Kiran series of military exercise with Nepal twice a year, alternating between India and Nepal. The last one, SURYA KIRAN-XIII, was held in June this year. Reportedly, this series of military exercise with Nepal remains the “largest military exercise in terms of troop participation” that the Indian army undertakes with any other country. A press statement noted that that the focus of the exercise was on counterterrorism operations.

While India can find some solace in the depth of New Delhi’s relations with Nepal, India’s concerns nonetheless have been growing about this new facet of the China-Nepal relationship that has seen an uptick, particularly in recent years.

That concern is not entirely without reason. India’s own relations with Nepal have seen some testing times. More generally, Beijing’s proactive diplomacy in South Asia and the Indian Ocean remains particularly sensitive to New Delhi. While these are not new manifestations to be sure, China’s outreach has indeed picked up the pace in recent years.

The growing security ties between China and Nepal also comes in the wake of growing commercial and economic linkages as well. China pumped in more than $8 billion in investments in Nepal last year and overtook India as the biggest foreign investor three years ago. That is no small feat.

To be sure, it has not all been smooth sailing for China. For example, Nepal recently cancelled two massive hydroelectric projects that Chinese firms were contracted to build. Furthermore, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has been stepping up his outreach to Nepal as well, making his third visit to Kathmandu in just four years.

But, for perspective, Modi’s latest visit was also to repair the damage done by the two-month long Indian economic blockade of Nepal in 2015, a move that had caused serious hardships for ordinary Nepalis. Everything from fuel to medicines and earthquake relief supplies were affected, resulting in a huge backlash against India in Nepal. This had happened in the backdrop of Nepal’s efforts to amend its Constitution and India’s efforts at championing the case of the Madhesi people, which made India a villain in the eyes of ordinary Nepalis. Following these events, Nepal’s outreach to China grew even as the Himalayan Kingdom attempts to maintain a balance in its relationship with these two giants on its border.

That balance appears set to continue. For example, former Prime Minister of Nepal and alliance partner of the Oli Government, P K Dahal Prachanda, is slated to visit India next month from September 7 to 12, a few days before he travels to China. Prime Minister Oli too had done this balancing act earlier this year, when he travelled to India first before he headed to Beijing.

All of this indicates that the Oli government is possibly just keeping its options open, and that there are really no major or dramatic changes to Nepal’s foreign policy in spite of individual moves that might be taken.

Yet India’s fears about China’s encirclement in the neighborhood are not without any basis. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s aggressive strategic pitch through his Belt and Road Initiative and debt trap diplomacy have seen the strengthening of China’s footprint in the Indian neighborhood.

The case of Sri Lanka’s Hambantota port is the oft-cited case in point. But the Maldivian government’s approach toward India is another instance of how the traditionally pro-India Maldives has turned against New Delhi, with support from China.

To be sure, India must shoulder its own share of blame for not managing these relations well. But the fact also is that for the smaller countries in the region, the economic incentives offered by China has been critical. Nepal’s decision to join the BRI will beef up Beijing’s role and presence in Kathmandu manifold. Similarly, Modi’s efforts to stem China’s influence in Nepal would depend on India’s ability to deliver on the promises made during Oli’s visit to India earlier this year, apart from any wider geopolitical calculations or moves.

It is worth keeping in mind that the fact that India and China are competing on similar projects including infrastructure development means this competition is likely to be lopsided. India does not enjoy a good track record in completing such ventures on time. The India-Myanmar-Thailand trilateral way is a case in point, with the project, initially conceptualized in 2002, seeing many delays and the latest update suggests 2021 as the completion date.

Certainly, in an election year, Modi will want to show clear successes in his neighborhood-first approach. But unless India strengthens its delivery capacity, New Delhi is bound to continue to lose to China. Ultimately, irrespective of what India’s neighbors do with China in the economic or military domains, New Delhi’s surest bet to shore up ties with these countries is to focus on shoring up its own reputation as a provider of security and prosperity. Nepal is no exception to this rule.

The Hidden Failure of US-India Counterterrorism Cooperation, August 15, 2018

This week, I wrote for The Diplomat on the nature and effectiveness of India's counter-terrorism efforts, in The Hidden Failure of US-India Counterterrorism Cooperation, While New Delhi is getting more diplomatic support for its position, it is doing little to change the threat Pakistan poses.



Late last month, the United States penalized three Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) terrorists and terror financiers as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT) in a move that challenged Pakistan’s professed earnestness in its fight against terrorism.

With the objective of restricting the financing and fundraising of the LeT, the U.S. Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated two of the group’s financial facilitators, Hameed ul Hassan (Hassan) and Abdul Jabbar (Jabbar), as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs) in accordance with Executive Order (E.O.) 13224.

The two individuals were accused of working with or on behalf of the LeT. Sigal Mandelker, undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, said that these “financial facilitators” were responsible for “collecting, transporting and distributing funds to support this terrorist group and provide salaries to extremists.”

The consequences are not insignificant. This action prohibits any U.S. citizens from conducting any transactions with them, in addition to blocking the property and assets in the name of the two individuals within the United States. In addition to blocking the LeT’s financial assets and network, it will seriously impair their capacity to raise funds for their activities.



The individuals in question are also notable. According to the U.S. Treasury Department notification, Hassan has been a financial facilitator for LeT, having worked earlier with Falah-e Insaniat Foundation, an alias of LeT, to send funds to Syria in late 2016. The notification provides additional background information too: Earlier in 2016, Hassan worked with his brother, Muhammad Ijaz Safarash and Khalid Walid to send funds to Pakistan on behalf of LeT. Safarash and Walid were earlier designated as SDGTs for their links with LeT in March 2016 and September 2012 respectively.

Hassan on his Twitter account identifies himself as the leader of Jamat-ud Dawah (an alias of LeT) in Azad Kashmir. Likewise, Jabbar also has been a financier for LeT and is believed to have been working for the finance department of LeT since 2000.

The third person designated as an SDGT is Abdul Rehman al-Dakhil. This measure will similarly impose sanctions on the terrorist leader, blocking his property and assets in the United States as well denying his ability to engage in fundraising activities. Al- Dakhil, was “an operational leader for LeT’s attacks in India between 1997 and 2001” according to the State Department. Al- Dakhil was a senior divisional commander for the Jammu region in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir in 2016. As of early 2018, he was a senior commander within LeT.

There is no doubt that the designation of the Pakistan-based LeT and penalizing it for their continuing acts of terrorism highlights the increasing synergy between India and the United States on counterterrorism. And one ought not to understate the importance of that collaboration.

But at the same time, that cooperation also has its limits. It is doubtful that these designations, and other moves like it, would be in any way sufficient to deter Pakistan and Pakistan-based terrorist organizations from continuing terrorist attacks against India.

Of course, the U.S. move has been welcomed by the Indian establishment. The MEA spokesperson in his press briefing said, “India welcomes the announcements… The announcement vindicates India’s consistent stand that internationally designated terrorist groups and Individuals, including LeT and it’s front, Falah-e-Insaniyat Foundation [FIF], continue to operate from and raise financial resources with impunity in Pakistan, and use territories under its control for carrying out cross-border terrorism in India and elsewhere in South Asia.” Clearly, New Delhi is pleased.

On the other hand, both the LeT and Jamat-ud Dawah have been under both U.S. and UN terrorist group categorization for some time. The U.S. designation is the only the latest in a long string of Indian diplomatic victories in getting other countries and groups to support the Indian position on terrorism, even though there have also been occasional setbacks such as China blocking the effort in the UN to put Masood Azhar, a leader of the Jaish-e-Mohammad terror group, in a list of UN-designated terrorists.

There are questions about the utility of this diplomatic strategy. Pakistan has shown little indication that its policies will be dictated by fear of international diplomatic response. Thus, India is facing a situation today where it has substantial diplomatic success in its fight against terror, but with little real benefit in terms of any reduction in the threat it faces. Facing up to this reality is also challenging because it requires New Delhi to consider harder options that it has little appetite for.

The Trouble With China’s Edge in the AI Arms Race - 10 August 2018

In this week's column for the Diplomat, I write on the AI arms race and possible implications, The Trouble With China’s Edge in the AI Arms Race. Beijing’s rising capabilities, while not surprising, should raise concerns for the region.

Artificial Intelligence or AI, simply described as the machine intelligence, has come to apply itself in several different sectors across countries in recent years, including healthcare, finance, education and security. But it has also increasingly become inserted into wider geopolitical conversations about the capabilities of major powers, including the United States and China.

For the full post, click here.



Within that aspect of the ongoing conversation, in terms of market share within the industry, the leaders in the field include the United States, with around 40 percent of the global market by some accounts, with countries like China, Israel, Germany, Canada and Russia fast catching up.

But market share is just one indicator of capabilities in this realm. Arguably the more important criteria to understand the lead in the domain is possibly the data that one is able to gather. On that count, it is estimated that China is possibly well ahead of the United States, perhaps aided by the fact that privacy laws in many countries, especially democracies, can dampen data access, thus hampering the prospects of AI, as noted by Microsoft President Brad Smith recently.

Reports suggest that China is probably ahead of the United States in terms of the amount of personal data collected, owing to many factors including the fact “it is a larger country” and the opportunities for collecting information in a country like China are “colossal.”

Chinese government wants to overtake the United States and be the global leader in the field by 2030. China has been making massive investments to create a huge pool of AI experts – in one indicator, it was reported that during the period 2011-2015, China had published more than 41,000 papers on AI, almost double the number of that of the United States. China is also ahead of the United States in patent applications for AI, with Chinese tech giants including Alibaba and Baidu making massive investments in AI.

The regional competition within China to set up AI hubs is also picking up pace. Tianjin, a coastal province in northern China, for instance, revealed $16 billion in funding for AI in the province. There is a clear economic logic to this too, with China attempting to use the AI as a platform to make the switch from being the world’s factory of cheap goods to a technology pioneer. A Cabinet note in China last year stated that by 2030, it will leap ahead with a global lead on AI theory, technology, and application.

However, there is little doubt that China’s leap in AI will extend far beyond civilian sectors and into the military as well. China intends to apply AI in important security sectors such as in the warfighting domain with special emphasis on naval warfare. China has established many AI institutes, but the most eye-catching one from a security perspective is a new research center established by the PLA Academy of Military Science. China’s National Defense University too has a new center for AI sciences, in addition to Tsinghua University’s “high-end” laboratory for military intelligence.

Both the United States and Russia are making efforts to catch up with China in terms of the number of institutions and centers focused on AI. Both countries will reportedly open their own centers for AI in the near future, although there are significant differences in which the three countries approach AI. For instance, Russian efforts are driven closely by the Kremlin, whereas China seeks to combine the civilian and military utilities of AI in a big way. The United States, at least for the time being, is looking at AI for assistance in areas such as logistics and open-source data analysis.

Clearly, there is a big surge in AI research in China, and it is easy to come to some hasty conclusions about how that might play out. According to Jeffrey Ding, a researcher at the University of Oxford and author of a study on China’s AI strategy, China’s capabilities as on date are “only about half those of the US.” He argues that the United States has an edge in AI when it comes to hardware design, algorithmic research, and overall commercial linkages. China’s edge is possibly in terms of the data they are about to churn through a mix of Chinese “private” companies and government agencies. Some groups estimate that China “will possess about 30 per cent of the world’s data” in about a decade.

For many countries around the world, China’s lead in AI itself is not much of a concern. But how that aids Beijing’s military plans in the future should cause some worry. China’s plans to develop large autonomous robotic submarines, to give just one example, create anxieties. These are believed to “large, smart and relatively low-cost,” unmanned in nature and can traverse the international strategic maritime spaces by 2020s.

The traditional advantage held by the western naval powers such as the United States, and Asian maritime powers such as Japan and India, could possibly be eroded by the new Chinese venture. These submarines could be entrusted with underwater operations including mine placement, reconnaissance, and anti-carrier kamikaze ops aimed at the United States and its allies. Zhuhai in Guangdong province boasts of having the world’s largest testing facility for surface drone boats.

While China does not plan to do away with human operators in submarines totally, these AI-assisted underwater boats will have no humans on board and they will have the self-sufficient capacity to head out, complete their missions, and head back to the base without any command support.

It is worth noting that this could also heighten regional security competition more generally. China’s new venture is unlikely to go ahead without any competition, and this could in fact drive a new competition on the naval front as well. In fact, the United States has plans to develop its own Extra Large Underwater Unmanned Vehicles (XLUUVs), for instance, and Boeing and Lockheed Martin are already on the job.

China is also pushing AI in tank warfare by reportedly converting its old Type 59 Soviet tanks into unmanned vehicles fitted with AI. Reports indicate that back in 2014, China had set up its first dedicated research center for unmanned ground vehicles. While the tanks’ main gun was not visible in the recent China Central Television (CCTV) footage, Indian analysts familiar with tank warfare note that it is only a matter of time.

China’s advances in the military domain using AI are nothing short of remarkable. Clearly, such AI-assisted systems, if they are successfully deployed, give China a huge edge. But this will also likely spur a new technological arms race in the region, giving defense planners one more thing to worry about.

India’s China Challenge in Africa, July 31, 2018

Last week, I analysed for The Diplomat India’s China Challenge in Africa as both Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister undertook a three-nation African tour before heading to the BRICS Summit in South Africa.

While the tenth iteration of the BRICS Summit brought its own share of headlines, an equally notable development was the effort put by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to tour key African states ahead of the meeting alongside Chinese President Xi Jinping’s own visits. The effort spotlighted New Delhi’s continued bid to strengthen its influence in the continent despite the clear limitations it has relative to Beijing.

For the full post, click here.



While India has engaged Africa for long, its capacity to effect changes have been limited primarily due to lack of India’s economic capacity. Conversely, China’s deep pockets and the larger trade engagement have seen it garner far greater influence. Chinese investments in Africa have been growing for more than a decade. In 2014, China-Africa bilateral trade was around $220 billion. In comparison, India-Africa bilateral trade in March 2016-17 was $52 billion.

Modi’s forays to Rwanda and Uganda, before landing in South Africa for the BRICS Summit, was an attempt to bring about new dynamism in the India-Africa relationship. In Rwanda, which has China as its largest trading partner and had inked a strategic partnership with Beijing just last year, Modi became the first Indian leader to visit the country and signed several agreements on trade, agriculture, and defense. In Uganda, Modi delivered the first-ever address for an Indian premier and announced two key lines of credit alongside support for African states across sectors such as agriculture, health, education, infrastructure, defense, and energy sectors.

To be sure, both China and India have downplayed the Sino-Indian rivalry factor in each country’s engagement in Africa. In an effort to downplay the strategic and economic competition in Africa between India and China, the Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang during a press briefing said that “both China and India are willing to help Africa within the South-South cooperation framework to accelerate its industrialization and achieve self-driven development… China and India are on the same page in this regard.” But even as Chinese officials make such claims, Xi has signed several agreements furthering China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), many components of which has been objected to by India.

Indian officials have similarly echoed Chinese ones in rejecting any competition. TS Tirumurti, a senior official in India’s Ministry of External Affairs, said that the Modi visit was simply a continuation of India’s long relations with Africa, which go “back…to Mahatma Gandhi.”

The reality is much different and also clearer. While New Delhi often makes claims of about its century-old historical relationship with Africa, there can be little doubt that the new Indian focus on Africa is more the result of China’s growing footprint in Africa. China in the last few years has been strengthening its presence and influence in Africa, as well as some of the African littoral states in the Indian Ocean. India’s nervousness with the growing Chinese maritime interests is quite real. In response, India is now trying to step up its cooperation with a number of countries including Seychelles and Mauritius (incidentally, Xi is also included Mauritius in his African tour). The Indian Ocean region along with the littoral states will become much more vital in the coming years, with these maritime spaces carrying two-thirds of the global oil cargo, one third of the bulk cargo, and half of all container traffic.

For New Delhi, Africa has become a lot more significant because of China’s proactive engagement in the region. But at the same time, India’s long neglect and the inadequate economic capacity are serious disadvantages in the face of China’s strategic push and the economic muscle. Nonetheless, India’s promises and commitments will be judged against China’s projects in the region. New Delhi’s biggest challenge has been its inability to deliver on the promises that it makes. There is little sign that India has done much about this, adding to the doubts about India’s capacity to compete with China.