Will India’s Trump Fears Ease With the New US Asia Reassurance Initiative Act? - 5 January 2018

In this week's column, Will India’s Trump Fears Ease With the New US Asia Reassurance Initiative Act?, I wrote on the US Asia Reassurance Initiative Act and whether the Act will address some of India's concerns. New Delhi will be hoping that Congress can continue to rein in Trump’s worst instincts.

For the full article, click here.



On December 31, U.S. President Donald Trump signed the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA), which promises to bring back fresh focus to American priorities in the Indo-Pacific. The Act assumes particular importance in the context of China’s expanding and aggressive footprint across Asia, Africa, Europe, and Oceania and the responses by the United States as well as its allies, partners, and friends in the region.

India for one has three specific areas of concern that it would want the United States to address. Within South Asia, there are two: India is worried about the prospect of American withdrawal from Afghanistan as well as about the inroads that China is making in India’s neighborhood. A third concern is more broadly the challenge that China poses to India, both militarily and politically. So, New Delhi is likely to judge this Act on how it will address these three challenges.

India will be happy to have been accorded special importance under the Act, which reiterates India’s significance in the U.S. strategy in the region. The Act notes India as a Major Defense Partner, a “unique” status for India, which would ease defense trade and sharing of technology, including “license-free access to a wide range of dual-use technologies” as well as promote greater coordination on security policies and strategies and increased military-to-military engagements. Of course, in practical terms, this doesn’t change very much. Nevertheless, the symbolic element is always important while dealing with New Delhi.

Of course, the congressional action comes immediately after Trump’s decision to withdraw U.S. troops from Afghanistan. Whether the congressional action will slow down or alter American withdrawal remains to be seen. Trump is reportedly considering changes to his approach to Syria, including slowing down a reduced presence. On the other hand, he also dismissed the Indian contribution to Afghanistan as nothing more than a library. Given India’s sensitivity to developments in Afghanistan, New Delhi will be very interested in whether the U.S. Congress can moderate Trump’s instinct to withdraw.

A second regional issue is China’s expansion in India’s neighborhood. China’s enormous wealth and its remarkable capacity for infrastructure building has made it an attractive partner for India’s neighbors, despite the threat of being sucked into a Chinese debt trap. Beyond this, the comfort of having an extraregional great power as a counter to the regional hegemon was probably an equally important factor. India’s limited capacity to provide an alternative has been an issue. The Act does talk about countering China’s coercive economic policies, but New Delhi would be interested in seeing whether this will provide any help to India’s neighbors in escaping China’s debt grasp.

A third issue is whether this Act will reassure India in its direct confrontation with China. Like other powers in Asia, India has also sought a more accommodative policy toward China over the last year. Change of leadership in the Indian foreign ministry was one factor, with Vijay Gokhale replacing S. Jaishankar in January 2018. Jaishankar was known to be an advocate of closer U.S.-India relations while Gokhale appears to be a much more traditional Indian Foreign Service officer who prefers equidistance from both the United States and China.

But more than personality factors were at play in India’s pursuit of closer ties with China. Though the Indian military stood fast in the 2017 Doklam crisis, the Indian military’s overall preparedness is rather poor. Indian military budgets are lower than they have been in decades and corruption scandals and bureaucratic incompetence have delayed necessary acquisitions. Another issue is domestic politics. India is set to hold national elections in 2019, and there are suspicions that the Modi government did not want to be diverted by a confrontation in the Himalayas.

Though these factors were important, underlying all these is a certain lack of confidence in America’s commitment to India and Asia. In that sense, this congressional action is potentially positive in providing greater reassurance, even though a lot will also depend on whether the Trump administration follows up on it or not.

India, like other American partners in Asia, has had concerns about Washington’s commitment to the region. This Act is not likely to remove those concerns. But to the extent that it endorses a consensus opinion within the U.S. Congress and also expresses the broad bipartisan consensus in Washington, it is likely to be welcomed in New Delhi.

Houston Calling New Delhi, co-authored piece on US-India space cooperation....

Here's a recently published piece on US-India space cooperation, co-authored with Dr. Adam Lowther, and published in the National Interest. We have explored several potential areas of cooperation in the US-India context, with a special focus on space situational awareness (SSA).

U.S.-India relations reached a high point when the two countries signed the Civil Nuclear Agreement in 2005. But since then, relations between the two countries have drifted.

While the Obama administration continues to reiterate that relations with India are vital, there have been several issues where Washington has expressed its displeasure. These include India’s nuclear liability bill, which Washington sees as unfair to U.S. companies; India’s decision to reject two different American jet fighters for India’s Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) requirement; and India’s less-than-supportive role within the United Nations on a range of issues, including Libya, Iran and Syria.

New Delhi is not without its own set of complaints about Washington. India feels that American pressure to deepen U.S.-India defense cooperation is premature, particularly given Indian questions about the United States’ credibility as a potential ally or partner. The Obama administration’s initial focus on China is still an irritant in New Delhi, although Washington has since corrected course.

There is certainly no dearth of official statements from both capitals concerning the vitality of the relationship. But it is clear that what is needed is a grand project around which the relationship can grow and strengthen. Without this initiative, we may see US-India relations flounder. One such ideal place for the two countries to collaborate on a grand scale is space.



An Opportunity and Imperative

In 2009, Karl F. Inderfurth, former Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Affairs, and C. Raja Mohan, prominent Indian foreign policy analyst, argued in the Financial Times that space cooperation should become the heart of U.S.-India relations. Several space joint-working group meetings have taken place since then, but substantive outcomes are proving elusive.

Such cooperation would have proven difficult in previous decades. Many Indian space research agencies, including ISRO (Indian Space Research Organization)—India’s equivalent of NASA—were under U.S. sanctions. With sanctions lifted, the potential for cooperation is much greater. Unlike nuclear cooperation, space is much less controversial—and promises benefits not only for humanity but for the long term sustainability of outer space.

Indo-American space cooperation also offers the potential for becoming a broad-based initiative which brings a wide spectrum of stakeholders—national space agencies on both sides, education, science, and technology agencies, as well as private commercial entities—together in collaboration. With private sector participation, there is the prospect of moving beyond governmental entities to create new strategic industries in space.

To achieve such an ambitious agenda, the two governments should institutionalize space cooperation by setting up an Indo-American Commercial Space Initiative or a Space Knowledge Initiative. Such an effort could fall along the same lines as the U.S.-India Agricultural Knowledge Initiative and the U.S.-India Clean Energy Initiative, which are successful models of cooperation. Clean energy is a particularly successful model because it is a public-private partnership, with both governments investing $25 million and the private sector investing $50 million.

Space Traffic Control

There are several specific areas of space exploration where the two countries could cooperate. But an urgent need exists for collaboration on space situational awareness (SSA), which is the ability to monitor, understand, and predict the changing physical environment of outer-space. This includes the location and movement of natural and manmade objects in an effort to prevent collisions and accidents.

This is the corollary of maritime domain awareness (MDA), which refers to essentially large collation of data—both intelligence and information to arrive at what is called in the maritime lingo a common operative picture (COP)--and air domain awareness (ADA), a similar concept regarding air domain.

Of all the potential areas of collaboration, joint space situational awareness is most urgent for India and the United States. Outer space has become crowded, congested and contested—increasing the potential for collisions. The long-term sustainability of outer space is of paramount concern to India and the United States. An increasing number of incidents—the Chinese weapons test in 2007, destruction of a defunct satellite by the United States in 2008, and the collision between a Russian and U.S. satellite in 2009—illustrate the potential threats for space-faring nations. Space debris, unpredictable space weather and aging satellites continue to create insecurity.

According to NASA, there are over 500,000 pieces of debris in Earth’s orbit, some of which are large enough to cause serious damage to satellites and spacecraft. Space weather, caused by charged solar particles and the Earth’s magnetic field, also create disturbing conditions for space objects.

Improving space situational awareness can help in alleviating some of these concerns. Simply put, SSA aims at creating a constant understanding of the space environment by keeping a close watch on developments, including tracking of space objects, debris, and space weather. This includes predicting collisions in orbit, detecting launches of new space objects, predicting reentry of space objects into the atmosphere, and detecting threats and attacks on spacecraft. This can be done by radar, optical telescopes, electronic signals sensors, infrared sensors, or other spacecraft.

The United States already has the most comprehensive SSA mechanism, which is called the Space Surveillance Network (SSN). The SSN is a wide-ranging array of radars and optical telescopes that provides information to the Joint Space Operations Centre in California. Data collected enables tracking of objects. A telescope mounted on the Space-Based Space Surveillance (SBSS) satellite that is operated by the U.S. military also provides such information. But even the U.S. SSN has limited coverage in the Southern Hemisphere.

The Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO), has an operational Telemetry, Tracking and Command Network (ISTRAC), which currently provides mission support to low-earth orbit satellites and launch vehicles. A network of ground stations, spread across India, form the structure of ISTRAC. The Indian Deep Space Network (IDSN) also provides operational support for India as well as external space agencies. Additionally, the two Swordfish tracking radars, which have been deployed by India, have the potential for monitoring activities in space.

On the American side, U.S. Strategic Command/Air Force Space Command manage these functions. ISRO, India’s civilian space agency—not the Indian military—is STRATCOM’s counterpart. Bringing the two together has proven difficult in the past. For India to move forward, its space-domain bureaucracies have to overcome any aversions to working with the U.S. military.

The Dragon in the Room

For many within the U.S. military space community, collaboration with India is seen as having limited potential. With the United States clearly the more advanced technologically, there is legitimate concern that cooperation may lead to large and costly technology transfers. After all, space remains one of the U.S. military’s most highly classified areas. But safeguarding critical information and technology is possible and well worth taking a reasonable risk.

As India and the United States look to the future, both are deeply concerned over a rising China that is asserting itself in unexpected and aggressive ways. To effectively counter the Chinese dragon, Uncle Sam and the Indian tiger must move beyond the U.S.-India civil nuclear agreement and existing commercial relations to build trust and cooperation in other areas. Space has the potential to serve as the next grand project steering the relationship to greater heights.

China Walks the US-India Space-Based Solar Power Dream

Here's a link to the analysis on how China walks the US-India space-based solar power dream, written by Rahul and me for the ORF.

While India and the US make pledges about potential collaboration on space, others walk those promises and potentials. In the India-US context, space has remained a potential area of cooperation for the last decade or so whereas China, which has studied the Indo-US joint communications carefully, has made fast progress on space-based solar power (SBSP), in terms of devoting financial and human resources into the project.



The need of the hour is for democracies like India, US and may be even Japan to come together, structure large collaborations around space and capture the political space in this regard. The political leadership in both India and the US should recognise the importance of it and act accordingly before it is too late.

Recognising the spin-off benefits of space-based solar power, China recently unveiled a plan to build and orbit a solar power station for commercial use by 2040. The Chinese plan drawn by one of its space pioneers Wang Xiji is an ambitious one and aims to look at various aspects of space-based solar power applications, designs and key technologies that would make the option economically feasible in the first instance and sustainable by 2020. Detailing the research conducted by the China Academy of Sciences, Wang said at the fourth China Energy Environment Summit Forum: "The development of solar power station in space will fundamentally change the way in which people exploit and obtain power. Whoever takes the lead in the development and utilization of clean and renewable energy and the space and aviation industry will be the world leader."

Given China's rising energy requirements, it is imperative that Beijing look at alternate sources of energy to meet its enormous demand. By 2050, it is estimated that China would have an energy gap of approximately 10.5 percent which it would seek to fill in by exploring alternate sources of energy such as fusion and space power stations. Also, the greenhouse gas emissions and climate change considerations have become serious enough concerns for the international community. These factors have also pushed Beijing to invest more in low-carbon energy sources. SBSP is possibly on top of the options list for China given the safety concerns vis-à-vis nuclear energy, particularly after the Fukushima crisis. According to the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST), the Solar Power Satellites (SPS) and solar power applications will help China in sustaining its economic and social development, disaster prevention and mitigation and would also assist in retention of qualified personnel.

China has been working on this concept for several years with CAST spearheading its research work. After the initial feasibility report compiled by CAST, a concept design for the SPS was submitted to China's Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, which eventually gave the approval and funding for the design. According to CAST, the SPS development includes four parts - satellite launching, in-orbit construction/multi-agents, efficient conversion of solar energy and wireless transmission. Apart from the launch factor, an area where China has excelled significantly, other parts of the project will demand greater effort for development.

While China's lead in the SBSP could provide for a co-operative framework in Asia, the geopolitical realities and the inherent problems in Asia - competition, rivalry and mistrust - may hamper such collaboration in the near future.

Under such a scenario, there lies a strong imperative for India, the US and other like-minded democracies to come together and realise the SBSP utilisation dream. This will not only provide economic gains but also give a strategic advantage in the changing security environment in Asia. For India, such collaboration would meet its growing energy demand and provide other spinoff benefits like job creation and access to advanced technology, much-needed for sustaining India's growth story. It is estimated that India's energy requirements would double by 2030, making it imperative for it to explore other feasible options. Also, if India becomes a part of the process of realising the SBSP dream, it will augment India's position in Asia as well as the world as a responsible leader.

The political consensus for India and the US to collaborate in space already exists although it appears that each side has been leaving it to the other to take the initiative and materialise the potential. The US-India Agreement to establish an S&T Board and an endowment for research provides the apparatus needed for starting the SBSP research and development. This fund can finance a broad number of issues of mutual interest such as bio technology, advanced materials and nanotechnology science, clean energy technologies, basic space, atmospheric and earth science. SBSP easily fits into the sphere of issues supported by this fund. As far as other funding options are concerned, private sector companies on both sides have shown interest in exploring the SBSP option. US companies like Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman and Tata in India have shown positive signs. Other countries like Japan have also done considerable research in this field. Japan's Aerospace Exploration Agency has done decade-long research on SBSP in collaboration with high-end technological companies such as Mitsubishi. Collaboration among these countries would also facilitate funding for this ambitious project.

While China may not have developed the best model in terms of cost effectiveness, it will surely send out a strong message to the international community about China's capabilities in developing such technologies and its ambitions to become the global leader in space solar power harnessing. If China wins the race in developing SBSP as a feasible source of energy, which would meet the world's growing energy demand, it will result in huge economic and strategic gains for China.

It is now time for both India and the US to explore the opportunity seriously and not let prospects for cooperation remain only as prospects. Hopefully, the advent of China into the picture would give the much-needed push for both countries to actually start real-time development work on SBSP.