Indian Frustration With China Grows - The Diplomat, 12 August 2020

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I write on the Indian frustration in dealing with China. I argue New Delhi’s responses to Beijing’s efforts — such as raising the Kashmir issue at the U.N. — are becoming increasingly harsh.

Since August 2019, China has consistently raised the Kashmir issue at the United Nations Security Council. Last week, on August 5, China again sought a discussion on Kashmir under the “Any Other Business” category in the UN Security Council. This was the third time that China has done this, following earlier efforts in August 2019 and January 2020.

Indian responses to such efforts, as well as Chinese comments, are becoming harsher, a possible indication that the Indian government is losing patience with Beijing.

For the full essay, click here.



Kashmir has not been on the U.N. Security Council’s agenda since 1971. China resurrected the Jammu and Kashmir issue in the Security Council in August 2019 following the Indian decision to nullify Article 370, the special status given to the state of Jammu and Kashmir under the Indian Constitution. China has continued to describe the Indian action to remove the special status of Jammu and Kashmir and bifurcate the state into two union territories as affecting its territorial claims in the Ladakh region. In August 2019, China said the Indian decision was “unacceptable.” India rejected China’s criticisms, saying the decision was an internal matter with no impact on its external borders. China has persisted.

After last week’s UNSC meeting, India’s Permanent Representative at the UN in New York tweeted, “Another attempt by Pakistan fails!” Although the tweet did not name China, Indian officials elsewhere explicitly named China as responsible. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) in a statement said:

We have noted that China initiated a discussion in the UN Security Council on issues pertaining to the Indian Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir. This was not the first time that China has sought to raise a subject that is solely an internal matter of India. As on such previous occasions, this attempt too met with little support from the international community. We firmly reject China’s interference in our internal affairs and urge it to draw proper conclusions from such infructuous attempts.

Unnamed Indian officials pointed out that the United States and France have been especially notable in rebutting Chinese attempts. They have https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/sino-pakistans-unsc-attempt-on-kashmir-fails/articleshow/77400944.cms the Indian press that the United States took the lead in in challenging China’s actions and was followed by other UNSC members as well.

Indian responses to Chinese comments have become angrier. For example, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin stated that Beijing pays close attention to the Kashmir issue and that “any unilateral change to the status quo in the Kashmir region is illegal and invalid.” The spokesperson added that the issue has to be “and peacefully resolved through dialogue and consultation between the parties concerned.” Wang added that “China sincerely hopes that the two sides can properly handle differences through dialogue, improve relations and jointly safeguard peace, stability and development of the two countries and the region.”

Despite that slightly gentler tone, India responded harshly, stating that “The Chinese side has no locus standi whatsoever on this matter and is advised not to comment on the internal affairs of other nations.” This kind of response is becoming more common among Indian officials, a possible reflection of the frustration that New Delhi is feeling with Chinese behavior. During a recent interview, Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar pointedly stated that “the state of the border and the future of our ties… cannot be separated,” in essence suggesting that the standoff at the border will affect the bilateral relationship.

This is a link that India has been made before, but not (as starkly) in the recent past. For example, during President Xi Jinping’s visit to India in September 2014, Prime Minister Narendra Modi made this link in response to a border confrontation that was ongoing during that state visit. Modi said publicly, with Xi at his side, that he had “raised our serious concern over repeated incidents along the border. We agreed that peace and tranquility in the border region constitutes an essential foundation for mutual trust and confidence and for realizing the full potential of our relationship.” He went on to add that “peace and stability in our relations and along our borders are essential for us to realize the enormous potential in our relations,” explicitly making the linkage between the border and peaceful bilateral cooperation.

India is also stepping up its strategic partnership with like-minded Indo-Pacific partners. This is prompted by a number of factors, including the pandemic and Chinese military pressure in Ladakh, rather than just China’s antics at the UNSC, but there appears to be an effort to signal further linkages. Tweeting about his conversation with U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Jaishankar stated that he also “(D)iscussed meeting in the Quad format in the near future.” A day later, the minister had a virtual meeting with Pompeo, Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne and others.

There is little doubt that frustration is growing among officials in New Delhi at the intransigence from Beijing, both in terms of the Ladakh confrontation but also about bilateral relations more broadly. Even if the current problems are resolved, Sino-Indian ties are unlikely to swing back to normal for some time.

India Under Strain Across South Asia - The Diplomat, 7 August 2020

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I look at India's strained relations with almost all its neighbours in South Asia. I argue that India’s regional relations are almost all in states of distress and that’s a big problem for New Delhi.

India’s standing in its South Asian neighborhood is under some strain. New Delhi is facing trouble not only in its relations with its traditional adversary, Pakistan, but also Nepal, Bangladesh and possibly Sri Lanka, too, just as it is facing pressure from China along the Tibet border. The Maldives is possibly the only relatively bright spot for India in the region at present.

For the full article, click here.



In May this year, Nepali Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli surprised India by releasing a new political map claiming a part of Indian territory. The new map shows the Kalapani, Limpiyadhura, and Lipulekh areas in the Indian state of Uttarakhand as belonging to Nepal. These areas are shown as part of Byas rural municipality in Nepal’s Sudurpaschim province. Speaking to the media, Padma Kumari Aryal, the minister for land management, cooperatives, and poverty alleviation, said that the map will come into effect immediately and added that “The areas including Gunji, Navi and Kuti near Kalapani, which had been left out in earlier maps, are also included in the new map.”

India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) responded by calling it a “unilateral act” that “is not based on historical facts and evidence.” The Indian statement rejected the claim, calling “contrary to the bilateral understanding to resolve the outstanding boundary issues through diplomatic dialogue.” Nepal’s action followed large protests in Kathmandu after Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh opened an 80-kilometer road between Dharchula and Lipulekh in Uttarakhand, part of India’s effort to improve its infrastructure along the Tibet border. Indian Army Chief General M.M. Naravane suggested that Nepal was possibly acting on behalf of “someone else,” a not-so-veiled reference to China, creating more anger in Nepal.

The new map has now been endorsed by Nepal’s Parliament and the Oli government is planning to send the map to the United Nations and other multilateral institutions. Meanwhile, Oli appears to be making a bad situation worse by talking about India’s efforts to remove him from office. This escalation has worried even members of his own party, with one saying that if India asks for concrete evidence “we will have to prove it or face the consequences.” Oli has made other controversial anti-India statements recently including a reference to the “Indian virus” being “more lethal than the Chinese or Italian viruses.” Although he was talking about workers carrying the virus from India to Nepal and trying to suggest a possible difference in the strain of the virus, it was an inelegant formulation that has not gone down well in New Delhi.

Following the India-Nepal map row, Pakistan is testing the waters by issuing a new political map of its own. On the eve of the first anniversary of India’s revoking the special status of Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan released a new political map, containing the whole of Jammu and Kashmir as well as parts of Gujarat. Calling it a “historical occasion,” Prime Minister Imran Khan said, “The political map reflects our national aspiration and supports our principled stance on Kashmir dispute.”

This has clearly irked India and New Delhi dismissed it as “ridiculous assertions” with “neither legal validity nor international credibility.” The Indian MEA in a statement called it “an exercise in political absurdity” and that it “confirms reality of Pakistan’s obsession with territorial aggrandisement supported by cross-border terrorism.” Manish Tewari, a member of parliament from the opposition Congress party, said in a tweet that this is essentially “a Geostrategic statement by China.” He added that, “Coming as it does after Nepal’s new map it is China’s way of rubbing in India’s isolation in it’s Neighbhourhood (sic). Wouldn’t be surprised if one or two others in neighbourhood walk down this absurd street.”

India is facing difficulties with Bangladesh, too. India had managed its relations with Bangladesh quite well during Modi’s first term, but that is not the case anymore. The India Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), which is seen as targeting Muslims, especially migrants from Bangladesh, has cratered relations. The Sheikh Hasina government has been clear about how Bangladesh views CAA, and the reference to Bangladeshi migrants as “termites” by India’s home minister created understandable anger. Demonstrating Dhaka’s displeasure, a scheduled visit by Bangladesh Foreign Minister A.K. Abdul Momen was cancelled by Dhaka at the very last minute. The CAA has put Bangladesh, a predominantly Muslim country that was friendly to India and the Modi government, in a difficult position. Bangladesh also worries about possible reverse migration, because there could be an exodus of Muslim migrants escaping persecution in India, especially from the northeastern state of Assam.

With the Rajapaksas back in office, Sri Lanka, another South Asian neighbor, may also be a cause for worry in New Delhi. The Rajapaksas are seen to be close to China, and there are reports suggesting that China is keen for Sri Lanka to distance itself from India and its other partners such as Japan. Austin Fernando, former Sri Lankan high commissioner to India, argued in a recent essay that India’s over-cautious approach is partly to blame for the situation. The Sri Lankan government’s recent decision to halt a Japan-funded light rail project is one indicator that all is not well. Bandula Gunewardene, Sri Lanka’s information minister, stated that it was an expensive proposition with low returns. Similarly, the India-Japan collaboration on Sri Lanka’s East Container Terminal (ECT) project in Colombo is on shaky grounds. The three countries had signed an Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) only a year ago but there is no guarantee that this project will go ahead, at least with India and Japan as partners.

With much of its neighborhood relations in various degrees of distress, India is making its pitch in the Maldives to restrict China’s growing influence. According to Indian media reports, India is planning to announce a “substantial financial assistance package” to the Maldives in order for Male to address the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The real goal appears to be strategic: to curtail China’s growing footprint. In July, Sunjay Sudhir, Indian high commissioner in the Maldives, gave the country a symbolic check for carrying out nine projects in the Maldives through the High Impact Community Development Projects (HICDP) scheme. Under this scheme, India has signed several MoUs to develop fish-processing units, set up tourism zones, and establish a bottled water plant. The current package comes after India had given the Maldives $400 million under an extended currency swap arrangement to help manage its liquidity crisis. India has also provided the Maldives with an additional $1.4 billion as budgetary aid to battle the economic impact from the COVID-19 pandemic.

Whether these assistance packages will sustain India’s role and influence in the Maldives remains to be seen. For the moment, it appears to be so. India enjoys considerable goodwill in the country after the 2018 elections, with the election of Ibrahim Mohamed Solih. India does have friends in the Maldives. Mohamed Nasheed, speaker and former president, recently said in Male that the Maldives must be wise in making smart choices, and “join hands with India” for growth and prosperity. Highlighting the Maldives’ important geographical importance, he added, “I am also certain that Maldivians and their elected leaders will be wise and make shrewd and sensible decisions regarding our foreign policy and our relationship with our closest allies and neighbors, the closest and dearest of whom is India.”

New Delhi will try hard to improve its relations with other neighbors, but for now, it has to be satisfied with just the Maldives.

The Rising Domestic Danger to India’s Foreign Policy Under Modi - The Diplomat, 6 March 2020

In this week's essay for The Diplomat, I looked at the growing international attention and criticism to some of the recent internal developments in India. Whether New Delhi likes it or not, it is becoming increasingly clear that domestic issues are affecting ties with its neighbors and partners and that the costs of this are increasing.

Over the past few months, it has become increasingly clear that India’s domestic issues are increasingly threatening to impact India’s foreign policy. Issues such as the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) and India’s actions in Kashmir are beginning to affect India’s relations with its neighbors, major Islamic countries such as Iran and Indonesia, and strategic partners such as the United States. Last week’s violence in Delhi, in particular, is drawing negative attention to India’s internal matters and could possibly affect its reputation.

For the full essay, click here.



In an exceptional move, and a first for India, the Geneva-based Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has said that it was planning to file an application on the CAA in the Indian Supreme Court. The UN Higher Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet subsequently filed an Intervention Application against the CAA. The MEA responded to this by saying that the CAA is an internal issue of India and “no foreign party has any locus standi on issues pertaining to India’s sovereignty.”

Iran is another recent critic, and another surprising one too, and it was vocal in condemning the communal violence in Delhi, especially the targeting of India’s Muslim citizens. Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif had a tough tweet on the Delhi violence, saying, “Iran condemns the wave of organized violence against Indian Muslims. For centuries, Iran has been a friend of India. We urge Indian authorities to ensure the well-being of ALL Indians & not let senseless thuggery prevail. Path forward lies in peaceful dialogue and rule of law.”

New Delhi did not respond kindly to the foreign minister’s comments. Responding to a question on the Iranian foreign minister’s tweet, the MEA spokesperson stated that India had summoned Iranian Ambassador Ali Chegeni and “a strong protest was lodged against the unwarranted remarks made by the Iranian Foreign Minister. It was conveyed that his selective and tendentious characterization of recent events in Delhi are not acceptable. We do not expect such comments from a country like Iran.” Apparently, it was made clear to the Iranian ambassador that this was an internal issue of India and that Iranian comments were not appreciated.

It is strange that the Iranian foreign minister’s particularly harsh tweet came just a few days after India joined hands with Iran to speed up the Chabahar port development. While Iran is known to champion the rights of Muslim minorities in other countries, it was a bit incongruous considering that Iran has said little about China’s behavior towards its Muslim Uyghur minority, large numbers of whom have been placed in concentration camps simply because of their Islamic faith. Of course, nations are not always consistent in their policies, and Iran fears China far more than it fears India.

While Iran is not a particularly strategic partner for India and can possibly be ignored, others are more difficult to dismiss. Indonesia, an important partner in India’s Act East and Indo-Pacific strategy, has also voiced serious concerns about the violence in Delhi. Muhammadiyah, Indonesia’s second largest Muslim group, expressed disquiet about the violent clashes between Hindus and Muslims on account of the CAA. Muhammadiyah secretary-general Abdul Mu’thi while denouncing the violence, said that the violence was “clearly against human rights principles.” A day after the violence, hashtag #ShameOnYouIndia was among the top trending topics on Twitter in Indonesia, and as many as 46,000 tweets were related to the Delhi violence, many condemning the violence.

This was mirrored by some of the government reactions as well. There was an unusually strong statement issued by the Indonesian Religious Affairs Ministry condemning the religious violence in Delhi. Within hours of this statement, the Indonesian foreign ministry made a statement saying that “The Government of Indonesia has complete confidence that the Government of India will be able to manage the situation and ensure the harmonious relations among its religious communities. Moreover, both countries share similar characteristics, as pluralistic countries that uphold democratic values and tolerance.” The Indonesian foreign ministry also called in the Indian Ambassador to Jakarta, Pradeep Rawat, seeking details on the Delhi violence.

Of course, this pales in comparison to any damage that may be caused to India’s ties to the United States, its most important strategic partner. Despite the successful Trump visit to India, this bears watching. India’s foreign minister and its diplomats have done a good job explaining its position in the United States after the revoking Article 370 in Jammu and Kashmir, but India’s approach after the CAA has been quite poor. For instance, Indian Foreign Minister Jaishankar’s cancellation of meetings with U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) because Pramila Jayapal was part of the delegation possibly did not help. In fact, the resolution in the Congress, seeking a return to normalcy in Kashmir, sponsored by Jayapal found 10 additional legislators ready to co-sponsor it right after the cancellation of the meeting.

Last week’s violence in the capital sparked new concerns in the United States with several leading names from the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) and others, including Democrat presidential candidate Bernie Sanders, expressing serious concerns. Once again, the MEA spokesperson called these statements “irresponsible.” Raveesh Kumar, the MEA spokesperson went on to state that “Our law enforcement agencies are working on the ground to prevent violence and ensure restoration of confidence and normalcy. Senior representatives of the government have been involved in that process. Prime Minister has publicly appealed for peace and brotherhood.” A lot of India’s diplomatic bandwidth now has to be used for fighting these fires than for improving a vital relationship.

India can continue to dismiss these criticisms and concerns as unnecessary interference in its internal affairs, but it is unlikely this would help much. Even India’s well-wishers are beginning to worry. This will eventually be expensive if these problems are not resolved, especially because New Delhi will be wasting effort in explaining itself and creating unnecessary tensions and discomfort in critical relationships. Of course, the most important reason for resolving these problems is that India should be a society in which no section feels persecuted and differences are resolved peacefully, which it is difficult to say right now.