Assessing the British Proposal on Space Security - The Diplomat, 10 December 2020

In my column for The Diplomat last week, I looked at the recent UK proposal on space security governance.  That the UK proposal emphasizes a bottom-up approach and stresses trust-building are important.  It is a critical first step.  

Space security issues have potentially serious consequences. The consequences of either a deliberate or even an accidental conflict in space are too horrible to contemplate. A day without the utility provided by outer space is difficult to even conceive and yet the actions of states might lead the world in that direction sooner than later. Unless states take measures to restrain some kinds of activities in space, access to space will not be safe, secure, or guaranteed. 

For the full post, click here.  

Because of the highly competitive and contested nature of major power relations today, even peaceful applications and technological developments such as On-Orbit Satellite Servicing or technologies to tackle space debris are viewed with much suspicion. There are also more specific space security threats – the return of anti-satellite (ASAT) testing, and cyber and electronic warfare in space, for example. Any satellite service disruption or damage will have a wide-ranging impact, one that cannot be contained to the security or economic sectors alone, and one that cannot be limited geographically either given the significant global dependence on space. Space is truly a global commons. 

All of this suggests we need new rules of the road. There have been recent efforts including the Russia-China sponsored draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT), originally proposed in 2008 (with a revised text introduced in 2014); the 2010 EU-initiated International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (ICoC), the U.N. Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on transparency and confidence building measures (TCBMs) in 2013, and the 2018-19 GGE on further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS). None of these have led to a favorable conclusion.  

The biggest challenge facing the development of an outer space regime is a lack of consensus among major powers. These are essentially political impediments and therefore that much harder to overcome than practical issues. Major power relations are characterized by a serious lack of trust and confidence in each other. And therefore, what we need in the first instance are measures that would strengthen confidence.  

The United Kingdom has also made a recent proposal — “Reducing Space Threats through Norms, Rules and Principles of Responsible Behaviors” — aimed at looking at problems in space through a bottom-up approach. The proposal, in one of its operational clauses:

encourages Member States to study existing and potential threats and security risks to space systems, including those arising from actions, activities or systems in outer space or on Earth, characterize actions and activities that could be considered responsible, irresponsible or threatening and their potential impact on international security, and share their ideas on the further development and implementation of norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviors and on the reduction of the risks of misunderstanding and miscalculations with respect to outer space.

It further calls on the U.N. secretary general to get views from member states in a substantive report to be submitted to the General Assembly at the 76th session scheduled for September 2021 for additional discussion. The plan is to include this in the provisional agenda of the General Assembly’s session, under the item, “Prevention of an arms race in outer space,” with a sub-item entitled, “Reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviors.” 

One of the key features of the U.K. proposal is to focus on a behavior-based approach, since debates focused on an object-based approach have not gone very far. The U.K. proposal is not prescriptive in suggesting a particular type of outcome or a particular format. Thus, this proposal provides room for greater flexibility and certain amount of maneuvering among member states as they debate the threats and challenges and possible ways forward. 

Even though there is no particular preference for a specific format as an outcome, it is important to look at this as a process that would lay stress on trust-building as a key driver. Given the high level of disagreements among major space powers, this is a sensible approach. In this regard, transparency and confidence building measures (TCBMs) offer a good first step between recognizing the functional need of regulating space and the negotiation of a binding instrument. There has been any number of debates on the need for and effectiveness of binding and non-binding instruments, but these discussions have not led to any meaningful outcome. TCBMs are certainly not a substitute for legal measures but they can be effective tools in bringing about openness, transparency, and information sharing, which are badly required to raise the level of political confidence between key great powers. TCBMs are essentially a bridge that can provide opportunities for countries to talk to each other and work on building greater trust in each other. This is a recognition that political issues have become the biggest hindrance in developing new rules of the road for outer space activities. 

A few measures that could be considered in this regard include pre-launch notifications (already contained in the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation) and ASAT test guidelines and rules for intentional orbital breakups. Others include the UNIDIR proposal (no debris, low debris, and notification) and pledges like “Not the First to Act beyond the scope of Article 51” because many developing countries worry that the right to self-defense under U.N. Charter Article 51 may be used as an excuse for space weaponization. 

While an end goal of developing more binding agreements for space security must be pursued, reaching a political consensus to commit to legal instruments appears to be difficult in today’s political and security environment. Revising or reforming the 1967 Outer Space Treaty is problematic precisely due to the current political impediments. Therefore, states need to first invest a great deal in developing mutual trust. The U.K. proposal provides an alternative to the PPWT or the EU ICoC, both of which have run into their own problems. The bottom-up approach emphasized in the U.K. proposal, letting member states to identify threats and challenges from their national security perspectives, is a welcome step.

Managing New Actors in the Space Domain - The Diplomat, June 29, 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I looked at the new actors in outer space and what it means for the global governance and space sustainability issues. I argue new entrants in the Indo-Pacific offer both opportunities and challenges for the outer space realm.

New actors in space is a tricky idea to define. Is it determined by the number of years a player has been in the space business, or something more nuanced? If one is talking about industry and the commercial sector, it is relatively easy to categorize and identify who is a new actor in space. But when it comes to states, what determines who is a new space actor is slightly more problematic.

Surely, those emerging states that are pursuing space programs can be called new actors in space. Nevertheless, one must push the envelope further to look at who the traditional players are, and these are the United States, Russia, and Europe. Therefore, even countries like India and China and others who have pursued space programs for a few decades now can be called new actors in space. This is the case because one is beginning to see new facets of their space programs which are affecting space security and sustainability dynamics.

For the full post, click here.



But the space domain is changing. It is not just the presence of new start-up companies that are altering the space landscape, but there are any number of new state actors that are pursuing space programs for a number of different functions and utilities. This has been possible because there has been certain amount of democratization of space with access to space becoming a lot more affordable. Costs are coming down, technological hurdles are lower, and new space collaboration and partnerships driven by geopolitical goals are introducing new players in space. These make it possible for a growing number of actors to pursue space programs. Many states in Africa, Latin America, and particularly Asia are pursuing space programs for a variety of different utilities including for national security applications.

Entry of new actors in space bring both opportunities and challenges. On the opportunity side, space has become more accessible to a large number of states due to innovation in technology and dilution of certain global export control regulations. The development benefits alone of this are huge. There is a great opportunity here, for both private sector and for others, to collaborate with these new actors because they are looking for efficient, cheap, flexible solutions (such as in communications, or in weather forecasting or in remote-sensing applications for land use etc) rather than simply prestige projects.

New private actors bring new energy, new ideas, possibly a more efficient way of doing things. Of course, when private corporations get involved, some part of the social needs that governments focus on can be lost, obviously, since private actors are less likely to focus on development issues or on non-profit ventures. Even here, though, we need to acknowledge the general contribution made by these new entities in terms of the technologies they develop, which will have a broader impact, and make space more accessible.

Also, it is important to see what kind of partnerships can be fostered to make space accessible to all. Partnerships between private sector and national programs will be a good burden-sharing arrangement. This kind of public-private sector partnership has worked in the Western context with a lot more ease, but in the Asian context, it has not been easy. We see a bit of it, but established government space agencies tend to be suspicious of new private actors, such as in India. Another problem might be the kind of areas that private sector is involved, whether there are only areas servicing expensive, well-heeled customers (such as space tourism) or whether they are also looking at things that benefit smaller, poorer countries.

The entry of new actors in space has brought certain risks as well. One major risk is related to the impact on norms of behavior. With more actors in space, there has been a dilution of some of the existing norms and the new players appear to be less willing to play by rules developed by others. For instance, the norm of not testing anti-satellite (ASAT) missiles that prevailed for decades appear to be weakening. More importantly, the norm of not interfering in each other’s space assets appear to be getting diluted even further with the growth in cyber and electronic warfare in outer space.

The established players who have shaped these norms appear less likely to break those norms as compared to new players who are less bound by them. Newer players possibly assume that these norms are a way of restricting their growth and therefore they are less likely to play by them. Additionally, the spread of technology and geopolitical competition have aided this dilution of norms.

Therefore, as new players emerge in space, one of the critical areas to focus on is to strengthen the rules of the road, in a number of different ways. These could include establishing or reinforcing norms of responsible behavior, developing TCBMs and codes of conduct. These are the required first steps before establishing legal mechanisms because of the political difficulties that have come in the way of making new legal frameworks for outer space.

Rule-making was an easier exercise when there were fewer actors, obviously. Today, with close to 80 actors including non-state and new actors in space, finding an agreement and developing consensus has become a significant challenge. Finding an avenue to bring in the commercial voice is also important but traditional venues such as the Conference on Disarmament (CD), where space security and arms control issues are debated, are opposed to the introduction of commercial players as a stakeholder in their debates. This is not to suggest that commercial perspectives cannot be brought in through governments. But involving commercial players as independent actors in CD-like venues is not likely to happen in the near future.

Clearly, politics in outer space is getting complicated. It needs far more concerted attention than it has received. It may not be too late yet, but time is running out.

Space should be playground for humanity’s dreams, not new battlefield

Here's a short essay of mine on the global governance of outer space published by the Global Times on October 09, 2013. As two of the established space powers in Asia, India and China, have a responsibility in framing the evolving rules by rectifying loopholes. Legally binding mechanisms are ideal and desirable. However, the prospect of consensus among major powers in identifying challenges and introducing solutions seems distant.

Given these difficulties, India and China could start working toward common definitions of responsible behavior and greater transparency measures among major powers.

For full post, click here.

With the growing dependence on outer space assets for socioeconomic, developmental and military purposes, the number of players in outer space is growing rapidly. There are more than 60 such operators, including non-state actors, in this domain.

India and China, as two of the established space powers in Asia, have a responsibility in framing the evolving rules by rectifying loopholes.

Legally binding mechanisms are ideal and desirable. However, the prospect of consensus among major powers in identifying challenges and introducing solutions seems distant.

Given these difficulties, India and China could start working toward common definitions of responsible behavior and greater transparency measures among major powers.

A new regime should be guided by three key objectives: the security of outer space, order and stability, and sustainability. Most nations accept and acknowledge these objectives, at least rhetorically.

India and China face several common challenges. Operationally, these include space traffic management, overcrowding of satellites and debris in outer space. The debris increases the potential of collision with currently viable assets.

For example this May, the only Ecuadorian satellite, Pegasus, collided with Russian space debris and on August 28, it was officially declared "lost." The UN Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee predicted that space debris, unless tackled aggressively, will have grave consequences over the next 200 years.

The ongoing militarization of space is a concern. Several countries are using space assets for military functions, developing anti-satellite capabilities and offensive uses for space assets, and are making the threat of weaponization and a new arms race imminent.

With this congestion, the need for cooperative rules and regulation cannot be overemphasized, possibly through an institution similar to the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

Unregulated cooperation will only heighten insecurities at multiple levels. This explains the inadequacy of the current regime which has been hobbled by political differences and precluded a new cooperative architecture.

Consequently, different countries have been pursuing tangential solutions. The West has by and large favored Transparency and Confidence Building Measures (TCBMs) as a means to develop norms of responsible behavior in order to ensure safe, secure and continued access to space. While Russia accepts TCBMs, it has joined hands with Beijing to propose a draft treaty preventing the placement of weapons in outer space.

Similarly, a resolution on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) was passed by the UN General Assembly in 1981, but the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva is yet to have a productive session on PAROS.

The UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) is another mechanism to develop cooperative measures in outer space. India too has been active in writing new rules. With a consistent policy against the weaponization of space, it has been active in forums like the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and the CD.

Even as it insists on working out a legally binding mechanism, it is pragmatic enough to recognize the need to start with a normative exercise and gradually move to legal measures.

Space, as a true global commons, must be protected for safe, secure and uninterrupted access. India and China, along with other spacefaring powers, must therefore utilize every opportunity to push for developing norms of responsible behavior, including strengthening measures in the area of active debris removal and on-orbit satellite servicing.

These two early space powers should take on an active role in bridging the gap between the West and the rest in formulating new rules including the Space Code of Conduct and should not allow a few Western countries to monopolize the process, given the huge financial stakes involved.