China’s Worrying Military Exercises Near Taiwan, The Diplomat - 17 April 2020

In last week's column for The Diplomat, I looked at China's worrying military exercises near Taiwan. I argued that China’s moves in the region, despite the pandemic, are only likely to generate fear and inspire greater cooperation with Washington.

In my column for The Diplomat last week, I looked at China’s military activities and resultant confrontation with its Southeast Asian neighbors, Indonesia and Vietnam. Despite the Indo-Pacific region reeling under the coronavirus pandemic, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been active farther east as well. There have been reports of several Chinese naval and air intrusions in Taiwan and Japan.

Back in the first half of February, the PLA Eastern Theater Command started sending its fighter jets and bombers around Taiwan. In response, Taiwan’s Air Force had to scramble its own fighters to shadow the Chinese aircraft. On February 10, Chinese jets reportedly briefly crossed “an unofficial middle line in the Taiwan Strait.” The same day, the PLA Eastern Theater Command stated that its military has been engaged in “air-ground assault and fire support drills to further refine and test their multi-service joint combat capabilities.” Further, Zhang Chunhui, Air Force spokesman of the PLA Eastern Theater, said that “following the February 9 sea-air combat readiness cruise, the theater forces organized a joint exercise of sea and air forces in the sea area of ​​southeastern Taiwan on February 10, mainly carrying out air-ground assault, firepower support and other actual combat training, further tempering and testing the joint combat capabilities of multiple arms in the theater.”

Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in a tweet asked Beijing to stop threatening Taiwan militarily, and instead focus on the coronavirus. Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) in a statement affirmed that “provocations by PLA warships and planes which have frequented the vicinity of the Taiwan Strait in recent years to seek unification through military force gravely undermine the status quo in the Taiwan Strait and heighten regional tensions.” Commenting on the situation, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs R. Clarke Cooper said, “It was completely inappropriate of China to take such an aggressive act.” Elaborating on the impact on the security of the Indo-Pacific, Cooper said that “there should be responsible behavior to make sure that the region is free and open — not just for navigation but also for trade and for relationships. Such coercive, aggressive behavior is counter to having a free and open Indo-Pacific region.”

The PLA’s air intrusions continued in March and April as well. In mid-March, Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense stated that they had to respond to Chinese J-11 fighters and KJ-500 airborne early warning and control aircraft, which flew into the waters southwest of Taiwan conducting night-time exercises. This was possibly the first time that they were engaged in a night-time drill near Taiwan. The Ministry also said that these aircraft had come close to Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone. The Ministry added that “After our air reconnaissance and patrol aircraft responded appropriately, and broadcast (an order) to drive them away, the communist aircraft flew away from our Air Defense Identification Zone.” Toward the end of March, Taiwan’s Defense Ministry claimed that there were as many as four “targeted” drills by China around Taiwan, which Taipei considered as “concrete evidence of provocations and threats.” In response, Taiwan conducted its own exercise, deploying its F-16 fighter jets. The PLA Daily reportedly said that the Eastern Theater Command responsible for Taiwan had carried out long-endurance training with its early-warning aircraft lasting for 36 hours.

Tensions between China and Taiwan are not new. Friction has been increasingly evident since Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen came to power in 2016 and her re-election in January has served to further increase tensions. Put simply: Beijing fears that Tsai will encourage pro-independence forces in Taiwan.

Meanwhile, in mid-April, China’s aircraft carrier Liaoning and five other warships were reportedly sighted sailing past Taiwan waters and through the Miyako Strait. A Japanese Ministry of Defense official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, said that they tracked the Chinese aircraft carrier, two guided missile destroyers, two multirole warships, and one supply-class fast combat support ship. Citing Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense statement, the report said that the Taiwanese navy, too, had sent its ships to monitor the carrier strike group as it sailed east of Taiwan. Taiwan’s vice defense minister, Chang Guan-chung, stated in parliament that when the pandemic was spreading worldwide, “if the Chinese Communists attempted to make any military adventure leading to regional conflict, they would be condemned by the world, and regardless of what would happen, we are all ready and have made the best preparation for this.”

Currently, the Chinese aircraft carrier is the only one in the area. Two U.S. carriers, Theodore Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan, are in port. The Theodore Roosevelt is now in Guam, on account of an outbreak of coronavirus cases among the crew, and the Ronald Reagan is in Yokosuka Naval Base for maintenance. However, the increase in PLA military activities in the Taiwanese waters and airspace have spurred greater U.S. military engagements as well. It has been reported that a U.S. Navy EP-3 reconnaissance plane was sighted close to Taiwanese airspace near Kaohsiung. Increased military drills of such kinds could potentially lead to unintended mishaps. The EP-3 spy plane incident in April 2001 should be a useful reminder regarding the kind of mishaps that can happen. China’s military moves in the region, despite the pandemic, are only likely to generate fear in the region and inspire greater cooperation with Washington.

China’s Second Aircraft Carrier: A Sign of PLA Naval Muscle? - The Diplomat, 26 December 2019

In my column for The Diplomat last week, I looked at China's commissioning of its second aircraft carrier and what it means for the overall PLA Navy.

On December 17, China commissioned into service its first home-built aircraft carrier, Shandong, at the Sanya naval base in Hainan, with President Xi Jinping presiding over the commissioning ceremony.

The commissioning of the aircraft carrier is significant. This is China’s second aircraft carrier, and an important addition to China’s power projection capabilities. It is also noteworthy because it displays China’s capability to develop aircraft carriers indigenously.

For the full essay, click here.



Military analysts argue that the layout of the warships “limits her military potential” as also its power projection capabilities since it is simply a copy of its first carrier, Liaoning, which itself is a refurbished ship bought from Ukraine. The J-15s that it operates also imposes limitations on the kind of operations it can undertake. Nevertheless, PLA Navy is clearly on the way to becoming a more credible blue water navy and it warrants close attention from key Indo-Pacific nations including, India, the United States, Japan and Australia.

China’s Navy has traditionally remained weak on account of the excessive focus on China’s ground force. As such, it did not have an aircraft carrier and even lacked amphibious operations capabilities. But all this is changing. China has strengthened its ability to project sea power significantly in the last few years. The building of the naval base, Sanya, in Hainan was one such indicator. Sanya has the capacity to maintain a large fleet of surface warships, and as an underground base for submarines. The Sanya base gives China significant advantages because of its proximity to the South China Sea as well as the Malacca Straits.

China has given great importance to building its aircraft carriers. It sees the utility of a carrier both for achieving sea control and for sea denial goals. The PLA Navy acknowledges the importance of maintaining air superiority in future naval conflicts, for which large aircraft carrier are important. The best pilots are being selected for the air wing, and they are also expected to eventually command these ships.

The construction of the Shandong, displacing around 50,000 tons, and with a conventional propulsion system, appears to have begun in 2013. The carrier can reportedly “carry up to 24 Shenyang J-15 multirole fighter jets and a variant of the fourth-generation Sukhoi Su-33 twin-engines air superiority fighter, as well as around ten rotary wing aircraft including Changshe Z-18, Ka-31, or Harbin Z-9 helicopters.” Unlike the U.S. aircraft carriers that can carry up to 100 fighter jets, Shandong will be able to carry a total of only 32 aircrafts, as per senior PLAN officers.

China had procured its first aircraft carrier, Liaoning (originally the Varyag, and built for the Soviet navy) from Ukraine as scrap for $20 million, but it was eventually restored and entered service in 2012. A senior colonel and spokesman for the Ministry of National Defense, Geng Yansheng, said the carrier was to be “used for scientific research and training.” But the colonel also clearly outlined the necessity of an aircraft to protect China’s varied interests, giving some clue to future Chinese plans.

In November, on its ninth sea trial (since May 2018) to undertake equipment tests and personnel training, it sailed through the Taiwan Straits. Both of China’s aircraft carriers have a ramp to launch J-15 fighter aircraft, which is seen as the primary combat jet for the Chinese carrier battle group.

The exact composition of a Chinese carrier battle group is unknown, but some have suggested that a future Chinese Carrier Strike Group (CSG) could include Jiangkai-II-class (Type 054A) frigates, Luyang-III-class (Type 052D) destroyers, Renhai-class Type 055 destroyers, and a couple of Yuan-class (Type 039A) or Song-class (Type 039) submarines along with additional support vessels. There are also reports that both of China’s carriers could operate together, along with others (two Type 055 guided-missile destroyers; four Type 054 frigates; six guided-missile frigates, as well as one supply ship and three Type 093B nuclear submarines), to prevent u.s. or Japanese military assistance to Taiwan in case of a war.

The PLAN’s operational tempo is also increasing. A PLA naval formation led by its first carrier, Liaoning entered the Miyako Strait for the second time in June this year; the first such passage was in December 2016. Japan had then sent its surveillance vessels although an article by Xiakedao, the official WeChat account operated by the overseas edition of People’s Daily, called the Japanese action an overreaction and unnecessary, adding that “China’s aircraft carriers will routinely pass the Miyako Strait.” In addition to a possible Taiwan Straits scenario, experts foresee the use of the aircraft carriers “to stop US long-range bombers from taking off from a naval base in Guam.”

While the induction of China’s second aircraft carrier is a significant development, there are still issues that China will need to resolve in terms of training and operational experience in operating an aircraft carrier. There will also be issues of jointness to be sorted out with other combat units such as the amphibious troops, rocket forces and other service legs.

A more significant issue would be its ability to take on other traditional naval powers such as the United States and Japan. China’s two carrier battle group together would have only 30 J-15 fighter jets to take on U.S. forces in the area. And unlike the American aircraft carriers that use catapults, Shandong’s ski-jump configuration adds additional burdens, including how fast aircraft could be launched. China plans to address this issue in the next two aircraft carriers that it will build in the coming years. The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency in a January 2019 report on China’s military power had noted other limitations of the ski-jump configuration including its ability to “operate large, specialized support aircraft, such as an AEW [airborne early warning] aircraft.”

There are other weaknesses as well that China needs to address before it can take on more capable navies in the Indo-Pacific. But the fact remains that China’s progress so far has been impressive, and that point ought not to be lost even as we remain cognizant of Beijing’s limitations.