Saturday, April 25, 2020

Iran Successfully Launches Military Satellite - The Diplomat, 23 April 2020

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I wrote on the Iranian military satellite launch. I believe the launch this week is likely to increase not just regional tensions but deepen existing difficulties with the United States.


On Wednesday, Iran successfully launched a military satellite into space. Though it enhances Iran’s space and rocketry capabilities, it is also likely to increase competition between Iran and its neighbors, as well as between Iran and the United States. Coming on top of existing tensions in the region, it is likely that this launch will only further increase anxieties in the region.

For the full post, click here.



Although Iran has been one of the worst-hit countries by the coronavirus pandemic, Tehran’s behavior in the region has increased tensions in the Middle East. A number of military activities undertaken by Iran in recent days suggest that Tehran is relentless in upping the ante and creating strategic frictions with the U.S. as well as others in the region. These developments come against the backdrop of growing tensions between Iran and the United States after Washington walked out of the 2015 nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1. As tensions with the U.S. increase, Iran has been growing closer to China and Russia.

Just this past week, the U.S. criticized Iran for its “provocative maneuvers” in the Persian Gulf. A press release from U.S. Naval Forces Central Command said 11 small vessels of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy engaged in “dangerous and harassing approaches” on American ships including the USS Lewis B. Puller (ESB 3), USS Paul Hamilton (DDG 60), USS Firebolt (PC 10), USS Sirocco (PC 6), USCGC Wrangell (WPB 1332) and USCGC Maui (WPB 1304) during their joint integration exercises with U.S. Army AH-64E Apache attack helicopters in the north Arabian Gulf. It should be noted that the U.S. forces claim that they were conducting their military exercise in international waters.

The statement added that the Iranian vessels “repeatedly crossed the bows and sterns of the US vessels at extremely close range and high speeds, including multiple crossings of the Puller with a 50 yard closest point of approach (CPA) and within 10 yards of Maui’s bow.”

U.S. Naval Forces Central Command also said that this is not in line with the internationally acclaimed Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS) or other international customary practices that obligate states to act with due regard for the safety of other vessels operating in the area.

Earlier in March, Gen. Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr., the commander of U.S. Central Command, stated that “tensions with Tehran have not come down and may be exacerbated” due to the large number of infections and casualty in Iran from the coronavirus. This could very well be the case but U.S. President Trump has responded to Iran’s aggressive moves by saying that “I have instructed the United States Navy to shoot down and destroy any and all Iranian gunboats if they harass our ships at sea.”

All of this makes the situation quite precarious in the Persian Gulf. These kinds of naval incidents could turn quickly into major mishaps. Iran’s behavior also calls into question its adherence to internationally recognized rules of the road in the naval domain.

It was in the middle of these tensions that the IRGC announced that Iran launched its first military satellite, the Nour 1, into orbit at an altitude of 425 kilometers (264 miles). Iran has had a number of failures prior to this week’s successful launch. Most recently in February, its launch of the Zafar 1, a communications satellite, failed. Similarly, in 2019, Iran saw two launch failures, a launchpad rocket explosion and a separate fire incident at the Imam Khomeini Space Center, which killed three researchers. Thus, the success of this week’s launch is a big moment for Iran’s scientific community and the political and military leadership.

The launch was timed well – the fact that Iran has been able to undertake a successful launch of a military satellite on the 41st anniversary of the establishment of the IRGC is politically and militarily an important milestone for the country and, of course, Tehran is using the opportunity to send a strategic message to other powers in the region and beyond. IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami congratulated the Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and lauded the “new dimensions of the defence power of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” citing it as a “strategic achievement” for Tehran.

Given the growing reliance on outer space by a large number of developed and developing countries, Tehran’s launch is no surprise. In fact, Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh, the commander of the IRGC Aerospace Force, stated that “access to the space is not a choice but an inevitable necessity and we should find our place in the space.”

Boasting about the rocket, Brigadier General Hajizadeh said that Iran is now part of the club of superpowers that have rockets combining solid and liquid fuel. He added that the rocket – Qassed – that was used for today’s launch “is different from the previous ones as its propulsion system is a combination of liquid and solid fuel. The propulsion system has the same non-metal and composite body which was unveiled a while ago.”

Iran was also proud of the fact that all components of the satellite and the rocket were indigenously developed by Iranian scientists and consider it a proud achievement, especially since Tehran has been under sanctions.

This week’s satellite launch will prompt both regional and global responses. At the regional level, it could trigger reactions from Israel and major Persian Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia. The UAE has had a focused approach to its space program and is far ahead of other regional players; their plans include a Mars mission in 2020. But Iran’s military satellite launch could open some exciting tie-ups and collaborations in the region that may not have been foreseen otherwise. But in the immediate term, it is likely to do little to reduce tensions in the region.

Thursday, April 23, 2020

China’s Worrying Military Exercises Near Taiwan, The Diplomat - 17 April 2020

In last week's column for The Diplomat, I looked at China's worrying military exercises near Taiwan. I argued that China’s moves in the region, despite the pandemic, are only likely to generate fear and inspire greater cooperation with Washington.

In my column for The Diplomat last week, I looked at China’s military activities and resultant confrontation with its Southeast Asian neighbors, Indonesia and Vietnam. Despite the Indo-Pacific region reeling under the coronavirus pandemic, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been active farther east as well. There have been reports of several Chinese naval and air intrusions in Taiwan and Japan.




Back in the first half of February, the PLA Eastern Theater Command started sending its fighter jets and bombers around Taiwan. In response, Taiwan’s Air Force had to scramble its own fighters to shadow the Chinese aircraft. On February 10, Chinese jets reportedly briefly crossed “an unofficial middle line in the Taiwan Strait.” The same day, the PLA Eastern Theater Command stated that its military has been engaged in “air-ground assault and fire support drills to further refine and test their multi-service joint combat capabilities.” Further, Zhang Chunhui, Air Force spokesman of the PLA Eastern Theater, said that “following the February 9 sea-air combat readiness cruise, the theater forces organized a joint exercise of sea and air forces in the sea area of ​​southeastern Taiwan on February 10, mainly carrying out air-ground assault, firepower support and other actual combat training, further tempering and testing the joint combat capabilities of multiple arms in the theater.”

Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in a tweet asked Beijing to stop threatening Taiwan militarily, and instead focus on the coronavirus. Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) in a statement affirmed that “provocations by PLA warships and planes which have frequented the vicinity of the Taiwan Strait in recent years to seek unification through military force gravely undermine the status quo in the Taiwan Strait and heighten regional tensions.” Commenting on the situation, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs R. Clarke Cooper said, “It was completely inappropriate of China to take such an aggressive act.” Elaborating on the impact on the security of the Indo-Pacific, Cooper said that “there should be responsible behavior to make sure that the region is free and open — not just for navigation but also for trade and for relationships. Such coercive, aggressive behavior is counter to having a free and open Indo-Pacific region.”

The PLA’s air intrusions continued in March and April as well. In mid-March, Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense stated that they had to respond to Chinese J-11 fighters and KJ-500 airborne early warning and control aircraft, which flew into the waters southwest of Taiwan conducting night-time exercises. This was possibly the first time that they were engaged in a night-time drill near Taiwan. The Ministry also said that these aircraft had come close to Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone. The Ministry added that “After our air reconnaissance and patrol aircraft responded appropriately, and broadcast (an order) to drive them away, the communist aircraft flew away from our Air Defense Identification Zone.” Toward the end of March, Taiwan’s Defense Ministry claimed that there were as many as four “targeted” drills by China around Taiwan, which Taipei considered as “concrete evidence of provocations and threats.” In response, Taiwan conducted its own exercise, deploying its F-16 fighter jets. The PLA Daily reportedly said that the Eastern Theater Command responsible for Taiwan had carried out long-endurance training with its early-warning aircraft lasting for 36 hours.

Tensions between China and Taiwan are not new. Friction has been increasingly evident since Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen came to power in 2016 and her re-election in January has served to further increase tensions. Put simply: Beijing fears that Tsai will encourage pro-independence forces in Taiwan.

Meanwhile, in mid-April, China’s aircraft carrier Liaoning and five other warships were reportedly sighted sailing past Taiwan waters and through the Miyako Strait. A Japanese Ministry of Defense official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, said that they tracked the Chinese aircraft carrier, two guided missile destroyers, two multirole warships, and one supply-class fast combat support ship. Citing Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense statement, the report said that the Taiwanese navy, too, had sent its ships to monitor the carrier strike group as it sailed east of Taiwan. Taiwan’s vice defense minister, Chang Guan-chung, stated in parliament that when the pandemic was spreading worldwide, “if the Chinese Communists attempted to make any military adventure leading to regional conflict, they would be condemned by the world, and regardless of what would happen, we are all ready and have made the best preparation for this.”

Currently, the Chinese aircraft carrier is the only one in the area. Two U.S. carriers, Theodore Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan, are in port. The Theodore Roosevelt is now in Guam, on account of an outbreak of coronavirus cases among the crew, and the Ronald Reagan is in Yokosuka Naval Base for maintenance. However, the increase in PLA military activities in the Taiwanese waters and airspace have spurred greater U.S. military engagements as well. It has been reported that a U.S. Navy EP-3 reconnaissance plane was sighted close to Taiwanese airspace near Kaohsiung. Increased military drills of such kinds could potentially lead to unintended mishaps. The EP-3 spy plane incident in April 2001 should be a useful reminder regarding the kind of mishaps that can happen. China’s military moves in the region, despite the pandemic, are only likely to generate fear in the region and inspire greater cooperation with Washington.

My Perspective On US Space Resources Executive Order: Raji Rajagopalan On The EO’s First Mover Advantage - SpaceWatch Global, April 15, 2020

Recently, I did a Q&A with the SpaceWatch Global on the US Space Resources Executive Order.

On 6 April 2020, US President Donald J. Trump signed an Executive Order (EO) on Encouraging International Support for the Recovery and Use of Space Resources. This order addresses US policy regarding the recovery and use of resources in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies. Over the next few weeks, SpaceWatch.Global will publish a range of perspectives supporting and opposing the EO from experts around the world. Today’s two expert perspectives come from Rajeswari Rajagopalan of India (below) and Professor Guoyu Wang of China.


For the full Q&A, click here.



In your opinion, what is the underlying strategic and economic rationale for President Trump’s Executive Order?

The possible underlying economic and strategic rationale is to gain the first mover advantage. While the US and other western space players talk about space mining and resource extraction, China has been making progress. Whether the resource is being extracted for bringing it back to Earth or for making the Moon as the base for more ambitious plans to go to Mars, the technological benefits through spinoffs from such activities are significant. The US clearly does not want to let China gain any unilateral advantage.

The Executive Order explicitly rejects the 1979 Moon Agreement. How do you think this will be received by other countries, particularly other major space powers?

Rejection of the 1979 Moon Agreement is not a surprise because very few countries have signed and ratified it. What is surprising in the Executive Order is the explicit rejection of the idea of outer space as a global commons. Even though the suspicion was that this was how the United States (and others) viewed it, openly saying so in the EO is unusual. For that matter, even other spacefaring powers have had similar attitudes towards space because if space is truly a ‘global commons’, it would prevent other states also from activities such as resource mining in space. And this is possibly the reason why all the major spacefaring powers including the US, Russia, China, Japan and many in Europe have not signed the Moon Treaty. India is among the handful of space powers that is a signatory to it although it has not ratified it.

Similarly, the Executive Order explicitly rejects the view that space is a Global Commons. What, in your opinion, is the policy rationale behind this claim and, again, how do you think this will be received by other countries?

It is correct that this is not the first US administration to hold this view. But equally, other countries also hold such views, though they have not been as explicit about it. Trump’s action, however, might be indicator that competition for resources in space is likely to accelerate because others countries are likely to see this as reason to speed up their programs.

In your view, how likely will this Executive Order “encourage international support for the public and private recovery and use of resources in outer space…?”

Trump’s approach on setting up a base camp on the Moon has already seen many countries supporting it. I would assume these players including the UAE, Luxembourg and Canada, Australia, would find a way of supporting this idea as well.

Hypothetically assuming that this Executive Order leads to international support, will it make the prospect of commercial space resource extraction closer to reality?

It might lead to international collaboration. But I wrote an Op-Ed where I raised some of the complications of this. For example, how would national courts arbitrate any disputes unless these are subject to national sovereignty? If this is beyond national courts, how can disputes between parties engaging in such activities be resolved? Unless these legal issues are resolved, technical advances cannot by itself ensure resource extraction from space.

Monday, April 13, 2020

Amidst a Pandemic, Donald Trump Signs Order to Mine on the Moon - The Wire, 12 April 2020

I write for The Wire on US President Trump's Executive Order to mine on the Moon. On the anniversary of Yuri Gagarin's (and humankind's) first journey into space, the US Executive Order, stipulating that Americans should have the right use the resources of space, rings outrageous.

In the midst of the global pandemic crisis, US President Donald Trump has found time to sign an Executive Order charting out a new US policy on recovery and use of resources on the Moon, including water and minerals.


Despite the pandemic, the move has received global attention, much of it critical. But there are also some seeking to partner with the US on lunar exploration.

For the full post, click here.

The Executive Order reads that Americans “should have the right to engage in commercial exploration, recovery, and use of resources in outer space, consistent with applicable law. Outer space is a legally and physically unique domain of human activity, and the United States does not view it as a global commons.”

The US seeking “the right to engage in commercial exploration, recovery, and use of resources in outer space” is possibly in line with international law. Nevertheless, it is controversial because it is unclear who other than national courts could enforce any mining rights, and national courts, in turn, cannot do so without exercising sovereign rights, as lawyers have pointed out.

But the explicit assertion that outer space will not be considered as part of global commons is new.

Space powers have generally been uncomfortable with idea of space as a global common because this was thought to preclude mining and extracting resources from space.

This was a major reason why the US and many other spacefaring nations such as the Soviet Union/Russia, China and Japan and even many of the countries making up the European space consortium refused to sign the Moon treaty. India is the only space power that has signed the treaty, though New Delhi has not yet ratified it.

Following the Executive Order, Dr. Scott Pace, Deputy Assistant to the President and Executive Secretary of the National Space Council, stated in a press statement that as the US “prepares to return humans to the Moon and journey on to Mars, this Executive Order establishes US policy toward the recovery and use of space resources, such as water and certain minerals, in order to encourage the commercial development of space.”

He went on to add that “the order reaffirms US support for the 1967 Outer Space Treaty while continuing to reject the 1979 Moon Agreement, which only 17 of the 95 Member States of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space have ratified in the past four decades.”

He also pointed out that the Executive Order “reinforces the 2015 decision by Congress that Americans should have the right to engage in the commercial exploration, recovery, and use of resources in outer space.”

This Executive Order needs to be seen in the light of this 2015 US legislation that Dr. Pace referenced, the “Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015”, signed into law by President Barack Obama, which permits American companies to extract space resources.

A second document that relates to the Executive Order is the NASA’s Artemis lunar exploration programme. Last week, NASA came out with a report, the Plan for Sustained Lunar Exploration and Development, which outlines plans for long-term space exploration. The reports details plans for the next several years which includes humans returning to the Moon and a mission thereafter to “also emplacing and building the infrastructure, systems, and robotic missions that can enable a sustained lunar surface presence.” In order to do this, NASA wants to “develop Artemis Base Camp at the South Pole of the Moon.”

On the lunar exploration for water and other minerals, a White House space adviser is reported to have told the media that “it was important to clarify what US policy was toward the Moon Agreement and then lay out a more positive vision going forward.” Section 2 of the Executive Order talks about the Moon Agreement, saying that the US is not a party to the Agreement; and that the US does not believe “the Moon Agreement to be an effective or necessary instrument to guide nation states regarding the promotion of commercial participation in the long-term exploration, scientific discovery, and use of the Moon, Mars, or other celestial bodies.”

Trump has further directed the Secretary of State to oppose to any state or multilateral organisation that would consider the Moon Agreement as customary international law.

The other aspect that is emphasised in the Executive Order is the US seeking collaboration with like-minded partners. To this end, Trump has directed the Secretary of State to work out bilateral and multilateral statements of intent and arrangements “regarding safe and sustainable operations for the public and private recovery and use of space resources.”

The president has sought action on this within 180 days. It remains unclear what happens to the body of work done by The Hague Space Resources Governance Working Group which has been working to develop a legal framework for the use of space resources found on asteroids and other celestial bodies.

While most spacefaring countries are yet to make a formal response to the Executive Order, deputy head of Russian Roscosmos in charge of international cooperation is reported to have said that Trump’s Executive Order is “comparable” to colonialism. The Roscosmos has stated that “Attempts to expropriate outer space and aggressive plans to actually seize territories of other planets hardly set the countries (on course for) fruitful cooperation.” The Kremlin is also reported to have remarked that “any colonization of space would be ‘unacceptable’.”

The US is not the only country that has plans for the Moon and other celestial bodies. China has ambitious plans in this regard too. A few years ago, Ye Peijian, chief commander and designer of China’s lunar exploration programme stated that China would send the first batch of asteroid exploration spacecraft around 2020.

Ye added that “many of the asteroids near the Earth contain high concentrations of precious metals,” which could rationalise the huge cost and risks involved in these activities. He estimated their economic value to be in the trillions of US dollars.

Despite its criticism of the US move, Russia is not lagging behind when it comes to asteroid mining and other space exploration plans either. Russia plans to have a permanent base on the Moon somewhere after 2025 for possible extraction of Helium. In the mid-2000s, Russia had said that it will have a lunar base between 2015 and 2025. These plans appear to have been delayed because of domestic difficulties. Additionally, both Russia and China are also planning to team up, contributing science payloads to their respective Luna-26 and Chang’e-7 spacecraft sometime in the 2020s. They also plan to establish a joint lunar and deep space data centre with hubs in both the countries.

Given the changing balance of power dynamics, the outer space domain is once again becoming a victim to great power competition and rivalry.

To minimise the harmful impact of this competition and to establish certain amount of predictability in outer space affairs, there have been several efforts to develop certain global rules of the road. But these efforts have not made any progress.

The Danger of China’s Maritime Aggression Amid COVID-19 - The Diplomat, 10 April 2020

In my column for The Diplomat last week, I looked at the danger of China's maritime aggression in the middle of the COVID-19 pandemic. I argue that Beijing’s behavior, while unsurprising, is only likely to further antagonize its neighbors.


While most countries in the Indo-Pacific region are battling the coronavirus pandemic, China has been active in the South China Sea, taking aggressive action against Indonesia and Vietnam. China’s belligerent behavior, including military maneuvers and large-scale deployment of military assets to the region, have caught many of its neighbors and the United States off-guard, understandable considering their preoccupation with the pandemic in their respective countries. Such aggressive behavior, in the midst of a crisis that is itself blamed on China, is only likely to further antagonize China’s Indo-Pacific neighbors.

For the full post, click here.



For several weeks, China has been hounding Indonesian fishing vessels in the Indonesian waters off the Natuna Islands. Chinese fishing fleets with the support of armed Chinese Coast Guard ships have been encroaching into areas that Indonesia considers exclusive. Indonesian fishermen are perturbed that the government in Jakarta is not doing anything to protect them. Ngesti Yuni Suprapti, the deputy regent of the Natuna archipelago, said, “There was a vacant period, then China came back. Our fishermen feel scared.”

Such Chinese excursions are becoming more common. In January too, the Chinese fishing vessels were hovering around the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the Natuna Islands, but they retreated to the edge of the EEZ just before President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s visit to the region. The Joint Defense Area Command (Kogabwilhan) I commander Rear Admiral Yudo Margono, commenting on the situation, said, “Around 30 foreign vessels are currently situated on the Natuna EEZ border” but affirmed that irrespective of the withdrawal, Indonesian military operations in the region will continue. He added that there are still four fighter jets on standby at the Natuna Air Base.

Indonesia has not been keen to raise the issue through political or diplomatic channels with Beijing for fear of negative impact on the economic ties between the two countries. But that has not helped because Beijing now claims that these are China’s traditional fishing waters and lawful under UNCLOS. Still, Indonesian officials are categorical that “Indonesia has to do nothing with China over the Natuna Islands and their surrounding waters, as UNCLOS does not recognize ‘traditional’ fishing grounds.”

But while Indonesian diplomats may not feel the need to open any talks with Beijing on this issue, the military has a different take, saying that “China’s position is totally unacceptable and we should take concrete actions in the field.” Also, for ordinary Indonesians, China in recent times has become too aggressive. In a recent opinion piece, Kornelius Purba wrote in The Jakarta Post that “For millions of Indonesians, China’s diplomat has crossed the line by openly challenging Indonesia’s territorial integrity. Their pride as a nation has been wounded, for right or wrong reasons. ‘China can easily do it to smaller members of ASEAN, but not with us,’ was the common reaction of Indonesians on social media.” This was a reference to the Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson, who made quite harsh statements regarding the rights of Chinese fishermen in the Indonesian EEZ.

Meanwhile, last week, China rammed into and sank a Vietnamese shipping boat with eight fishermen on board while they were out fishing in the Paracel Islands, which are controlled by China but also claimed by Vietnam. The spokesperson for Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the Chinese action “violates Vietnam’s sovereignty over the Paracel Islands . . . [and is] not conducive to the development of the bilateral relations between the two countries as well as the maintenance of peace, stability and cooperation in the East Sea (South China Sea).” Vietnam also lodged a formal protest against China at the local embassy in Hanoi.

The U.S. Department of State also responded with a strongly worded statement expressing its concerns about China’s behavior. The statement further noted that this is only “the latest in a long string of PRC actions to assert unlawful maritime claims and disadvantage its Southeast Asian neighbors in the South China Sea.” The statement also pointed out since the outbreak of the pandemic, China has announced the setting up of “new ‘research stations’ on military bases it built on Fiery Cross Reef and Subi Reef and landed special military aircraft on Fiery Cross Reef,” in addition to the continuing deployment of maritime militia around the Spratly Islands. Of course, China has predictably come out with its harsh criticism of the U.S. statement, calling upon Washington to focus on its COVID-19 response rather than sending ships and aircraft to the South China Sea.

In a surprising move, the Philippines Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also come out with a strong statement expressing concern over the Chinese sinking of the Vietnamese fishing boat and referencing a similar incident involving a Filipino fishing vessel last year. The statement said, “Our own similar experience revealed how much trust in a friendship is lost by it; and how much trust was created by Vietnam’s humanitarian act of directly saving the lives of our Filipino fishermen. We have not stopped and will not stop thanking Vietnam. It is with that in mind that we issue this statement of solidarity.”

The statement further noted the importance of maintaining peace and stability in the South China Sea and said that incidents such as these derail “the potential of a genuinely deep and trusting regional relationship between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China… [and hence] it is crucial that such incidents be avoided and that differences be addressed in a manner that enhances dialogue and mutual trust.”

It would appear that China, in addition to mishandling both the coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan and its rather crass public relations efforts on the pandemic, is demonstrating further strategic tone-deafness in its actions toward its neighbors. In doing so, China is likely to shoot itself in the foot: further accelerating efforts by Beijing’s neighbors to partner with the United States and other Indo-Pacific powers.

How Is COVID-19 Reshaping China-India Relations? - The Diplomat, 02 April 2020

Earlier in the month, I wrote about the impact of COVID-19 on India-China relations, for The Diplomat. The global pandemic has hit amid the 70th anniversary mark for relations and affected perceptions and realities in ties.

India was the first non-communist country in Asia to establish diplomatic ties with the People’s Republic of China on April 1, 1950. But the plans for celebrating the 70th anniversary of the event have been hit by the coronavirus pandemic.


For the full post, click here.



Despite the cancellation of 70th anniversary events, a senior Chinese official is reported to have said that the two countries “will emerge stronger and their relationship can scale new heights after the pandemic.” The presidents and the premiers on both sides have exchanged congratulatory messages and have made the expected euphoric statements about the two working together to “bring more benefits to the two countries and peoples and contribute more positive energy to Asia as well as the world.”

The Chinese Ambassador to India, Sun Weidong, tweeted Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s reference to the Panchsheel principles, “the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, which is a historic contribution to the promotion of a new type of intl relations.” Considering Sino-Indian history, the Panchsheel may not have been the best reference, considering that Indian officials rarely invoke it because it is associated in Indian perceptions with the Sino-Indian war of 1962 and what is widely seen as Chinese betrayal. That aside, there are also questions about how the coronavirus pandemic will affect Sino-Indian ties.

Responding to a question during the daily press briefing, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying sounded quite jubilant. The spokesperson pointed out that during the second informal Sino-Indian leaders summit in Chennai, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping had agreed to host 70 activities commemorating the 70 years of diplomatic relations, which will contribute to significant progress on the bilateral ties, and highlighted the “deep historical connection between two ancient civilizations.” The planned activities were supposed to cover an entire gamut of areas including legislature, business, culture, and defense.

Also, the foreign ministries of both countries announced detailed plans for celebrations in October 2019. Hua went on to say that with the 70th anniversary celebration “as an opportunity, we would like to work with India to elevate our bilateral relationship to a new height.” On another question about whether China would send help India in fighting address the pandemic by supplying ventilators, the spokesperson said that it would do what it can once the domestic demand is met.

As of now, the Indian government has been careful not to blame China for the coronavirus or its propagation because of China’s actions. Indeed, External Affairs Minister Dr. S Jaishankar tweeted saying he had discussed with both State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi in addressing the corona virus and build collaborative efforts in this regard. China has tried to woo India by saying that it “stands ready to share its experience in epidemic prevention and control and diagnosis and treatment, and provide further support and assistance to the best of our capability.” But there is likely to be some wariness in Delhi, based on the kind of Chinese assistance provided to a number of countries including Italy, Czech Republic, and Spain, where even the testing kits sent from China showed faulty results.

Moving forward, China’s role in the pandemic is likely to have a negative impact on Sino-Indian relationship. If China had been transparent, the pandemic could have been tackled much more efficiently, and this is clear for all to see including India. Not only has China been not transparent about the level of spread within the country and the human transmission issues, but more importantly it had silenced the World Health Organization and other international organizations from raising concerns about the Wuhan virus.

That WHO went one step ahead with its Director General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus praising China for its “transparency” and added that China is a model to follow as far as the response to the virus management is concerned made this clear for all to see. This is despite the fact that there were ample number of reports pointing to the Chinese state efforts to cover up the extent of the virus’ outbreak and silencing of whistleblowers. It should be noted that the current Director General came to office in 2017 with China’s backing.

Though India has so far managed to control the spread of the coronavirus within the country with a national lockdown, the economic costs are going to be large, and it is likely that public perception in India is likely to blame China for the damages this has caused, once the pandemic itself is under control. Though India is unlikely to officially blame China, Beijing’s behavior will deepen the general public distrust of China and it will impact Indian domestic debate about Sino-Indian ties. Thus, for all the polite words and mutual congratulations about the anniversary, the pandemic once again seems to indicate to New Delhi that China is likely to be an irresponsibly selfish actor, deepening the concern that India already had about China’s behavior.

2020 - A challenging year yet a satisfying year, professionally

2020 has remained a challenging year for the world around and I was no exception.  Personally, it was a trying year with a lot of dislocatio...