Countering Chinese assertiveness: India’s changing posture in the Indian Ocean - Indo-Pacific Analysis Brief, Perth USAsia Centre, 4 December 2020

In my third Analysis Brief as an Indo-Pacific Fellow at the Perth USAsia Centre, I looked at India's changing Indian Ocean strategy in order to address China's growing footprint in the region.  

Note: The paper contains endnotes, which I have not been able to incorporate here.  So, please check out the main page of the article, the link for which is given here.  

Major Takeaways are: 

→ The Indian Ocean region is becoming increasingly contested as Chinese presence expands. In recognising the threat posed by China, India has shifted its perceptions and priorities in the region. 

→ A large concern is the security of sea lines of communication in the Indian Ocean, which many Asian countries use as a trade corridor. 

→ China has demonstrated an objective to become a key player in the region with increased presence and activities, including in India’s Economic Exclusion Zone. 

→ India has become more active in protecting its interests in the region by calling for cooperation with external powers and enhancing its capabilities in the Indian Ocean to overcome capacity constraints. 

→ Cooperation between like-minded powers in the region is challenging due to divergences in individual perspectives, approaches and outlooks. Closer coordination is needed between these powers to build greater synergy. 

The Indian Ocean is once again at the centre of major geopolitical competition. China’s growing footprint and influence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has made the contest for power and control in the region between China and the US and its partners significant. The Indian Ocean sea lines of communication (SLOCs) are important for many Asian countries because it is both an energy and trade corridor, making these countries sensitive to any vulnerabilities. Now, undersea cables add to these vulnerabilities.1 

India has long been wary of power-plays in the Indian Ocean but finds itself with few options today but to participate in securing a free and open Indo-Pacific. 

In the process, India appears to be willing to reconsider some of its old concerns about external actors in the Indian Ocean. On the other hand, there are also some questions about the terms of engagement between India and its partners about the focus of their common efforts. Resolving these could lead to greater synergy and easier cooperation. 

For the full brief, click here.  

Growing Chinese presence is cause for concern

India’s stakes in the IOR are obvious, despite India’s lack of attention to the maritime front. From a security perspective, since independence, India has not faced any significant maritime threat. Much of the Indian maritime security focus was in terms of the relatively minor naval threat from Pakistan and non-traditional threats including piracy and terrorism. While these concerns remain, they have been overtaken by worries about China as an emerging IOR power, with a growing footprint in the region. 

Darshana Baruah argues that China’s growing Indian Ocean presence is not just about contesting India’s strategic role in the IOR, but it is part of a determined agenda to “emerge as a key player in the IOR” which feeds into “China’s larger objective of becoming a global maritime power2 .” The PLA Navy’s growing strength means that it is shaping up to be a formidable force to reckon with. This is complemented by China’s growing maritime ties with countries in the IOR and increasing naval presence in the region. 

India has multiple concerns about China in the Indian Ocean. One, already alive, is Chinese activities in India’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Speaking earlier this year, Indian Navy Chief Admiral Karambir Singh said that both Chinese research vessels and fishing boats have been seen in Indian Ocean, including in the Indian EEZ. 

This is a long brief but I concluded the Brief with the following thoughts.  

Australia’s participation at the 2020 Malabar naval exercises is a clear recognition of India’s changing attitude towards foreign navies in the Indian Ocean. It is a step towards fulfilling Modi’s call for cooperation with like-minded strategic partners, fuelled by India’s changing posture towards China. 

It is also an indication of the increasing synergistic approach among the major Indo-Pacific powers – Australia, India, Japan and the United States. The expanded Malabar exercises demonstrate the common strategic endeavour among the four to develop cogent responses to the many security challenges in the Indo-Pacific including China. The naval exercises could go a long way in creating greater confidence and interoperability among the four navies, which will be key in ensuring a stable, secure and prosperous Indo-Pacific. 

But cooperation with such partners will also require some common terms of understanding, most basically of the relationship between the ‘Indian’ and ‘Pacific’ components of the IndoPacific. Even though the concept of Indo-Pacific has gained greater traction over the last couple of years, there have been differences in the understanding of what constitutes the Indo-Pacific. 

The geographical limits of the Indo-Pacific in particular has been a topic of considerable debate. India, Japan and France have similar perceptions that the term ‘Indo-Pacific’ covers the area from the eastern shores of Africa to the west coast of America. Others, especially the US, appear more focused on the Pacific component. The Pacific powers, including Japan, the US, Australia, and New Zealand, appear to be more focused on countering China’s power in the Pacific and South China Sea, whereas Indian worries have been around China’s expansion into the Indian Ocean. There clearly needs to be better coordination between these two sets of concerns. Only when there is better coordination between these two sets of focus areas would it be possible to consider burden-sharing between the partners. 

Hopefully, a clearer enunciation of India’s Indian Ocean strategy will also translate into efforts for coordination between India and its partners in dealing with maritime challenges, especially those posed by China. 

There is a precedent for cooperation, though, at a smaller scale: India has worked with others to cooperate in anti-piracy operations. These, of course, included China also. Cooperating to deal with the security challenge posed by China in the Indo-Pacific will be at an entirely different scale and seriousness. This would require a sustained dialogue involving the different partners to evolve some sort of division of labour and burden sharing in order to effectively monitor China’s naval activities in all theatres of the Indo-Pacific. This could lead to arrangements in which India bears a greater burden in the Indian Ocean, while others bear a similar burden in the eastern waters. Other minilaterals in the Indo-Pacific are exploring such options of burden sharing in order to address capacity gaps – the India-France-Australia trilateral is a case in point. 

There is little doubt that China’s growing naval capacity affects all Indo-Pacific powers. New Delhi appears to recognise the difficulties involved and thus appears more keen to cooperate with other maritime powers in maintaining security in the Indian Ocean region. This is a good first step to greater Indo-Pacific cooperation, but further coordination is clearly needed.

Business Now Asia Pacific (BNAP) Today Interview on India-China relations post-Galwan and other developments including Quad- July 15, 2020

On July 15, I did an interview with Australia-based Business Now Asia Pacific (BNAP) Today on the India-China Galwan clash, where I argued that the Galwan clash is pushing a major shift in India’s security and foreign policies and how the changing Sino-Indian relationship is influencing India’s relations with QUAD and QUAD Plus countries.

For the full interview, click here.



Some of the major points I made include:

1. Difficult to imagine that it will be business as usual after Galwan.

2. India has shown growing commitment to groupings such as the Quad, which has now been upgraded to ministerial level engagements; Quad Plus in the Covid context; Australia could be invited to the Malabar naval exercises.

3. India is yet to make a decision on the 5G but in all likelihood, Huawei will be blocked. Even prior to the Galwan clash, India had its apprehensions but after the last month clash, signing up with China is extremely unlikely.

4. India’s pharma industry will be affected for instance because we still buy a lot of the chemicals from China. Like I said, India will need to bite the bullet and go through some hard times because the economic impact will be significant.

5. Here is the need for the Indo-Pacific powers to come together to take decisions to consciously diversify their over-dependence on China and engage with each other even in the face of some difficulties.

India Expands Diplomatic Efforts Amid Border Standoff With China - The Diplomat, 5 June 2020

In this week's essay for The Diplomat, I looked at India's strengthened diplomatic outreach amidst border standoff with China. I argue that New Delhi has been sending Beijing signals via its diplomatic interactions with the U.S., Taiwan, and Australia in recent weeks.

As India’s border confrontation with China deepens into a crisis, New Delhi appears to be using a combination of military power and diplomacy. According to reports in the Indian media, India has already begun moving troops from other sectors, including those facing Pakistan along the Line of Control (LOC), toward the Line of Actual Control (LAC) that separates India and China in Ladakh. At the same time, in a move that could be seen as a signal to China, India has stepped up its diplomatic efforts. In the last week, India has reached out to the United States, signaled a warning on Taiwan, and is set to strengthen security ties with Australia.

For the full essay, click here.



The United States remains the most critical of India’s partners. On May 29, U.S. Defense Secretary Mark T. Esper and Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh spoke on the phone, taking stock of their defense cooperation, and vowed to continue their efforts “for a strong and enduring U.S.-India defense partnership.” Even though the China matter was not specifically mentioned, both official statements, one released by the U.S. Department of Defense and other by the Indian Ministry of Defense, mentioned Esper and Singh discussing regional security issues. It would be highly unlikely that they discussed “regional security issues” without touching on the current Sino-Indian border confrontation.

In addition, on June 2, there was a telephone conversation between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and U.S. President Donald Trump. Unusually, the readout of their conversation specifically stated that they discussed the Sino-Indian border standoff and the need to reform the World Health Organization (WHO). The WHO has been much criticized for being too cozy with China. Trump also wants to expand the G-7 grouping (which China is not a part of) to include Australia, India, South Korea, and possibly Russia, thus making it a G-10 or G-11, which Modi also supported.

The messaging was not lost on Beijing: Promptly after the call between the two leaders, China’s foreign ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian said that there was “no need for any third party to intervene.” He added that “at present, the overall situation in the China-India border areas is stable and controllable.”

At the same time, India made another unusual diplomatic play, this time with regard to Taiwan. In an extraordinary move, two Members of Parliament (MPs) — Meenakshi Lekhi and Rahul Kaswan — from the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) virtually attended President Tsai Ing-wen’s swearing-in ceremony online. The two MPs also sent congratulatory messages to Tsai on the start of her second term, highlighting how India and Taiwan are bound by their shared belief in democratic values. Reportedly, in addition to the two MPs, Sohang Sen, the acting director general of India-Taipei Association, joined the ceremony, representing India in Taipei. In a separate video message, which was played at the ceremony, Lekhi emphasized the “continued strengthening of the comprehensive relations between India and Taiwan.”

This was a departure from India’s traditional stand on the Taiwan issue and the contrast to India’s decision in 2016 is striking. After naming two parliamentarians to attend Tsai’s first swearing-in ceremony in 2016, the government backtracked at the last moment, leading to much disappointment in Taipei. Many suspected that it was worry about China’s reaction that led to the last minute cancellation then, with one official saying that India possibly “bound itself up tightly in its own policies.” It was even more puzzling for many Taiwanese as to why India accepted the invitation in the first place and then cancelled, which made the disappointment bigger.

The third recent move worth taking into account regards Australia. Modi and Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison just concluded their first virtual India-Australia summit meeting. Though the summit had originally been scheduled for February, but postponed because of the Australian bushfires and then the pandemic, China continues to very much be on the minds of both leaders. Australia is feeling China’s wrath for pushing for an investigation into the origins of the pandemic, while Indian troops are confronting Chinese forces directly at the border. Not surprisingly, the meeting appears to have been a successful one, with several agreements and MOUs on strategic issues concluded between the two countries. Given the progress made in bilateral relations over the last few years, the two leaders decided to elevate their Strategic Partnership status reached in 2009 to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP).

The Joint Statement issued at the end of the meeting is carefully worded, with several important messages. It noted that “the CSP is based on mutual understanding, trust, common interests and the shared values of democracy and rule of law.” Further, it said that both India and Australia “share the vision of an open, free, rules-based Indo-Pacific region supported by inclusive global and regional institutions that promote prosperous, stable and sovereign states on the basis of shared interests.” The emphasis on maritime security and defense cooperation is significant. On regional and multilateral cooperation, the statement said that the two countries “share a vision of a free, open, inclusive and rules-based Indo-Pacific region to support the freedom of navigation, over-flight and peaceful and cooperative use of the seas by adherence of all nations to international law including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and peaceful resolution of disputes rather than through unilateral or coercive actions.” There were press reports in India that New Delhi was finally going to invite Australia to the Malabar naval exercise, though that has not been confirmed.

Among the nine agreements signed or announced, some were particularly significant: the Joint Declaration on a Shared Vision for Maritime Cooperation in the Indo- Pacific; Arrangement concerning Mutual Logistics Support (MLSA); an MOU on cooperation in the field of mining and processing of “critical and strategic” minerals; and the Implementing Arrangement concerning cooperation in Defense Science and Technology to the MOU on Defense Cooperation. These have the potential to deepen India and Australia’s bilateral defense and strategic cooperation for navigating the turbulent Indo-Pacific. While China has not been named specifically, many of the agreements as well as the joint statement appear clearly driven by the shared concern about China.

It is unclear how India’s diplomatic moves will be interpreted in Beijing, but it is clear that in New Delhi the pressure from an unrelenting China is pushing India farther away and leading it to deepen its security partnerships.

Amid COVID–19, India’s Modi and Australia’s Morrison Plan Virtual Prime Ministerial Summit - The Diplomat, 07 May 2020

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I wrote about Prime Minister Modi's upcoming virtual summit with Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison. The Indian and Australian leaders are expected to “meet” virtually soon. There’s no shortage of important topics to cover, especially related to China.

In a first, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is planning to host a virtual bilateral “summit” meeting with Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison. While the date for the meeting has not been announced, an Indian news report said that it will be soon. The Australian prime minister was initially scheduled to travel to India in January, but that had to be postponed due to the bushfires in Australia. The two leaders had been looking toward scheduling an in-person meeting in May, but that does not appear feasible under the current circumstances as much of the region is reeling under the stress of containing the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, there is excitement on both sides about the prospects of their meeting and New Delhi and Canberra are likely to conclude the much-awaited Mutual Logistics Sharing Pact (as well as other agreements covering science and technology and public administration).

While recent Indo-Pacific developments, including China’s muscle flexing in the South China Sea, may likely be on the agenda, it will be interesting to see how India positions itself on such issues.

For the full essay, click here.



Australia is going through one of the worst phases in its contemporary relations with China. In an opinion piece in The Conversation, Tony Walker from La Trobe University wrote that Australia-China relations are “fractured,” calling it “the worst moment in Sino-Australian relations since Gough Whitlam normalised ties on his election in December 1972.” Australia’s call for an independent investigation into the origins of the pandemic has not been well-received by China, to put it mildly. China, in response, unleashed its “wolf warrior” diplomats to lambast the Australian political leadership by threatening economic penalties. In a direct threat, China’s ambassador to Australia, Cheng Jingye, warned that Canberra asking for an independent probe “could spark a Chinese consumer boycott of students and tourists visiting Australia, as well as sales of popular agricultural exports like beef and wine.”

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang also commented:

at such a critical juncture [pandemic], it is highly irresponsible to resort to politically motivated suspicion and accusation. We advise the Australian side to put aside ideological bias and political games, focus on the welfare of the Australian people and global public health security, follow the international community’s collective will for cooperation, and contribute to the global cooperation in fighting the virus, instead of doing things to the contrary.

But Australia is not the only target of China’s economic coercion and trade threats, which have angered many countries. In fact, the Morrison government has found significant support for its call for an independent inquiry into the pandemic’s origins.

On the South China Sea as well, tension has been picking up and Australia is involved. The Chinese Haiyang Dizhi 8 survey ship was operating in the Malaysian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), around 325 kms away from the Malaysian coast starting around April 20. Following this, in a show of support, Australian ships joined three U.S. warships operating close to where the Chinese vessel was suspected to be undertaking oil exploration operations. The Australian Department of Defense in a statement said, “During the passage exercises, the ships honed interoperability between Australian and U.S. navies, including replenishment-at-sea, aviation operations, maritime manoeuvres and communications drills.”

China’s survey ships were operating close to where Malaysia’s Petronas state oil company was already engaged in exploratory drilling. Harassment by China is not new. Even the recent events are a culmination of developments that have been going on since December, according to Asia Maritime Transparency International. Even amid the current stand-off, China claimed that Haiyang Dizhi 8 was only conducting its normal activities. Meanwhile, Malaysian Foreign Minister Hishammuddin Hussein has come out with grim warnings that while “international law guarantees the freedom of navigation, the presence of warships and vessels in the South China Sea has the potential to increase tensions that in turn may result in miscalculations which may affect peace, security and stability in the region.”

India has not responded to either China’s trespassing into the Malaysian EEZ or the Chinese sinking of a Vietnamese fishing vessel last month. Both incidents have increased concerns about China’s behavior in the region.

The Modi-Morrison meeting agenda is not clear but the Indian government will likely be under some pressure to address at least some of these difficult issues. India will be expected to take a stand especially as it moves to take over as the Chairman of the WHO Executive Board. Australia will seek greater support from India to push for a clearer understanding of the role of the WHO in the early stages of the pandemic. India should take this opportunity to build a larger coalition of like-minded states such as the Quad-Plus grouping including New Zealand, South Korea and Vietnam to develop a coordinated actionable agenda to bring about better reforms and accountability within the WHO. More importantly, at a bilateral level, the Morrison government will expect a strong show of support for Australia in the face of China’s bullying behavior.

The Modi-Morrison summit could also possibly cover the recent developments in the South China Sea. China’s continuing harassment of small and big neighbors alike, including Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia is reaching a peak and could call for concerted action among the key southeast Asian players. As a key Indo-Pacific and Quad player, India could be expected to take a clear stand and gradually ready itself to play a more active operational role. The U.S.-Australian joint patrols were impressive and important for the southeast Asian countries which were at the receiving end of China’s harassment. As the Quad enhances its role, India may be asked to take part in activities like joint and coordinated patrols with others such as Australia.

The push and pull in the Australia–India partnership - East Asia Forum, 1 February 2020

In February, I wrote a short essay on India-Australia strategic partnership for the East Asia Forum. The essay, "The push and pull in the Australia–India partnership", looked at the pulls and pressures of this partnership and what lies ahead.

The India–Australia strategic partnership has grown quite rapidly over the last few years. This is impressive considering how indifferent New Delhi and Canberra were towards each other a decade ago. The change in the tone and direction of the relationship over the past decade is driven by shared concerns about China’s rise and its strategic implications for the Asia Pacific order.

For the full post, click here.



Despite the number of high-level political visits and military exchanges, such as the 2+2 Dialogue, there still remains scepticism about the relationship. Many believe that the shared concerns of both countries have not yet translated into a shared policy approach. Frederic Grare raised this point in 2014, but six years later India and Australia remain unable to forge a coherent strategy or a common policy approach to China.

There has traditionally been some wariness among Australian security analysts about the India–Australia relationship, and vice-versa. But as the threat from China grows, New Delhi and Canberra should find more innovative ways to work together to shape a stable Asian strategic order. The two already work together in larger strategic formulations such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad).

A new wrinkle in the relationship is the Modi government’s identity politics. Many argue that India’s recent internal developments go against the grain of its strategic partnerships — based on shared liberal democratic values.

Whether mutual concerns about China are serious enough to offset worries about the unhelpful direction of India’s internal politics and nurture the budding India–Australia strategic partnership remains to be seen.

Australian officials are very positive about the direction of relations. At the fourth Raisina Dialogue in January 2019, Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne noted that as ‘competition intensifies, Australia and India have shared interests in ensuring the peaceful development of an open, inclusive and prosperous Indo‑Pacific region — a region in which the rights of all states are respected, large and small’.

The signing of a Framework for Security Cooperation between India and Australia in 2014 by Prime Ministers Narendra Modi and then-prime minister Tony Abbott still provides the much-needed impetus for greater security engagement between the two countries.

The two countries are currently finalising a mutual logistics support agreement, an information exchange agreement and a broader maritime agreement. These are expected to increase military interoperability and help ‘elevate’ the strategic partnership.

There remain areas that need greater clarity. One of the problems with the India–Australia relationship is that both countries have a different set of concerns about China. Australian concerns have to do with China’s increased activities in the Pacific, while India is concerned about China’s greater presence and influence in the Indian Ocean. India has also been uncertain about Australia’s reliance since Canberra backed out of the Quad in 2007, though this uncertainty is slowly disappearing. It is equally likely that Canberra has a certain lack of confidence given that New Delhi seems ambiguous about whether to balance or hedge. These differences might partly have to do with strategic histories. Australia has long been an American ally, while India remains uncomfortable about alliances.

This need not be an impediment to the strategic relationship if the two countries are able to forge their partnership based on some key principles, norms and ideals. Both countries should champion the rule of law, a rules-based order, respect for human rights and norms of responsible behaviour.

The joint naval exercise AUSINDEX (which began in 2015) reflects the convergence of Indian and Australian approaches to maritime and regional security. The two countries conducted the third edition of AUSINDEX in April 2019. The exercise was reported to have been the biggest in terms of the scale of participation from both navies.

The second issue with the relationship is the deficit of military capabilities, especially on the Indian side. While the two militaries have been able to showcase their prowess during exercises, their ability to come to each other’s aid during conflict remains in question. The joint logistics services agreement would go a long way in addressing this issue as it would provide joint access to each other’s military facilities.

Third, there is a need for greater agreement among the Quad member states about burden-sharing. A discussion about the operational aspects of their cooperation would create greater synergy between their forces when dealing with common problems.

From an Australian perspective, the fourth and final irritant in the relationship is India’s reluctance to involve Australia in the Malabar trilateral naval exercise alongside the other three Quad nations — India, Japan and the United States. Indian media reports indicate that India might be open to involving Australia at the next Malabar naval exercises scheduled to take place later in the summer.

Indian reluctance to involve Australia in the Malabar exercise has not produced significant negativity towards India, especially given the progress in bilateral relations more broadly. But if India thinks Australia is a legitimate security partner, it must expand the trilateral to include Australia as well. The fact that Australia is included in other bilateral and multinational military exercises should not be an excuse.

The India–Australia strategic partnership has seen impressive advancements in the last few years, but its potential and promise are yet to be fully realised. It will require dedicated attention and political leadership from both capitals to become more than a work in progress going forward.

Will India Now Finally Invite Australia to the Malabar Exercise? - The Diplomat, 31 January 2020

In my last column for the month for The Diplomat, I looked at the question if India is going to finally invite Australia to the Malabar exercise. New reports have surfaced regarding a previously headline-grabbing, controversial development.

In a significant development that has been through multiple rounds of headlines and controversy, India might be finally getting ready to invite Australia to the Malabar naval exercise, according to media reports. The next edition of the exercise is scheduled to take place around July or August this year.

For the full post, click here.



The question of inviting Australia to the exercise, which currently includes India, Japan and the United States, has been controversial. India has for several years resisted bringing Australia on board, reportedly because of possible negative reactions from China. The fact is that the first and only time Australia has been part of this exercise was in 2007, when both Australia and Singapore were invited to join India, Japan and the United States.

Nonetheless, if India finally agrees to invite Australia for the 2020 Malabar naval exercises, it will be a welcome break and would suggest the growing seriousness and synergy among four key Indo-Pacific powers – Australia, India, Japan, and the United States.

The India-U.S. Malabar series of naval exercises go back to 1992 and became a regular annual feature since 2002, after it was suspended following India’s nuclear tests in 1998. The initial series of exercises were held off the coast of Malabar, and hence the name of the series but these naval engagements have been held in other areas as well including the Arabian Sea, Bay of Bengal and in the Western Pacific.

In 2007, there were two editions of the Malabar exercise – one held in the Western Pacific along with Japan in April 2007 and a second one in the Bay of Bengal with the participation of Australia, Japan and Singapore in September 2007. That year also saw the first meeting of the Quadrilateral group – India, Japan, Australia and the United States.

China’s displeasure at the forming of the group – it sent a demarche to all four countries – ended the Quadrilateral group and also ended the practice of such naval exercises. Neither India nor Australia was willing to cross China. So, for the next few years, Malabar reverted to being a U.S.-India naval exercise.

Japan has joined Malabar sporadically for several years before becoming a permanent member in 2015. Bringing Tokyo into the mix was an important strategic signaling itself. It indicated the growing strategic convergence among the three nations on the one hand, while also illustrating the fact that the three countries recognized the need to undertake joint exercises to make interoperability a viable proposition.

Around the same time, relations between New Delhi and Canberra too were improving, but the apprehension of Australia’s dependability (after the 2007 experience) made India cautious. But other reasons could have played into this as well, including the fact that India wanted to first be confident of the durability of the existing trilateral exercise before expanding it.

In truth, neither of these explanations can satisfactorily account for India’s reluctance to move on this front if New Delhi were serious enough. If India were serious about strategic messaging to China, it would not waste any opportunity because fearing Chinese negative reaction and appeasing China has not brought India any goodwill previously. China’s behavior does not automatically call for any restraint; equally, if not more important, was New Delhi’s own reluctance to antagonize Beijing.

But as the Quad diplomatic group has revived, Australia has sought to be part of the Malabar exercises. Indeed, Australia appears to have pushed hard for an invite. This is not entirely surprising: It also fits with the growing strategic interaction between India and Australia that now includes on both bilateral as well as multinational military engagements. Kakadu, AUSINDEX, and the Black Carillon military exercises are illustrative of this. In January 2019, a defense source is reported to have said that including Australia and engaging in a Quad naval exercise would lead to sending a political message to China, something for which India apparently is not ready.

A year later, India now reportedly appears to be more confident about inviting Australia to the naval exercise. Several recent developments could have contributed to this development. One, the upgrading of the Quad engagements to the foreign minister level is reflective of a growing seriousness with which Quad members are treating each other. This can be viewed as part of that wider strategic development.

Two, India’s bilateral strategic partnership with Australia has improved dramatically in recent years. The 2+2 strategic dialogue, the military exercises, and the regular political and security conversations between India and Australia have strengthened India’s confidence about Canberra as a security partner. There were as many as 39 bilateral interactions in 2019 alone.

Three, despite two informal summits between India and China, the two sides do not appear to have made any substantial progress in improving their relations. Indeed, China has continued to make inroads into South Asia with little consideration for India’s concerns. Beijing’s Belt and Road push in Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Myanmar has given it a greater foothold in Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal.

Four, India’s own comfort level in building strategic relationships has grown and it is evident in the manner in which India has gradually expanded Malabar to include Japan first and now possibly Australia. India also engages Australia through another trilateral – India, Indonesia and Australia. Therefore, India’s ease of doing business with Australia in the strategic realm has gone up several notches even in the last three years since the quad has made a comeback.

Five and lastly, the shared concerns among the four countries about the future of the Indo-Pacific has possibly been the biggest factor pushing India to expand the trilateral. The convergence around these notions of broader regional order have reinforced the shared interests between them and also acted as another boost for developing ties.

An expanded Malabar series of exercises is obviously important in terms of developing coherent strategic approaches to addressing many of the region’s security challenges. On the diplomatic side, a useful first step was the Quad ministerial level consultations. And on the defense side now, further engagement in naval exercises could strengthen interoperability among the four partner navies, which ultimately will be important in addressing the very issues they are speaking about.

India and Australia Defense Relations: Towards a Common Vision of an Open Indo-Pacific Region? - The Diplomat, 20 September 2019

I have been a little behind in updating my blog but I am trying it up to date. Two weeks ago, in my column for The Diplomat, I focused on the growing closer defence relations between India and Australia and the potential for the two countries in stabilising the Indo-Pacific. I argue that despite differences that remain, there is clear evidence of growing strategic convergence by both countries in the security realm.

After decades of being indifferent to each other, India and Australia have recently emerged as close strategic partners in the Indo-Pacific. This is evident in the number of high level visits and the number of joint military exercises between the two countries. Indian Navy Chief Admiral Karambir Singh was in Australia in early September, and the Indian Defense Minister, Rajnath Singh, is slated to visit Australia in November.

The shift in the relationship, both in terms of the tone and direction, is remarkable. This is primarily led by a common concern about a rising China and its strategic consequences on the Indo-Pacific strategic order. But there have been concerns about whether the two countries are on the same page: as Frederic Grare says in a 2014 paper, it is not clear if the common concerns have materialized into a shared approach in addressing the China factor.

For the full post, click here.



Clearly, even as different countries have concerns about China, their concerns have been defined by local and often differing national interests and perspectives. Australia worries about China’s role and presence in the Pacific whereas India’s concerns are more to do with China’s increasing influence and activities in the Indian Ocean. And on the Indian Ocean, Australian analysts see little convergence and alignment of thinking with India. David Brewster for one, argues that “Australia is likely to be less willing to recognize any Indian claims of a ‘predominant’ maritime role in the Indian Ocean, much less any Indian sphere of influence in the north-east Indian Ocean.” But it is more important for India and Australia to come together in upholding rule of law, rules based order, respect human rights and establish norms of responsible behavior.

Despite this apparent mismatch in the thinking between the two capitals, maritime security concerns about the broad Indo-Pacific region has been gaining greater traction. The joint naval exercise, AUSINDEX, is a manifestation of this synergistic approach to maritime security. The third iteration held in April this year was the biggest so far between the two navies. Held off the coast of Visakhapatnam in southern India, it saw the participation of the highest number of units of the two countries so far including four frontline ships with integral helicopters, one submarine and a variety of aircraft including P8I and P8A long-range Maritime Reconnaissance Anti-Submarine Warfare aircraft. The exercise involved all three dimensions comprising anti-submarine warfare exercises, air defense exercises, and anti-surface warfare exercises. In a first, fifty-five American and twenty New Zealand military personnel were present to witness the exercise. According to an Indian government statement, “the increased scale of participation signifies the importance attached to the exercise by both countries while the enhanced complexity is indicative of the interoperability between the two navies.”

Therefore, it is clear that both New Delhi and Canberra have come a long way in their strategic engagements in a very short span of time, even if it has not advanced as fast as some observers would like to see. But this relationship will only further intensify in the coming years given that the common threat of a hegemonic China is unlikely to disappear anytime soon. It is quite likely that both countries will come to appreciate the increasing relevance of working together on a number of areas including maritime security, the establishment of a blue economy, infrastructure and connectivity initiatives, and strategic industry collaboration. The security dialogue, political consultations and bilateral and multinational military exercises can be expected to gain further depth and appreciation in both capitals. In addition, developing a common approach to certain ideas and principles like free, open and transparent Indo-Pacific is important.

Such strategic engagements will receive a major fillip with the visit of the Indian defense minister to Australia later this year. Reports suggest that India and Australia are likely to sign a number of important agreements including the mutual logistics support agreement, an information exchange agreement and a broader maritime agreement. A report citing diplomatic sources said that “These will lead to greater interoperability and help in elevating the strategic partnership.”

The logistics agreement has been in the discussion phase for a few years now and Australia is reported to have given India a draft text in 2016. It should be noted that India took more than a decade to finalize and conclude such an agreement with the United States. Ever since the LEMOA was concluded with the United States in 2016, it appears that India is getting a lot more comfortable with such agreements. Since 2016, India has signed two such agreements, one with France and a second one with South Korea, just a few weeks ago. These agreements go to enhance the interoperability between the militaries of the two countries, and simplify the process of using each other’s military facilities.

Maritime security cooperation, especially the information sharing arrangement, will help both sides to gain a better strategic awareness picture of the Indo-Pacific region. These have been on the bilateral agenda for some time – these were identified as elements in the India-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation signed during Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s visit to India in 2009 as well as the Framework for Security Cooperation between India and Australia of 2014.

It is clear that the India-Australian strategic relationship has some way to go yet. But despite understandable disappointments about the slow pace, there are also advances being made.