Liang's India visit: What does it mean for bilateral ties?

Here's an article on the recent visit of Chinese defence minister Liang to India.

The three-nation visit of a high-powered Chinese defence delegation led by Defence Minister Liang Guanglie is significant for a variety of reasons. Liang was on a visit to Sri Lanka, India and Laos. Obviously, the India leg was the most critical one because Sino-Indian political and military ties have not kept pace with the increasing trade relationship between the two countries. But Liang's first stop-over in Sri Lanka was also important.



The delegation was in Sri Lanka for five days and its conduct of business in the backdrop of the strengthening bilateral ties merit closer attention. Sri Lanka's Army chief Jagath Jayasuriya was in Beijing only two months ago. Recently, Sri Lanka has partnered with China's state-owned China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC) to design, manufacture and launch a satellite-a feat to be accomplished in 2015. The fact that this was the first time that a Chinese defence minister was in Sri Lanka and the timing of the visit against the backdrop of the changing regional security dynamics are also important and New Delhi should be paying greater attention.

Both the Sri Lankans and the Chinese are being cautious about the relationship, mindful of India's concerns, but the growing warmth is undeniable and understandable, given New Delhi's propensity to pay greater attention to domestic politics rater than neighbourhood sensitivities in framing these relationships. At a lecture at the Sapugaskanda Defence Staff Collee, Liang pointedly referred to "how [the two countries had] withstood the test of international vicissitude"-obviously referring to the negative international human rights attention on both countries, a point that would have many takers in both Sri Lanka and China. He was careful to say that closer China-Sri Lanka military relations were not focused at any third country, but the elephant was obviously in the room. China is also believed to be extending a $ 100 million package to the army-run reconstruction efforts in the north and the east in addition to a grant of $ 1.5 million for the upgradation of the Defense Services College in Colombo for children of security forces and police personnel.

Liang arrived in India on Sunday for a three-day visit, after a gap of nearly a decade. While these visits are not meant to solve some of the major irritants in the bilateral relationship, such high level interactions could help ease the tension and reduce some of the trust deficit issues that characterise India-China relations-something that should be encouraged in that context. The visit also assumed relevance given that Liang was accompanied by top military officials of the important military commands, including Guangzhou, Tibet, Lanzhou and the political commissar of the South China Sea fleet of the PLA Navy.

The composition of the Chinese team indicated a broad agenda, possibly including both bilateral and multilateral issues. The border issue was obviously discussed with both sides stating that efforts to promote peace and tranquility on the border areas will be pursued. It is also fair to assume that other issues such as India's oil exploration in Vietnam and the South China Sea troubles were also discussed. A third issue was the re-starting of the stalled joint military exercises between India and China.

India and China have so far held two rounds of military exercises, in 2007 in Kunming and in 2008 Belgaum, Karnataka. India called off the third "Hand-in-Hand" series exercises in August 2010 when Beijing refused permission to a senior army officer from Jammu and Kashmir to be part of the delegation. There have been attempts since 2011 by both sides to re-start the exercises although both have been looking at face-saving options to do the same. Thereafter, India sent a multi-command military delegation in June 2011 that included the military officer who was earlier denied permission. A return visit from the Chinese side took place in November 2011. Both sides appeared keen on restarting these exercises. Meanwhile, the India-China annual defence dialogue has also progressed, with the fourth one held in Beijing in December 2011.

These visits and interactions are mainly meant for improving the atmospherics of the relationship. In that context, it is also important that both India and China find newer areas for cooperation and move beyond collaboration on soft issues such as economic or climate change issues. Both countries have to look for newer avenues in the security domain if they are serious in addressing the trust gap that exits currently. There are several issues including the Asian framework issue that could mar progress in this bilateral relationship unless the two sides identify new areas for cooperation in the security and strategic realm because improvement in economic relations has its own limits and need not necessarily result in better bilateral relations.

In addition to bilateral military-to-military ties, India and China should explore cooperating on maritime security, UN Peace Keeping Operations, and reconstruction and rehabilitation in the aftermath of natural disasters, all of which are common challenges to both the countries and which are probably easier to cooperate on. Working on areas which are not suffused with political sensitivities would not only be easier but could instill a habit of cooperation and trust that could pay dividends in the larger bilateral ties.

Why China, India Clash, my article in The Diplomat

Here's an article of mine of India-China relations, published in The Diplomat. While the prevailing view is that it is the border issue which is the most contentious issue between the two countries, I would argue that border issue is only a symptom of the larger problem that exists between India and China.

India-China relations are often seen through the prism of their bilateral disputes. Indeed, the border dispute between the two is generally seen as the biggest hurdle to improving ties. But it could be argued that disagreements such as that over the border in Arunachal Pradesh are only a symptom of the larger problem that exists between these two Asian giants, namely the inevitable and increasing competition between two rising powers.

For the full article, click here.

While the simultaneous rise of powers need not always result in a clash, the four major powers in Asia – established powers Russia and Japan, and newly rising China and India – have had troubled historical relations, contributing to deep-rooted mistrust and mutual suspicion. With the exception of India-Russia and India-Japan relations, the baggage of history is weighing on almost all bilateral relations. It may be true that this century will be an “Asian century,” but it can’t be said with certainty that it’s going to be a stable and peaceful one.

India and China have certainly gone through their share of ups and downs in their relations over the last six decades. Currently, their relations are probably on an upward curve, but one based on trade and raw economics. And while their bilateral trade has climbed to $60 billion, there has been a simultaneous rise in tensions. Improved economic relations don’t necessarily mean better ties overall, as has been demonstrated with U.S.-China relations, as well as those between Japan and China and Taiwan and the mainland.

So, if improved trade ties haven’t resulted in better political and strategic relations, what are the key issues that are holding the two back? Historically, it used to be the border issue, China’s relationship with Pakistan and the rest of South Asia in general, and China’s policy on Jammu and Kashmir specifically. But over the past decade, the emerging Asian strategic framework and the global role for each of these rising powers has been an important factor.

Sadly, this is only likely to get worse. As India’s influence increases within Asia and beyond, there are bound to be problems between Beijing and New Delhi as the two are seen competing for influence and resources. For instance, China is increasingly wary of India’s closer engagement with Japan, South Korea and some Southeast Asian countries. The Chinese leadership appears equally wary of India’s “Look East” Policy as it seems to believe that this will dilute Chinese influence in the region. India has improved its trade ties with Japan, South Korea and ASEAN countries, and there appears to be an increasingly strategic component to relations.

On the other hand, India has remained concerned about China’s ever-growing reach into South Asia, particularly in Pakistan. Of all the South Asian countries, it is Islamabad that most closely shares China’s strategic interests, and their interests vis a vis India have been crucial in cementing relations between the two. For Pakistan, Kashmir is an unfinished item on the agenda of the partition of the subcontinent. India’s sensitivity over Kashmir is matched by China’s worries about Tibet. China believes that New Delhi has ulterior motives regarding Tibet, and the very fact that the Dalai Lama and as many as 150,000 Tibetan refugees live in India continues to irk Beijing. For a country that’s actively engaged in image building as a responsible power, the shortcomings of China’s ethnic policy isn’t something China likes to be reminded about.

Complicating India’s relations with China was the fact that the George W. Bush administration saw a greater role for India and Japan in the emerging Asian strategic framework. The U.S.-India Nuclear Deal in 2005 furthered China’s anxieties, and the fact that the United States took the lead in altering the global rules so that India could engage in international nuclear commerce wasn’t well received by Beijing.

Ultimately, it’s India’s increasing role and influence that’s the crux of the issue. Although India and China both acknowledge the role of the other in the emerging Asian strategic order, they have different conceptions over how this will all pan out. India has continued to adopt an accommodative and inclusive approach in shaping this new architecture, while China has followed an exclusivist approach that appears to be directed against India, Japan and the United States.

Beijing has argued that its rise is peaceful, but as China’s military and economic strength grows, India may not be prepared to see an Asian order dominated by any single power. Given such trends, it’s likely that competition for influence between these new powers will be a significant feature of the Asian century.

Does India threaten China?

Does India threaten China? A recent Chinese poll shows that India does pose a threat. Here's a story by Zhu Shanshan that states India is a threat.



Zhu Shanshan

An online poll conducted by huanqiu.com on June 10 shows that 90 percent of participants believe India poses a big threat to China after India announced it would dispatch 60,000 troops to the border with China.

The tension along the disputed border between the two countries has escalated in the last few days after India's latest military move. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh claimed, despite cooperative India-China relations, his government would make no concessions to China on territorial disputes.

The Indian government's tough stance has won applause among Indian nationalists, but it's not well-received in China.

About 74 percent people in the poll by huanqiu.com believed China should not maintain the friendly relations with India anymore after its military provocation. And more than 65 percent of people taking part in the poll believed India's actions were harmful to bilateral ties and it is more harmful to India.

India's military moves could cast a shadow over bilateral relations, said Dai Xun, an expert in military affairs, who described India's actions as “plundering a burning house”, when the international community was focused on a reported nuclear test in the DPRK, destroying the mutual trust between neighboring countries.
An expert in the Asia-pacific region, Sun Shihai, with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences told the Global Times that the two countries share a lot of mutual interests, so India has to cooperate with China; but India also needs to show its “will and resolution” to both domestic politicians and the international community.

“It (additional deployment) is not helpful to resolve the border dispute, and could easily cause regional tension,” Sun said.

In 1962, India and China fought a brief war over the 3,500 km Himalayan border area. The two countries later signed a treaty and agreed to maintain “peace and tranquility” along the disputed frontier, but since then have made little progress.