China's ASBM: Dragon's New Claw

Here's a link to my article on China's ASBM capabilities published in today's Deccan Herald.

The trend in Chinese military strategy is worrisome. In the last few years, it has focused on the area denial strategy.

Development of anti-ship ballistic missile capabilities are significant given the fact that these systems do have the potential to damage or destroy large ships, including US carrier battle groups operating in the region.

The Chinese approach to finding technological or military solutions to geopolitical problems can be a dangerous trend.



The US office of naval intelligence report of August 2009, titled ‘The People’s Liberation Army Navy: A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics,’ reveals that China is close to developing the world’s first anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) system. If China succeeds, it could alter the military equation in the Asia-Pacific region.

Development of ASBM systems is particularly significant given that it will have the capability to defeat US carrier strike groups operating in the region, making it a ‘no-go-zone’ for the US and other advanced navies.

The anti-ship missile systems are believed to be using the modified DF-21 missile that has better accuracy and can carry nuclear warheads big enough to inflict damage on large naval vessels. The missiles, reportedly with a range of 2,000 km, covering the second chain of islands, are aided by a network of satellites, radar and unmanned aerial vehicles that can locate US ships and then guide the weapon, enabling it to hit moving targets.

The employment of a complex guidance system, low radar signature and maneuverability makes its flight path unpredictable, thereby making the tracking systems ineffective.

While there may be scepticism among analysts as to whether China has advanced to such a high level of sophistication, Dai Xu, a Chinese military expert, who spoke to ‘Global Times’ (China) said, “China is indeed developing anti-ship ballistic missiles. It is not a secret. During the 60th anniversary National Day military parade, China exhibited such missiles.”

He however added that these systems need not necessarily have a ‘killer’ effect, capable of defeating the US fleet, as has been made out in several reports. While one may agree with such an argument, what has been worrying is Beijing’s increasingly aggressive behaviour in the seas even against the US and Japanese naval vessels and thereby the potential of these missile systems to create difficult situations in the future.

One of the latest instances of such aggressive behaviour is that of the March 2009 incident in which US Navy reported that five Chinese ships harassed the US submarine surveillance vessel ‘USNS Impeccable’ in the south China area.

Pentagon reports suggests that there were at least half a dozen such incidents in the very same week, where US surveillance vessels were “subjected to aggressive behaviour, including dozens of fly-bys by Chinese Y-12 maritime surveillance aircraft.”

Chinese assertiveness, based on China’s claim to the entire South China Sea as its territory and creating conflictual situations with several countries, including the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan, could lead to increasing tensions and possible accidents in the seas.

Need for agreement

Although there is scope for these discussions in the 1998 US-Chinese military maritime safety agreement, the two sides have not been able to address these incidents in a useful manner. The US has been seeking an incidents at sea agreement, similar to the 1972 US-Russian Incidents at Sea Agreement.

The trend in Chinese military strategy is worrisome. One of the key areas that China has focused on in the last few years relates to the area denial strategy. Such a strategy, restraining the ability of another country to use a particular space or facility, will allow China to create a buffer zone around its land and maritime periphery which in turn will increase the difficulty for other states to operate close to Chinese mainland.

Chinese sea denial capability is essentially enforced through its growing submarine force. China has a force of 62 submarines, including 12 new and advanced Kilo-class Russian submarines, in addition to different classes of domestically-developed diesel submarines and several nuclear-powered attack boats.

It also has a significant number of surface combatants, including air-defence guided missile destroyers such as Luyang-II and Luzhou class vessels, several powerful multi-role vessels (Sovremenny class destroyers) like Hangzhou, and a large number of different anti-ship missiles that can be launched from submarines, surface ships and airplanes and even shore-based launchers, such as the SS-N-22 Sunburn and SS-N-27 Sizzler systems procured from Russia.

The US Navy does not yet have an effective way of defending their aircraft carriers against these missiles. In a potential conflict on the Taiwan Straits, the PLAN could possibly destroy some ships of the US carrier battlegroups, including US aircraft carriers.

Development of these weapon systems has upped the ante in the region and beyond. First, development of such capabilities by China could potentially lead to arms race in Asia, with countries wanting to develop systems that can counter Beijing’s ASBM capabilities.

The US Navy is already looking at responses, in terms of building deep water ballistic defence destroyers. It is moving away from a strategy of building a fleet that would operate in shallow waters near coastlines to developing capabilities for deep sea anti-ballistic defences.

Similarly, Chinese assertiveness in the Indian Ocean region, its increasing presence in all the littoral states, could create tensions with India. Additionally, the Chinese approach to finding techno-military solutions to these problems can lead to a destabilising situation emerging in Asia.

China Develops ASBMs

The US Office of Naval Intelligence Report of August 2009, titled The People’s Liberation Army Navy: A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics, reveals that China is close to developing the world’s first anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) system. How does this alter the military equation in the Asia-Pacific region? Development of these systems is particularly significant given that it will have the capability to defeat US carrier strike groups operating in the region, making it a “no-go-zone” for the US and other advanced navies. Such capability-building needs to be seen in conjunction with the increasingly aggressive Chinese behaviour not only with neighbours with which Beijing has border and territorial issues with, but also with the United States. More importantly, Chinese tendency to rely on military solutions to geopolitical problems can be a worrying trend. For instance, the 1996 Taiwan missile crisis is believed to be one of the factors that pushed Beijing towards the development of these missile systems. The crisis clearly showed how the PLA Navy (PLAN) was wanting in response against US navy carrier groups. However, finding military solutions to problems like Taiwan can set a dangerous trend.



The anti-ship missile systems are believed to be using the modified DF-21 missile (solid propellant ones) that has better accuracy and can carry nuclear warheads big enough to inflict damage on large naval vessels. The missiles, reportedly with a range of 2,000 kilometers, covering the second chain of islands, are aided by a network of satellites, radar and unmanned aerial vehicles that can locate US ships and then guide the weapon, enabling it to hit moving targets. The employment of a complex guidance system, low radar signature and maneuverability makes its flight path unpredictable, thereby making the tracking systems ineffective.

While there may be skepticism among analysts as to whether China has advanced to such high level of sophistication, Dai Xu, a Chinese military expert, who spoke to Global Times (China) said, “China is indeed developing anti-ship ballistic missiles. It is not a secret. During the 60th anniversary National Day military parade, China exhibited such missiles.” He however added that these systems need not necessarily have a “killer” effect, capable of defeating US fleet, as has been made out in several reports. While one may agree with such an argument, what has been worrying is Beijing’s increasingly aggressive behaviour even in the seas against the US and Japanese naval vessels and thereby the potential of these missile systems to create difficult situations in the future. One of the latest instances of such aggressive behaviour is that of the March 2009 incident in which US Navy reported that five Chinese ships harassed the US submarine surveillance vessel USNS Impeccable in the South China area. There have been also several media reports citing Pentagon reports bringing out at least half a dozen such incidents in the very same week, where US surveillance vessels were “subjected to aggressive behavior, including dozens of fly-bys by Chinese Y-12 maritime surveillance aircraft.” Increasing Chinese assertiveness, based on China’s claim to the entire South China Sea as its territory and creating conflictual situations with several countries, including the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan, could lead to increasing tensions and possible accidents particularly in the seas. In order to negate such effects, the US has been taking efforts to put in place an incidents at sea agreement, similar to the 1972 US-Russian Incidents at Sea Agreement. Although there is scope for these discussions in the 1998 US-Chinese Military Maritime Safety Agreement, the two sides have not been able to address these incidents in a useful manner.

The trend in Chinese military strategy is worrisome. One of the key areas that China has focused on in the last few years relates to the area denial strategy. Such a strategy will essentially restrain the ability of another country to use a particular space or facility. Such a capability will allow China to create a buffer zone around its land and maritime periphery which in turn will increase the difficulty for other states to operate close to Chinese mainland.

Chinese sea denial capability is essentially enforced through its growing submarine force. China has a force of 62 submarines, including 12 new and advanced Kilo-class Russian submarines, in addition to different classes of domestically-developed diesel submarines and several nuclear-powered attack boats. China also has a significant number of surface combatants, including air-defence guided missile destroyers such as Luyang-II and Luzhou class vessels and several powerful multi-role vessels (Sovremenny class destroyers) like Hangzhou. Besides, Beijing has a large number of different anti-ship missiles that can be launched from submarines, surface ships and airplanes and even shore-based launchers, such as the SS-N-22 Sunburn and SS-N-27 Sizzler systems procured from Russia. The US Navy does not yet have an effective way of defending their aircraft carriers against these missiles. In a potential conflict on the Taiwan Straits, the PLA Navy could possibly destroy some ships of the US carrier battlegroups, including US aircraft carriers. China also reportedly has a range of medium- and long-range ballistic missiles that can target surface ships at great distances.

Similarly, the January 2007 ASAT test provides a new platform for area denial to China. During times of conflict, the US may be restrained from using space-based assets after the test of SC-19 ASAT missile. Sea mining is another tactic that the Chinese could possibly employ in future warfare. Sea mines are available widely and at cheaper rates, whereas counter-measures are expensive and time consuming. However, given the difficulty in laying mines, and in the absence of significant air superiority, use of submarines might prove to be the best option for China. Sea-mining by air is another option. This would entail again blockading a certain section of the sea, a certain coastal area, or a certain country by way of air-dropped mines in order to blockade seaports and sea lanes as well as attack targets trying to break the blockade. Chinese military strategists estimate the role of such air blockades to increase further in the future.

Development of such capabilities with an objective of denying space to other countries in the region is a disturbing trend. The Chinese claim that its military modernisation is geared towards a Taiwan scenario only, but it does not justify the level and pace of its military upgradation. However, from a Chinese point of view, it appears that they want to develop advanced and sophisticated capabilities, particularly in the naval arena, to deny access to other modern navies that could be operating in the region, anticipating a crisis on the Taiwan Straits. In fact, General Xu Caihou, Vice Chairman of China’s Central Military Commission, who was visiting the United States in October noted that its “rapid military modernization, including the deployment of advanced weapons in the Pacific, is only to meet the minimum requirements of national security.” In their perception, advanced navies such as that of the US and Japan need to be denied access to the region and therefore an increased focus on access control/denial strategies in the last few years.

While it may appear justified from a Chinese point of view, development of anti-ship missile and area denial weapon systems have upped the ante in the region and beyond. First, development of such capabilities by China could potentially lead to arms race in Asia, with countries wanting to develop systems that can counter Beijing’s ASBM capabilities. The US Navy is already looking at responses, in terms of building deep water ballistic defence destroyers. It is moving away from a strategy of building a fleet that would operate in shallow waters near coastlines to developing capabilities for deep sea anti-ballistic defenses. The US Navy is actually looking at Zumwalt DDG 1000 destroyer as the answer to the latest Chinese weapon. Admiral Lyons, while analysing the situation, wrote that the destroyer is the best option, given that it is stealthy (thereby improving the survivability), and also has “the power, cooling, space and weight margin to meet the full spectrum of future threats, both known and unknown.” While this may be the best response, the US Navy, for a variety of factors including costs, has decided to put a cap and limit production of the Zumwalt class DDG 100 to just three ships with no ballistic missile defence capability. The US Navy, instead, is planning to build more of the 30-year old design Aegis Arleigh Burke class DDG 51 destroyers which have only the most basic BMD capability. Unless the US Navy reverses the decision, this will have repercussions not only for the US but also for its allies, Taiwan, Japan and South Korea.

Militarization of the conflict-response mechanism on Taiwan by Beijing is therefore leading to dangerous games, with arms race as a predominant feature in the coming years. US’ counter-measures to the Chinese ASBM will inevitably evoke response from Russia.

Although unlikely, a Sino-Russian conflict on the port of Vladivostok cannot be ruled out in the future. Chinese penetration into the Russian Far East, its increasing footprint in Central Asia are areas of friction between the two countries that could get sharpened in the years to come.

Similarly, Chinese assertiveness in the Indian Ocean region, its increasing presence in all the littoral countries, could spiral conflict with India. Additionally, the Chinese approach to finding techno-military solutions to these problems can lead to a destabilizing situation emerging in Asia.

China's Submarines Are Still Noisy, Says Hans Kristensen

Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists has written that China’s new Jin-class ballistic missile submarine is noisier than the Russian Delta III-class submarines built more than 30 years ago. He based this on the U.S. Navy’s Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI)Report of August 2009.



Kristensen says that the report makes three points cery clear:

1. China now has three ballistic missile submarines, one Xia class and two Jin class.

2. One Jin class submarine is based at Hainan. The other Jin and the Xia are at Qingdao.

3. The Jin is really frickin’ noisy.

Given below is Kristensen's report on the Chinese submarines, available at the FAS Blog at http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/11/subnoise.php.

China’s new Jin-class ballistic missile submarine is noisier than the Russian Delta III-class submarines built more than 30 years ago, according to a report produced by the U.S. Navy’s Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI).

The report The People’s Liberation Army Navy: A Modern Navy With Chinese Characteristics, which was first posted on the FAS Secrecy News Blog and has since been removed from the ONI web site [but now back here; thanks Bruce], is to my knowledge the first official description made public of Chinese and Russian modern nuclear submarine noise levels.

Force Level

The report shows that China now has two Jin SSBNs, one of which is based at Hainan Island with the South Sea Fleet, along with two Type 093 Shang-class nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN). The Jin was first described at Hainan in February 2008 and the two Shangs in September 2008. The second Jin SSBN is based at Jianggezhuang with the North Sea Fleet alongside the old Xia-class SSBN and four Han-class SSNs.

The report confirms the existence of the Type 095, a third-generation SSN intended to follow the Type 093 Shang-class. Five Type 095s are expected from around 2015. The Type-95 is estimated to be noisier than the Russian Akula I SSN built 20 years ago.

Missile Range

The ONI report states that the JL-2 sea-launched ballistic missile on the Jin SSBNs has a range of ~4,000 nautical miles (~7,400 km) “is capable of reaching the continental United States from Chinese littorals.” Not quite, unless Chinese littorals extend well into the Sea of Japan. Since the continental United States does not include Alaska and Hawaii, a warhead from a 7,400-km range JL-2 would fall into the sea about 800 km from Seattle. A JL-2 carrying penetration aids in addition to a warhead would presumably have a shorter range.

Julang-2 SLBM Range According to ONI



Although the ONI report states that the Julang-2 can target the Continental United States, the range estimate it provides is insufficient to reach the lower 48 states or Hawaii.


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Alaska would be in range if the JL-2 is launched from the very northern parts of Chinese waters, but Hawaii is out of range unless the missile is launched from a position close to South Korea or Japan. The U.S. Defense Department’s 2009 report to Congress on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China also shows the range of the JL-2 to be insufficient to target the Continental United States or Hawaii from Chinese waters. The JL-2 instead appears to be a regional weapon with potential mission against Russia and India and U.S. bases in Guam and Japan.

Patrol Levels

The report also states that Chinese submarine patrols have “more than tripled” over the past few years, when compared to the historical levels of the last two decades.

That sounds like a lot, but given that the entire Chinese submarine fleet in those two decades in average conducted fewer than three patrols per year combined, a trippling doesn’t amout to a whole lot for a submarine fleet of 63 submarines. According to data obtained from ONI under FOIA, the patrol number in 2008 was 12.

Since only the most capable of the Chinese attack submarines presumably conduct these patrols away from Chinese waters – and since China has yet to send one of its ballistic missile submarines on patrol – that could mean one or two patrols per year per submarine.

Implications

The ONI report concludes that the Jin SSBN with the JL-2 SLBM gives the PLA Navy its first credible second-strike nuclear capability. The authors must mean in principle, because in a war such noisy submarines would presumably be highly vulnerabe to U.S. or Japanese anti-submarine warfare forces. (The noise level of China’s most modern diesel-electric submarines is another matter; ONI says some are comparable to Russian diesel-electric submarines).

That does raise an interesting question about the Chinese SSBN program: if Chinese leaders are so concerned about the vulnerability of their nuclear deterrent, why base a significant portion of it on a few noisy platforms and send them out to sea where they can be sunk by U.S. attack submarines in a war? And if Chinese planners know that the sea-based deterrent is much more vulnerable than its land-based deterrent, why do they waste money on the SSBN program?

The answer is probably a combination of national prestige and scenarios involving India or Russia that have less capable anti-submarine forces.