Not So Fast..., my third essay for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists on societal verification in arms control....

My third essay for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists on societal verification in arms control was published in the latest issue.

As this Roundtable nears its conclusion, I continue to believe that the success of societal verification will depend above all on arms control itself gaining greater acceptance in developing countries. A useful first step would be to make arms control processes more transparent and inclusive. Societal verification itself can follow at a later stage -- once arms control has gained more acceptance, developing countries have achieved greater freedom and established less dangerous security environments, and states themselves feel ready to implement and encourage societal verification measures. This is a long list of conditions. So though I believe that societal verification might one day make a meaningful contribution to treaty verification, I don't believe that its widespread use is imminent in most of the developing world.

For the full article, click here.

I accept Jamal Khaer Ibrahim's argument that informal, person-to-person approaches, in the vein of track 3 diplomacy, seem to be among the most promising ways for societal verification to gain acceptance in the developing world. But at the same time, I agree with Ibrahim Said Ibrahim's assertion that societal verification can't truly thrive in places where sustainable development, good governance, and the like have yet to take hold. Jamal Khaer Ibrahim speaks of support for societal verification bubbling up from the business community to high levels of government -- but this will only happen in nations that are reasonably open to begin with. Elsewhere, societal verification will have to gain acceptance in bureaucracies and the political class before it can percolate down to the public level.

But even in countries with open forms of government, dangerous regional security environments will often pose obstacles for societal verification. India's neighborhood, for example, is not benign, and it is not perceived as benign either in official circles or among the public. And in a nationalistic environment such as that which exists in South Asia, security concerns are intensified and real threats are sometimes exaggerated. So India's public discussions of security issues focus on issues such as military modernization, offensive capabilities, force multipliers, and strategies allowing vigorous responses to regional security realities. Societal verification is not close in spirit to any of these topics, and it is unlikely to enter public discussion any time soon.

External threats can be major obstacles to societal verification; in a nation like India, so can internal pressures. India faces internal security threats from religious fundamentalists, ethnic secessionists, and a rural Maoist movement that aims to overthrow the state. When a nation faces such menaces within its own borders, the last thing on decision makers' minds will be societal verification. Indeed, societal verification might strike leaders primarily as a threat to the state: The same techniques that could promote treaty verification efforts could also be used for harm if they were taken up by terrorists and other radical elements.

As this Roundtable nears its conclusion, I continue to believe that the success of societal verification will depend above all on arms control itself gaining greater acceptance in developing countries. A useful first step would be to make arms control processes more transparent and inclusive. Societal verification itself can follow at a later stage -- once arms control has gained more acceptance, developing countries have achieved greater freedom and established less dangerous security environments, and states themselves feel ready to implement and encourage societal verification measures. This is a long list of conditions. So though I believe that societal verification might one day make a meaningful contribution to treaty verification, I don't believe that its widespread use is imminent in most of the developing world.

CBR Security in India: Threat Analysis and Role of Industries, an Issue Brief written by Rahul and me....

Here's an Issue Brief written by Rahul and me on the CBR security in India, looking specifically at the role of industries in setting security standards, among other issues.

The paper examines the current state of security and safety of chemical, biological, radiological materials in India's industrial sector, with particular focus on small and medium-sized industries. It argues that an integrated approach that includes prevention, mitigation and response is required to meet the nation's CBR related security challenges.

For the full report, click here.

Type rest of the post here

Incentives and Limits, my second essay in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists

My second essay for Bulletin of Atomic Scientists was published yesterday... In this piece, I look at ways to incentivize good behaviour and what the limits are....

Until leaders believe that societal verification serves the national interest, ordinary people will be in no position to become educated practitioners....

For the full essay, click here.





In his second Roundtable essay, Jamal Khaer Ibrahim argued that professionals in industries associated with the nuclear supply chain might embrace societal verification out of a desire to "protect their professional reputations and avoid criminal or civil penalties associated with wrongdoing." But that may tell only part of the story. In my own nation, India, security at firms involved with sensitive materials is often lax. In some cases these firms do not even comply with the law, much less display concern about their professional reputations.

I recently co-authored a study on security risks related to chemical, biological, and radiological materials PDF. The study, which entailed field visits to several of India's major industry clusters, revealed significant variations in companies' compliance with the law and their implementation of security standards. Firms that see themselves as part of a globalized world and whose commercial interests extend internationally -- for instance, large pharmaceutical and petrochemical firms -- tend to perform well. But at small and medium-sized firms that operate more locally, the short-term profit motive tends to outweigh safety and security concerns. It is difficult to imagine that firms such as these, which often fail to comply with existing laws and best practices, will demonstrate much interest in participating in societal verification initiatives. And if this is true in India, it is likely to be true across much of the developing world.

Ibrahim also writes that nations might support societal verification efforts out of a desire "to gain trust as economic partners." This strikes me as more valid, and it raises the larger question of how best to incentivize compliance with verification arrangements, including but not limited to societal verification. Incentives could include the prospect of earning economic trust, as Ibrahim suggests, and of gaining greater integration into the world's political and security architectures. Indeed, the best incentive may be to create a more dynamic global political order in which a broader range of nations have a realistic chance of playing an important role.

The principle point of Ibrahim Said Ibrahim's first Roundtable essay is that educated practitioners are key to societal verification's success, and I broadly agree. But I don't believe that many educated practitioners will soon emerge in the developing world. As Ibrahim suggests, only a limited number of people in developing countries understand and appreciate arms control arrangements themselves. Moreover, as I argued in my first essay and as Ibrahim acknowledges, citizens who participate in societal verification efforts might put themselves at personal risk because bureaucratic and political elites could perceive these activities as illegitimate. And particularly in countries where sovereignty, security, and the state's control of sensitive technologies are very closely tied together -- China and India, for example -- states will not embrace societal verification until they perceive substantial benefit in doing so. Until leaders believe that societal verification serves the national interest, ordinary people will be in no position to become educated practitioners.

Pune Blasts and India's CBR Security Challenges

Here's an article of mine on CBR security challenges in India published by The Diplomat on August 28, 2012.

The use of ammonium nitrate in the recent Pune blast signifies yet again India’s vulnerabilities in the Chemical-Biological-Radiological (CBR) security domain. Trafficking and trading of chemicals such as ammonium nitrate, which are used in explosives, have become common among terrorist groups and criminal gangs.

For full article, click here.



Amending India’s Explosives Act is long overdue. The law must take into account the changing circumstances and the more challenging ways in which state and non-state actors are aiding and abetting terrorism. One of the major shortcomings of the act is its sole focus on the safety of these materials in terms of managing the handling and storage. The security of such materials is often overlooked.

India’s small- and medium-scale industries have continued to argue that any theft of chemicals is done only for pecuniary reasons, which would mean that the security of these materials – the material falling into the wrong hands – is often overlooked. Pilferage is often rubbished as stolen material for commercial purposes; simply put, to earn some extra money. But they do pose serious security threats to India’s internal security, as was evident in the Pune blast. India has now witnessed several recent incidents of such security breaches, including the July 2011 Mumbai attacks.

In an effort to arrest criminal use and to control the easy and unrestricted availability of the chemical, the government in 2011 categorized ammonium nitrate as an “explosive.” However, the catch was that ammonium nitrate is in large-scale use in the agricultural sector and therefore, the government loosened the regulation to say that “its possession and use would invoke penal action only if the composition had 45% or more ammonium nitrate content.” Terrorists and criminal groups have been able to exploit this loophole effectively, which has allowed them to repeatedly use it in major and minor terrorist incidents in India.

Recently, a committee set up by the central government to look into the distribution and handling of explosives suggested that the Home Ministry may be better suited to regulate the flow and trading of these chemicals instead of the Department of Industries, Policy and Planning, as is the case currently. However, the Home Ministry’s already much too overstretched to be assigned additional tasks. Regardless, one agency must be invested with the sole responsibility to lead on this issue.

A separate internal security ministry with a department focused on CBR security with adequate manpower is truly needed. With India’s expansive and expanding network of educational institutions and associated labs as well as private industrial units, the use of ammonium nitrate and other chemicals is likely to grow manifold.

Consequentially, India should be monitoring and addressing the weaknesses in the current approach of controlling the material technical know-how of the product. The need for an integrated approach cannot be overstated.

India’s ancient rules are another set of issues that need urgent attention. The Explosives Act of 1884, which was last amended in 2002 need to be overhauled again in the face of new challenges.

A recent study by ORF and RUSI on the subject, India & Non-State Actors: Chemical, Biological & Radiological Threats, which was largely based on primary research, highlighted some of these loopholes while also suggesting ways to remedy some of the gaps.

While the central government-appointed committee is looking into some of these recommendations, it appears to be focusing a great deal on coordination between different departments handling these chemicals. This is by no means unimportant; indeed, as noted above, a whole-of-government approach is needed to properly address the threat. Nonetheless, a host of other issues also require greater attention.

For example, transportation remains a significant weakness. Additionally, industry rarely considers the dangers of these materials from falling into the hands of terrorists, criminals, and third parties who may sell the materials to terrorist groups.

The huge variation between the large, medium and small-scale industries in their approach to security of these dangerous materials is significant. The government has to devise innovative measures to control and streamline the production and distribution of such materials. The wide-scale disparity in the training and security provisions and the lack of standardization of private security agencies puts India at serious risk. An accreditation and audit mechanism, with periodic security audits and a reporting structure for audit findings to be signed off by a designated regulator, should become standard practice in industries. Industries also have to be alert to insider threats that go undetected by and large because of inadequate background threats.

A related issue is the lack of threat communication and training at the grassroots level among ordinary security agencies. While senior-level officers may be aware of CBR threats, the forces that form most of the front-line security layers are not adequately aware of the dangerous materials they deal with. In cases where they are alert, moreover, they are not adequately equipped with in-house security forces and certainly cannot afford to pay for a Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) contingent. Also small, profit-driven units are not as concerned about the security of these materials. Addressing this effectively could be done by encouraging greater resource-pooling among smaller units to employ good security outfits as a way to reduce costs while strengthening the impact of security spending.

Lastly, India’s mindset about having precedents before strengthening measures needs to undergo change. We have to become sensitive to threats as they evolve rather than wait for incidents to happen and react thereafter.