India and the US Are Expanding Their Space Cooperation - The Diplomat, 30 October 2020

In my column for The Diplomat, I looked at the expanding US-India space cooperation.  I argue that Space Situational Awareness (SSA) is a very specific subfield, but an increasingly important one for safeguarding space operations, and that is slowly gaining traction in the US-India context.  

The third India-U.S. 2+2 strategic dialogue, with the foreign and defense ministers of the two countries, has just concluded. The joint statement issued at the end of the dialogue is a remarkable and significant one. Space cooperation has usually not featured prominently in discussions between the two sides, yet the joint statement noted the agreement among the four ministers to start cooperation on a specific agenda within the broad space domain – Space Situational Awareness (SSA). The importance of SSA cannot be overemphasized given its utility in ensuring safe, secure, and sustainable use of outer space.

For the full post, click here.  

As important as space has become, it is also crowded and congested with more than 80 countries active in way or another in this domain. In addition, private companies have plans to launch thousands of satellites for broadband and communication purposes.  This will make space traffic management a nightmare in the coming years. The first step is awareness of the space environment. SSA is simply that: awareness about the space environment, which can help ensure safety of space missions by giving collision avoidance information, information about space weather, and related natural phenomenon in space. Unless states are able to develop a clear picture of the space environment that they operate in, space assets could be in danger from both intentional threats and natural hazards. SSA is an effort at collating data on orbiting satellites, old rocket bodies, and other space debris, predicting re-entry of space objects into the atmosphere, and monitoring any threats to spacecrafts and satellites. The overall goal is to generate the ability to monitor, understand, and predict the physical space environment.

There are good reasons for India and the United States to develop a collaborative mechanism to start sharing SSA data. Both are major spacefaring nations with significant investment in space; their societies and militaries are dependent on space for a number of critical functions. Therefore, any disruptions of their space assets would result not only in social and economic disruption but interference in the effectiveness of their militaries as well.

SSA involves collection and analyses of data to convert them into actionable information to deal with threats to space assets. A report by Bhavya Lal et al for the Washington D.C.-based IDA Science & Technology Policy Institute divided the space traffic system into six components. This includes the data collection component “which refers to civil, military and commercial sensors, whether ground- or space-based,” the data processing part, and the data products component, “such as conjunction or collision warnings” so that operators can avoid collisions. Then there’s the oversight and coordination component, which “includes regulations, policies, guidelines, standards, and best practices.” The fifth component is data sharing, which “spans the entire continuum of the space traffic system.” The last component is external factors, “the combination of environmental and operational realities that are driving changes both on the technical and coordination sides.” 

This is obviously a complicated set of capabilities that are better handled cooperatively. India has been in the space business for about five decades now but it has developed only limited SSA capabilities. Many other players including China and Japan also do not have extensive capabilities in this regard. As of today, the United States has the largest network – the Space Surveillance Network – which has maintained among the most comprehensive coverage so far, though its coverage of the southern hemisphere is a bit weak. The U.S. is followed by Russia, which has the second largest network and has better coverage of the southern hemisphere. The EU also has a fairly detailed SSA network.

With India’s space program expanding in its scope and sophistication, India’s civil space organization, the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) has established a dedicated SSA department at the ISRO headquarters. Prior to this, without a dedicated SSA department, India did not show much interest in collaborating with other countries or their space agencies. But other major space players such as the United States and Japan have been keen to work with India on SSA.

Until now, the ISRO relied on limited data from the North America Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) for tracking space debris as well as checking on the active and passive satellites in orbit. But this has been insufficient because this did not give India access to full or real-time data because India was not part of the NORAD network. The ISRO could only access the two-line element (TLE) data set, which is a specific format used by NORAD and provided free to the ISRO as well as other space players. TLE provides data on space objects that are orbiting the earth at a particular point in time. But the fact that the ISRO cannot access real-time NORAD data imposes limitations in terms of accuracy and precision of data acquired and delay in tracking objects in space. 

The urgency and the need for India to monitor and track space objects and space debris became particularly evident after India’s anti-satellite (ASAT) test in March 2019. This possibly led to the establishment of the ISRO’s Space Situational Awareness and Management Directorate at the ISRO Headquarters, which is an important step as India’s space program grows. India’s decision to establish its own dedicated SSA capabilities also comes from the growth in the number of satellites and counter-space capabilities such as ASATs. India today operates a combination of communication satellites including GSATs and INSATs, navigation satellites (IRNSS constellation), and a series of surveillance satellites such as CARTOSAT and RESOURCESAT series.

As for its SSA capabilities, the ISRO started a new initiative called Project NETRA (Network for Space Object Tracking and Analysis) that will keep track of satellites in Low Earth Orbit to prevent them from being hit by space debris or space weather incidents. The ISRO is also in the process of establishing several observation facilities that would include radars, telescopes, data processing centers, and a control center. These are meant to “spot, track and catalogue objects as small as 10 cm, up to a range of 3,400 km and equal to a space orbit of around 2,000 km.” According to reports quoting ISRO Chairman Dr. Sivan, NETRA will become part of the global efforts at “tracking, warning about and mitigating space debris.” NETRA is to eventually track objects in GEO or geostationary orbit, at 36,000 km. 

According to Sivan, India’s SSA capabilities will include a long-range telescope in Leh, a radar in India’s northeast, and a Multi-Object Tracking Radar (MOTR) in Sriharikota, in southern India. As for telescopes, India has a number of optical-infrared observatories including at Bangalore, Pune, Mt. Abu, Nainital, and Hanle. MOTR has been in use already for carrying out space debris proximity analysis in powered and orbital phases during satellite launch, re-entry prediction of debris, and TLE catalogue building. In June this year, the ISRO signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Aryabhatta Research Institute of Observational Sciences (ARIES) for collaboration in SSA and Astrophysics. In fact, a telescope that belongs to the ARIES Devasthal Observatory was used for tracking the Indian GSAT-6A satellite. 

These are fairly limited SSA capabilities that can be expanded in collaboration with others like the United States, France, and Japan to develop better coverage and more comprehensive SSA systems. India can also take advantage of the amateur astronomer community in building up its capabilities. 

Even though late in the day, the ISRO’s steps to establish an SSA Directorate are important. In addition to establishing a certain amount of self-sufficiency in its ability to track and monitor the space environment, it also showcases India as a responsible stakeholder in the space arena. These are baby steps, but SSA is a very challenging problem. As Moriba Jah explains, the absence of standardization and a common “lingua franca” so as to “minimize redundancy and confusion” are issues that need to be addressed. SSA systems themselves will probably need to be adapted with newer applications such as rendezvous and proximity operations, satellite servicing and refueling, inspection, and space-based manufacturing. Another set of challenges will be tracking small satellite constellations that are set to grow exponentially in the coming years. Thus, the SSA challenges will continue to grow manifold. 

This also makes international collaboration a necessity. India-U.S. SSA collaboration is a good starting point that can be expanded to include other like-minded partners such as Japan, France, and Australia.

Keep Our Eyes on the Sky - The Economic Times, 27 March 2019

I wrote an OpEd, "Keep Our Eyes on the Sky," for The Economic Times on the Indian anti-satellite (ASAT) test conducted on March 27. Now that India has a demonstrated ASAT capability, New Delhi's focus must be ever more in strengthening the global space regime.

India became the fourth country to demonstrate an anti-satellite (ASAT) capability by conducting its first test on March 27. This has ensured that New Delhi does not meet the same fate as it did in the nuclear domain, should there be a global initiative that bans ASAT tests in the future.

There was a fear that India might miss the bus again and the three countries that had conducted such tests in the past — the US, Russia and China — could formalise an instrument that would place an effective ban on India from conducting an ASAT in the future. Indian policymakers from across the civilian, scientific and military bureaucracies were mindful of such an eventuality.

Make Space for Me
But now that it has demonstrated such a capability and ensured a seat at the ‘high table’, India should take a leading role to channelise its efforts to avoid weaponisation of outer space. This is to be undertaken both for the internal and external aspects of India’s space security policy.



Reports such as Prime Minister Narendra Modi asking National Security Adviser Ajit Doval to prepare draft space doctrine could send misleading misperceptions about India’s objectives. This government appears to be taking the same approach as the Atal Bihari Vajpayee government did after the Pokharan-2 nuclear tests in 1998, when it immediately began preparing a draft nuclear doctrine.

While clarity is required in terms of the future steps, GoI must also appreciate that there are important differences with the 1998 nuclear tests and what followed from that. ASAT capability is not a war-fighting capability and, therefore, plans to operationalise such capability need to be treaded carefully.

In this sense, it is different from the circumstances of 1998. Though nuclear weapons tests were not for war-fighting purposes either, there was a need then to come out with a doctrine to outline India’s deterrent posture and its limited nature. But such operationalisation is not required with the ASAT capability — unless it turns out that others are operationalising their ASAT capabilities too, of which there is no sign yet.

It is reported that India plans to create institutional authority along the lines of the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA), which will deal with issues of actual operationalisation of this capability within India’s military with clear counter-response options appropriated.

One senior official is reported to have said, “We have to lay down the defensive/offensive steps required in case Indian satellites are destroyed or degraded or there is access denial by an adversary through electro-magnetic radiation.”

While this clarity is appreciated, such actions should not lead to more alarm bells ringing. So far, none of the other countries who have acquired such ASAT capability have operationalised such a capability. The fact that space has not become part of overt deterrence calculations for any of the spacefaring powers is an encouraging sign that must be maintained.

Some of the immediate steps that India needs to articulate are, first, what kind of activities in space need to be restricted. This can be done by first producing a backgrounder or policy paper highlighting the importance of outer space for meeting India’s developmental and strategic functions.

This should detail the kind of space environment that must be maintained to ensure that deterrence does not become a reality in outer space and, thereafter, to suggest means and ways to strengthen norms of responsible behaviour. India may be accused of being hypocritical, but India was more of a reluctant ASAT power and has been compelled to act because of the worsening security competition within the space domain.

Not a LEO Toy
But having decided to do an ASAT, it must be recognised that India conducted the test in a responsible and transparent manner. The fact that India decided to do it an altitude of 300 km in low earth orbit (LEO) ensured that its action did not lead to the creation of long-lasting space debris.

Despite a much-reported complaint from Nasa about the Indian test leaving debris that could “pose a risk to the International Space Station” and adding that it was a “terrible, terrible thing”, so far, according to the US Strategic Command’s Joint Force Space Component Command (JFSCC), there are about 250-270 debris pieces that have been generated from the Indian ASAT test — which is more along the lines of the debris created during the US ASAT test in 2008, which was also at a similar altitude.

A second aspect that India needs to emphasise is outlining rules for what is permissible. India has interests in ensuring that outer space is kept clean, safe and secure for future generations to use as well.

It also has interests in strengthening its credentials in global space governance. Until now, New Delhi could not play an active role in this because it did not have that capability that gives it a voice in this arena.

Now that India has successfully demonstrated its ASAT capability, it should play an important role in mitigating problems such as space debris, space traffic management, orbital frequency issues and other issues that are important for ensuring safe and secure access to outer space. India should partner with like-minded countries in initiating these conversations and take them to meaningful international platforms such as Conference on Disarmament, UN First Committee and UN Disarmament Commission.

China takes seriously only the language of power, deterrence! Why India’s A-SAT missile test was a necessity - The Financial Express, March 29, 2019

I wrote a fourth piece on the Indian ASAT test for The Financial Express, looking at the rationale and compulsions for India to actually demonstrate the capability.

After debating for more than a decade, India has now conducted its anti-satellite (ASAT) missile test, pushing itself into an exclusive group of countries that includes the US, Russia and China. Prime Minister Narendra Modi made this announcement in a televised address saying that the demonstration of the Indian ASAT capabilities has made it a true space power. Hitting a satellite at an altitude of 300 kms. in the low earth orbit, one must agree that this has been a fairly responsible act on India’s part because this would not create long-lasting space debris, which is a serious problem in space.

For example, the Chinese ASAT test in 2007 created a huge debris problem. The US ASAT test in 2008 was done at an altitude of 275 kms and the debris possibly came down in a few weeks. Thus, India will not come in for major flak on that count. As for the rationale and timing, there could be several factors at play. Clearly, the terrestrial competition with China and the larger geopolitical games underway in Asia have possibly had a determining say in the Indian ASAT decision. China’s growing power and aggressiveness, as well as its disregard for established global norms and rules means that it only understands the language of power and deterrence.

For the full article, click here.



It was China’s 2007 ASAT test that broke a long-standing voluntary moratorium on such tests. Moreover, that test was particularly unfortunate because, as mentioned earlier, it created a huge debris field. Such disregard has become a characteristic of China’s behaviour. It appears that China will only take seriously the language of power and deterrence. Thus, demonstrating an ASAT capability was an absolute strategic necessity to let Beijing and others know that if Indian assets in outer space are attacked, India has the means to retaliate. A second important calculation for India is to not find itself in the NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) trap yet again. In the case of the NPT, India’s reluctance to push for a nuclear test in the 1960s left it out of the NPT category of “nuclear weapon state”, and India was unwilling to give up the nuclear option by signing on as as a non-nuclear weapon state. Thus, India found itself outside the entire NPT structure.

Having gone through the “pariah” experience for three decades, India has been particularly mindful of the developments in the global governance area to avoid being caught in a similar trap. There have been a few initiatives on and off in the past decade to regulate activities in outer space and India did not want to be on the wrong side of the wall again. However, neither the International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities proposed originally the European Union nor the current UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) seek to ban ASAT tests but it may have been the apprehension about such initiatives that could have motivated India to demonstrate the ASAT capability now.

There is also nothing that stops the current three countries who have tested ASAT capabilities from framing an NPT-like treaty for outer space denying others the technological capacity to develop such weapons. Moreover, India’s test does not violate any existing norms or rules, as the press note put out by the Ministry of External Affairs points out. India is a signatory to all the major agreements on outer space, including Moon Treaty that has seen very few signatories.

Nevertheless, some criticism and concern from other countries should be expected. China has put out a somewhat cautious statement to suggest that countries should “uphold peace and tranquillity in outer space” whereas Pakistan had a stern response calling upon international community to condemn India’s test. Russia and the US are yet to issue a statement. Countries that have pursued strong disarmament efforts such as Japan, for instance, could be a little uneasy with India’s test.

They could perceive India’s test as triggering fresh prospects for militarisation of outer space, which indeed would be unfortunate. India has little interest in militarization of space, considering how dependent India itself is on outer space for a variety of civilian needs. On the other hand, India also had little choice but to respond to China’s earlier test in order to maintain deterrence and protect India’s assets in outer space. Having done that, New Delhi should redouble its efforts to build a global movement to strengthen the norm of non-militarization of outer space.

India’s Missile Test Spotlights Its Lingering Space Challenges, The Diplomat, March 28, 2019

In this week's Diplomat column, I focused on India's demonstration of the ASAT capability arguing that while a recent test is no doubt historic, New Delhi has much work left to do to address the challenges that remain.

Earlier this week, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi made a televised address to announce that India had conducted an anti-satellite (ASAT) missile test from the Dr. A. P. J. Abdul Kalam Island launch complex. Modi went on to tweet that this is a moment of “utmost pride” and an event of “historic impact.”

The test targeted and destroyed one of India’s own satellites operating in low-Earth orbit (LEO). A press release, rather an FAQ issued by the Ministry of External Affairs, claimed that the test was “fully successful” and achieved all mission objectives.

Modi also recalled the precise and complex nature of the exercise, saying “#MissionShakti was a highly complex one, conducted at extremely high speed with remarkable precision. It shows the remarkable dexterity of India’s outstanding scientists and the success of our space programme.”

For the full piece, click here.



It is not clear when India’s ASAT program started but it is safe to assume that it began after the first successful Chinese ASAT test in January 2007. Going by the statements issued by scientists, ministers, as well as military leaders, it is clear that China’s ASAT was a big factor. The previous government of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) led by the Congress party has indeed taken credit for starting the program. Former Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) officials like Dr. V.K. Saraswat had previously stated that India had developed the technological blocks for an ASAT demonstration but lacked the political will to demonstrate the capability.

Traditionally, India’s space program focused largely on civilian and developmental uses but has increasingly had a national security and strategic focus also. Over the last decade, India has deployed a number of satellites with specific national security roles in surveillance as well as military communication. It launched the first dedicated military satellite for the Indian Navy in 2013. This was the result not just of India’s growing technological capacity but also of the increasing competition in the space arena.

China’s efforts to catch up with the United States in outer space, while understandable, also have a second-order impact on India’s national security. And China’s power in both Asia and particularly in South Asia means that New Delhi could not ignore China’s capabilities, including in outer space. Terrestrial conflict and competition have begun to impact outer space activities too, much as during the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union.

In addition, India has also felt the need to conduct spectacular space operations to demonstrate its capabilities. These help demonstrate India’s achievements and possibly give it a bigger voice in international discussions about managing outer space. Though international management of outer space is beginning to fray, with more players, more challenges, and greater nationalism, this is all the more reason for countries like India to make efforts to re-establish some of the norms and rules of managing outer space.

But developing technological capabilities is only one dimension of the challenges India faces. An equally serious challenge is building the institutional apparatus within the government to use these capabilities in the most effective manner possible. To take just one example, the Indian government established the Integrated Space Cell more than a decade ago, which was a good first step, but the Cell has not been able to perform the kind of integrative functions it was originally meant to.

Similarly, the establishment of a triservice aerospace command has been debated for two decades with no real progress. The idea was first articulated by Air Chief Marshal SK Sareen back in 1998 when he headed the Indian Air Force (IAF). Two decades later, India is getting closer to having a Defense Space Agency but not yet a Command. Many in the IAF leadership have argued that the changing nature of warfare, with greater integration of space capabilities as seen during the U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, should be clear imperatives for India to proceed with institutional changes. Moreover, other countries like China are learning from United States’ operations and reorienting their own space programs.

But India has not progressed much in developing an integrated approach to outer space or creating the institutional architecture to ensure greatest effectiveness and efficiency. This task, in fact, may be harder than just developing technology, which is one reason why this has not kept pace with technological developments.

Another area where New Delhi must change is with regard to its involvement in global space governance. India so far has been quite reluctant to get involved in space governance or in the debates about its future. Having demonstrated its ASAT capability, India should not shy away from playing an active role in ensuring that outer space remains peaceful, without weapons, and developing mechanisms that would curb certain irresponsible actions in outer space. At the very least, India should take the lead in shaping the norms of responsible behavior even if formulating legally binding mechanisms are challenging given that developing consensus among major spacefaring powers has been the biggest challenge in this regard.

Having Tested Its ASAT Capability, India Should Help Shape Global Space Norms - The Wire, March 28, 2019

In a second piece on India's ASAT test, I published a short essay in The Wire. I argued here that now that India has demonstrated its ASAT capability, it should move away from its current position of ambiguity to taking a proactive role in shaping the norms, rules and regulations in this area. Having crossed the rubicon, it can join the conversations along with other established space powers to ensure that space remains weapons-free.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced on Wednesday that India has conducted an anti-satellite missile test against a live satellite in low earth orbit (LEO). The ASAT test from the Dr. APJ Abdul Kalam Island launch complex lasted for three minutes and was claimed to be “fully successful” and accomplished all the parameters set out for the missions.

Modi also tweeted that this was a proud moment for India and stated that this test is special for two reasons: First, “India is only the 4th country to acquire such a specialised and modern capability,” and second, “The entire effort is indigenous. India stands tall as a space power! It will make India stronger, even more secure and will further peace and harmony.”

Thereafter, the Ministry of External Affairs provided some additional details on the rationale and the timing for the test in the form of FAQs. The document underlined the rationale for India to demonstrate its ASAT capability as a means “to safeguard our space assets”.

For the full essay, click here.



ASAT itself is not a new technology. The US and the Soviet Union had conducted many ASAT tests during the latter years of the Cold War. After a voluntary moratorium that was in place for more than two decades, China conducted its own first successful ASAT test in January 2007.

The Chinese ASAT test was conducted at an altitude of 865 km and resulted in the creation of 3,000-odd pieces of long-lasting space debris. This was followed by the US, which conducted its own ASAT test, bringing down an old satellite in 2008 at an altitude of 275 km, but with very limited debris. India’s test today was at an altitude of 300 km and thus any debris that has been created could burn up in the atmosphere or come down in a few weeks and months. The larger pieces of debris will come down much faster because gravity will act on them more, but even the smaller pieces should down-enter the atmosphere and burn up in a few months’ time.

India’s demonstration of its ASAT capability has obvious implication for national and international security. For instance, though other countries have tested this capability, they are not thought to have actually deployed it. India is also likely to follow the same path and avoid deploying this system. However, this does not take away from the utility of the demonstration itself. This was required in order to avoid some of the mistakes that India had done in other areas, such as the nuclear domain. India refused to test its nuclear capability in the 1960s, thus being left out of the Non Proliferation Treaty’s category of “nuclear weapon state”.

Clearly, India does not want an NPT for space to be developed and then be banned from developing and demonstrating its ASAT capability. Before today’s test, there were only three countries that have demonstrated this capability and the three could easily come up with an international mechanism that would ban additional ASAT tests. India has been mindful of any such efforts to develop political and legally binding agreements addressing the trend towards weaponisation.

The other key question is the rationale for India to do the ASAT test. Since China’s ASAT test in January 2007, India has been concerned about the security of its space assets. Given India’s investment in the outer space domain including the services and ground infrastructure, India has significant material stakes. Therefore, developing certain deterrent capabilities against any ASAT threat is important.

Now that India has demonstrated its ASAT capability, it should move away from its current position of ambiguity to taking a proactive role in shaping the norms, rules and regulations in this area. Having crossed the rubicon, it can join the conversations along with other established space powers to ensure that space remains weapons-free.

There have been a number of efforts in recent years, including the Code of Conduct proposed by the European Union in the early 2010s to the current UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), which will submit its report soon to the UN General Assembly for further action. India can and should be an active player in these deliberations.

India’s ASAT test: Further steps - ORF March 28, 2019

SO, India finally conducted an anti-satellite (ASAT) test on March 27, 2019. And there I was in Geneva for the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) Meeting on Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS). The timing was interesting and strange in many ways. But amidst all the GGE work, I managed to write a few OpEds on the ASAT test, the strategic implications of it and what needs to be done now that it has a demonstrated ASAT capability.

For the ORF, I wrote a piece examining the next steps following the ASAT test. India’s ASAT test is not surprising although the timing of the test is. India started developing its ASAT capabilities in the last decade after the first successful Chinese ASAT test in 2007. It goes without saying that other countries could follow suit and build ASATs. But China made the first move with regard to ASATs and it took India a dozen years to decide whether it wanted to demonstrate this capability or not.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced yesterday that India has conducted an anti-satellite (ASAT) missile test, hitting a live satellite at an altitude of 300 kms. This makes India only the fourth country after the US, Russia and China to demonstrate such a capability. The only other country that is thought to have this capability is Israel, although it has not demonstrated it as yet.

India’s ASAT test could raise some questions given that it is likely to be perceived as a path to weaponisation but Modi argued that this was a “defensive” move meant to secure India’s own assets. He said, “Our aim is to maintain peace over war mongering. The space programme’s aim is peace, India’s economic and technological progress.” Highlighting the salience of space to India, Modi asserted, “Today, we are using space and satellites for all sorts of purposes, including agriculture, defence, disaster management, communication, entertainment, weather, navigation, education, medical uses, and other things. In such a situation, the security of these satellites is extremely important.”

In fact, the former DRDO chief Dr. VK Saraswat has claimed several times that India is developing the necessary technologies in order to destroy an enemy satellite. In fact, the successful testing of India’s anti-ballistic missile on March 6, 2011 was seen as taking a step closer to India’s development of an ASAT capability.

For the full article, click here.



Many will question the need for India to develop and test such capabilities when it is mired in a number of developmental challenges but the fact is that India is not located in a benign neighbourhood and cannot afford to ignore the new realities within the region and globally within the space domain. Therefore, even though India’s space programme is largely civilian oriented, it has acquired a slightly greater focus on national security concerns. While India still wants to ensure that outer space remains free of weapons and continues as a domain of peace and stability, it is of course not up to New Delhi alone to ensure that. India cannot avoid the increasing militarization of outer space and ignoring this reality will only hurt India’s security interests. Moreover, these developments are taking place at a time when there is a larger power transition within Asia and beyond. India’s difficulties with an aggressive China have also been pushing India down this path.

India has come a long way as far as the ASATs are concerned. From fierce opposition to the US and Soviet ASAT tests in the 1970s and 1980s, India has come to appreciate the strategic utility of these capabilities and demonstrations. While India’s approach to non-proliferation issues and the global regimes has been changing since the early 2000s, a clearer articulation on space began to appear after the Chinese ASAT test in January 2007. The Chinese test was a wake-up call for Indian policymakers who called for breaking down some of the bureaucratic and inter-departmental barriers within the Indian government to better address this threat. Then DRDO Chief Dr. M Natarajan suggested that there must be greater integration between institutions such as Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO). Similar statements were echoed by former ISRO chiefs like Dr. K Kasturirangan, who said that India has spent huge amount of resources to develop and place assets in space and therefore there is responsibility “to protect them from adversaries.”

India did not have knee-jerk reaction to China’s tests but given the worsening security competition, New Delhi had little choice but to make this decision in the interest of ensuring deterrence. But all sides will lose in such an unbridled competition because all are dependent on space.

Now that India has crossed the rubicon and has a demonstrated ASAT capability, New Delhi must make earnest efforts to help develop rules of the road that will bring about certain restraint in outer space activities. Under the current international political climate, it is unrealistic to assume that the major spacefaring powers will develop a consensus for a global treaty but India must not lose opportunities in making those efforts. At the very least, India must coordinate with all the key players in producing some consensus language about those global governance arrangements that can be taken up in multiple foras including the Conference on Disarmament, UN First Committee, and UN Disarmament Commission.

Space should be playground for humanity’s dreams, not new battlefield

Here's a short essay of mine on the global governance of outer space published by the Global Times on October 09, 2013. As two of the established space powers in Asia, India and China, have a responsibility in framing the evolving rules by rectifying loopholes. Legally binding mechanisms are ideal and desirable. However, the prospect of consensus among major powers in identifying challenges and introducing solutions seems distant.

Given these difficulties, India and China could start working toward common definitions of responsible behavior and greater transparency measures among major powers.

For full post, click here.

With the growing dependence on outer space assets for socioeconomic, developmental and military purposes, the number of players in outer space is growing rapidly. There are more than 60 such operators, including non-state actors, in this domain.

India and China, as two of the established space powers in Asia, have a responsibility in framing the evolving rules by rectifying loopholes.

Legally binding mechanisms are ideal and desirable. However, the prospect of consensus among major powers in identifying challenges and introducing solutions seems distant.

Given these difficulties, India and China could start working toward common definitions of responsible behavior and greater transparency measures among major powers.

A new regime should be guided by three key objectives: the security of outer space, order and stability, and sustainability. Most nations accept and acknowledge these objectives, at least rhetorically.

India and China face several common challenges. Operationally, these include space traffic management, overcrowding of satellites and debris in outer space. The debris increases the potential of collision with currently viable assets.

For example this May, the only Ecuadorian satellite, Pegasus, collided with Russian space debris and on August 28, it was officially declared "lost." The UN Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee predicted that space debris, unless tackled aggressively, will have grave consequences over the next 200 years.

The ongoing militarization of space is a concern. Several countries are using space assets for military functions, developing anti-satellite capabilities and offensive uses for space assets, and are making the threat of weaponization and a new arms race imminent.

With this congestion, the need for cooperative rules and regulation cannot be overemphasized, possibly through an institution similar to the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

Unregulated cooperation will only heighten insecurities at multiple levels. This explains the inadequacy of the current regime which has been hobbled by political differences and precluded a new cooperative architecture.

Consequently, different countries have been pursuing tangential solutions. The West has by and large favored Transparency and Confidence Building Measures (TCBMs) as a means to develop norms of responsible behavior in order to ensure safe, secure and continued access to space. While Russia accepts TCBMs, it has joined hands with Beijing to propose a draft treaty preventing the placement of weapons in outer space.

Similarly, a resolution on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) was passed by the UN General Assembly in 1981, but the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva is yet to have a productive session on PAROS.

The UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) is another mechanism to develop cooperative measures in outer space. India too has been active in writing new rules. With a consistent policy against the weaponization of space, it has been active in forums like the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and the CD.

Even as it insists on working out a legally binding mechanism, it is pragmatic enough to recognize the need to start with a normative exercise and gradually move to legal measures.

Space, as a true global commons, must be protected for safe, secure and uninterrupted access. India and China, along with other spacefaring powers, must therefore utilize every opportunity to push for developing norms of responsible behavior, including strengthening measures in the area of active debris removal and on-orbit satellite servicing.

These two early space powers should take on an active role in bridging the gap between the West and the rest in formulating new rules including the Space Code of Conduct and should not allow a few Western countries to monopolize the process, given the huge financial stakes involved.

UNIDIR annual space conference, "Space Security Conference 2013: Enhancing confidence, securing space stability" in Geneva, April 02-03, 2013

Recently, I was at the UNIDIR's annual space security conference titled, "Space Security Conference 2013: Enhancing confidence, securing space stability,"held at UN Headquarters, Geneva, on April 02-03, 2013. The annual space conference of the UNIDIR has become a signature event given the high level participation of all the different stakeholders. I was speaking on space security dialogues and how to ensure widespread representation.

My talk and the PPT are available online now.



Type rest of the post here

Houston Calling New Delhi, co-authored piece on US-India space cooperation....

Here's a recently published piece on US-India space cooperation, co-authored with Dr. Adam Lowther, and published in the National Interest. We have explored several potential areas of cooperation in the US-India context, with a special focus on space situational awareness (SSA).

U.S.-India relations reached a high point when the two countries signed the Civil Nuclear Agreement in 2005. But since then, relations between the two countries have drifted.

While the Obama administration continues to reiterate that relations with India are vital, there have been several issues where Washington has expressed its displeasure. These include India’s nuclear liability bill, which Washington sees as unfair to U.S. companies; India’s decision to reject two different American jet fighters for India’s Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) requirement; and India’s less-than-supportive role within the United Nations on a range of issues, including Libya, Iran and Syria.

New Delhi is not without its own set of complaints about Washington. India feels that American pressure to deepen U.S.-India defense cooperation is premature, particularly given Indian questions about the United States’ credibility as a potential ally or partner. The Obama administration’s initial focus on China is still an irritant in New Delhi, although Washington has since corrected course.

There is certainly no dearth of official statements from both capitals concerning the vitality of the relationship. But it is clear that what is needed is a grand project around which the relationship can grow and strengthen. Without this initiative, we may see US-India relations flounder. One such ideal place for the two countries to collaborate on a grand scale is space.



An Opportunity and Imperative

In 2009, Karl F. Inderfurth, former Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Affairs, and C. Raja Mohan, prominent Indian foreign policy analyst, argued in the Financial Times that space cooperation should become the heart of U.S.-India relations. Several space joint-working group meetings have taken place since then, but substantive outcomes are proving elusive.

Such cooperation would have proven difficult in previous decades. Many Indian space research agencies, including ISRO (Indian Space Research Organization)—India’s equivalent of NASA—were under U.S. sanctions. With sanctions lifted, the potential for cooperation is much greater. Unlike nuclear cooperation, space is much less controversial—and promises benefits not only for humanity but for the long term sustainability of outer space.

Indo-American space cooperation also offers the potential for becoming a broad-based initiative which brings a wide spectrum of stakeholders—national space agencies on both sides, education, science, and technology agencies, as well as private commercial entities—together in collaboration. With private sector participation, there is the prospect of moving beyond governmental entities to create new strategic industries in space.

To achieve such an ambitious agenda, the two governments should institutionalize space cooperation by setting up an Indo-American Commercial Space Initiative or a Space Knowledge Initiative. Such an effort could fall along the same lines as the U.S.-India Agricultural Knowledge Initiative and the U.S.-India Clean Energy Initiative, which are successful models of cooperation. Clean energy is a particularly successful model because it is a public-private partnership, with both governments investing $25 million and the private sector investing $50 million.

Space Traffic Control

There are several specific areas of space exploration where the two countries could cooperate. But an urgent need exists for collaboration on space situational awareness (SSA), which is the ability to monitor, understand, and predict the changing physical environment of outer-space. This includes the location and movement of natural and manmade objects in an effort to prevent collisions and accidents.

This is the corollary of maritime domain awareness (MDA), which refers to essentially large collation of data—both intelligence and information to arrive at what is called in the maritime lingo a common operative picture (COP)--and air domain awareness (ADA), a similar concept regarding air domain.

Of all the potential areas of collaboration, joint space situational awareness is most urgent for India and the United States. Outer space has become crowded, congested and contested—increasing the potential for collisions. The long-term sustainability of outer space is of paramount concern to India and the United States. An increasing number of incidents—the Chinese weapons test in 2007, destruction of a defunct satellite by the United States in 2008, and the collision between a Russian and U.S. satellite in 2009—illustrate the potential threats for space-faring nations. Space debris, unpredictable space weather and aging satellites continue to create insecurity.

According to NASA, there are over 500,000 pieces of debris in Earth’s orbit, some of which are large enough to cause serious damage to satellites and spacecraft. Space weather, caused by charged solar particles and the Earth’s magnetic field, also create disturbing conditions for space objects.

Improving space situational awareness can help in alleviating some of these concerns. Simply put, SSA aims at creating a constant understanding of the space environment by keeping a close watch on developments, including tracking of space objects, debris, and space weather. This includes predicting collisions in orbit, detecting launches of new space objects, predicting reentry of space objects into the atmosphere, and detecting threats and attacks on spacecraft. This can be done by radar, optical telescopes, electronic signals sensors, infrared sensors, or other spacecraft.

The United States already has the most comprehensive SSA mechanism, which is called the Space Surveillance Network (SSN). The SSN is a wide-ranging array of radars and optical telescopes that provides information to the Joint Space Operations Centre in California. Data collected enables tracking of objects. A telescope mounted on the Space-Based Space Surveillance (SBSS) satellite that is operated by the U.S. military also provides such information. But even the U.S. SSN has limited coverage in the Southern Hemisphere.

The Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO), has an operational Telemetry, Tracking and Command Network (ISTRAC), which currently provides mission support to low-earth orbit satellites and launch vehicles. A network of ground stations, spread across India, form the structure of ISTRAC. The Indian Deep Space Network (IDSN) also provides operational support for India as well as external space agencies. Additionally, the two Swordfish tracking radars, which have been deployed by India, have the potential for monitoring activities in space.

On the American side, U.S. Strategic Command/Air Force Space Command manage these functions. ISRO, India’s civilian space agency—not the Indian military—is STRATCOM’s counterpart. Bringing the two together has proven difficult in the past. For India to move forward, its space-domain bureaucracies have to overcome any aversions to working with the U.S. military.

The Dragon in the Room

For many within the U.S. military space community, collaboration with India is seen as having limited potential. With the United States clearly the more advanced technologically, there is legitimate concern that cooperation may lead to large and costly technology transfers. After all, space remains one of the U.S. military’s most highly classified areas. But safeguarding critical information and technology is possible and well worth taking a reasonable risk.

As India and the United States look to the future, both are deeply concerned over a rising China that is asserting itself in unexpected and aggressive ways. To effectively counter the Chinese dragon, Uncle Sam and the Indian tiger must move beyond the U.S.-India civil nuclear agreement and existing commercial relations to build trust and cooperation in other areas. Space has the potential to serve as the next grand project steering the relationship to greater heights.