India-Iran-Uzbekistan Pursue Central Asian Connectivity - The Diplomat, 18 December 2020

In my column for The Diplomat this week, I looked at India-Iran-Uzbekistan plans for Central Asian connectivity.  The region has its fair share of great power politics, but the Iranian port of Chabahar has the potential to shift some of the regional dynamics in India's favor.   

India, Iran, and Uzbekistan have held their first trilateral meeting for possible joint use of Chabahar port. The meeting was chaired jointly by India’s Secretary of Shipping Sanjeev Ranjan, Uzbekistan’s Deputy Minister of Transport Davron Dehkanov, and Iran’s Deputy Transport Minister Shahram Adamnejad. Using Chabahar port for trade and transit purposes as well as strengthened regional connectivity were the key agenda items at the meeting. India’s keenness to explore this option comes from its desire to extend connectivity into Eurasia. Double landlocked Uzbekistan has also been interested in using the port for transit facilities into the Indian Ocean and as a means to expand its trade and transit options. That Uzbekistan has already developed rail connectivity into Afghanistan as a means to link with Iranian railway lines reflects Tashkent’s seriousness. Other Central Asian states like Kazakhstan have also been interested in exploring such options.  

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Given the geostrategic location of Central Asia, the region is also witnessing a fair share of great power competition. While the region is viewed as Russia’s immediate backyard and Moscow has traditionally maintained a dominant role in relations with Central Asia, China has steadily strengthened its footprint. India has also been pursuing both geopolitical and economic ties with the region. 

Chabahar has the potential to shift some of the regional dynamics in India’s favor. First, it could prove to be a gateway to Central Asia and Eurasia, which can, most importantly, avoid Pakistan. A year ago, the Trump administration exempted India from sanctions for the development of the port because of the benefits it potentially had for both India and Afghanistan. A Trump administration official said, “We have provided a narrow exemption for the development of Chabahar that allows for the construction of the port and rail line that allows for the export of refined oil products to Afghanistan.” 

This week’s trilateral meeting is reported to be an outcome of last week’s India-Uzbekistan bilateral summit between India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev. This is clearly an effort at exploring an alternate option for Central Asia to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). India has long historic connections to Central Asia, but its relations with the region waned for a number of reasons, most importantly the partition of the Indian subcontinent and the creation of Pakistan, which blocked Indian access to the region. Since coming to office, Modi has made fresh efforts to re-establish linkages with the region, calling Central Asia a part of the country’s extended neighborhood. 

But lack of physical connectivity has proven to be a major hurdle in building trade and economic ties. Modi became the first Indian leader to travel to all five Central Asian republics – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan – in 2015. In addition to energy security cooperation, India and Central Asia have both shunned Islamic terrorism and extremist ideology. Fighting cross-border terrorism has become an important common issue shaping their agenda. India has also been stepping up defense cooperation with the region, with a defense attaché posted in each of the Indian missions in Central Asia. Among the Central Asian republics, Uzbekistan has emerged as one of the more proactive players in its engagement with India. The two countries signed a civil nuclear agreement in January 2019, under which Uzbekistan agreed to supply India with uranium.  

Regional connectivity and infrastructure projects have also been high on Uzbekistan’s agenda. Seeing Chabahar port as a connectivity solution for Uzbekistan is not new either. In fact, in June 2018, following an earlier meeting between Modi and Mirziyoyev on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit, then-Indian Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale said the two leaders were keen to use Chabahar port as an additional connectivity route.  

Not surprisingly, at last week’s bilateral summit meeting between India and Uzbekistan, infrastructure and connectivity projects figured prominently. The two countries signed nine agreements including on counterterrorism and infrastructure-related issues. Both Modi and Mirziyoyev agreed to pursue connectivity projects via the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). INSTC is a multi-modal infrastructure initiative spanning around 7,200 km. It encompasses a network of ship, rail and road routes for transporting freight between India, Iran, Afghanistan, Central Asia, Azerbaijan, and Europe, with the goal of creating transport linkages among major cities including Astrakhan, Baku, Bandar Abbas, Moscow, and Mumbai. Feasibility studies undertaken so far has shown significant reduction of transportation costs, to the tune of $2,500 per 15 tons of cargo. India is “pitching for” Uzbek participation in the INSTC connectivity project.  

India’s push with the trilateral arrangement for Uzbekistan to use Chabahar port is important in the context of expanding bilateral, trilateral, as well as broader regional cooperation. But more significantly, it is a geopolitical move aimed at countering growing Chinese influence in the region. India has capacity issues in this regard compared to China, but New Delhi is planning on cashing in on existing projects to expand its reach and linkages so that the Central Asian republics have an alternative to China’s BRI.  

The Rising Domestic Danger to India’s Foreign Policy Under Modi - The Diplomat, 6 March 2020

In this week's essay for The Diplomat, I looked at the growing international attention and criticism to some of the recent internal developments in India. Whether New Delhi likes it or not, it is becoming increasingly clear that domestic issues are affecting ties with its neighbors and partners and that the costs of this are increasing.

Over the past few months, it has become increasingly clear that India’s domestic issues are increasingly threatening to impact India’s foreign policy. Issues such as the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) and India’s actions in Kashmir are beginning to affect India’s relations with its neighbors, major Islamic countries such as Iran and Indonesia, and strategic partners such as the United States. Last week’s violence in Delhi, in particular, is drawing negative attention to India’s internal matters and could possibly affect its reputation.

For the full essay, click here.



In an exceptional move, and a first for India, the Geneva-based Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has said that it was planning to file an application on the CAA in the Indian Supreme Court. The UN Higher Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet subsequently filed an Intervention Application against the CAA. The MEA responded to this by saying that the CAA is an internal issue of India and “no foreign party has any locus standi on issues pertaining to India’s sovereignty.”

Iran is another recent critic, and another surprising one too, and it was vocal in condemning the communal violence in Delhi, especially the targeting of India’s Muslim citizens. Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif had a tough tweet on the Delhi violence, saying, “Iran condemns the wave of organized violence against Indian Muslims. For centuries, Iran has been a friend of India. We urge Indian authorities to ensure the well-being of ALL Indians & not let senseless thuggery prevail. Path forward lies in peaceful dialogue and rule of law.”

New Delhi did not respond kindly to the foreign minister’s comments. Responding to a question on the Iranian foreign minister’s tweet, the MEA spokesperson stated that India had summoned Iranian Ambassador Ali Chegeni and “a strong protest was lodged against the unwarranted remarks made by the Iranian Foreign Minister. It was conveyed that his selective and tendentious characterization of recent events in Delhi are not acceptable. We do not expect such comments from a country like Iran.” Apparently, it was made clear to the Iranian ambassador that this was an internal issue of India and that Iranian comments were not appreciated.

It is strange that the Iranian foreign minister’s particularly harsh tweet came just a few days after India joined hands with Iran to speed up the Chabahar port development. While Iran is known to champion the rights of Muslim minorities in other countries, it was a bit incongruous considering that Iran has said little about China’s behavior towards its Muslim Uyghur minority, large numbers of whom have been placed in concentration camps simply because of their Islamic faith. Of course, nations are not always consistent in their policies, and Iran fears China far more than it fears India.

While Iran is not a particularly strategic partner for India and can possibly be ignored, others are more difficult to dismiss. Indonesia, an important partner in India’s Act East and Indo-Pacific strategy, has also voiced serious concerns about the violence in Delhi. Muhammadiyah, Indonesia’s second largest Muslim group, expressed disquiet about the violent clashes between Hindus and Muslims on account of the CAA. Muhammadiyah secretary-general Abdul Mu’thi while denouncing the violence, said that the violence was “clearly against human rights principles.” A day after the violence, hashtag #ShameOnYouIndia was among the top trending topics on Twitter in Indonesia, and as many as 46,000 tweets were related to the Delhi violence, many condemning the violence.

This was mirrored by some of the government reactions as well. There was an unusually strong statement issued by the Indonesian Religious Affairs Ministry condemning the religious violence in Delhi. Within hours of this statement, the Indonesian foreign ministry made a statement saying that “The Government of Indonesia has complete confidence that the Government of India will be able to manage the situation and ensure the harmonious relations among its religious communities. Moreover, both countries share similar characteristics, as pluralistic countries that uphold democratic values and tolerance.” The Indonesian foreign ministry also called in the Indian Ambassador to Jakarta, Pradeep Rawat, seeking details on the Delhi violence.

Of course, this pales in comparison to any damage that may be caused to India’s ties to the United States, its most important strategic partner. Despite the successful Trump visit to India, this bears watching. India’s foreign minister and its diplomats have done a good job explaining its position in the United States after the revoking Article 370 in Jammu and Kashmir, but India’s approach after the CAA has been quite poor. For instance, Indian Foreign Minister Jaishankar’s cancellation of meetings with U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) because Pramila Jayapal was part of the delegation possibly did not help. In fact, the resolution in the Congress, seeking a return to normalcy in Kashmir, sponsored by Jayapal found 10 additional legislators ready to co-sponsor it right after the cancellation of the meeting.

Last week’s violence in the capital sparked new concerns in the United States with several leading names from the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) and others, including Democrat presidential candidate Bernie Sanders, expressing serious concerns. Once again, the MEA spokesperson called these statements “irresponsible.” Raveesh Kumar, the MEA spokesperson went on to state that “Our law enforcement agencies are working on the ground to prevent violence and ensure restoration of confidence and normalcy. Senior representatives of the government have been involved in that process. Prime Minister has publicly appealed for peace and brotherhood.” A lot of India’s diplomatic bandwidth now has to be used for fighting these fires than for improving a vital relationship.

India can continue to dismiss these criticisms and concerns as unnecessary interference in its internal affairs, but it is unlikely this would help much. Even India’s well-wishers are beginning to worry. This will eventually be expensive if these problems are not resolved, especially because New Delhi will be wasting effort in explaining itself and creating unnecessary tensions and discomfort in critical relationships. Of course, the most important reason for resolving these problems is that India should be a society in which no section feels persecuted and differences are resolved peacefully, which it is difficult to say right now.

What Does Trump’s Iran Deal Withdrawal Mean for India’s Security?, my weekly essay for The Diplomat, 12 May 2018

My this week's Diplomat column focused the Trump's Iran nuclear deal deal and what it means for India's security. Though the decision itself may not have been surprising, the consequences could be serious for New Delhi’s security. In fact, the United States pulling out does create more than a few uncertainties – for regional security, for nonproliferation, and for American credibility more generally.



For the full article, click here.



On May 9, U.S. President Donald Trump announced his decision to pull out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), popularly called the Iran nuclear deal. While the decision itself may not have been surprising, its consequences could be serious for other regional actors, including India.

The JCPOA, meant to stall Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, was finalized in July 2015. The deal was concluded between Iran and the P5 (United States, Russia, France, China, and United Kingdom) plus Germany and the European Union. The deal was controversial in the United States, and Trump had promised to get rid of the deal even during his election campaign. So, his decision itself was not a surprise.

Nevertheless, the United States pulling out does create more than a few uncertainties – for regional security, for nonproliferation, and for American credibility more generally. There could also be potentially serious consequences for third countries such as India.

Typifying its usual balancing act, New Delhi issued a statement following the U.S. pull out, saying, “All parties should engage constructively to address and resolve issues that have arisen with respect to the JCPOA.”

In reality, even though India was not party to the deal, India supported it. New Delhi had watched the growing tensions between Iran and the United States before the deal was reached with some trepidation because a war could have had multiple negative consequences for India, including threats to the very large Indian expatriate population, disruption of oil supplies, and being forced to pick sides between Iran and the United States, to name just a few. Thus, India was quite happy with the nuclear deal because it eliminated the probability of immediate war.

Now, with the future of the deal in doubt and increasing tensions in the region, India has reasons to be concerned and cautious. Some officials have sought to promote calm: Commerce Secretary Rita Teaoti, for instance, stated that the U.S. decision to pull out of JCPOA will have limited impact. She said that the Obama administration’s partial easing of sanctions did not lead to larger trade between India and Iran and that the “trade with Iran has remain at even levels.” Therefore, she argued that the reinstatement of sanctions will not have a significant impact on India-Iran ties. There is an element of truth to this: India’s Iran projects were not exactly progressing with any great speed in any case.

A bigger concern is regarding India’s energy security. Iran is the third largest supplier of oil to India, supplying 18.4 million tons (mt) of crude from April 2017 to January 2018 and 27.2 mt in 2016-17. Iran’s acting ambassador in India, Massoud Rezvanian Rahaghi, attempted to reassure New Delhi, stating that “oil trade with India will not be affected.” But it is quite apparent too that he was attempting desperately to keep India engaged with Iran, arguing that given the strategic importance of the Chabahar port to India, no political issues should come in the way of developing the port.

Rahaghi went on to suggest that the India and Iran must therefore find ways to “immunize” the relationship and keep it “sustainable and durable.” India-Iran relations tend to shift in terms of who holds more of the leverage depending on how troubled Iran is: now, with Iran potentially facing isolation, New Delhi clearly is in a better position.

The second concern is about Chabahar port. Development of the port has been delayed by several years, although it appears to have gained new momentum following Modi’s visit to Tehran in May 2016. According to Nitin Gadkari, the national minister of roadways, the port will be operational by 2018. There is fear that U.S. sanctions could affect this timeline and delay the handing over of the project further.

But New Delhi is likely to make a strong case with Washington for Chabahar by highlighting the connectivity that will be established through the port. The port will create direct links with Afghanistan, which India believes is vital for New Delhi as well as Washington, in addition to becoming the gateway to Russia and Central Asia for India. More critically, if India fails to complete the project, China could step in, which would be a double blow to India.

A broader concern is about the general stability of the region. If the increasing tension in the region should ignite into a full-scale war, India faces a number of challenges. Millions of Indian expatriates live in the Arab states of the Gulf, and they would be in the direct line of fire. And politically, it will become very difficult for India to continue playing the balancing game between Iran on one side and Israel, the Arab states and the United States on the other.

Finally, India will also have to balance its other interests with the developments in the Gulf. Important as Iran might be, there is little comparison between Iran and the United States when it comes to protecting India’s larger national security interests, which heavily concerns China. If India is forced to choose, it is likely to decide that it needs Washington more than Tehran. This would not be unprecedented: India sided with the United States against Iran in critical IAEA votes when New Delhi was negotiating the U.S.-India nuclear deal. If the push comes to shove, India’s choice is likely to be no different.