India under Strain across South Asia - my Diplomat column translated and republished in a mainstream Bangladesh newspaper - 9 August 2020

I am pleased to see my latest column for The Diplomat on India's strained relations with its neighbours in South Asia translated in Bangla and reprinted by one of the largest circulating dailies in Bangladesh, Manabzamin today. Those of you who may not have seen the original article, it is available here. I argue that India’s regional relations are almost all in states of distress and that’s a big problem for New Delhi.

India’s standing in its South Asian neighborhood is under some strain. New Delhi is facing trouble not only in its relations with its traditional adversary, Pakistan, but also Nepal, Bangladesh and possibly Sri Lanka, too, just as it is facing pressure from China along the Tibet border. The Maldives is possibly the only relatively bright spot for India in the region at present.



I conclude by saying that New Delhi will try hard to improve its relations with other neighbors, but for now, it has to be satisfied with just the Maldives.

India Under Strain Across South Asia - The Diplomat, 7 August 2020

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I look at India's strained relations with almost all its neighbours in South Asia. I argue that India’s regional relations are almost all in states of distress and that’s a big problem for New Delhi.

India’s standing in its South Asian neighborhood is under some strain. New Delhi is facing trouble not only in its relations with its traditional adversary, Pakistan, but also Nepal, Bangladesh and possibly Sri Lanka, too, just as it is facing pressure from China along the Tibet border. The Maldives is possibly the only relatively bright spot for India in the region at present.

For the full article, click here.



In May this year, Nepali Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli surprised India by releasing a new political map claiming a part of Indian territory. The new map shows the Kalapani, Limpiyadhura, and Lipulekh areas in the Indian state of Uttarakhand as belonging to Nepal. These areas are shown as part of Byas rural municipality in Nepal’s Sudurpaschim province. Speaking to the media, Padma Kumari Aryal, the minister for land management, cooperatives, and poverty alleviation, said that the map will come into effect immediately and added that “The areas including Gunji, Navi and Kuti near Kalapani, which had been left out in earlier maps, are also included in the new map.”

India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) responded by calling it a “unilateral act” that “is not based on historical facts and evidence.” The Indian statement rejected the claim, calling “contrary to the bilateral understanding to resolve the outstanding boundary issues through diplomatic dialogue.” Nepal’s action followed large protests in Kathmandu after Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh opened an 80-kilometer road between Dharchula and Lipulekh in Uttarakhand, part of India’s effort to improve its infrastructure along the Tibet border. Indian Army Chief General M.M. Naravane suggested that Nepal was possibly acting on behalf of “someone else,” a not-so-veiled reference to China, creating more anger in Nepal.

The new map has now been endorsed by Nepal’s Parliament and the Oli government is planning to send the map to the United Nations and other multilateral institutions. Meanwhile, Oli appears to be making a bad situation worse by talking about India’s efforts to remove him from office. This escalation has worried even members of his own party, with one saying that if India asks for concrete evidence “we will have to prove it or face the consequences.” Oli has made other controversial anti-India statements recently including a reference to the “Indian virus” being “more lethal than the Chinese or Italian viruses.” Although he was talking about workers carrying the virus from India to Nepal and trying to suggest a possible difference in the strain of the virus, it was an inelegant formulation that has not gone down well in New Delhi.

Following the India-Nepal map row, Pakistan is testing the waters by issuing a new political map of its own. On the eve of the first anniversary of India’s revoking the special status of Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan released a new political map, containing the whole of Jammu and Kashmir as well as parts of Gujarat. Calling it a “historical occasion,” Prime Minister Imran Khan said, “The political map reflects our national aspiration and supports our principled stance on Kashmir dispute.”

This has clearly irked India and New Delhi dismissed it as “ridiculous assertions” with “neither legal validity nor international credibility.” The Indian MEA in a statement called it “an exercise in political absurdity” and that it “confirms reality of Pakistan’s obsession with territorial aggrandisement supported by cross-border terrorism.” Manish Tewari, a member of parliament from the opposition Congress party, said in a tweet that this is essentially “a Geostrategic statement by China.” He added that, “Coming as it does after Nepal’s new map it is China’s way of rubbing in India’s isolation in it’s Neighbhourhood (sic). Wouldn’t be surprised if one or two others in neighbourhood walk down this absurd street.”

India is facing difficulties with Bangladesh, too. India had managed its relations with Bangladesh quite well during Modi’s first term, but that is not the case anymore. The India Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), which is seen as targeting Muslims, especially migrants from Bangladesh, has cratered relations. The Sheikh Hasina government has been clear about how Bangladesh views CAA, and the reference to Bangladeshi migrants as “termites” by India’s home minister created understandable anger. Demonstrating Dhaka’s displeasure, a scheduled visit by Bangladesh Foreign Minister A.K. Abdul Momen was cancelled by Dhaka at the very last minute. The CAA has put Bangladesh, a predominantly Muslim country that was friendly to India and the Modi government, in a difficult position. Bangladesh also worries about possible reverse migration, because there could be an exodus of Muslim migrants escaping persecution in India, especially from the northeastern state of Assam.

With the Rajapaksas back in office, Sri Lanka, another South Asian neighbor, may also be a cause for worry in New Delhi. The Rajapaksas are seen to be close to China, and there are reports suggesting that China is keen for Sri Lanka to distance itself from India and its other partners such as Japan. Austin Fernando, former Sri Lankan high commissioner to India, argued in a recent essay that India’s over-cautious approach is partly to blame for the situation. The Sri Lankan government’s recent decision to halt a Japan-funded light rail project is one indicator that all is not well. Bandula Gunewardene, Sri Lanka’s information minister, stated that it was an expensive proposition with low returns. Similarly, the India-Japan collaboration on Sri Lanka’s East Container Terminal (ECT) project in Colombo is on shaky grounds. The three countries had signed an Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) only a year ago but there is no guarantee that this project will go ahead, at least with India and Japan as partners.

With much of its neighborhood relations in various degrees of distress, India is making its pitch in the Maldives to restrict China’s growing influence. According to Indian media reports, India is planning to announce a “substantial financial assistance package” to the Maldives in order for Male to address the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The real goal appears to be strategic: to curtail China’s growing footprint. In July, Sunjay Sudhir, Indian high commissioner in the Maldives, gave the country a symbolic check for carrying out nine projects in the Maldives through the High Impact Community Development Projects (HICDP) scheme. Under this scheme, India has signed several MoUs to develop fish-processing units, set up tourism zones, and establish a bottled water plant. The current package comes after India had given the Maldives $400 million under an extended currency swap arrangement to help manage its liquidity crisis. India has also provided the Maldives with an additional $1.4 billion as budgetary aid to battle the economic impact from the COVID-19 pandemic.

Whether these assistance packages will sustain India’s role and influence in the Maldives remains to be seen. For the moment, it appears to be so. India enjoys considerable goodwill in the country after the 2018 elections, with the election of Ibrahim Mohamed Solih. India does have friends in the Maldives. Mohamed Nasheed, speaker and former president, recently said in Male that the Maldives must be wise in making smart choices, and “join hands with India” for growth and prosperity. Highlighting the Maldives’ important geographical importance, he added, “I am also certain that Maldivians and their elected leaders will be wise and make shrewd and sensible decisions regarding our foreign policy and our relationship with our closest allies and neighbors, the closest and dearest of whom is India.”

New Delhi will try hard to improve its relations with other neighbors, but for now, it has to be satisfied with just the Maldives.

China Shows its True Colors by Blocking India’s Terror Blacklist Bid Again - The Diplomat, March 15, 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, "China Shows its True Colors by Blocking India’s Terror Blacklist Bid Again", I argue that Beijing’s move, though unsurprising, is not without significance.

Earlier this week, for the fourth time, China has blocked India’s efforts to designate Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) chief Masood Azhar as a global terrorist under the United Nations (UN). Beijing’s effort represents just the latest blow to New Delhi’s efforts in this vein. While India has been making global efforts to isolate Pakistan diplomatically, its efforts at placing Azhar under the 1267 Al Qaeda Sanctions Committee of the UN Security Council has been yet again blocked by China.

To be sure, China’s action should not obscure the fact that the broader support base for India has gone up on this score. This is reflected in the number of co-sponsors of the proposal this time. The current proposal was initiated by France, the UK and the United States and co-sponsored by countries including Germany, Poland, Belgium, Italy, Bangladesh, Maldives, Bhutan, Equatorial Guinea, Japan and Australia.

Nonetheless, Beijing’s response is significant. China justified its action by saying that “our action is to make sure that the committee will have enough time to study the matter so that the relevant sides will have time for dialogue and consultation. Only a solution that is acceptable to all sides could fundamentally provide a chance for a lasting solution to the issue. China is ready to communicate and coordinate with all sides including India to properly handle this issue.”

For the full essay, click here.



India’s official response was disappointed but calm. The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), in a statement, said, “The ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee (1267 Sanctions Committee), upon completion of the no-objection period on 13 March 2019, was not able to come to a decision on the proposal for listing Mohammed Masood Azhar Alvi under the UN Sanctions regime, on account of a member placing the proposal on hold. We are disappointed by this outcome. This has prevented action by the international community to designate the leader of Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), a proscribed and active terrorist organization which has claimed responsibility for the terrorist attack in Jammu and Kashmir on 14 February 2019.”

Irrespective of what India says publicly, this is proof, yet again, that China is not going to abandon its ironclad relationship with Pakistan. Neither is Beijing going to succumb to pressure from others such as the United States, France, the UK, Russia, and India to change its tack on Pakistan. About an hour before the expiry of the deadline for any member to raise objections, China put in place a “technical hold” meaning that the proposal will be on the hold for the next six months. Member countries can supply information over the next nine months for lifting the hold and Masood Azhar can be listed.

In the past, China has argued that there is “no contradiction” in its policies on terrorism such as in supporting the BRICS declaration against terrorism and its policy to Masood Azhar designation as a global terrorist because the BRICS declaration was addressing terrorist groups and not individuals. And to be sure, there is some logic to Beijing’s position: It is premised on balancing India by supporting Pakistan. Pakistan has remained China’s all-weather ally through more than five decades, and both Islamabad and Beijing worry about and balance against India.

From Pakistan’s perspective, India represents an existential threat. Pakistan’s primary strategic objective since the two nations were born has been to weaken India by any means necessary. For Beijing, India represents one of the few potential challengers to China’s dominance of Asia. Both have been clear and single-minded in their pursuit to weaken and balance India, which has made for one of the most durable and deepest strategic alignments since the 1950s. There is little likelihood that this will end any time soon, a reality that seems lost on India’s foreign policy elite.

It is unlikely that India will respond in any extreme, escalatory manner toward Beijing in the short term. The general elections next month occupy much of the government’s attention. Foreign policy issues are unlikely to play a big part in the campaign except for the ruling BJP chest-thumping on the Balakot strike against Pakistan. Moreover, India’s opposition parties, all to the left of the nationalist BJP, have few foreign policy ideas or critiques that have any traction. Calling Modi “weak” and “scared of Xi”, as Rahul Gandhi, the leader of the opposition Congress party has charged, is unlikely to suffice.

On the other hand, there is significant and vocal criticism in the Indian media of the “Wuhan spirit,” and the broader Sino-Indian reset in the aftermath of the Doklam confrontation in 2017. The Hindustan Times, a leading English-language national daily, editorialized that “the Wuhan exercise seems to have failed. Not just Pakistan-backed terrorism, China has not yielded ground on anything else.” Another newspaper has warned that bilateral ties could suffer because New Delhi feels betrayed. This has been matched on social media sites in India such as Twitter where #BoycottChineseProducts and #ChinaBacksTerrorism have been trending. Whether and how this will affect Indian policy towards China after the coming elections remains to be seen.

India-Pakistan Crisis Exposes Modi’s Dilemma - The Diplomat, 28 February 2019

In a first, Rajesh (Rajagopalan) and I have a joint article on the India-Pakistan crisis post-Balakot air force strikes and what Modi's options are. In the piece, India-Pakistan Crisis Exposes Modi’s Dilemma, we argue that the decision about whether to escalate or not is much more complex than it appears.

The India-Pakistan confrontation over the terrorist attack on Indian troops in Pulwama does not appear to be easing just yet. After the Indian air strike on a Jaish-e-Mohammad terrorist camp in Pakistan, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) retaliated by bombing several “non-military” targets across the Line of Control.

What happened subsequently is a bit hazy, but it appears that at least one Indian MiG-21 fighter was shot down as it chased the PAF fighters away, with the pilot falling into Pakistan’s hands. India has demanded that he be handed over. Paradoxically, this could be a blessing in disguise as it provides an avenue for both sides to deescalate the crisis.

On the other hand, the current situation does put Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on the horns of a dilemma. He has incentives both to escalate and climb down, and the stakes for him are the upcoming elections.

For the full post, click here.



The incentives to escalate are clear: if this is where the confrontation ends, India has clearly lost, and the Modi government will be held responsible. Already Indian opposition parties are blaming the government for the situation India finds itself in. Twenty-one of these parties have jointly blamed the government for the “blatant politicization of the sacrifices made by our armed forces by leader of the ruling party”, a clear indication that Modi will be personally targeted if this does not end well for India. With barely a couple of months left for polls in India, it will be difficult for him to spin this as an Indian victory if this is where it ends. Moreover, it strikes at the root of the Modi persona as a strong man, and as a decisive leader.

The other strong incentive for India to escalate is the strategic equation if the crisis ends now. The Balakot strike was designed to demonstrate that India had the upper hand because of its conventional military superiority and that it had the space to escalate if it wanted to. If India had been able to do this successfully, it could have fundamentally changed the India-Pakistan dynamic, because it could have set up a template for future Indian military action. By the same token, an Indian failure does not return the situation to status quo ante, but to a much worse place for India. It would reinforce Pakistan’s deterrence logic, tie India’s hands in future confrontations, and give Pakistan a free hand to continue with its strategy of using terror against India. It would have been better for India to not have launched the Balakot attack at all because India’s conventional deterrence, such as it is, will lie in tatters.

Set against these are two disincentives for escalation, again one political and the other strategic. The political one is that after this taste of the unexpected turns in a test of arms, Modi will have to worry about whether he can trust the Indian military to carry out subsequent actions successfully. Further confrontation carries with it the possibility of retrieving the situation but equally, further risk that the situation could get worse. Though it is reasonably certain that India will come out on top in a long drawn out fight, a long drawn out fight itself would be humiliating for a country that is by many orders larger and more powerful. Modi will find it difficult to go campaigning if India has not won decisively, and the risk of escalation is that there will be no immediate or decisive victory.

A second disincentive for escalation is that India may not have militarily prepared for this confrontation. Doubling down on escalation with a military force that is not ready is a recipe for disaster. The Modi government has only itself to blame, having paid little attention to the military and starved it of funds to the point that it is not certain that it would perform much better if the situation worsens. The unpreparedness provides a good disincentive for further escalation because of the uncertainty.

It is not clear in which direction Modi will push. But beyond this iteration of India-Pakistan confrontation, this should hopefully demonstrate to Indian political leaders that they need to pay greater attention to military and security matters than they have hitherto and make the necessary adjustments before a crisis hits rather than after.

Prince Salman Tour Spotlights Saudi Arabia Variable in India-Pakistan-China Relations - The Diplomat, 28 February 2019

I had not updated my blog for a few days amidst some travel and other commitments. A few days ago, I wrote a piece for the Diplomat on the Saudi Crown Prince's visit to India, looking at the larger dynamics of MBS/ Saudi Arabia in India-Pakistan-China relations. The voyage highlighted Riyadh’s role in the balance of ties between the three states and India’s continued concerns on that front.

Last week, in the midst of India-Pakistan tensions which show few signs of ebbing, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, popularly known as MBS, kicked off a pre-planned regional trip that included stops in India, Pakistan, and China. Though the coincidence in timing was accidental, his voyage nonetheless spotlighted the Saudi factor in India-Pakistan relations.

In a reflection of how sensitive MBS’s trip was, he paid a trip to Pakistan but then, in order to “de-hyphenate” the visit, he returned to Saudi Arabia and traveled back to the region a second time for the India visit before moving on to China. That spotlighted the effort Saudi Arabia continues to make to not unnecessarily alienate either New Delhi or Islamabad.

For the full essay, click here.



More substantively, in terms of the legs of the visit, the Pakistan trip produced little for India to cheer about. The two sides expressed appreciation for efforts made by them in the “war on terrorism” despite Islamabad’s complicity with some terror groups, and there was a reference in the joint statement to “avoiding politicization of UN listing regime” although Saudi Foreign Minister Adel Al-Jubeir has come out clarifying that this was not a reference to Masood Azhar, the head of the Jaish-e-Muhammad (the terrorist group that has claimed responsibility for the Pulwama terror attack) that India had been trying to put under this list. In an indication of continued Saudi Arabia-Pakistan ties, the two countries signed deals worth $20 billion which comes in addition to $6 billion loan that Riyadh had given to Islamabad in October 2018, with Saudi Arabia also planning to invest $10 billion in a refinery and petrochemical complex in Gwadar.

The India part of the trip was also hardly a win for New Delhi. MBS’s visit to India, which came nearly three years after Modi’s visit to Saudi Arabia when leaders from both countries took a decision to diversify and expand their relationship to include trade, investment and counterterrorism, came under greater scrutiny this time around. For instance, at a more symbolic level, Modi has come under sharp criticism domestically for breaking with protocol and doing his usual bear hug with the Saudi Crown Prince. On a more substantive note, there has also been criticism that Modi did not use the occasion to extract some strong commitment from Saudi Arabia on Pakistan and terrorism. Though he had said that there will be strong reference to countering terrorism, the fact that MBS did not mention Pulwama is seen in India as a big failure.

Of course, the expectation that India could extract certain concessions from Saudi Arabia may seem far-fetched because a leader of the Islamic world like Saudi Arabia will always be in a tight spot in managing relations with both secular India and Islamic Pakistan. There was also a clear effort to forge greater cooperation. As a senior Indian official TS Tirumurti emphasized, for Saudi Arabia, India is one of the eight strategic partners and Riyadh plans to “deepen partnership” with India in the areas of security, trade, investment and culture. During the visit, MBS committed to invest $100 billion over the next few years in areas like energy, refining, petrochemicals, infrastructure, agriculture, and manufacturing, and the two sides also plan to deepen the bilateral defence and security engagements, with a special focus on joint naval exercises between the two militaries.

In sum, New Delhi should be happy with Saudi promises of trade and investment. But from the perspective of the fight against terror or on Indian objective of “isolating Pakistan,” it will be seen rather disappointing. For Saudi Arabia, Pakistan offers important security benefits, including a potential nuclear cover, which India simply cannot match.

After finishing his India visit, the crown prince traveled to China. China is important to Riyadh on its own terms – it is its largest trading partner and MBS sees an opportunity to further his Vision 2030 plan. But the focus was also on what if any additional cooperation both sides would forge during the visit, given that Saudi Arabia is one of Pakistan’s strongest friends and strategic partners.

On this part of the voyage, there were few surprises for India. The trip saw China and Saudi Arabia forge greater economic ties and also reinforce their shared cooperation on counterterrorism, with the international headlines focused on how Riyadh, the center of the Muslim world, seemed to basically sweep aside China’s poor treatment of its own Muslim Uyghurs. There were also references made to China’s interest in Saudi Arabia in terms of its grander designs with respect to the Belt and Road Initiative and the Maritime Silk Road, as a lot of the Chinese trade will go through the Red Sea, bordering Saudi Arabia.

All in all, unfortunately for New Delhi, if anything this leg, as with MBS’s trip more generally, amounted to largely more of the same in terms of both the concerns India has long had and the limits to further altering the Saudi Arabia variable in the India-Pakistan relationship to its advantage.