Friday, September 18, 2020

Rise of the Minilaterals: Examining the India-France-Australia Trilateral - The Diplomat, 17 September 2020

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I look at the rise of the minilaterals, wherein I examine the India-France-Australia Trilateral. The India-France-Australia trilateral is only the latest of the many minilaterals that are taking shape in the Indo-Pacific region.

Last week, India, France, and Australia held their first trilateral meeting. The senior officials’ meeting, held in a virtual setting, was co-chaired by Vardhan Shringla, India’s foreign secretary; François Delattre, secretary-general of the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs; and Frances Adamson, secretary of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT).

For the full post, click here.

The Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), in a statement, said that the trilateral meeting was an effort at strengthening cooperation among the three countries in the Indo-Pacific region. The statement also noted that the three countries plan to meet on an annual basis. Tweeting about the meeting, the MEA said, “We agreed to build convergences in our approach to the Indo-Pacific region and to explore ways to strengthen trilateral cooperation, particularly in the maritime domain.”

An Australian readout of the meeting was similar to the Indian statement, while the French readout was more explicit in emphasizing the importance of international law, peace, and security in the Indo-Pacific. The French statement said that the meeting “helped underscore the goal of guaranteeing peace, security and adherence to international law in the Indo-Pacific by drawing on the excellence of bilateral relations between France, India and Australia.” The French ambassador in India also tweeted, saying that “Together we will uphold our values and interests!”

While none of the readouts mention China per se, China is clearly the key reason for the emergence of this and a number of other minilaterals in the region. The India-France-Australia trilateral is only the latest of the many minilaterals that are taking shape in the Indo-Pacific region. India, which traditionally did not join these exclusive small groups, has shown greater interest and capacity in the last few years. There is also an India-Australia-Indonesia trilateral that is taking shape. In fact, Indian media reports note that India, Australia, and Indonesia are getting ready for two virtual meetings in the coming weeks between the foreign and defense ministries of the three countries in order to enhance broader regional strategic cooperation as well as maritime security in the Indo-Pacific region.

There is also the India-Japan-Australia trilateral, another significant group, which had its first meeting in 2015. There is already an India-U.S.-Japan trilateral. Since 2015, Japan has also participated with India and the United States in India’s Malabar series of naval exercises as a permanent partner.

Indeed, even the idea of the India-France-Australia trilateral is not new. The need for such initiatives has been discussed in track 2 and track 1.5 formats and experts and officials have long made the case for elevating these conversations to an official level. In 2018, Carnegie India, the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, and the National Security College of the Australian National University came together to explore the potential areas of cooperation as well as the extent of possibilities under such a framework. In an op-ed in May 2018, C. Raja Mohan, Rory Medcalf, and Bruno Tertrais (representing the three think tanks that had organized one such track 1.5 forum) detailed the “striking convergence of security interests, defense capabilities and maritime geography” that bring Delhi, Canberra, and Paris together. They argued that the three “respect a rules-based order informed by the sovereign equality of nations and the need to guard against coercion and interference, whether from states or from terrorism.” Thereafter, French President Emmanuel Macron during his visit to Australia spoke of “the Paris-Delhi-Canberra axis” that should be strengthened as “an established regional structure, reflecting an Indo-Pacific ‘geo-strategic reality in the making.’”

At the inaugural India-France-Australia trilateral, the three officials took stock of the prevailing and future economic and strategic challenges and possible ways of cooperation in addressing the challenges of COVID-19 and beyond. Maritime security and securing the marine global commons were particularly identified as important issues for trilateral and broader regional cooperation through regional institutions such as ASEAN, the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), and the Indian Ocean Commission. That India has concluded logistics agreements with both France and Australia brings their cooperation around maritime security issues a bit closer to reality.

According to the MEA, the three leaders also focused on trends, challenges, and priorities in regional and global multilateral institutions and discussed ways to review, strengthen, and reform multilateralism. This assumes particular importance in the context of the functioning of institutions such as the World Health Organization (WHO) especially in the initial weeks of the COVID-19 pandemic The fact that the WHO was influenced heavily by a single power, China, which some argue has resulted in the current global health crisis, will remain a constant reminder of the trends and challenges in multilateralism and multilateral institutions.

The India-France-Australia trilateral meeting was also a result of the deepening bilateral relations among the three countries across multiple sectors, and aimed at “synergizing their respective strengths to ensure a peaceful, secure, prosperous and rules-based Indo-Pacific Region.” In fact, this was part of a set of recommendations made by the Australian Senate Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Committee to “explore the India France Australia trilateral dialogue to enhance strategic cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.” Related issues such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, maritime domain awareness, the blue economy, and marine biodiversity were also discussed at the meeting. Given the increasing Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean and the South Pacific, one area that could gain greater attention from the three countries is maritime surveillance to monitor the Chinese naval activities in these waters. The three could work out some burden sharing in this regard to step up vigilance on these waters.

Commenting on the rationale for the India-France-Australia trilateral, Abhijnan Rej, The Diplomat’s security and defense editor, wrote that against the backdrop of “recent American unpredictability” U.S. allies in the region are looking to create “a more networked architecture involving a range of often-overlapping minilateral arrangements and consultative mechanisms.” Given this strategic rationale, the India-France-Australia trilateral is a natural fit for all three because of their stake in ensuring a free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific order. France, via its overseas territories, has 8,000 defense personnel, 1.5 million French citizens, and 93 percent of its maritime economic exclusive zone in the Indo-Pacific, making it a legitimate stakeholder, with huge stakes in the Indo-Pacific region.

The other important rationale for many of these trilaterals has to do with capacity issues. The Indo-Pacific region has several capable navies and yet their ability to match up to China on their own is questionable. The individual capacities of these countries have remained inadequate to protect their vital security interests, and therefore there is a stronger case to be made for these kinds of minilaterals.

Given these factors, this trilateral is likely here to stay. While the U.S. will remain an important source of support for these minilateral conversations in the Indo-Pacific, the fact that New Delhi, Paris, and Canberra can also discuss various strategic issues without Washington present in the room may also be appealing to these countries from time to time.

Thursday, September 17, 2020

Nuclear Policy Expert Raji Rajagopalan On Manels And How To Fix Them - Ungender Blog Post - 9 September 2020

Pallavi Pareek of Ungender did a conversation with me around Manel issues on 1 September and here is a blog post written by Rajkanya Mahapatra.

Currently the Head of the Nuclear and Space Policy Initiative at the Observer Research Foundation, Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan is a foreign policy expert with 20 years of experience. She’s previously worked with the National Security Council Secretariat and the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses in New Delhi. Rajeswari has authored four books, including Nuclear Security in India, Uncertain Eagle: US Military Strategy In Asia, and more.

In conversation with, Pallavi Pareek, Founder and CEO, Ungender, Rajeswari discusses the deep-rooted problem of manels, what should we do to fix them, insights from her own journey of navigating and growing in a male dominated space, and more.

Pallavi: Today, we’re going to be talking about a topic that has bothered us at Ungender ever since the Covid-19 lockdown started. As everyone started to work-from-home, folks brought their offline conversations (webinars, panel discussions, learning sessions) online. At some point, this issue that we were observing became a problem – the problem of all-male panels. I’d like to share some numbers that we’ve gathered at Ungender in the last six months – in the 95 webinars we took note of, there were a total of 715 men and 23 women. Why do you think it’s important to talk about manels?

Rajeswari: Absolutely, I think this has become a challenge, it’s not just an issue anymore because we do not lack women in any field, whether it is healthcare, infrastructure or urbanization. You’ve so many women working in non traditional security threats and hard security issues, especially younger women. So, why is it that they are not represented? Why is it that they do not have a voice out there? I think this has always been an issue.

Under the lockdown situation, one would think that people would find more flexible arrangements, so as to bring women into these panels, so their voices are heard and their perspectives are out there. But, we’re actually seeing the continuation of the same old trend. This is a reflection of the same sort of blindness towards the bias that has existed in society for a very long time.

I spoke to some of the manel organizers in the last few months, and to many it didn’t even occur that they were doing anything wrong at all. They’re not even conscious of the fact that they don’t have any women on the panel, and there is anything wrong about it. In fact, they said, “No, oh, I didn’t even think about it in those terms. We just wanted foreign policy experts and we just looked at these names and put it together.” That’s it. They’re not even making an effort to go out and find diverse voices, genders and get different kinds of perspectives.

Recently, a TV channel had a discussion on China, and the panel had only men and there was a lot of hue and cry on Twitter. I asked, “Could you not find any woman to be a part of this discussion on China?” The anchor said, “Oh, we tried to bring in some women but there were timezone issues.” I thought that was the most lame excuse, to even suggest that. Some of these men who were part of this panel were not even top experts. You have many women who are much more capable. They have a lot more substantive expertise on the subject but clearly they’re not a part of this internal circle. I think there is a need for us to call out manels and social media platforms are an effective medium. It’s time for us to do that in a sustained fashion.

Rajeswari’s Journey In The Male-Dominated Field Of Security Studies

Pallavi: How has it been for you – navigating a field that’s predominantly dominated by men?

Rajeswari: Yeah, it may be slightly better because when I came to do my MPhil and PhD at JNU, I did see a number of women, both faculty and students. The international relations field, of course, was still dominated by men. There were some role models like Professor Urmila Phadnis and Professor Surjit Mansingh. There was a little bit of comfort seeing those women out there and realizing that it was not going to be a lonely journey. After my MPhil, I joined IDSA (Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis), a Ministry of Defense funded Think Tank, based in Delhi. At IDSA, there were no women at the leadership level but there were a lot of women scholars. So again, that gave me a sense that you have a certain number of peers who are women who have been going through the same set of issues.

I think as you go up, you start recognizing these problems. At least in the earlier days for me, I accepted what we see as a problem today as something that was natural and not as an extension of the patriarchal society and the system that I’d been a part of. Men dominated certain fields, like international relations, space, nuclear, and some of the technology fields.

As one gets older, there’s a tendency in all of us to question male dominance, and ask why is it that women can’t talk or write about these issues. I started questioning this in the middle of my career when I started attending professional meetings.

For instance, when I wanted to make a comment or ask a question to the panel – first, I would note, and then, say. There have been situations when men who make the same point as I did, were quoted and tagged to say, “Oh, Mr. So and So said that,” but what I said was exactly the same thing. Your voice is completely ignored. Initially, I felt irritated when I came out of these meetings and discussions. But I also need to recognize some of the really good mentors that I’ve had who’ve been men, who’ve encouraged me and given me a lot of space and freedom to work on whatever it is that I wanted.

There was General VP Malik. He was the Army Chief during the Kargil War. He was also my boss when I came to ORF. I worked with Brijesh Mishraa who was the National Security Advisor. I worked briefly with him. It was not a day-to-day operation, but the meetings I had with him were fantastic. Dr. Raja Mohan was a big figure in the field of IR and Security studies. The leadership within ORF has been tremendous. The founding director, Chairman RK Mishra. The current chairman, Mr. Sanjay Joshi, Dr. Samir Saran. I think the leadership at ORF has been extremely encouraging. They give you the space for you to choose what you want to do. But despite all of this, I wouldn’t say that it has always been easy.

Why Organisers Need To Do Better

Pallavi: Thank you for sharing, Raji. Every time someone says, “Why are you after men?” It’s about all male panels. Right now, it’s about men, eventually it’s about bringing diversity across the board. When the world is for everyone, why isn’t everyone a part of the discussion? What can organisers as well as individuals participating in these manels do about this problem?

Rajeswari: I think there are important reasons as to why this should change. We’re not looking at manels, or even wanels. People are questioning me on Twitter, they’re saying, “why don’t you go and organise a panel for all women?” That’s not the point. All I’m saying is – we need to have inclusive conversations, we need to have diversity, we need to have a balance on these panels.

When you ignore women in panels or discussions, you’re actually ignoring their entire body of work. I think it’s fairly important you give women that exposure, especially younger women who are entering the field. If you don’t give them that exposure, the opportunity to be part of these conversations, create, and understand from each other, have a shared perspective on issues – it’s a disservice to people. So, that’s one issue.

Second, there’s a need for diverse opinions and perspectives on any issue that you may be discussing. You can’t assume that a set of men have all the answers, whether it is on China, defense planning, nuclear policy or any other issue. On any particular issue, unless, you have age, gender, demography, all of the different aspects represented there, you will have a very one-sided perspective in any discussion.

Today’s webinars and panels are all looking at contemporary policy issues. Why should women not be a part of those conversations? Women represent 50% of the population, why should they not have that voice? It doesn’t matter whether they are able to provide a solution or not. Men, so far, have not provided solutions to a number of different problems.

How To Tackle The Problem Of Manels

Pallavi: Why should we not move on from the problem of manels? What are the implications, you think, if we move on like this? There are so many organisations now, including us, who are curating a list of leaders from different segments. People are nominating not just themselves but folks from other under-represented communities. Why is it important to keep talking about manels?

Rajeswari: Absolutely. We’re all influenced by the environment that we’re in and that obviously influences us at every every step of the way. There are some positive and negative influences that come our way. So, unless you’re able to shape a positive environment for the next generation of people, you’re going to be sustaining this unhealthy practice into the future as well. Manels are a serious enough problem and calling them out in a sustained fashion is what is needed.

One of the first things we need to do is sensitise leadership in institutions. I’m proud of the fact that ORF took a decision many years ago not to do manels. We are also always encouraging younger people to be part of the panels and discussions. I think ORF has been one of the few organisations that has always been welcoming and sensitive to the fact that you need to have diversity of every kind on the panels otherwise you are going to have a very skewed discussion on any subject.

Like I said, it’s (calling out manels) for the future generations because the environment that we are in is not conducive for young women who are coming into the IR and security field.

I see a much bigger number than when I joined but unless those women find a conducive atmosphere where they are able to talk, publish, write, speak at conferences, and have that interaction with others in a formal setting, they are not going to be able to grow well in this field. That’s a disservice again, being done to the next generation. That in itself should be a good enough reason for us to continue this calling out manels.

So when you said you were putting a list together. From what I can recall, two young professionals, Khushi Singh Rathore and Rohan Mukherjee actually put together a list of female experts in IR and security studies and that list runs up to about 400 names. There is no dearth of women in any field. You need to give them a platform and exposure.

Pallavi: Do you think organisers follow some guidelines before they organise a panel? Shouldn’t it start with figuring out how many people are needed on a panel and then what are the different perspectives that need to be represented and included in that conversation?

Rajeswari: I think most panels when they’re getting organised, they (men) will start with their network. These are mostly organised by men at the senior level, they know their peers, and they know their friends. So, your peers are also mostly men, you don’t interact, go out, make that effort to interact and expand your peer group. So in a sense, your peers are again men, you call them and they come.

Wouldn’t it be better if the first step is to analyse and see how many people and what kind of representations are needed? They’re (manel organisers) not asking themselves these questions.

The Missing Women And Manels

Pallavi: I can tell you from the data we’ve gathered, repeat offenders like TiE and CII feature some people again and again. Do you think credibility checks are done? How come the same set of people know everything or are able to speak on just about any topic?

Rajeswari: Absolutely. You said it. Many times, when you’re looking at the names of possible women panellists – often the following comments come from men – “well, I think she’s just about okay”, “she’s kind of below average,” “she’s not that great,” “she’s not this…not that.” But when it comes to men, we don’t even discuss any criteria, whether they’re good, bad or ugly – the question does not arise at all. We need to get more sensitive about the need for inclusion.

It’s important to target the next generation. I’ll give you two instances: in one case when I was talking to some of the organisers who I had called out on Twitter – with great difficulty this one woman wrote back to me saying, “We have so many women behind the team working on this.” I said, “You made the point. Why are those women behind the scene working on it? And these are professionals, working on space issues, why are they not part of the discussion? Why are they behind the scenes helping with things?” The second instance concerned a repeat offender. When I called out the men, they came out and said, “we had two women last week.” This response was given by younger people. I was actually shocked to see that even the younger generation hasn’t recognised the problems associated with these skewed discussions.

Pallavi: I know a lot of women are constantly questioned if they’re qualified to be in a certain place or not. Such questions leave a deep psychological impact. How do you think that can be addressed?

Rajeswari: So, as a woman, I think we always tend to question ourselves, doubt our capabilities in a very, very critical and harsh fashion passion. I think we need to get over that. I would say, whatever path you choose, you need to be very clear about why you are choosing that path in your career as it will stay with you for the next 30 years of your life. You need to be passionate about what you do. There’s no shortcut to hard work and if you have the courage and conviction, plus the hard work, it helps you in building that confidence. It’s very important because people will always try and pull you down.

There have been so many instances where people have put me into clichéd boxes and thought I will not be working on a certain subject as I’m not capable of working on hard military security issues. The fact is that you need to develop that self confidence and that’ll come from conviction. You will also need to have a support group to lean on because the field can get lonely from time to time. So having that support group in your line of work is absolutely essential. Finding a good mentor can be very helpful, someone who can give you that sense of self-confidence.

Friday, September 11, 2020

Washington Watching as Beijing’s Space Power Grows -The Diplomat, 10 September 2020

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I looked at the latest U.S. Defense Department report on Chinese military power that recounts Beijing’s growing space and counterspace capabilities.

The U.S. Department of Defense last week released its annual report on China’s military power. The report details all aspects of China’s military including land, naval, air, space and information domains. The report identifies a few areas such as shipbuilding, land-based conventional ballistic and cruise missiles, and integrated air defense systems where China has “achieved parity with – or even exceeded – the United States.”

According to the report, China has also made impressive strides in critical sectors such as cyber and space. Since President Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, there has been greater focus on overall military capabilities and the PLA has devoted more attention to space and information capabilities. The last Chinese Defence White Paper (2019) identified space as “a critical domain of international strategic competition.” The 2019 White Paper also identified the important role that space will play in “improv[ing] the capabilities of joint operations command to exercise reliable and efficient command over emergency responses, and to effectively accomplish urgent, tough and dangerous tasks.”

With China emerging as a global power, it is only natural to expect it to develop a range of space and counterspace capabilities. However, Beijing’s emphasis on developing these capabilities to “paralyze the enemy’s operational system of systems” as well as “sabotage the enemy’s war command system of systems” means others have to take note. This, Beijing believes, can enable it to disrupt and deny any space-based advantage that an advanced military like the U.S. may have. The Pentagon’s report highlights PLA writings that have noted “the effectiveness of IO and cyberwarfare in recent conflicts and advocate targeting C2 and logistics networks to affect” an adversary in times of conflict. The report also cites “authoritative PLA sources” who have called for “the coordinated employment of space, cyber and EW as strategic weapons” in order to create significant disruptions in an adversary’s command and control as well as logistics networks.

Worryingly, the U.S. report states that China has plans to use a combination of these capabilities on assets beyond military ones to include “political and economic targets with clear ‘awing effects’ – as part of its deterrence.” This would entail the PLA’s possible use of its cyber warfare capabilities “to collect data for intelligence and cyberattack purposes; to constrain an adversary’s actions by targeting network-based logistics, C2, communications, commercial activities, and civilian and defense infrastructure; or, to serve as a force-multiplier when coupled with kinetic attacks during armed conflict.”

With the goal of being a “world-class military power,” China has gone about advancing its space power, both in terms of institutional reorganization and development of space and counterspace capabilities. The military modernization and reorganization undertaken by China since 2015 is worth noting. In terms of institutional architecture, the most significant development is the creation of the PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF), a theater command-level organization designed to combine “the PLA’s strategic space, cyber, electronic, and psychological warfare missions and capabilities.” The U.S. report adds that the PLASSF’s Network Systems Department, which controls information warfare, has identified the U.S. as the “current major target.” The PLASSF is an institutional innovation to bring about greater synergies in functions that were previously spread across a number of departments. Under the reorganization, the PLASSF is directly under the Central Military Commission and is responsible for extending support to the entire PLA. China’s 2019 Defence White Paper clearly outlined the goals of the PLASSF as “seeking to achieve big development strides in key areas and accelerate the integrated development of new-type combat forces, so as to build a strong and modernized strategic support force.”

The U.S. Department of Defense’s report details the structure and functions of some of the key institutions under the PLASSF. The PLASSF houses two near-independent departments – the Network Systems and the Space Systems Departments – that are responsible for an entire range of capabilities and missions involving space, cyber and electronic warfare technologies. The Space Systems Department, for instance, has the complete responsibility for almost all of the PLA space operations including space launch and support, space surveillance, space information support, space telemetry, tracking and control, and space warfare. While it is not clear where the counterspace capabilities fit and which institution is responsible for it, China is clear on the role of space in future conflicts to enable “long-range precision strikes and in denying other militaries the use of overhead command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems.”

Unlike many other space powers, China’s space program has historically been under the PLA, and it continues to play a critical role in developing China as a major space power Today, China has fielded a large fleet of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), communication and navigation satellite constellations which is enabled by strengthened launch capabilities. China has been also active in its human spaceflight and lunar exploration missions, plus a debut Mars mission in 2020. China has additionally gone about developing a larger space ecosystem that has resulted in diversification to include several sub-sectors beyond the military, to the political, defense-industrial and commercial arenas. It is not clear if this was a deliberate decision by the PLA or not, but it could possibly help in strengthening China’s overall space competitiveness. China is also thought to have developed “quick response” small satellite launch vehicles to cater to the growing small satellite market. This capability could be helpful to China “to rapidly reconstitute low Earth orbit space capabilities,” which could come into play during conflicts should Beijing have the need to launch a large number of satellites to replace satellites that are damaged or increase the number of satellites in a particular orbit for better services.

While China’s development of space capabilities has been impressive, it has also pursued counterspace capabilities in a focused manner. Beijing has an array of counterspace capabilities including direct ascent and co-orbital anti-satellite weapons, offensive cyber and electronic warfare capabilities such as satellite jammers, as well as directed energy weapons that can target an adversary’s system and create disruptions or denial of services, thereby cutting off “an adversary’s access to and operations in the space domain during a crisis or conflict.” According to the U.S. report, China has expanded its space surveillance capabilities which aids Beijing in keeping a watch on “objects in space within their field of view and enable counterspace actions.” China has demonstrated its ground-based ASAT capability which is capable of targeting satellites in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) but the report notes that China possibly has plans to expand its ASAT capabilities to destroy satellites in geosynchronous Earth orbit, targets that are much farther away.

Over the last few years, a number of open-source reports have detailed growing Chinese counterspace capabilities. The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency report of 2019 also highlighted these growing threats. China is known to be engaged in testing certain dual-use technologies in space that could be used for counterspace activities as well. For example, China’s “Roaming Dragon” system, fitted with a robotic arm, is supposed to be used for space debris removal missions but can very well be used for counterspace missions. In fact, Chinese scholars have stated that the “Roaming Dragon” could be engaged in debris removal activities during peacetime but at times of conflict, “they could be used as deterrents or directly against enemy assets in space.”

The U.S. report also outlines China’s efforts at espionage to steal U.S. military technology including space technology. According to the report, a number of U.S. criminal indictments have been handed down involving Chinese nationals, naturalized U.S. citizens, permanent resident aliens from China, and U.S. citizens since 2015, for attempts at “procuring and exporting controlled items to China.” Some of the sensitive, dual-use technology or military-grade equipment in these cases have included radiation hardened integrated circuits, monolithic microwave integrated circuits, accelerometers, gyroscopes, syntactic foam trade secrets and space communications technologies, among others. The report listed some recent cases including one in October 2019 when a Chinese national was sent to prison for 40 months for “conspiring to export military- and space-grade technology illegally” from the U.S. to China. The individual is reported to have worked with others in China “to purchase radiation-hardened power amplifiers and supervisory circuits used for military and space applications.”

China’s achievements in the space domain are indeed impressive but the increasingly contested geopolitics make space yet another arena for competition and rivalry. China’s actions will be closely watched and, in many respects, will fuel further rivalries in the Indo-Pacific.

Thursday, September 10, 2020

Manel Chat With with Dr. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, Head, Nuclear & Space Policy Initiative, ORF with Ungender - 1 September 2020

On 1 September, I did a conversation with Ms. Pallavi Pareek from Ungender on why we need to address the issue of Manels and why it is important to have inclusion, balance and diveristy in our panels, industry boards and management.

The conversation can be found here.

This is the not the full transcript but a mere preview of some of the issues we discussed.

Manels are also a reflection of the blindness towards this bias. For instance, in the past few months, I have spoken to many of these Manel organisers and it doesn’t even occur to them that they are doing anything wrong. They are just not conscious of the fact that they don’t have any women on the panel and that there is something so wrong about it.

Recently, you have also been seeing so many Manels on TV shows – be it discussions on China or Pakistan… there is so much of women expertise on the subject and yet you see dozens of men. There was one discussion on one of the Indian TV channels had 12 men speaking on China and they are not even the top experts on the subject whereas you have equally good or even more substantial women who are China experts but why are they absent? The worst is that the person came out defending with the silliest of arguments saying time zone issues etc. one would have thought that with the lockdown and everything taking place in the virtual space, it might be easier for women to be part of many of these conversations. But sadly, that is just not the case.

This is because many of these meetings/ conferences are organised by senior men and they simply call their friends and peers whom they know already because it is also a small clique. They just have not made the effort to reach out to women, expand their circle of their peers.

Friday, September 4, 2020

How China Strengthens the Quad - The Diplomat, 4 September 2020

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I wrote on the future of the Quad, looking at the challenges to the group because of Abe's sudden resigning and a possible political change in the US following the November elections. Despite some minor headwinds, I argue that Chinese belligerence further strengthens the motivation for Australia, India, Japan, and the United States to keep the Quad together.


The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or the Quad has regained strength in the face of an aggressive China. The foreign ministers of the four countries – Australia, India, Japan, and the United States – are scheduled to meet in Delhi for a face-to-face meeting in late September. That New Delhi is playing host to the Quad ministerial meeting amid the COVOD-19 pandemic is particularly noteworthy. The countries are reacting to increased bullying by China. The grouping has gained greater traction since early 2020 because of Beijing’s role in the COVID-19 pandemic and the manner in which it has attempted to hijack multilateral institutions, such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). The four countries are also concerned about global supply chain problems, recognizing the vulnerability of their dependence on China. The upcoming in-person foreign ministers meeting appears, at the least, aimed at sending a strong message to China about the resoluteness of the Quad.

For the full essay, click here.

That said, the Quad does face some minor headwinds, which are likely to be easily overcome, due to political changes in both Japan and the United States.

Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s sudden resignation was a blow to the Quad because Abe was one of the major proponents of this minilateral initiative, even if his departure does not shift Japan’s policy. Under Abe’s leadership, Japan had become a driving force for the Quad. His strategic vision and determined leadership in the face of China’s belligerent behavior will be missed by Japan’s Quad partners. Although Abe was not successful in changing Japan’s pacifist constitution, he has been instrumental in bringing important changes to Tokyo’s approach to regional and global security.

For New Delhi, Abe was a reliable pillar of support. Takenori Horimoto says that the big push for Japan to build closer relations with India happened in 2004-05 because of anti-Japan protests taking place in China, leading Tokyo to reduce the risks to its investments by moving to other countries. Thus, although India-Japan ties had been gaining momentum even before Abe came into office, the Abe-Modi dynamic helped a great deal. It led to strengthened military and security ties, including military exercises across all the branches of the military, and a civil nuclear agreement. With Abe leaving office, it remains to be seen how bilateral India-Japan relations as well as Japan’s broader strategic engagement in the Indo-Pacific will play out with a new leader in office.

Second, the coming presidential elections in the United States in November also raises some concerns about a possible change in leadership. While Joe Biden and the Democrats are not against the Quad or the free and open Indo-Pacific strategy, a change in the political powers that be could introduce short-term policy turbulence. It will take a few months for a new administration to settle into office before addressing some of the political and strategic issues in the Indo-Pacific region. That said, China’s aggressive behavior will invariably draw any administration’s attention. A Biden administration may differ from the Trump administration more in terms of style and rhetoric than actual policy when it comes to China. Indeed, the two parties are competing over who is harsher on China.

Set against these small challenges is China’s behavior, which serves to promote the Quad. India and Australia, the other two Quad parties, have recently faces even greater aggression from Beijing.

Since early May, China has crossed into Indian territory and engaged in violent clashes, including the one at Galwan in June that resulting in the deaths of 20 Indians and an unknown number of Chinese troops. Since then, there have been several military and diplomatic discussions between India and China, but with no progress. Over the past few days, there has been further activity, with India reportedly occupying areas south of the south bank of Pangong Tso (Lake); the military talks that followed, as usual, have been inconclusive. China claimed that India violated the consensus and crossed the Line of Actual Control (LAC). In India, both the foreign ministry and army put out statements blaming China. The expectation appears to be that the border confrontation will escalate further. India, for good measure, has also banned another 118 Chinese apps.

Similarly, Australia has been under strident Chinese attack almost from the beginning of 2020. China has been using coercive trade practices to target Australia for asking for an independent investigation into the origin of the novel coronavirus. In the latest move, China targeted Australian barley in response to Prime Minister Scott Morrison’s announcement of a new Australian legislation that would “tear up” the Belt and Road Initiative agreements with the state of Victoria that run into billions of dollars. A few days earlier, China targeted Australian beef exports. Prior to this, it was the Australian wine that was banned by China. But Jeffrey Wilson of the Perth USAsia Centre says it is not that the Chinese government cares about wine, beef, or barley, but “the real game is to create societal splits that pressure the Government to change foreign policy toward China.”

China’s crude attempts to put pressure on other countries have met with increasingly stiff resistance, of which the Quad is a clear manifestation. In India, there have even been suggestions for the Quad to assume a military role. Thus, whatever minor headwinds the Quad faces are likely to be easily overcome by the rapidly changing attitudes in the region because of China’s unrelenting pressure on others.

2020 - A challenging year yet a satisfying year, professionally

2020 has remained a challenging year for the world around and I was no exception.  Personally, it was a trying year with a lot of dislocatio...