Friday, November 30, 2018

India and the Maldives: Back on Track? @ The Diplomat, 30 November 2018

In this week's column for the Diplomat, I wrote on the changing dynamics in the India-Maldives relations. Clearly, the recent changes have provided an opening for both sides to recalibrate ties.

With a new government under President Ibrahim Mohamed Solih in office, the Maldives appears ready to get its relationship with India back on track.


Prime Minister Narendra Modi made his maiden visit to the Maldives earlier in the month for the swearing in ceremony of Solih. A joint statement signed by the two leaders noted the “importance of maintaining peace and security in the Indian Ocean and being mindful of each other’s concerns and aspirations for the stability of the region,” a clear reference to recent controversies in their relationship.


Solih also used the opportunity to apprise Modi of the urgent assistance needed in the areas of housing and infrastructure as well as setting up water and sewerage systems in the remote islands.

For the full article, click here.



Following tradition and highlighting India’s importance to the Maldives, the new president will be visiting India on December 17. Within a few days of Modi’s visit, a number of Maldivian ministers and officials visited India, including Foreign Minister Abdulla Shahid, Finance Minister Ibrahim Ameer, Economic Development Minister Fayyaz Ismail, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Ahmed Khaleel, and Foreign Secretary Abdul Ghafoor Mohamed.

There are definitely some signs of a fresh beginning. The Ministry of External Affairs in a statement, following the foreign minister’s visit, said that “India attaches highest importance to its relationship with the Maldives which is marked by trust, transparency, mutual understanding and sensitivity.” Further, Minister of External Affairs Sushma Swaraj noted that as per India’s “Neighborhood First Policy,” India “stands ready to fully support the Government of Maldives in its socio-economic development.” The statement further noted that Maldivian Foreign Minister Abdulla Shahid had reiterated his government’s “India First” policy and had said that his government looks forward to working closely with the government of India on all issues.

The two ministers discussed defense and security cooperation and scheduled the next meeting of the Defense Cooperation Dialogue between India and the Maldives in the first half of December 2018. The foreign minister also noted that the Maldives has asked India for a Dornier aircraft and the MEA has also “promised that it would be delivered soon.”

These developments are significant because the Maldives under the previous Abdullah Yameen regime seemed to be slipping into China’s orbit. For instance, the Maldives had signed a new law permitting developers to own islands on lease for development for a period of 99 years. Subsequently, a Chinese company took control of Feydhoo Finolhu, an uninhabited island close to Male and its international airport, on a development lease for 50 years for $4 million.

The current finance minister is also now finding out that China is running “most of these projects (are) at inflated price” but many of them are now completed, which means these are fait accompli. But the new government is reviewing every project that is yet to be completed. For instance, a Male hospital project given to China has already cost $140 million, whereas a rival cost estimate was just $54 million.

The two countries also signed free trade agreement (FTA), which took India by total surprise and one that could have longer term implications for India. In addition to the strategic concerns, India has worries that Chinese goods dumped in Maldives could find its way into India.

The negative impact of the China FTA for the Maldives is huge too. Mohamed Nasheed, former Maldivian President and now adviser to Solih, recently said the trade imbalance is quite enormous and called the FTA “very one-sided” arrangement. Chinese companies also benefited disproportionately, pouring in large sums of money into infrastructure projects, including upgrading of the airport at a cost of $830 million and building a bridge linking the airport to Male at a cost of $400 million. Beijing now worries that Male will scrap some of the agreements.

Even as the economic component of the relationship is significant to Beijing, it is the geographical location of the Maldives in the Indian Ocean that appears to have been of the greatest interest. With the Maldives endorsing China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the Maritime Silk Road, Beijing felt that it had developed better hold and influence over a crucial piece of real estate in the Indian Ocean.

The fact that India enjoyed unparalleled access and influence in many of the Indian Ocean island states, including the Maldives, Seychelles, and Mauritius has been a problem for China. India has been the unofficial security guarantor to these states, providing patrol vessels, helicopters, and military training. So China’s interest in the Maldives was understandable and Beijing was able to secure its interests in Male through the “raw power of financial incentives” to the detriment of Indian interests.

With a new government in the island nation, there is much hope in India that New Delhi and Male will be able to undo some of the damage under the previous regime. Both Modi and Sushma Swaraj, as well as the Indian Defense Minister Nirmala Sitharaman, have promised significant help to deepen and expand the partnership while helping to prevent Maldives from falling into a possible debt trap with China.

However, like in India’s relations with other smaller neighbors, the key question is one of delivery. India has to be mindful of the fact it is competing with China in many of these projects and India will be judged against China’s accomplishments.

Even though things have turned around for India politically in many of the neighboring countries such as Sri Lanka and the Maldives, New Delhi’s ability to match China in providing economic and infrastructural assistance is open to question. While dealing with smaller neighbors, India also needs to become a lot more magnanimous, staying true to its own “Gujral doctrine,” thus creating greater confidence. India has a great opportunity in the Maldives to demonstrate that it can learn from its previous errors.



Modi Visits Japan: What’s on the Security Agenda? @ The Diplomat, October 26, 2018

Here's an article, "Modi Visits Japan: What’s on the Security Agenda?" I wrote for the Diplomat in October before Prime Minister Modi's visit to Japan. Due to some personal issues, I have not updated my blog for more than a month, but hoping to get back on track from now on.


India’s Ministry of External Affairs recently announced that Prime Minister Narendra Modi will travel to Japan on October 28-29 for the 13th India-Japan Annual Summit. The fifth annual summit meeting between Modi and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe will put the bilateral relationship in the spotlight amid wider regional and global changes.

In this article, I examine some of the agenda items on the defense side between India and Japan.

For the full essay, click here.



The India-Japan relationship has expanded over the years, and given the rapidly changing strategic dynamics in the Indo-Pacific, the two leaders are expected to further boost and deepen their bilateral cooperation and discuss a range of bilateral, regional, and global issues that impinge on their security. Nevertheless, there are specific areas on defense that will stand out and potentially further elevate the India-Japan partnership.

At a broad level, the mutual concern between India and Japan about China is evident, and Tokyo and New Delhi hope to be able to present clear and credible alternatives to smaller nations in the Indo-Pacific on economic and infrastructural assistance. So, in that vein, establishing regional connectivity appears to be high on the agenda for both Abe and Modi. Kenji Hiramitsu, Japan’s Ambassador to India, hinted that there may be certain projects for South Asia that may be announced during the summit meeting.

He also reiterated what Abe had stated in his address to the Indian Parliament a decade back, that “a strong India is in the best interest of Japan, and a strong Japan is in the best interest of India.” Many Indian officials acknowledge the importance of Japan in India’s strategic calculations and say that “Few governments align their foreign policies as closely to New Delhi’s as Tokyo. Even fewer have committed as much aid and investment to boost India’s economy.”

Even as there is collaboration across several other sectors between India and Japan, defense and security cooperation has been at the forefront driving the relations in recent years. At a recent interaction at a think tank in India, Hiramitsu said the two sides will strengthen maritime cooperation further on all aspects from maritime domain awareness (MDA) to logistics support and joint exercises. He said, “We are also expecting to sign agreement between Indian Navy and Japan’s Naval Defence Force with regard to maritime domain awareness and security issues. Also defence equipment and technology cooperation, we have agreed to have joint research activities with regard to unmanned vehicles and robotics.”

He also added that for the first time, the two armies will exercise together in a joint drill at the Counter Insurgency Warfare School in Vairengte in India’s northeast, in November. The exercise, to be called “Dharma Guardian 2018” will see the participation of 6/1 Gorkha Rifles on the Indian side and the 32 Infantry Regiment on the Japanese side. This will come close on the heels of the just concluded the JIMEX series of maritime exercises earlier this month. Japan will also participate as an Observer at Cope India, a joint air exercise between India and the United States.

Defense trade is also an important facet of India-Japan defense ties. Talks to procure the US-2 amphibious aircraft are apparently once again on – the ShinMaywa Industries Limited and India’s Mahindra have reportedly signed a Memorandum of Understanding “to manufacture and assemble structural parts and components for the US-2 amphibious aircraft.” Reports have also suggested that this will feature as an important item during Modi’s visit and that there is willingness on both sides to push the deal through a G2G route.

In a particularly significant move, Japan and India are also contemplating the signing of a Mutual Logistical Support Agreement. This agreement, something along the lines of Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA), would be strategically beneficial as it would permit the Indian armed forces and the Japanese Self Defense Force (JSDF) to access each other’s military bases for logistics support.

While neither the Japanese nor the Indian officials have provided any details, it is possibly one like the arrangement India signed with France earlier this year and the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) with the United States in 2016. According to one report, “sources said the pact would require armed forces of India and Japan to help each other with logistic supports, including food, water, billet, transport (airlift, if necessary), petroleum, oils, lubricants, clothing, communications, medical services, base support, storage, use of facilities, training services, spare parts, repair and maintenance and airport and seaport services.”

Signing such an agreement would give the Indian military access to Japan’s base in Djibouti and the Japanese forces would in turn gain access to Indian military facilities on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, in the Indian Ocean.

But the implications of the pact would be beyond that as well, and it would be a huge boost to the India-Japan strategic partnership more widely too. A major handicap of geographical distance between India and Japan, and therefore the inability of the two sides to reach out in times of crisis and conflict, can be addressed quite effectively with such an arrangement.

Therefore, it is no surprise that logistics and base sharing proposals were initially discussed at the annual defense ministers meeting held in New Delhi earlier this year. Speaking to reporters after that meeting, Japanese Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera said, “The (early) conclusion of the bilateral ACSA is important for creating an environment to allow the SDF and the Indian military to conduct sufficient joint exercises.” This agreement will indeed expand the military reach for the two navies across the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

The possible signing of a logistics agreement and the increasing number of military and security engagements between India and Japan are clear attempts at balancing the growing Chinese muscle in the Indo-Pacific region. The relations have seen a big boost with Abe and Modi at the helm. With both leaders likely to stay in power for a few more years, the prospects for India-Japan security and defense relations continue to remain quite good.

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