India Must Keep Its Eye on the China Challenge in Modi’s Second Term - The Diplomat, June 20, 2019

In my column for The Diplomat last week, I focused on Modi 2.0 and China. I argue that in Modi’s second term, India needs to be pragmatic and cleareyed about the challenge that Beijing poses for its interests.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is back in office for a second term with an even bigger mandate. But this also means that the expectations on him to deliver are that much greater, and foreign and defense policy are no exceptions to this. As New Delhi deals with a range of priorities, it will be important to keep an eye on its China challenge in the coming years.

For the full essay, click here.



On the foreign and security policy front, India faces several different challenges, from cross-border terrorism and insurgencies of varying magnitude to the rise of China. Ensuring a stable and secure neighborhood is, rightly so, an important priority for the new government, as has been evident even at the swearing-in ceremony of the Modi government (during his first swearing-in in 2014, Modi had invited the SAARC leaders, and, for his second one, the BIMSTEC leaders were invited as guests). Terrorism is also a critical issue given Pakistan’s behavior. In his address at the 5th CICA Summit in Dushanbe last week, new Minister of External Affairs S. Jaishankar said terrorism was “the gravest threat that we face in Asia today.”

Even though neighborhood and terrorism priorities are important, India also faces a serious strategic challenge from China. But on this front, New Delhi appears to be getting carried away by China’s efforts to woo India against the backdrop of Beijing’s growing trade frictions with Washington. As a scholar of the Indo-Pacific recently noted, “With Washington full of anti-China sentiment and an Indo-Pacific Strategy to match, prying India away from the US becomes increasingly important geostrategically for Beijing. And it’s doing pretty well so far—Wuhan spirit/reset has lasted over a year now.”

Modi’s foreign policy approach as far as China is concerned appears to be immersed in the 2018 Wuhan Summit. He is now preparing for a follow-up informal summit in Varanasi later in the year. On the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit, Modi held a separate bilateral meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping, where Modi remarked “There has been much improvement in our relations since [the] Wuhan Informal Summit. We have also become sensitive to each other’s interests and concerns. We are also showing better understanding of each other’s stance.”

Indian Foreign Secretary Vijay Keshav Gokhale, briefing the media on the bilateral meeting, said that the meeting was a brief one but “very substantive and the atmosphere was very positive.” He underlined the fact that the Wuhan spirit was very much there and this is the beginning of a series of meeting between the two leaders, with the next meeting slated to be on the sidelines of the G-20 Summit in Japan. The two leaders will also meet for the BRICS Summit later in the year.

So far, Jaishankar’s induction as India’s foreign minister appears to have had little impact on India’s China policy. Certainly, China has been smart at throwing a few bones in India’s direction in a timely fashion, with China’s change of heart with regard to Masood Azhar just before the Indian elections being one case in point. It appears that there was a quid pro quo, possibly on the Belt and Road Initiative. While India is still opposed to it on account of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), New Delhi appears to have softened its criticism. According to one Indian news report, India agreed not to raise objections to BRI in return for China dropping its hold on adding Azhar to a UN terrorism-based sanctions list.

In the face of the changing global balance of power dynamics, India’s foreign policy challenges will get even more daunting. But India’s foreign policy has to approach national security considerations with utmost pragmatism. New Delhi must realize that it has few long-term common interests with China, and that partnering with Beijing even for short-term gains carries considerable risks.

Will the Masood Azhar Listing Improve Sino-Indian Relations? - The Diplomat, May 7, 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, Rajesh and I wrote a joint article, "Will the Masood Azhar Listing Improve Sino-Indian Relations?," examining if China's decision on Masood Azhar is likely to have any positive impact on India-China relations. But we believe there are reasons to be skeptical.

Masood Azhar, a Pakistani national who heads the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) terrorist group, has now been placed in the United Nations Security Council 1267 Sanctions List. This was long sought by India, who blamed Azhar and the JeM for various terror attacks in India. The issue was also a major irritant in Sino-Indian relations because China had for several years placed a “technical hold” that prevented the listing.

The Indian government was jubilant, and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who is fighting national parliamentary elections, immediately claimed credit. Though the Indian government welcomed China’s decision, they have been cautious about whether this by itself would move the relationship forward, stating that there are “many things” which have contributed to the “Wuhan Spirit” and “it is difficult to point out one single incident or instance which will contribute to a better India-China relationship.”

The caution is well-founded. Sino-Indian relations have improved since the Doklam confrontation in 2017. The Wuhan “spirit,” the supposed positive outcome of the informal summit at Wuhan between Modi and Chinese leader Xi Jinping, is credited with improving relations between the two countries. A follow-up informal summit is slated for later this year. China’s move on Azhar should add to the positive spirit. Still, fundamental problems remain in the relationship and they are unlikely to be easy to resolve.

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The most important is the consequence of the changing balance of power between the two countries. From rough parity in the 1980s, China’s economy has pulled away from India at a dizzying speed, and it is now about five times as large. This has created a gross imbalance between the two sides that is likely to persist for some time to come, even if India’s marginally faster economic growth rate of the last couple of years continues into the future. This imbalance also leads to a military imbalance, as China’s military budget grows along with its wealth. Though China’s military spending as proportion of its GDP is still quite low, that should be of little comfort because in absolute terms, it is almost four times that of India’s.

More importantly, the effect of this imbalance is likely to be felt more in the political clout that it brings to China than in a test of arms. Over the last decade, China has become bolder in wielding its economic clout, as Evan Feigenbaum has pointed out. But even without such direct exhibitions of its power, China’s clout gives it political capacities in international settings that will be difficult to ignore. New Delhi will find that when it comes to many issues where its interest conflicts with that of China’s, China will be able to garner greater international political support than India. This is already very visible among India’s neighbors in South Asia, and its effect is possibly much more diffuse but far more potent than New Delhi yet realizes. This represents a pressure on India that will not yield in the near future, and it will limit the possibilities of Sino-Indian ties.

Of course, the older problem of the disputed border also remains, despite decades of negotiations. Neither side can compromise very much on this. The best that can be hoped for is that neither side will attempt to settle it by force, but misperceptions and local misunderstandings are likely to periodically recur. The Doklam confrontation was possibly the result of something along these lines; the next time, it could become more serious.

But one consequence that can be dismissed is any effect of the current general elections on the future course of Sino-Indian relations, even though China’s move comes in the midst of a hot campaign. As Vipin Narang and Paul Staniland have noted, foreign policy has fairly low electoral salience in India. Though the ruling BJP’s campaign is pushing strategic issues in an unusually heavy manner, it is unclear what effect this will have. But even if this has some limited effect (and it will be difficult to decide this even after the election results are announced, though exit polls may give at least some clues) on the elections, its effect on subsequent Indian foreign policy may be limited. Whoever wins these elections will still have to deal with the context of China’s power and its effects on India’s options, and these are fairly limited.

New Delhi is thus correct to be cautious about the effects of the Masood Azhar listings. And while it is at it, India should equally cautious about the so-called “Wuhan spirit” because it is not likely to last very much longer either.

China Shows its True Colors by Blocking India’s Terror Blacklist Bid Again - The Diplomat, March 15, 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, "China Shows its True Colors by Blocking India’s Terror Blacklist Bid Again", I argue that Beijing’s move, though unsurprising, is not without significance.

Earlier this week, for the fourth time, China has blocked India’s efforts to designate Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) chief Masood Azhar as a global terrorist under the United Nations (UN). Beijing’s effort represents just the latest blow to New Delhi’s efforts in this vein. While India has been making global efforts to isolate Pakistan diplomatically, its efforts at placing Azhar under the 1267 Al Qaeda Sanctions Committee of the UN Security Council has been yet again blocked by China.

To be sure, China’s action should not obscure the fact that the broader support base for India has gone up on this score. This is reflected in the number of co-sponsors of the proposal this time. The current proposal was initiated by France, the UK and the United States and co-sponsored by countries including Germany, Poland, Belgium, Italy, Bangladesh, Maldives, Bhutan, Equatorial Guinea, Japan and Australia.

Nonetheless, Beijing’s response is significant. China justified its action by saying that “our action is to make sure that the committee will have enough time to study the matter so that the relevant sides will have time for dialogue and consultation. Only a solution that is acceptable to all sides could fundamentally provide a chance for a lasting solution to the issue. China is ready to communicate and coordinate with all sides including India to properly handle this issue.”

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India’s official response was disappointed but calm. The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), in a statement, said, “The ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee (1267 Sanctions Committee), upon completion of the no-objection period on 13 March 2019, was not able to come to a decision on the proposal for listing Mohammed Masood Azhar Alvi under the UN Sanctions regime, on account of a member placing the proposal on hold. We are disappointed by this outcome. This has prevented action by the international community to designate the leader of Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), a proscribed and active terrorist organization which has claimed responsibility for the terrorist attack in Jammu and Kashmir on 14 February 2019.”

Irrespective of what India says publicly, this is proof, yet again, that China is not going to abandon its ironclad relationship with Pakistan. Neither is Beijing going to succumb to pressure from others such as the United States, France, the UK, Russia, and India to change its tack on Pakistan. About an hour before the expiry of the deadline for any member to raise objections, China put in place a “technical hold” meaning that the proposal will be on the hold for the next six months. Member countries can supply information over the next nine months for lifting the hold and Masood Azhar can be listed.

In the past, China has argued that there is “no contradiction” in its policies on terrorism such as in supporting the BRICS declaration against terrorism and its policy to Masood Azhar designation as a global terrorist because the BRICS declaration was addressing terrorist groups and not individuals. And to be sure, there is some logic to Beijing’s position: It is premised on balancing India by supporting Pakistan. Pakistan has remained China’s all-weather ally through more than five decades, and both Islamabad and Beijing worry about and balance against India.

From Pakistan’s perspective, India represents an existential threat. Pakistan’s primary strategic objective since the two nations were born has been to weaken India by any means necessary. For Beijing, India represents one of the few potential challengers to China’s dominance of Asia. Both have been clear and single-minded in their pursuit to weaken and balance India, which has made for one of the most durable and deepest strategic alignments since the 1950s. There is little likelihood that this will end any time soon, a reality that seems lost on India’s foreign policy elite.

It is unlikely that India will respond in any extreme, escalatory manner toward Beijing in the short term. The general elections next month occupy much of the government’s attention. Foreign policy issues are unlikely to play a big part in the campaign except for the ruling BJP chest-thumping on the Balakot strike against Pakistan. Moreover, India’s opposition parties, all to the left of the nationalist BJP, have few foreign policy ideas or critiques that have any traction. Calling Modi “weak” and “scared of Xi”, as Rahul Gandhi, the leader of the opposition Congress party has charged, is unlikely to suffice.

On the other hand, there is significant and vocal criticism in the Indian media of the “Wuhan spirit,” and the broader Sino-Indian reset in the aftermath of the Doklam confrontation in 2017. The Hindustan Times, a leading English-language national daily, editorialized that “the Wuhan exercise seems to have failed. Not just Pakistan-backed terrorism, China has not yielded ground on anything else.” Another newspaper has warned that bilateral ties could suffer because New Delhi feels betrayed. This has been matched on social media sites in India such as Twitter where #BoycottChineseProducts and #ChinaBacksTerrorism have been trending. Whether and how this will affect Indian policy towards China after the coming elections remains to be seen.

New Terror Attack Exposes India’s Limited Options - The Diplomat, 15 February 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I wrote on the horrific terrorist attack in Pulwama yesterday and what India's options may be in response to it. In the piece, "New Terror Attack Exposes India’s Limited Options," I argue that despite the severity of the attack and the pressure for action, New Delhi’s choices are much more limited than they may initially appear.

A major terrorist attack in Awantipora area of Pulwama district in south Kashmir has killed dozens of Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel, and the casualties are likely to go up. But despite the severity of the attack and growing pressure for action, New Delhi’s choices are much more limited than they may initially appear.

The Pulwama terrorist attack is one of the worst in recent years. The death toll is still climbing, but recent reports indicated over 40 people had been killed. In the 2016 attack on an Indian Army base in Uri, 16 personnel had died. The 2001 attack on the Jammu and Kashmir state assembly in Srinagar had killed 38 people. For the CRPF in particular, this is the second worst attack in its history. The last time it suffered such casualties was in Dantewada when Maoists insurgents ambushed and killed 75 CRPF personnel in April 2010.

The CRPF is the largest of the central paramilitary forces that come under the Ministry of Home Affairs. It has been carrying out law and order as well as counterinsurgency duties in Jammu and Kashmir and India’s northeast for several decades. The CRPF is generally less well trained and less well armed than the Indian Army, but it is usually used to bolster local police forces around the country in various contingencies including for counterinsurgency duties.

Reacting to the attack, Prime Minister Narendra Modi tweeted, “Attack on CRPF personnel in Pulwama is despicable. I strongly condemn this dastardly attack. The sacrifices of our brave security personnel shall not go in vain. The entire nation stands shoulder to shoulder with the families of the brave martyrs.” Union Minister VK Singh responded by saying, “As a soldier and a citizen of India, my blood boils at the spineless and cowardly attacks. 18 brave hearts from the @crpfindia laid down their lives in #Pulwama. I salute their selfless sacrifice & promise that every drop of our soldier’s blood will be avenged. #JaiHind.”

These statements are understandable and fairly routine, and the government will be under great pressure to do something. One reason is the scale of the attack and the open claim of responsibility by Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), a Pakistan-based terrorist group. Another reason is that the Modi government claims to be tough on national security matters and its supporters will expect it to act forcefully. Moreover, India’s so-called surgical strikes in 2016 will lead to expectations that India will act this time also. Finally, national elections are due to take place in the next few months which adds domestic political pressure on the government.

For the full article, click here.



On the other hand, India’s options to respond are fairly limited. On the diplomatic side, while we have seen Indian officials speak about isolating Pakistan and some steps may be taken in this direction, they are likely to have little substantive impact considering that the level of diplomatic intercourse with Pakistan is already quite minimal and no major negotiations or talks are underway. While India could downgrade diplomatic relations even further, it is unlikely that it could do very much to assuage the anger in the country.

India could also try to generate diplomatic pressure on Pakistan through its friends in the international community and through multilateral fora such as the United Nations. But these have so far proved of little value and they are unlikely to bear much fruit.

This attack also raises questions about the Modi government’s Wuhan initiative to smooth ties with China. Despite Modi’s efforts to mollify China, there is little indication that Beijing has stopped providing cover to Pakistan, especially on the Masood Azhar issue. In fact, any Indian effort to once again list JeM founder Masood Azhar as a global terrorist is likely to be blocked by China.

India’s military options are equally constrained. If past crises are any indication, it is unlikely that there are any well-planned and prepared contingency options that have been decided in consultation between the political leadership and the Indian military. Thus, any response will have to wait until plans are drawn up, forces prepared, and equipment deployed. This is likely to take time, possibly several weeks.

It is also unclear that the Indian military has sufficient superiority over Pakistani forces to even consider any full-scale military retaliation. The Indian military has been starved of funds in the last several years, with very little capital acquisition and significant weaknesses in critical areas. The Indian Air Force, for example, is down to about 30 squadrons and it will be years before India is able to field the full 42 squadrons that has been sanctioned for the Air Force.

It is also unclear that India will respond with a full-scale conventional assault as envisaged under the Cold Start doctrine. With elections looming, such a venture may be considered too risky. While it is possible that India could conduct a somewhat enhanced version of the 2016 surgical strikes, that may not be seen as sufficient.

The Modi government is thus likely to find itself facing a series of bad choices. But it has only itself to blame for the poor planning and preparation to meet a contingency that was easily predictable. The greatest danger is that under pressure to do something, Delhi will launch a military assault with inadequate forethought that will likely make the situation worse.