2020 - A challenging year yet a satisfying year, professionally

2020 has remained a challenging year for the world around and I was no exception.  Personally, it was a trying year with a lot of dislocations.  Nevertheless, it has been a satisfying year, professionally speaking.  

In March 2020, I was offered to join the Perth USAsia Centre as part of their inaugural Indo-Pacific Fellow programme for a period of nine months.  While I represented India, there were colleagues, one each from Australia, Japan, Indonesia and Vietnam.  It was a very fulfilling experience.  As part of the fellowship, I did a number of essays and webinars: Towards A Quad-Plus Arrangement?; Uneasy Contradictions Continue in India's Strategic Engagements; Countering ChineseAssertiveness: India’sChanging Posture in the Indian Ocean; and a forthcoming one, looking at how India-Australia relations will continue to get stronger in the face of an aggressive China.  

I got a peer reviewed journal article, "India's Emerging Space Assets and Nuclear-Weapons Capabilities" published in The Non-proliferation Review in March 2020.  In this article, I argue that over the last five decades, India’s nuclear and space programs have gone through several phases, from collaboration to divorce to supportive. An interplay of two factors determined the nature of the relationship. One was the state of India’s nuclear-weapon program. The second was international conditions, especially India’s relationship with the nuclear-nonproliferation regime. In the early decades, because of the rudimentary nature of India’s nuclear and space programs, the relationship was collaborative, since the rocket technology being developed was a necessary adjunct to the nuclear-weapon program. Subsequently, as India’s rocketry capabilities and nuclear-weapon program began to mature and concerns about international sanctions under the non-proliferation regime began to grow, the two programs were separated. The Indian rocketry program was also divided, with the civilian-space and ballistic-missile programs clearly demarcated. After India declared itself a nuclear-weapon state in 1998 and the programs matured, the relationship has become more supportive. As the two programs mature further, this relationship is likely to deepen, as the nuclear-weapon program requires space assets to build a robust and survivable nuclear deterrent force.  

In May 2020, the Office of Principal Scientific Adviser to the Government of India and the Department of Science and Technology invited me to be part of the process of formulating India's new Science, Technology, and Innovation Policy (STIP 2020).  As part of the STIP 2020 policy drafting exercise, 21 thematic groups (TGs) were constituted and I was asked to be a member and Co-Chair of the TG-Strategic Technologies.  It was such an honour and privilege for me to part of this exercise, discussing and coming up with recommendations on India's strategic technologies.  The report should be out within a few months, I guess.  

In October 202, I was invited to be part of the Editorial Board of Asian Security.  It is one of the top ranking journals on various aspects of national and international security in Asia.  I am honoured and delighted to be joining the journal in this capacity.  

In November 2020, I was part of the Bloomberg-Intelligence Squared US debate, "That's Debatable - Is A U.S.-China Space Race Good for Humanity?".  The debate was aired on November 7, 2020 and it is available at: https://www.intelligencesquaredus.org/debates/us-china-space-race-good-humanity.  American theoretical physicist, Prof. Michio Kaku and I argued against the motion, and Prof. Avi Loeb and Bidhushi Bhattacharya argued for the motion, and so well-moderated by John Donvan.  This was so much fun and we won the debate.  

I thought I will highlight some of my professional activities here but I have updated my blog with most of these developments on a reasonably regular basis.  

The push and pull in the Australia–India partnership - East Asia Forum, 1 February 2020

In February, I wrote a short essay on India-Australia strategic partnership for the East Asia Forum. The essay, "The push and pull in the Australia–India partnership", looked at the pulls and pressures of this partnership and what lies ahead.

The India–Australia strategic partnership has grown quite rapidly over the last few years. This is impressive considering how indifferent New Delhi and Canberra were towards each other a decade ago. The change in the tone and direction of the relationship over the past decade is driven by shared concerns about China’s rise and its strategic implications for the Asia Pacific order.

For the full post, click here.



Despite the number of high-level political visits and military exchanges, such as the 2+2 Dialogue, there still remains scepticism about the relationship. Many believe that the shared concerns of both countries have not yet translated into a shared policy approach. Frederic Grare raised this point in 2014, but six years later India and Australia remain unable to forge a coherent strategy or a common policy approach to China.

There has traditionally been some wariness among Australian security analysts about the India–Australia relationship, and vice-versa. But as the threat from China grows, New Delhi and Canberra should find more innovative ways to work together to shape a stable Asian strategic order. The two already work together in larger strategic formulations such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad).

A new wrinkle in the relationship is the Modi government’s identity politics. Many argue that India’s recent internal developments go against the grain of its strategic partnerships — based on shared liberal democratic values.

Whether mutual concerns about China are serious enough to offset worries about the unhelpful direction of India’s internal politics and nurture the budding India–Australia strategic partnership remains to be seen.

Australian officials are very positive about the direction of relations. At the fourth Raisina Dialogue in January 2019, Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne noted that as ‘competition intensifies, Australia and India have shared interests in ensuring the peaceful development of an open, inclusive and prosperous Indo‑Pacific region — a region in which the rights of all states are respected, large and small’.

The signing of a Framework for Security Cooperation between India and Australia in 2014 by Prime Ministers Narendra Modi and then-prime minister Tony Abbott still provides the much-needed impetus for greater security engagement between the two countries.

The two countries are currently finalising a mutual logistics support agreement, an information exchange agreement and a broader maritime agreement. These are expected to increase military interoperability and help ‘elevate’ the strategic partnership.

There remain areas that need greater clarity. One of the problems with the India–Australia relationship is that both countries have a different set of concerns about China. Australian concerns have to do with China’s increased activities in the Pacific, while India is concerned about China’s greater presence and influence in the Indian Ocean. India has also been uncertain about Australia’s reliance since Canberra backed out of the Quad in 2007, though this uncertainty is slowly disappearing. It is equally likely that Canberra has a certain lack of confidence given that New Delhi seems ambiguous about whether to balance or hedge. These differences might partly have to do with strategic histories. Australia has long been an American ally, while India remains uncomfortable about alliances.

This need not be an impediment to the strategic relationship if the two countries are able to forge their partnership based on some key principles, norms and ideals. Both countries should champion the rule of law, a rules-based order, respect for human rights and norms of responsible behaviour.

The joint naval exercise AUSINDEX (which began in 2015) reflects the convergence of Indian and Australian approaches to maritime and regional security. The two countries conducted the third edition of AUSINDEX in April 2019. The exercise was reported to have been the biggest in terms of the scale of participation from both navies.

The second issue with the relationship is the deficit of military capabilities, especially on the Indian side. While the two militaries have been able to showcase their prowess during exercises, their ability to come to each other’s aid during conflict remains in question. The joint logistics services agreement would go a long way in addressing this issue as it would provide joint access to each other’s military facilities.

Third, there is a need for greater agreement among the Quad member states about burden-sharing. A discussion about the operational aspects of their cooperation would create greater synergy between their forces when dealing with common problems.

From an Australian perspective, the fourth and final irritant in the relationship is India’s reluctance to involve Australia in the Malabar trilateral naval exercise alongside the other three Quad nations — India, Japan and the United States. Indian media reports indicate that India might be open to involving Australia at the next Malabar naval exercises scheduled to take place later in the summer.

Indian reluctance to involve Australia in the Malabar exercise has not produced significant negativity towards India, especially given the progress in bilateral relations more broadly. But if India thinks Australia is a legitimate security partner, it must expand the trilateral to include Australia as well. The fact that Australia is included in other bilateral and multinational military exercises should not be an excuse.

The India–Australia strategic partnership has seen impressive advancements in the last few years, but its potential and promise are yet to be fully realised. It will require dedicated attention and political leadership from both capitals to become more than a work in progress going forward.

Will India Now Finally Invite Australia to the Malabar Exercise? - The Diplomat, 31 January 2020

In my last column for the month for The Diplomat, I looked at the question if India is going to finally invite Australia to the Malabar exercise. New reports have surfaced regarding a previously headline-grabbing, controversial development.

In a significant development that has been through multiple rounds of headlines and controversy, India might be finally getting ready to invite Australia to the Malabar naval exercise, according to media reports. The next edition of the exercise is scheduled to take place around July or August this year.

For the full post, click here.



The question of inviting Australia to the exercise, which currently includes India, Japan and the United States, has been controversial. India has for several years resisted bringing Australia on board, reportedly because of possible negative reactions from China. The fact is that the first and only time Australia has been part of this exercise was in 2007, when both Australia and Singapore were invited to join India, Japan and the United States.

Nonetheless, if India finally agrees to invite Australia for the 2020 Malabar naval exercises, it will be a welcome break and would suggest the growing seriousness and synergy among four key Indo-Pacific powers – Australia, India, Japan, and the United States.

The India-U.S. Malabar series of naval exercises go back to 1992 and became a regular annual feature since 2002, after it was suspended following India’s nuclear tests in 1998. The initial series of exercises were held off the coast of Malabar, and hence the name of the series but these naval engagements have been held in other areas as well including the Arabian Sea, Bay of Bengal and in the Western Pacific.

In 2007, there were two editions of the Malabar exercise – one held in the Western Pacific along with Japan in April 2007 and a second one in the Bay of Bengal with the participation of Australia, Japan and Singapore in September 2007. That year also saw the first meeting of the Quadrilateral group – India, Japan, Australia and the United States.

China’s displeasure at the forming of the group – it sent a demarche to all four countries – ended the Quadrilateral group and also ended the practice of such naval exercises. Neither India nor Australia was willing to cross China. So, for the next few years, Malabar reverted to being a U.S.-India naval exercise.

Japan has joined Malabar sporadically for several years before becoming a permanent member in 2015. Bringing Tokyo into the mix was an important strategic signaling itself. It indicated the growing strategic convergence among the three nations on the one hand, while also illustrating the fact that the three countries recognized the need to undertake joint exercises to make interoperability a viable proposition.

Around the same time, relations between New Delhi and Canberra too were improving, but the apprehension of Australia’s dependability (after the 2007 experience) made India cautious. But other reasons could have played into this as well, including the fact that India wanted to first be confident of the durability of the existing trilateral exercise before expanding it.

In truth, neither of these explanations can satisfactorily account for India’s reluctance to move on this front if New Delhi were serious enough. If India were serious about strategic messaging to China, it would not waste any opportunity because fearing Chinese negative reaction and appeasing China has not brought India any goodwill previously. China’s behavior does not automatically call for any restraint; equally, if not more important, was New Delhi’s own reluctance to antagonize Beijing.

But as the Quad diplomatic group has revived, Australia has sought to be part of the Malabar exercises. Indeed, Australia appears to have pushed hard for an invite. This is not entirely surprising: It also fits with the growing strategic interaction between India and Australia that now includes on both bilateral as well as multinational military engagements. Kakadu, AUSINDEX, and the Black Carillon military exercises are illustrative of this. In January 2019, a defense source is reported to have said that including Australia and engaging in a Quad naval exercise would lead to sending a political message to China, something for which India apparently is not ready.

A year later, India now reportedly appears to be more confident about inviting Australia to the naval exercise. Several recent developments could have contributed to this development. One, the upgrading of the Quad engagements to the foreign minister level is reflective of a growing seriousness with which Quad members are treating each other. This can be viewed as part of that wider strategic development.

Two, India’s bilateral strategic partnership with Australia has improved dramatically in recent years. The 2+2 strategic dialogue, the military exercises, and the regular political and security conversations between India and Australia have strengthened India’s confidence about Canberra as a security partner. There were as many as 39 bilateral interactions in 2019 alone.

Three, despite two informal summits between India and China, the two sides do not appear to have made any substantial progress in improving their relations. Indeed, China has continued to make inroads into South Asia with little consideration for India’s concerns. Beijing’s Belt and Road push in Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Myanmar has given it a greater foothold in Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal.

Four, India’s own comfort level in building strategic relationships has grown and it is evident in the manner in which India has gradually expanded Malabar to include Japan first and now possibly Australia. India also engages Australia through another trilateral – India, Indonesia and Australia. Therefore, India’s ease of doing business with Australia in the strategic realm has gone up several notches even in the last three years since the quad has made a comeback.

Five and lastly, the shared concerns among the four countries about the future of the Indo-Pacific has possibly been the biggest factor pushing India to expand the trilateral. The convergence around these notions of broader regional order have reinforced the shared interests between them and also acted as another boost for developing ties.

An expanded Malabar series of exercises is obviously important in terms of developing coherent strategic approaches to addressing many of the region’s security challenges. On the diplomatic side, a useful first step was the Quad ministerial level consultations. And on the defense side now, further engagement in naval exercises could strengthen interoperability among the four partner navies, which ultimately will be important in addressing the very issues they are speaking about.

China-Pakistan Naval Drills: More Than Just Symbolism - The Diplomat, 10 January 2020

Once again, I am lagging with my blog posts but here is a short essay I wrote for The Diplomat from earlier in the month, where I focused on the impact of the China-Pakistan naval drills. Beyond symbolism, the substance behind the latest iteration of exercises between the two countries also deserves emphasis.

Earlier in the week, the navies of China and Pakistan began their sixth bilateral naval exercise, titled Sea Guardians-2020, in the northern Arabian Sea. Such military exercises are expected to strengthen security cooperation between the two countries, who are already “iron brothers.” According to Chinese media reports, the naval drills are aimed at exploring new methods of conducting China-Pakistan joint naval drills while stepping up the capabilities to jointly addresses issues such as maritime terrorism and crime.

For the full post, click here.



The exercise is also sensitive because it is taking place on India’s west coast, a critical security area from New Delhi’s perspective. Clearly, the exercise will be very important for China because it increases the PLA Navy’s familiarity and understanding of the operational conditions in this part of the Arabian Sea. Moreover, gaining greater access to the Arabian Sea through Pakistan is also likely an attractive incentive for China. If it works, it can be an alternate route for China in the event of a naval blockade by an adversary that closes the Malacca Straits choke point.

In addition, India will also have concerns because India’s Arabian Sea coast hosts several major Indian ports including Kandla, Okha, Mumbai, Nhava Sheva (Navi Mumbai), Mormugão, New Mangalore, and Kochi. For China, the Arabian Sea is also important in the context of its air and naval facility, Jiwani, close to the Gwadar Port and the Iranian Chahabar Port that is jointly developed by India and Iran.

China appears enthusiastic about undertaking these naval exercises on a regular basis. In a story about these exercises in the Chinese newspaper Global Times, Zhang Junshe, a senior research fellow at the PLA Naval Military Studies Research Institute, argues that “serializing the drills and making them a routine will further enhance China and Pakistan’s friendship and cooperation.” Similarly, Zhou Hanwen, an executive director of the exercise, stated that “the training involving submarine will boost the two navies’ combat capabilities and show a high level of strategic mutual trust.” Commenting on the exercise, China’s ambassador to Pakistan Ambassador Yao Jing said that the exercise “fully reflects the good wishes of the Chinese and Pakistani navies in jointly building a community of shared maritime destiny, and demonstrates the confidence and capability to jointly guard marine peace and security.”

The exercise that began at the Pakistan Navy Dockyard in Karachi will go on for nine days from January 6 to 14. The opening ceremony had Vice Admiral Dong Jun, general director of the Chinese side and deputy commander of PLA Southern Theater Command, and Vice Admiral Asif Khaliq, general director of the Pakistani side and commander of the Pakistani Naval Fleet deliver speeches emphasizing the importance of their joint collaboration. China has continued to reiterate that the naval drills have nothing to do with the prevailing situation in the Middle East and that it is not aimed at any third country. The PLA reportedly stated that the joint exercise will involve two sessions – “joint training in Karachi and live-fire drills in northern parts of the Arabian Sea－and will include workshops, tactical simulation, joint patrol, air and missile defense, law enforcement inspection and anti-submarine operation.”

For the exercise, the PLA Navy has deployed five major ships, including the guided-missile destroyer Yinchuan, the guided-missile frigate Yuncheng, the comprehensive supply ship Weishanhu, and the submarine rescue ship Liugongdao, whereas Pakistan is represented by two Zulfiquar-class F22P/F21 frigates, two fast attack craft, one fixed-wing anti-submarine patrol aircraft, two ship-borne helicopters and more than 60 special operations soldiers.

It has also been reported that the two navies will engage in a number of training exercises including joint patrol, air-defense, joint anti-submarine, maritime live-firing, and joint marine training. The Pakistan Navy reportedly said that the overall aim of the exercise is to enhance the two navies’ technical and tactical capabilities, exchange of professional experiences against maritime threats, evolve a synergistic approach between the two sides and preserve regional maritime security. The Chinese navy’s new website navy.81.cn provides a detailed summary of the exercise, including the naval platforms that have been deployed. It is also noteworthy that the joint naval exercise is in addition the “warrior” series of exercises between the two armies and the “eagle” series exercises between the two air forces.

China and Pakistan have had a decades-long strategic partnership, and they have conducted many military exercises. But it does appear as if these exercises are now getting more complex and are designed for more than simply symbolic demonstration of China-Pakistan friendship. These bilateral exercises need to be seen also in the context of the recent China-Pakistan-Iran-Russia naval exercise, all of which is likely to worry India as well others such as the United States.

India’s Self-Inflicted Foreign Policy Challenges in 2020 - The Diplomat, 4 January 2020

In my column for The Diplomat last week, India’s Self-Inflicted Foreign Policy Challenges in 2020, I looked at India's foreign policy challenges for 2020. Sadly, many of them have been the government's own making. Hence, I argue that while the Modi government secured some notable gains during its time in office thus far, challenges lie ahead this year and beyond.

Since becoming prime minister in 2014, Narendra Modi has paid significant attention to India’s foreign relations. Though there could be some quibbles about how much he managed to achieve, there is little doubt that his focus at least led to greater energy and push in India’s foreign policy, even if Modi’s foreign policy has not witnessed any significant shifts.

But since his re-election last summer, India’s foreign policy challenges have been growing. And while the reasons for this may be varied, some of it is because of the BJP government’s own mistakes.

For the full essay, click here.



In his first term, Modi was able to undertake significant strategic outreach to the United States, Japan, and Australia. The revival of the Quad is a great indicator of the pragmatism in India’s diplomacy today. Despite some setbacks in between, India also managed to consolidate its position in two important Indian Ocean countries – Sri Lanka and Maldives. Modi can also be credited with a more effective outreach to Southeast Asia, with its Act East Policy.

But there are also growing difficulties. Managing China, India’s most serious challenge, has seen some success but it remains a major and continuing problem. India’s more active role in the Quad in its second avatar is a positive sign. Despite the occasional wavering in India’s Indo-Pacific policy, elevating the Quad to foreign ministerial level deliberations shows the willingness of all the four Quad members to acknowledge the reality of the China problem and the need for the four to work toward strategic coordination.

But there are serious problems with India’s hard capacity to manage the China problem. General V.P. Malik, the former chief of Indian Army Staff, said during the Kargil war that “we will fight with what we have,” but such an approach while facing a much a larger and strong force in China will be dangerous for India. For all the loud rhetoric on national security, the Modi government’s defense budget allocation has been abysmal. Year after year, it has driven down the defense budget, which now has the lowest allocation since the period before the 1962 Sino-Indian War.

Even within this allocation, much of it is spent on salaries and pension, leaving very little for capital expenditure, thus leaving procurement issues unresolved. All three Indian services have significant gaps and this is going to test India’s ability to defend successfully against China. The Indian focus appears to be on diplomacy to deal with China, but depending on one toll alone could be dangerous.

Another major challenge is the neighborhood, and the problems here are compounded due to India’s internal developments. Today, India’s neighborhood policy is facing serious challenges, in part because of the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) and the proposed National Register of Citizens (NRC). Together, they have had a particularly negative impact on India’s relations with Afghanistan and Bangladesh. With the CAA targeting three Islamic neighbors – Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Pakistan – India’s neighborhood diplomacy suddenly faces new problems.

Relations with Bangladesh had improved significantly under Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina but the CAA and the NRC have put the Bangladeshi government in a difficult position. Relations with Afghanistan, another friendly neighbor, are affected also. Moreover, the CAA is seen both as specifically targeting Muslims and as equating Indian citizenship with Hinduism, raising eyebrows across the world. Even India’s partners are questioning its credentials as a multicultural, pluralist society. India did enjoy certain soft power benefit as the world’s largest democracy, with diverse cultures and religions co-existing in a stable political system, but that image has been tarnished by the recent developments.

Modi, Home Minister Amit Shah, and even External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar can ignore the global concerns by saying these are internal matters of India. But the reality is that India’s moral standing has taken a hit and it will need significant efforts on the part of the Modi government to demonstrate that India is still a multicultural and secular democracy.

Modi did make a smart choice in getting Jaishankar to head the foreign ministry. Jaishankar, a former foreign secretary, is well-respected around the world, and is known to have been an important reason for many of Modi’s foreign policy successes in his first term. But it is unclear if an experienced technocrat like Jaishankar can weather the storms created by poor domestic political decisions. Jaishankar was successful to a large extent in assuaging the fears around the developments in Jammu and Kashmir, after Article 370 was revoked in early July. His extensive engagements in the United States, speaking in nearly a dozen think tanks, as well as other media interviews, helped stem the damage.

But India’s outreach has been poor after the CAA. Jaishankar’s cancellation of meetings with U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) because the delegation included Ms. Pramila Jayapal, for instance, has angered Democrats in the United States to the point where Jayapal now has another 10 legislators co-sponsoring her resolution in the Congress, seeking a return to normalcy in Kashmir at the earliest. It is not clear that India still enjoys the kind of bipartisan support in the U.S. as it did in the last 15 years.

This comes on top of Modi’s statement, “Ab ki baar Trump Sarkar,” which has not gone down well with Democrats. It would have been better for Modi to not poke his head into the internal politics of another country. The U.S. relationship is absolutely critical in managing the China issue and it will be a challenge to get it back to even keel, especially if a Democrat wins the White House in November.

It is unclear how the India-Japan relationship has been affected. The annual summit, originally slated to take place in Guwahati in December 2019, was postponed because of CAA-related protests. This has been an annual feature for more than a decade and it is possibly the first time that the summit meeting has been skipped.

India’s democracy and stability plays at least a supporting role in India’s partnerships, and even uncertainty can hurt these relations. While India has faced many external difficulties in the past, they have rarely been the result of domestic politics. Handling these new challenges could be much more difficult than the Indian government assumes.

China’s Second Aircraft Carrier: A Sign of PLA Naval Muscle? - The Diplomat, 26 December 2019

In my column for The Diplomat last week, I looked at China's commissioning of its second aircraft carrier and what it means for the overall PLA Navy.

On December 17, China commissioned into service its first home-built aircraft carrier, Shandong, at the Sanya naval base in Hainan, with President Xi Jinping presiding over the commissioning ceremony.

The commissioning of the aircraft carrier is significant. This is China’s second aircraft carrier, and an important addition to China’s power projection capabilities. It is also noteworthy because it displays China’s capability to develop aircraft carriers indigenously.

For the full essay, click here.



Military analysts argue that the layout of the warships “limits her military potential” as also its power projection capabilities since it is simply a copy of its first carrier, Liaoning, which itself is a refurbished ship bought from Ukraine. The J-15s that it operates also imposes limitations on the kind of operations it can undertake. Nevertheless, PLA Navy is clearly on the way to becoming a more credible blue water navy and it warrants close attention from key Indo-Pacific nations including, India, the United States, Japan and Australia.

China’s Navy has traditionally remained weak on account of the excessive focus on China’s ground force. As such, it did not have an aircraft carrier and even lacked amphibious operations capabilities. But all this is changing. China has strengthened its ability to project sea power significantly in the last few years. The building of the naval base, Sanya, in Hainan was one such indicator. Sanya has the capacity to maintain a large fleet of surface warships, and as an underground base for submarines. The Sanya base gives China significant advantages because of its proximity to the South China Sea as well as the Malacca Straits.

China has given great importance to building its aircraft carriers. It sees the utility of a carrier both for achieving sea control and for sea denial goals. The PLA Navy acknowledges the importance of maintaining air superiority in future naval conflicts, for which large aircraft carrier are important. The best pilots are being selected for the air wing, and they are also expected to eventually command these ships.

The construction of the Shandong, displacing around 50,000 tons, and with a conventional propulsion system, appears to have begun in 2013. The carrier can reportedly “carry up to 24 Shenyang J-15 multirole fighter jets and a variant of the fourth-generation Sukhoi Su-33 twin-engines air superiority fighter, as well as around ten rotary wing aircraft including Changshe Z-18, Ka-31, or Harbin Z-9 helicopters.” Unlike the U.S. aircraft carriers that can carry up to 100 fighter jets, Shandong will be able to carry a total of only 32 aircrafts, as per senior PLAN officers.

China had procured its first aircraft carrier, Liaoning (originally the Varyag, and built for the Soviet navy) from Ukraine as scrap for $20 million, but it was eventually restored and entered service in 2012. A senior colonel and spokesman for the Ministry of National Defense, Geng Yansheng, said the carrier was to be “used for scientific research and training.” But the colonel also clearly outlined the necessity of an aircraft to protect China’s varied interests, giving some clue to future Chinese plans.

In November, on its ninth sea trial (since May 2018) to undertake equipment tests and personnel training, it sailed through the Taiwan Straits. Both of China’s aircraft carriers have a ramp to launch J-15 fighter aircraft, which is seen as the primary combat jet for the Chinese carrier battle group.

The exact composition of a Chinese carrier battle group is unknown, but some have suggested that a future Chinese Carrier Strike Group (CSG) could include Jiangkai-II-class (Type 054A) frigates, Luyang-III-class (Type 052D) destroyers, Renhai-class Type 055 destroyers, and a couple of Yuan-class (Type 039A) or Song-class (Type 039) submarines along with additional support vessels. There are also reports that both of China’s carriers could operate together, along with others (two Type 055 guided-missile destroyers; four Type 054 frigates; six guided-missile frigates, as well as one supply ship and three Type 093B nuclear submarines), to prevent u.s. or Japanese military assistance to Taiwan in case of a war.

The PLAN’s operational tempo is also increasing. A PLA naval formation led by its first carrier, Liaoning entered the Miyako Strait for the second time in June this year; the first such passage was in December 2016. Japan had then sent its surveillance vessels although an article by Xiakedao, the official WeChat account operated by the overseas edition of People’s Daily, called the Japanese action an overreaction and unnecessary, adding that “China’s aircraft carriers will routinely pass the Miyako Strait.” In addition to a possible Taiwan Straits scenario, experts foresee the use of the aircraft carriers “to stop US long-range bombers from taking off from a naval base in Guam.”

While the induction of China’s second aircraft carrier is a significant development, there are still issues that China will need to resolve in terms of training and operational experience in operating an aircraft carrier. There will also be issues of jointness to be sorted out with other combat units such as the amphibious troops, rocket forces and other service legs.

A more significant issue would be its ability to take on other traditional naval powers such as the United States and Japan. China’s two carrier battle group together would have only 30 J-15 fighter jets to take on U.S. forces in the area. And unlike the American aircraft carriers that use catapults, Shandong’s ski-jump configuration adds additional burdens, including how fast aircraft could be launched. China plans to address this issue in the next two aircraft carriers that it will build in the coming years. The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency in a January 2019 report on China’s military power had noted other limitations of the ski-jump configuration including its ability to “operate large, specialized support aircraft, such as an AEW [airborne early warning] aircraft.”

There are other weaknesses as well that China needs to address before it can take on more capable navies in the Indo-Pacific. But the fact remains that China’s progress so far has been impressive, and that point ought not to be lost even as we remain cognizant of Beijing’s limitations.

What’s in the Growing Russia-China-Iran Trilateral Convergence? - The Diplomat, 23 December 2019

Once again, I am lagging behind in posting my articles. I will try and rectify this in the new year.

On December 23, I published a short essay in The Diplomat on the recent Russia-China-Iran joint naval drills in the Indian Ocean. Potential security engagements among the three have spotlighted their increasing convergence.

While much of the focus in terms of minilateral alignments in the Asian region tends to be on those involving U.S. allies and partners, be it the Quad or U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral dynamics, there are other arrangements beyond this as well. Of particular note are the arrangements that have been forged by China and Russia over the past few years.

One of these is the China-Russia-Iran relationship. Like many other arrangements, this represents the outgrowth of the combination of existing links between the three countries and recent convergences due to various trends and developments, including growing opposition to the United States that has risen further under President Donald Trump. And it continues to attract headlines about other countries that could join as well, including Pakistan.

For the full essay, click here.



Spotlight on the arrangement has been growing in recent weeks with the three countries scheduled to hold their first joint naval drill in the Indian Ocean later this month. Iran’s semi-official Fars news agency reported that the commander of the Iranian Navy, Rear Admiral Hossein Khanzadi, has said that Iran will engage in a trilateral exercise called Marine Security Belt beginning on December 27. Khanzadi revealed that this is part of a broader naval collaboration between Iran and China, which includes also production of destroyers and submarines.

Details have been rather scarce on the engagement. Last week, while speaking to IRNA, Iran’s official news agency, Khanzadi had mentioned that the naval drill will take place in the northern Indian Ocean, although he did not then announce the date. And reports also suggest that both Tehran and Beijing are considering a “long term blueprint of military collaboration.” Confirming Russian participation, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said, “We, the People’s Republic of China, and Iran are preparing naval drills for fighting terrorists and pirates in this part of the Indian Ocean.” Commenting on the trilateral exercise, Lavrov stated on October 2 that the exercise will be undertaken to train their forces in anti-piracy and anti-terrorism efforts.

Irrespective of what is being said and not said publicly, the geopolitical underpinnings of the trilateral group are quite evident: all the three maintain a rather hostile relationship with the United States and have proven increasingly willing to take cooperative actions in the security realm to illustrate their own capabilities. While speaking to the Iranian Mehr News Agency earlier, Rear Admiral Khanzadi had hinted at the fact that a “joint wargame between several countries, whether on land, at sea or in the air, indicates a remarkable expansion of cooperation among them.”

But the strategic significance of this ought to be understood more broadly too. This is a region that has witnessed increasing military activity. The United States conducted a naval operation in Bahrain in November to safeguard shipping in the Persian Gulf waters, which has seen increasing tensions in recent times, and Washington also plans to initiate and lead an International Maritime Security Construct in the Gulf, with the participation of Australia, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the U.K. Other actors are also stepping in, with French Defense Minister Florence Parly saying in November that a European-led maritime surveillance initiative, stationed at the French naval base in Abu Dhabi, UAE, will be engaged in maintaining a watch on the Gulf waters.

The activities of Russia, China, and Iran on their own terms have also attracted interest. Russia has its own initiative, the Collective Security in the Persian Gulf, which is also backed by China. Meanwhile, Iran has plans to pursue a “Hormuz Peace Endeavor” called HOPE, with the Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Shamkhani saying that its own initiative would not include any foreign powers and that it will be a coalition of regional states (while Iran’s naval prowess thus far has been limited to its use of fast boats to harass and chase foreign naval vessels, which has been undertaken by the IRGC and not the actual navy, the Iranian Navy is gaining teeth with acquisition of new drones and other technologies).

Seen from this perspective, China, Iran, and Russia all have an incentive to use the trilateral naval exercise to showcase their growing alignment. From Iran’s perspective, for instance, it has directly said that the trilateral naval exercise is to send a strategic message that the three participating countries have “reached a meaningful strategic point in their relations, with regard to their shared and non-shared interests, and by non-shared I mean the respect we have for one another’s national interests.” China has been more cautious about formal statements, partly because Chinese security analysts say Beijing would not want “to be drawn into Middle East conflicts.”

In the backdrop of these heightened maritime engagements by different coalitions of powers, the China-Iran-Russia trilateral naval exercise will be watched with some concern. As mentioned previously, it is occurring in an area that has seen increased military engagement. Beyond that, for countries like India, there are concerns about additional partners, notably Pakistan, whose potential invitation has been the source of headlines with Rear Admiral Khanzadi mentioning that Islamabad was welcome.

The coming together of China, Iran, and Russia itself is a major strategic development, and the addition of countries like Pakistan into the mix increases the stakes. Irrespective of how things play out, one can expect continued attention to trilateral and quadrilateral configurations such as these that go beyond the ones usually talked about involving U.S. allies and partners.

What Does the New Counterterrorism Exercise Mean for the Quad? - The Diplomat, December 6, 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I looked at the recently concluded counter-terrorism exercise of the Quad. Certainly, the recent development again put the minilateral arrangement in the headlines.

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“Quad”) between the U.S., Japan, India and Australia has often been questioned about its purpose and capacity. For critics, other than occasionally irritating Beijing, the Quad did not appear to have much purpose. And, at times, even these expressions of occasional irritation from China had been sufficient to send one or the other Quad countries into a funk.

But in the last two years, the Quad has slowly become somewhat sturdier, with the level of interaction between the countries improving, and the members themselves becoming less skittish when Beijing criticizes the venture. Now, the Quad countries have taken a new step, holding a table-top counter-terrorism exercise together. What can we make of this?

For the full post, click here.



Details are skimpy. India has hosted the first counter-terrorism table-top exercise (CT-TTX) among the Quad countries in New Delhi on November 21-22. India’s National Investigation Agency (NIA), which hosted the TTX, is reported to have said the exercise is meant to assess and validate counter-terror mechanisms against a range of existing and emerging terrorist threats at both the regional and global levels.

At the most basic level, the CT-TTX is not surprising considering India’s concern about the issue. India’s own insufficient military capabilities are well-known, and New Delhi has been open to cooperation in this regard. This is clearly an important reason why India has shown willingness to tie up with the Quad on counter-terrorism.

The exercise was also aimed at sharing best practices in terms of preparedness, mitigation strategies and in developing coordinated strategies, and to expand the areas for strengthened cooperation among the four Quad countries. Seen from that perspective, the exercise would help highlight the interagency coordination issues within each of the countries and also bolster the multi-agency coordination between security and counter-terror agencies among the four countries.

The exercise is significant because this was the first concrete joint security initiative by the four countries. The TTX also reflected the shared resolve among the Quad countries in addressing a major challenge they all face. Importantly, though this was a security exercise, it did not target China. But still, it is a step up from the usual HA/DR type of exercises that many of these countries, especially India, prefers. The fact that the Quad has been upgraded to foreign ministerial platform is also an important indicator of the significance the four participating countries attach to the Quad.

That said, one should not exaggerate the significance of this development. The Quad’s revival and the carrying out of the exercise reconfirms the fact that the original concerns that led to the Quad were valid and getting more serious. But the level of commitment of different countries within the Quad has been suspect, and their mutual trust is still a work in progress.

India is no exception to this. On the one hand, India has been open to the Quad as one of several mechanisms that allows it to build on partnerships without entering into alliances, and China’s behavior and its hostility (despite the Chennai informal summit) towards India has pushed New Delhi to be less reluctant about the Quad. But on the other hand, for the time-being, India’s willingness to participate in the Quad is limited to testing out non-military alliance initiatives such as the CT-TTX to assess the possibilities and limitations.

Tiger Triumph: US-India Military Relations Get More Complex - The Diplomat, 15 November 2019

In my column for The Diplomat last week, I wrote on how the maiden joint tri-services humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) exercise between the Indian and the US militaries will further deepen the ties between the two countries in general and the two militaries in particular.

The Indian and U.S. militaries are engaged in their maiden joint tri-services humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) exercise, which they are calling “Tiger Triumph,” in Visakhapatnam and Kakinada in the southern Indian state of Andhra Pradesh. This represents an improvement over the type of joint military exercises that the two countries have held to date, and is an indication that defense relations between the two sides are steadily deepening.

For the full post, click here.



The U.S. and Indian militaries have been engaged in a number of different military exercises since the early 1990s, including Yudh Abhyas and Vajra Prahar (army), Malabar and RIMPAC (multilateral, navy) and Red Flag (air force). This followed the big boost to U.S.-India defense relations with the Kicklighter proposals in 1991, which included service-to-service exchanges between India and the United States.

The first India-U.S. military exercise codenamed “Teak Iroquois” took place between the two armies in February 1992; the first naval exercise named Malabar-I in May 1992. In addition to generating interoperability, these exercises have been great familiarization opportunities for the two militaries to understand each other’s strategic and security perspectives. With each iteration, these exercises have grown in terms of the number of personnel and platforms involved, and the exercises themselves have become much more complex and useful.

This week, we saw another indication of the increasing complexity of U.S.-India exercises with the holding of Tiger Triumph, the maiden tri-service HADR exercise. The exercises, which started on November 13, should last a week. It is taking place on the India’s eastern seaboard with the participation of all three Indian services along with the U.S. Navy and Marines.

Indian naval ships Jalashwa, Airavat, and Sandhayak; Indian Army troops from 19 Madras and 7 Guards; and Indian Air Force MI-17 helicopters and Rapid Action Medical Team (IAF-RAMT) are participating in it from the Indian side. The United States has sent the USS Germantown and troops from the U.S. 3rd Marine Division. The U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific, is leading the efforts on the U.S. side. There are a total of 1,200 Indian and 500 U.S. men and women from different services participating in the first-ever U.S.-India tri-service exercise.

The exercise, focused on HADR aspects, is meant to be an annual event from now on, bolstering the already-strong military-to-military collaboration between India and the United States.

The exercise is aimed at building and nurturing better and more effective interoperability between the services of the two militaries. It is because the two militaries have held specific service-led military exercises for more than a decade that the Indian and the U.S. militaries were able to respond to the 2005 Indian Ocean tsunami in a prompt and coordinated fashion. Interoperability is the mantra, especially for a region that is characterized by a high number of natural disasters on a fairly periodic basis to which multiple countries respond.

According to an Indian government press release, the exercise will begin with a Harbor Phase at Vishakapatnam, which will be followed by a Sea Phase conducted in Kakinanda, where “the landing of Relief Forces would be undertaken to the Exercise scenario.” A Joint Command and Control Centre will be established by the Indian Army and U.S. Marines. The HADR area will also have a medical facility camp, established by the IAF-RAMT and the U.S. Navy Medical team, that will cater to the “victims” who would have been shifted to the facility by air and road. The exercise, with a goal of helping capacity-building for both the militaries, will simulate a full scenario involving field training and moving humanitarian assistance and disaster relief from ship to shore. The exercise will end with a closing ceremony on board the U.S. naval vessel Germantown on November 21.

Beyond Tiger Triumph itself, the trend of increasing complexity of U.S.-India exercises is rooted in broader strategic dynamics. These exercises are the result of the growing convergence between American and Indian strategic interests with the changing strategic dynamics in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. In this context, there is a recognition on both sides that more capable powers such as India and the United States have to join forces to prevent the possibility of a hegemonic Asia.

This has manifested itself in how both sides have been talking about each other within their broader strategic approaches. There have been repeated assertions from the United States on the importance of India in their Indo-Pacific strategy, and this is asserted in the U.S. National Security Strategy document as well as the U.S. Department of Defense’s 2019 Indo-Pacific Strategy Report. India does not bring out formal, official strategy papers, but statements by senior government officials and the upgrading of the Quad talks to ministerial level are a demonstration of similar sentiments on the Indian side too. And the idea of a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific was reiterated by Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the Shangri La Dialogue in 2018.

Engagements such as Tiger Triumph are also a demonstration of the fact that despite the occasional irritants in the relationship, U.S.-India ties are still deepening amid these wider strategic dynamics.

India Must Look Beyond ASEAN in Regional Security - The Diplomat, 8 November 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I wrote on India's diplomatic outreach to ASEAN and the possible limits to that engagement. I argue that in recognition of ASEAN’s limitations, New Delhi must also continue to strengthen its ties with other institutions, frameworks, and countries as well.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was in Thailand recently for three major summits – the India-ASEAN Summit, the East Asia Summit, and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) Summit. His visit was focused on a number of issues such as trade and connectivity, as well as security partnerships.

India’s diplomatic establishment was keen to highlight this aspect of India’s engagement of ASEAN. The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), in a special press briefing on Modi’s visit, said “The ASEAN-related summits are an integral part of our diplomatic calendar,” highlighting the fact that this was Modi’s ASEAN-India summit and sixth East Asia Summit.”

With India’s renewed focus on Southeast Asia with the Act East Policy, this should not surprise anyone. But while India sees a central role for the ASEAN in its Indo-Pacific strategy, it also needs to be cognizant of the fact that ASEAN has its own limitations.

For the full post, click here.



India has been keen on warming up its ties to Southeast Asia since the end of the Cold War. It initially adopted what was called the “Look East” policy which emphasized trade and economic linkages, but over the last decade this relationship has evolved into one that is at least equally concerned with security and strategic considerations. The policy was rebranded as “Act East” under the Modi government, to emphasize greater activism and commitment on India’s part. In January 2018, India hosted the 25th anniversary of the India-ASEAN friendship and the 15th year of the India-ASEAN summit, in which all the ten ASEAN leaders participated.

Clearly, this new approach is dictated by India’s concern about China. But if that is so, it is not clear how far ASEAN will or can go in balancing China. ASEAN’s tepid reaction to the ‘Indo-Pacific’ concept is reflective of the ASEAN’s wariness in annoying China. Earlier in the year, ASEAN did release its “Outlook on the Indo-Pacific” document, which was appreciated by New Delhi, which saw this as converging with its own Act East policy. But managing China would require a more coherent strategy and ASEAN has not been able to present a unified front when it comes to China. This division within ASEAN will likely only get deeper as Beijing becomes more muscular.

Thus far, in the face of China’s extensive economic linkages with the region, ASEAN has found it harder to take strong positions against China. While it has been particularly hard for smaller countries like Cambodia and Laos, even bigger players such as Malaysia have said they cannot afford to confront China. Most recently, the Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad said that “Malaysia does not want to take a confrontational stance toward China over the disputed South China Sea and Beijing’s alleged mistreatment of its minority Uighur Muslims.”

In the face of a divided ASEAN, India needs to strengthen its engagement with the region through other but associated platforms such as the East Asia Summit which includes key Indo-Pacific powers such as Australia, Japan and the United States. Many analysts believe that despite East Asia Summit being a key leaders forum, it has never gained the kind of traction that APEC or the G-20 has. However, they argue that it has the potential to become a major platform because of the “broad remit” it enjoys and the “inclusive” nature of the institution.

Other initiatives proposed by India also bear careful watching. At this year’s East Asia Summit, Modi proposed a new initiative called the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative, which is a reiteration of India’s commitment towards a free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific region based on a rules-based order. The new initiative enlarges the focus on the strategic maritime space in the Indo-Pacific and is also a clear indicator of India’s willingness to address China’s maritime aggressiveness in an emphatic manner. The proposal was reportedly welcomed by ASEAN’s outgoing chair, Thailand, as well as Australia. Vijay Thakur Singh, Secretary of the MEA, detailed Modi’s new initiative as “creating partnerships among interested States in several pillars ranging from enhancing maritime security to preserving and sustainably using marine resources, building capacity, disaster prevention and management as well as working together in trade and maritime transport.”

On the sidelines of these summits, there was also a consultative meeting of the Quad countries where the Quad members reiterated “their commitment towards a free, open, prosperous and inclusive Indo-Pacific Region based on shared values and principles and respect for international law” while reflecting on “ongoing and additional practical cooperation in the areas of connectivity and infrastructure development, and security matters, including counterterrorism, cyber and maritime security, with a view to promoting peace, security, stability, prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region.” This came in the backdrop of a status report on the Indo-Pacific strategy from the U.S. State Department which also highlighted a “critical role” for India in the Indo-Pacific.

New Delhi is likely to continue to engage in large regional meetings and summits, but is probably also likely to step up engagement at bilateral and trilateral levels as well as the Quad and other minilaterals. A thicket of overlapping partnerships with like-minded partners is a better bet than following just single-track partnership with ASEAN alone. In order to develop concrete ideas on the Indo-Pacific Oceans initiative, India’s efforts cannot be limited to a normative exercise alone. Strategic partnerships with other key (and financially more capable) Indo-Pacific powers such as Japan has also become crucial.

Russia-China Strategic Alliance Gets a New Boost with Missile Early Warning System - The Diplomat, 25 October 2019

In my column for The Diplomat last week, I looked at as to how the growing Russia-China strategic alliance gets a new boost with missile early warning system.

The Russia-China alliance – as Russian President Vladimir Putin has described it more than once recently – is getting stronger. Even though an alliance of short-term convenience, brought about by their shared conflict with the U.S. and the West, it is deepening in ways that have implications not only for the West but also Asia. The latest indicator is Russian assistance to China to build a strategic missile early warning system.

In the beginning of October, Russian President Vladimir Putin said at an international affairs conference that Russia will be “helping China build an early warning system to spot intercontinental ballistic missile launches, something only Russia and the United States possess at the moment.” Speaking at a Moscow-based think tank, Valdai Club, Putin added that “This is a serious thing that will drastically increase the defense capabilities of the People’s Republic of China.” Kremlin spokesman did not give any specific details such as when the system would be operational but reportedly said this move “highlighted Russia’s close ties with China.” This clearly is an indication of the growing strategic partnership and the nature of the special relationship that Russia and China enjoy.

For the full post, click here.



In recent years, the Russia-China strategic partnership has assumed more importance than any other relationship for Russia. Russia has gone on to characterize this relationship as an “alliance” first in Vladivostok on September 6 2019, in Sochi October 3 2019 and later at the Valdai Club in Moscow on October 7 2019. In the first instance at Vladivostok, Putin had stated, “We have developed special relations over the past decade, truly allied, strategic.” Later at the Valdai Club, Putin is reported to have remarked, “We have an unprecedentedly high level of trust and cooperation. This is an allied relationship, a multifaceted strategic partnership.”

According to Russian media reports, an around $60 million worth contract has been already signed to develop the software for the PLA early-warning system (Systema Preduprezdenya o Raketnom Napadenii—SPRN) network. SPRN will include both ground (using powerful stationary radars) and space segments. The report stated that much of the work will be undertaken by IAC Vympel and the Central Research Institute Comet (part of the Almaz-Antey Concern for Aerospace Defense. – Vedomosti). China already possesses the Russian S-400 air defense system which can also partly serve the missile defense functions. Russia is in the process of developing a more advanced S-500 system and Moscow believes that if Beijing were to buy it, that would facilitate Russia setting up the full architecture of an integrated PLA SPRN and a missile defense network.

There is also some speculation that the system will allow the two countries to warn each other of third-country launches, but this clearly needs to be considered with some skepticism. For example, a military analyst based in Hong Kong, Song Zhongping opines that the Russian offer would facilitate the development of a joint early warning system between Russia and China. He added that “If the U.S. wants to attack China [with its ICBMs], their missiles are likely to be launched from the Arctic, and that will be covered by Russia’s early warning system, and that means Moscow will have the capability to alert Beijing.” But it is doubtful that this would come to pass. Strategic early warning systems are among the most closely guarded and vital national security establishments because they – literally – could decide the survival of the nation. It is unlikely that such systems will be operated jointly with another state, especially considering the history of past conflicts between Moscow and Beijing, as well as their current suspicions of each other.

China appears to be the beneficiary of the worsening Russia-West relations. After the Ukraine crisis and the sanctioning of Russia, Moscow has felt the need to cultivate its own strong partnerships in Asia and China has benefited immensely from this Russian outreach. But the reverse is also true: worsening U.S.-China relations is also making Beijing more receptive to Russian overtures. Irrespective of the reasons for this deepening alliance, it has implications for others, including Asian powers such as India, which have their own reasons for worrying about this relationship.

The Trouble with India’s Slow Naval Buildup - The Diplomat, 4 October 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I examine the trouble with India's naval modernisation. I argue that though India is trying hard to enhance its naval capabilities, it continues to be slow work.

India has been trying hard to enhance its naval capabilities over the past few years, both in recognition of its own needs as well as an understanding of evolving trends in the strategic environment. But despite New Delhi’s best efforts, doing so continues to be slow work.

A case in point is India’s submarine program, which was in the spotlight again recently when the second of the Indian Navy’s six Scorpene submarines, INS Khanderi, was inducted into service on September 28. The first Scorpene submarine, called INS Kalvari, was commissioned in 2017. The third submarine, INS Karanj, launched in January 2018, is undertaking sea trials now. INS Khanderi was manufactured by Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited at a cost of 187.98 billion rupees (about $2.6 billion) under an India-France bilateral agreement in 2005 to build six Scorpene class submarines in India. Not including the Scorpenes, India currently has two other older types of diesel-electric submarine types, the Sindhughosh (Kilo) class and the Shishumar (HDW 209/1500) class diesel-electric submarines, and the nuclear-powered Arihant class (as well as the leased Chakra class nuclear submarine).

But the induction of the new submarine belies the fact that the size of India’s submarine inventory has been declining for years. The Scorpene acquisition has undergone significant delays – more than six years – even though it remains an important addition to the Indian naval capability. Even though there have been triumphant comments from many senior Indian officials on the significance of this induction, it is far from sufficient given the growing naval and maritime challenges in the Indo-Pacific.

For the full essay, click here.



Commissioning the submarine into service, the Indian Defense minister Rajnath Singh talked of the importance of the submarine and Indo-French defense cooperation, though he framed the acquisition primarily as a message to Pakistan. But the Scorpene submarines still do not have a modern torpedo, making do with the older SUT torpedoes. India cancelled a deal for the heavy-weight Black Shark torpedoes, built by the Finmecannica subsidiary WASS, as a result of an unrelated corruption scandal that involved another subsidiary of Finmecannica, Augusta-Westland. In a makeshift arrangement, the Indian government approached the German defense company, Atlas Elektronik to upgrade 64 torpedoes, which were procured in the 1980s and 1990s for the Indian Navy’s four Shishumar-class submarines. The already-insufficient number of torpedoes in the Indian Navy’s arsenal is to be now also shared with the Scorpene submarines.

An additional issue comes from the slow development of the air independent propulsion (AIP) system. AIP allows submarines to stay under water for longer periods of time without being detected. However, the development of the indigenous AIP system by Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) has been delayed, which should not come as much of a surprise given the history of DRDO’s tendency to over-promise and under-deliver. The last two of the Scorpene submarines were to be equipped with the indigenously developed AIP systems but because of the delay by the DRDO, the plan is now to have them in the next six submarines that will be developed under Project 75-I.

But Project 75I has also been very slow. Under Project 75I, India plans to build six additional advanced conventional submarines in collaboration with a foreign manufacturer. But this has also run into difficulties. The Swedish defense firm SAAB, which was seen as one of the top foreign contenders, pulled out its bid because of onerous conditions the India has imposed regarding indigenous partnerships and instead South Korea’s Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering has entered the fray.

The South Korean decision possibly flows out of the visit of the Indian Defense minister Rajnath Singh to South Korea in September where defense industry cooperation was a major highlight. South Korea joins four other contenders: Naval Group (France), Navantia (Spain), Rosoboronexport (Russia) and TKMS (Germany) who are all bidding for the 450 billion rupee (about $6.32 billion) contract. During the recent visit of Prime Minister Modi to Russia, the Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed to undertake a “joint design and development of conventional submarines through an Inter-Governmental Agreement (IGA).” But it has been more than a decade since Project 75I started, and it will be years more before these submarines enter Indian Navy service.

The long, hard work of building up India’s naval capabilities is not just limited to its submarine program. On the same day as the INS Khanderi induction, there were two other developments that are critical to the Indian Navy: the launching of the first of the P-17A frigates, ‘Nilgiri’ and inauguration of a dry dock, located within the Naval Dockyard in Mumbai. According to Rakesh Anand, head of Mazagon Dock Limited, the new frigates come with “new design concepts for improved survivability, sea keeping, stealth and ship manoeuvrability.” The new dry dock will be the Indian Navy’s biggest one, capable of holding India’s aircraft carrier, INS Vikramaditya. It is state of the art, made of 1.5 meter-thick reinforced concrete and almost 300 meters into the sea. But it has taken more than a decade to complete the dock.

The slow nature of India’s naval buildup is the product of broader trends that are well-known. Much of the Indian budget is focused on the Army, with the air force being a distant second and the navy a poor third. And with naval capability building proving time-consuming and capital-intensive, that leaves New Delhi stuck with a continued slow pace of development of its naval capabilities relative to other actors, even as competitors such as China forge ahead more quickly.

The solutions are also well-known. Some of them involve process: for instance, India needs to change its decision-making processes and its complicated acquisitions process to halt the slide in its relative capabilities. Others relate to outlook, with India needing to focus on the right threats to its national security rather than leaving itself looking broad but being overextended as a result. Whether or not these solutions will be adopted or not remains to be seen. Until then, developing India’s naval capabilities will likely continue to prove to be slow work irrespective of the incremental gains that are seen in the headlines.

Vietnam Confronts China, Alone - The Diplomat, 26 September 2019

In this week's column for the Diplomat, Vietnam Confronts China, Alone, I looked at the slow boiling stand-off in the South China Sea that has not received sufficient attention.

Vietnam and China are engaged in a slow boiling stand-off in the South China Sea that has not received sufficient attention. China has reportedly sent one survey vessel and at least four Chinese maritime vessels; Vietnam has responded by deploying its Coast Guard vessels.

According to Vietnamese news reports citing its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the stand-off is taking place in Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone and continental shelf in the south of the East Sea (as Vietnam calls it) since July this year. The exclusive economic zones have been drawn in accordance with the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which both Vietnam and China are party to. Vietnam is finding itself in a tough spot, without very much support beyond words, as it faces a determined China.

For the full post, click here.



The most recent troubles began in mid-July, when the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lê Thị Thu Hằng claimed that the “Chinese geological survey vessel group Haiyang Dizhi 8 recently violated Việt Nam’s exclusive economic zone and continental shelf in the south of the East Sea.” Vietnam asserts that it has repeatedly reached out to China “to protest the violations.”

In addition, Vietnam has asked all the major powers to make efforts at bringing peace and order back in the region by saying “maintaining order, peace and security in the East Sea is a common interest of countries both inside and outside the region. Việt Nam wants concerned countries and the international community to protect and maintain this joint interest.” Toward the end of July, the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry spokesperson reaffirmed its stand asking that “China immediately withdraw all of its vessels from Việt Nam’s waters and… respect Việt Nam’s sovereign right and jurisdiction, for the sake of the relations between the two countries and for regional stability and peace.” Vietnam asserts that it has repeatedly reached out to China through several different channels.

Taking the issue to the ASEAN in late-July, the Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Pham Bình Minh “expressed his grave concern over the recent developments in the East Sea, with Chinese geological survey vessel group Haiyang Dizhi 8’s activities violating Việt Nam’s exclusive economic zone and continental shelf in the waters.” He added that such activities “seriously threaten legitimate rights of coastal countries, erode trust, and worsen tensions, thus hurting peace and stability in the region.”

Noteworthy too is that this time around, China has followed a different deployment pattern. The author has learnt from Vietnamese analysts that unlike in the past, when Chinese vessels stayed for a couple of months in the same area, this time China deployed its survey ships for a few weeks before withdrawing, only to come back again into the same Vietnamese exclusive economic zone areas later. In the beginning of August, the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson announced that “the Haiyang Di Zhi 08 (Marine Geology 8) survey vessel has halted its geological mission and left Việt Nam’s Exclusive Economic Zone and southeastern continental shelf.” A few days later, however, the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson stated that “the Chinese vessel group and a number of escort ships came back to Việt Nam’s territorial waters.” Vietnam once again appealed to the international community to respond to the situation in order to maintain regional peace and stability. Meanwhile, China has also reportedly begun fresh military exercises near Hoàng Sa (Paracel) Islands.

Despite the continuing protests by Vietnam, the stand-off has continued, and is now in its third month. A few days ago, Nguyễn Mạnh Đông, head of the maritime affairs department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ National Border Committee, in a detailed interview to the Vietnam News Agency, maintained that “Disputes are inevitable in interpretation and application of the [UNCLOS] Convention, but all countries have the obligation to settle these disputes in a peaceful manner via measures stipulated in Article 33 of the UN Charter and Article 279 of UNCLOS.”

China has become much more aggressive in the region in the last couple of years. A month before the current stand-off with Vietnam began, a Chinese ship sank a Philippines fishing boat in Bai Co Rong (Recto Bank). Earlier in May 2019, a China Coast Guard vessel, Haijing 35111, reportedly prevented Malaysia’s oil rig operation near Luconia Shoals off the coast of the Sarawak State. In another move to assert its claims, China organized the seventh Sinan Cup Regatta in Duy Mộng island, part of the Hoàng Sa archipelago.

Meanwhile, Vietnam has reached out to India, the United States, Russia, Australia and other Indo-Pacific countries. But the regional and global reactions to these developments have been muted. Malaysia in its new foreign policy document has said, “the South China Sea should be a sea of cooperation, connectivity and community-building and not confrontation or conflict. This is in line with the spirit of Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). Malaysia will actively promote this vision in Asean.” Further, a joint statement issued on August 27 between Vietnam and Malaysia “emphasized the importance of self-restraint, non-militarization and observance of international legal obligations in good faith, respect for sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction of the coastal states, and rule of law in accordance with the 1982 UNCLOS and avoidance of activities that may escalate tensions.”

Extraregional powers have also made similar statements but not much beyond. Testifying in front of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, David Stilwell, Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs said, “through repeated illegal actions and militarization of disputed features, Beijing has and continues to take action to prevent ASEAN members from accessing over $2.5 trillion in recoverable energy reserves.”

Other powers have stopped with reiterations of the importance of freedom of navigation, such as the India-France joint statement during Prime Minister Modi’s recent visit to France. The recently-held conference on Indian Ocean in the Maldives on September 3-4, where the prime minister of Sri Lanka and foreign ministers of Singapore, Maldives were present, also stressed the freedom of navigation but again there was no mention of South China Sea.

Japan has been slightly firmer, with the foreign minister saying that “South China Sea is an important sea lines of communications for Japan and many other countries. It is directly related to the stability and the peace of the region, and the international community, including Japan, pay serious attention to the situation in South China Sea. Japan opposes to any actions by anybody to increase the tension in South China Sea.” Similarly, India has emphasized that it “has an abiding interest in the peace and stability in the region. India firmly stands for the freedom of navigation and over-flight, and unimpeded lawful commerce, in the international waters, in accordance with international laws, notably UNCLOS.”

It appears unlikely that Vietnam will be able to get any stronger support from its partners in the region and outside. It is also unlikely that Vietnam will be able to resist China on its own. Beijing appears to have correctly calculated that it does not have to fear any serious, united opposition.