The Importance of Nepal’s First Satellite Launch - The Diplomat, 26 April 2019

In a second piece this week for the Diplomat, I write on the importance of Nepal's first satellite launch. Earlier this month, the United States launched Nepal’s first satellite, NepaliSat-1, into orbit. The satellite, equipped with a 5-megapixel camera and a magnetometer, is meant to gather information about Nepal’s topography and earth’s magnetic field, and is part of the greater attention the country is paying to the space realm amid domestic and wider regional developments.

The NepaliSat-1 was launched by the United States under the “Birds-3 satellite launch to International Space Station project.” The BIRDS project is a UN initiative to help countries launch their first satellite and the Japanese Kyushu Institute of Technology has been involved in this particular project. Under the project, there was also a satellite from Sri Lanka, named Raavana-1, that was launched along with the NepaliSat-1.

For the full piece, click here.



Nepal’s satellite was developed by two Nepali scientists, Abhas Maskey and Hariram Shrestha, at Japan’s Kyushu Institute of Technology and carries the Nepali national flag and the logo of the Nepal Academy of Science and Technology (NAST). Suresh Kumar Dhungel, senior technical officer and spokesperson of NAST, said that the data and images will be available in a month, by which time the ground station at NAST is expected to be ready. It is reported that the ground station at NAST will be able to receive data from the other Birds-3 project satellites too.

Nepal government is estimated to have spent a total of 20 million Nepali rupees (roughly $180,000) for the development and launch of the satellite as well as the construction of the ground station. This was clearly a proud moment for Nepal, and Nepal’s Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli congratulated the scientists in a tweet saying, “Though a humble beginning, with the launching of NepaliSat-1 Nepal has entered the Space-Era. I wish to congratulate all those scientists and institutions that were involved right from the development to its launching thereby enhancing the prestige of our country.”

Nepal’s involvement with satellites is expected to continue. The country is working on a second satellite, Nepal PQ-1, to be launched in 2020. And given the growing demand in the telecommunications sector, Nepal is reported to be working with France to launch a communication satellite in 2022.

That this is being made a priority should come as no surprise given Nepal’s own needs. For instance, currently, Nepal’s service providers rely on foreign communication satellites for meeting their requirement in the broadcasting and telecommunication sectors, but Kathmandu clearly understands the cost-effectiveness of having its own satellite. The growth projection in areas including direct-to-home (DTH) and rural internet connectivity is pushing Kathmandu to expand its own assets in outer space.

Interestingly, Nepal and Sri Lanka chose to avoid India and China — the two established space powers in the neighborhood — to launch their satellites. This comes after Bangladesh launched its Bangabandhu-1 satellite on an improved version of SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket last summer. India had reportedly offered assistance to launch the satellite but because the satellite weighed 3,500 kg, it was beyond the Indian launch capacity at the time.

On the other hand, both Nepal and Bangladesh are part of the Indian-launched South Asia Satellite (SAS) – or GSAT-9 – that has significance in the context of communication, e-governance, and disaster management. The SAS is expected to enhance communication and provide better disaster links in the Indian neighborhood. The satellite, launched in May 2017, was characterized by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi as a “priceless gift” to India’s neighbors.

More specifically with respect to Nepal, under the SAS, India agreed to provide at least one transponder with a bandwidth of 24,000 to 36,000 MHz to Nepal, though Nepal had to establish its own ground stations. In fact, a senior diplomat the Indian Embassy in Kathmandu is reported to have said that Nepal would receive two transponders on the SAS. Further, Nepali engineers are to be trained at Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) training centers in India. Each of the participating countries – Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, the Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka –have received 36 Mbps of bandwidth from this satellite.

It was smart of Modi to use outer space to entice India’s neighbors, giving New Delhi a high-profile success while also satisfying some real needs of its neighbors. Going beyond GSAT-9, Modi is reported to have invited the South Asian neighborhood also to use the Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System, a mini-version of the U.S. Global Positioning System. India could also be fielding its remote sensing satellites to help its neighbors as the growth for downstream applications picks up pace. While there has been some apprehension in the neighborhood about getting caught up in the geopolitical tensions between India and China, space cooperation is probably too tempting an offer for smaller countries like Nepal to refuse.

All indications are that Nepal’s focus on satellites is expected to continue in the coming years. And the recent launch reinforces the need to pay greater attention to smaller countries in South Asia and beyond in the wider conversation about space cooperation and assistance. Though space is often discussed in the context of emerging geopolitical competition between major powers, other dynamics such as these also have their own importance as well.

If Space is ‘the Province of Mankind’, Who Owns its Resources? - ORF Occasional Paper, January 2019

My first substantial publication for the year is on space mining, examining the legal angles to this emerging issue. Senjuti Mallick and I have co-authored an ORF Occasional Paper titled, "If Space is ‘the Province of Mankind’, Who Owns its Resources?: An Examination of the Potential of Space Mining and its Legal Implications," where we analyse the rationale for extraterrestrial mining, as well as the efforts and responses of various countries—i.e, USA, Luxembourg, Russia, China and India. In examining the legal and governance basis for States and commercial players, this paper appreciates the economic benefits of space mining but argues against the national legislations legalising extraterrestrial appropriation of resources due to inconsistency with international treaties and customary international law. It further argues that the concept of “common heritage of mankind” is defeated in the light of such legal frameworks. The paper ponders the global governance challenges brought about by space mining activities and suggests legal, policy and global frameworks for realising the benefits of commercial mining without creating disparity between nations and disrupting dynamics of the world economy.

INTRODUCTION
June 2018 marked the golden jubilee of the first United Nations (UN) Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, held in
Vienna in 1968. It also marked 51 years of the Outer Space Treaty (OST) of 1967. Today, what was once fodder for cosmological science fiction
has become reality, owing to outer-space innovations that have happened in the last half a century. Unlike the lunar missions of the past,
contemporary explorations are led mostly by private-sector entities eager to capitalise on the potential of extracting resources in outer space.
How plausible is extraterrestrial mining—is it a long-term proposition or more of a fantasy? And what challenges are facing those engaged in
space mining?

Soon after a bill was signed increasing the 2018 budget for NASA (the US’ National Aeronautics and Space Administration), Senator Ted Cruz said, “I’ll make a prediction right now—the first trillionaire will be made in space.” The question is, however, how those trillionaires will make their riches from space. Both Peter Diamandis (founder of the Google Lunar XPrize competition) and Neil deGrasse Tyson (US astrophysicist) suggest that the financial returns are to be made from mining/ asteroids.

Indeed, the economic imperative for space mining is evident and analysts predict that these extraction activities could translate to a multibillion-dollar industry. NASA estimates, for example, that the value of asteroids out there could be in the vicinity of US$700 quintillion – that amount is roughly equivalent to US$95 billion for each of us here on Earth. Another major attraction for the prospective extraterrestrial mining companies is the availability of precious minerals in abundance on the Moon, on Mars and the asteroids (among them—lithium, cobalt,
nickel, copper, zinc, niobium, molybdenum, lanthanum, europium, tungsten, and gold). After all, these metals and mineral resources have
grown scarce on Earth, and both governments and commercial actors are pushing to look to celestial bodies for resources.

This paper examines the legal and governance basis for States and commercial players to undertake space mining activities. It does not,
however, cover the technical aspects of space mining; that is a separate field by itself. The first section discusses the rationale for different stakeholders in undertaking extraterrestrial mining. So far, the countries most eager and making the most active preparations for space mining are the US and—surprisingly, as it has not been typically a spacefaring nation—Luxembourg. This section will detail these efforts as well as those of other countries planning to follow the path being paved by these two. The second section then examines the legal basis for space mining, covering provisions of national and international law. The subsequent section looks at the global policy discourse responses from other governments to proposals and preparations for space mining, primarily Russia and China. The paper concludes by summarising the global
governance challenges that are brought about by space mining activities.

For the full paper, please click here.



Type rest of the post here

India Changing Tack on Space Policy, my essay for AsiaGlobal Online Journal

Here's an essay of mine on the changing strategic dynamics in Asia including the outer space domain and how India is responding to that, published by the AsiaGlobal Online Journal.

India is scheduled to launch the lunar rover Chandrayaan-2 in 2018, an emblematic sign of the country's will to step up its space policy. Its efforts in this arena include a revival of international partnerships and a change in its position on space militarization. In the absence of an adequate global governance regime, such activity extends geopolitical tensions to outer space.

India has one of the oldest space programs in the world — in operation for more than five decades — and is considered an established spacefaring power. Today, the country is gradually reorienting its space program towards national security. This new approach is driving India to forge partnerships with countries such as Japan, and revise and strengthen old links with partners like the US and France. India’s changing tack towards a more security-driven space program is spurred by new geopolitical realities. But could this changed stance on space policy also spark further geopolitical competition?

For the full essay, click here.



Before we delve into the substance of India’s new space program, two points need to be made. First, India’s space program remains overwhelmingly focused on civilian initiatives, and the new and developing attention on the security utilities of the program will not fundamentally change its civilian orientation. The development of new capabilities that help address India’s national security concerns is an addition to, and not a replacement of, existing capabilities.

Second, India’s interest in developing these technologies is somewhat reactive, driven by the development of such capacities in other countries: China, for example. There is little to suggest that India’s expansion of the scope of its space program is being driven by purely domestic political interests or technological imperatives.

Japan and France, New Strategic Partners

The larger geopolitical developments in the region constitute a critical factor. The India-Japan strategic partnership, which has been steadily growing over the past decade, is a testament to the new geopolitical realities in the region. It is worth recalling that for decades, these countries had rather cool relations. Not anymore. China’s rise affects both, and they have reacted together. Space is one of the many arenas where this new strategic cooperation can be seen.

Naoki Okumura, president of the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), stated, “India and Japan will lead the space sector in the Asia-Pacific region.”

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe further elevated India-Japan space cooperation in September 2017, when the two leaders underlined the importance of their bilateral collaboration “in the field of Earth observation, satellite-based navigation, space sciences, and lunar exploration.” Emphasizing the significance of the countries’ joint lunar mission in November 2017, Naoki Okumura, president of the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), stated, “India and Japan will lead the space sector in the Asia-Pacific region.”

Just a few weeks ago, India entered into similar engagements with France. French President Emmanuel Macron’s recent visit to India saw surprisingly strong statements of deeper strategic cooperation between the two countries. So dramatic is this intensification of the relationship that some noted commentators have even suggested that France could be as important an ally for India as Russia has been.

India and France will be collaborating on a range of issues in defense and security. Their agreements on space and maritime security in the Indian Ocean, in particular, stand out in terms of the actionable agenda that New Delhi and Paris are working on. As is the case in collaboration between India and Japan, India and France are driven by shared global and regional security concerns, including maritime security, freedom of navigation and overflight, and respect for international law, among other issues. The two sides are planning on employing space assets to develop effective maritime domain awareness (MDA), given their increasing concern about maritime security in the Indo-Pacific.

As with France, India’s relationship with the US is also undergoing a strategic deepening, with the two countries sharing political and strategic goals in the Indo-Pacific region.

On the Road to Space Militarization?

This new focus on using space for security purposes has not come easily for India. India has traditionally been opposed to using space for security-related functions. In fact, from early on, India played an active role in pushing to keep outer space beyond interstate conflicts. In one of the first articulations on the issue at the United Nations, Indian representative Krishna Rao argued in 1964 that outer space was a new field, so “there were no vested interests to prevent the international community from embarking on a regime of cooperation rather than of conflict.” As he saw it, space fortunately did not have any regimes in place, so the questions were “not those of modifying an existing regime but of fashioning a new pattern of international behavior.” This had consistently been the Indian position: that space should only be used for peaceful, cooperative purposes.

In accordance with this position, India was stridently opposed to the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in the 1980s. In 1985, Muchkund Dubey, India’s ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament, criticized the SDI and “called for negotiations to prevent an arms race in outer space.” This policy stance continued even after the end of the Cold War.

This had consistently been the Indian position: that space should only be used for peaceful, cooperative purposes.

But over the last decade, there have been signs of change in India’s space policy orientation, especially its position on space militarization. For example, India supported the Bush administration’s decision to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, though this did not result immediately in any specific changes in Indian space military capabilities or even programs. This can be traced, partially, to larger political objectives.

A Response to China’s Geopolitical Positions

Real change in India’s space policy orientation came after January 2007, when China conducted its first anti-satellite (ASAT) missile test. This was compounded by changing geopolitical alignments and the shifting military balance in Asia. All of this is now driving new races, including in outer space. Though the primary competition is between the US, Russia, and China, there is a second rung of competition involving, among others, India because of China’s growing capabilities and the ambiguity of its policies, as well as the aggressiveness of some of its postures.

India has come to acknowledge that space may not remain a purely civilian domain.

China’s ASAT test in January 2007 is particularly important in this regard. China may have been responding to the capabilities already developed by the US and Russia during the Cold War, but its ASAT test was an eye-opener for New Delhi with regard to the kind of threats India must be ready to confront right in its backyard. Since then, India has nuanced its position on space militarization.

India has come to acknowledge that space may not remain a purely civilian domain. The implication of this is that if India does not improve its own capabilities, it may be left lagging behind in a critical area. Thus, India has set up an “Integrated Space Cell” within its Ministry of Defence, and has been discussing other administrative reforms.

There is, of course, little doubt that others, including Pakistan and China, will respond to the growing sophistication of India’s capabilities. There is little that India can do about this; what is clear is that the growing geopolitical tensions in Asia are going to reach outer space.