#SpaceWatchGL Op’ed: My 2019 in a review – Great Power Politics and Global Governance - SpaceWatch Global, 30 December 2019

I contributed an OpEd to SpaceWatch Global - My 2019 in a review – Great Power Politics and Global Governance, where I focused on two major developments - the Indian ASAT test and the end of the INF Treaty. SpaceWatch.Global had reached out to its staff and contributors to review 2019 and provide an outlook into 2020.

This has been an exciting year for me in a number of ways but also an increasingly worrying one, especially when we consider the growing threats to peace and the difficulties in getting the world’s nations to deal with them cooperatively.

Developments in the space domain and in the broader strategic realm have kept me engaged through the year. The latter provided the setting, in many ways, for many of the developments in the former, but has also been important by itself.

For the full OpEd, click here.



The developments in the broader strategic setting essentially refers to developments in the Indo-Pacific region, especially politics between the US, China, Japan and India. The region is also home to some of the fastest growing economies, which has translated to acquisition of major hard power capabilities. Competition with China has continued to tick upwards. Sino-Indian competition, in particular, is picking up. Two rounds of informal summits have not been helpful in mitigating the competition and tension in the relationship. China’s growing influence and penetration in southern Asia and Indian Ocean has led to a pushback, including the quadrilateral (Quad) arrangement, which gained further traction in 2019. Bilateral relations — such as the India-Japan, India-Australia, and India-US — and trilaterals including the India-US-Japan have become stronger for the same reason.

But one of my main focus has been on Sino-Indian competition, which is picking up, including in outer space.

The Indian anti-satellite (ASAT) in March 2019 was one consequence, a clear deterrence signal to China, which had already tested its ASAT a decade earlier. The test did raise some concern about debris in outer space. On the flip side, there were fears in India that it would yet again sit on the fence and miss an opportunity to develop a critical defense technology, as it had done in the nuclear arena. The debate on an Indian ASAT had become loud after the first successful Chinese ASAT test in January 2007. There has been consensus among all the different Indian stakeholders – the civilian, scientific and military bureaucracies – on the need to demonstrate India’s capability.

India’s newly-acquired capability has raised many questions but Prime Minister Modi argued that the test was a “defensive” move to protect India’s own space assets. Like India, most countries use space for a number of civilian applications including in areas like agriculture, disaster management, weather forecasting and communication, and there is a strong global interest to preserve outer space as a public good. Now that India has acquired an ASAT capability, New Delhi must take earnest efforts at preventing trends towards space weaponisation.

Another important issue has been the end of the INF Treaty and what it means for global security. The treaty led Washington and Moscow to destroy a total of 2,692 short-, medium-, and intermediate-range missiles by 1991. The treaty was seen as particularly important as it is the only nuclear arms control measure that abolished an entire class of weapons. Important questions have been raised as to whether the end of the INF would have strategic implications in the Indo-Pacific. Many in the US Congress as well as arms control advocates have lamented that walking out of a treaty without an alternative one in place as a recipe for an arms race.

Now that the treaty has ended, Russia could possibly build develop a series of INF-category missiles but the real concerns have been about China. Both the Obama and Trump administrations had accused Russia of violating its INF commitments, one of the reasons for the US to end the treaty. In addition to the Russian breaches, the Trump Administration was particularly worried about the Chinese inventory of around 2,000-odd ballistic and cruise missiles, a significant majority of which would be in violation of the INF if China was a party to the treaty. But now that the shackles of the INF are gone, Beijing argues that Washington could deploy conventional ground-launched missiles in East Asia that could possibly tilt the military balance in the region. This could of course legitimize all of the missiles that China has already deployed, which are threatening to its neighbours as well as the US. There has been talk about a possible multilateral arrangement as a successor to the INF but China has remained categorically opposed to such ideas.

Unfortunately, global governance mechanisms are not keeping up with the increasing threats that international peace and stability are facing. The failure was most evident at the 2018-2019 United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (GGE)

on PAROS (Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space). The failure in developing consensus among great powers has been an issue for more than two decades now. The state of the play within the Conference on Disarmament (CD) is illustrative of this paralysed nature of inter-state relations, especially among the great powers. I was associated with the UN GGE on PAROS as a Technical Advisor to the Group, which deliberated on PAROS over two two-week long sessions but at the end, the divisions within the Group was so stark that it could not agree upon a commonly-agreed upon text to be released as a consensus report.

As the year ends, therefore, it is clear that there is a lot of work to be done if we have to maintain a stable international order. But there is also growing worry that we are running out of time.

China’s Second Aircraft Carrier: A Sign of PLA Naval Muscle? - The Diplomat, 26 December 2019

In my column for The Diplomat last week, I looked at China's commissioning of its second aircraft carrier and what it means for the overall PLA Navy.

On December 17, China commissioned into service its first home-built aircraft carrier, Shandong, at the Sanya naval base in Hainan, with President Xi Jinping presiding over the commissioning ceremony.

The commissioning of the aircraft carrier is significant. This is China’s second aircraft carrier, and an important addition to China’s power projection capabilities. It is also noteworthy because it displays China’s capability to develop aircraft carriers indigenously.

For the full essay, click here.



Military analysts argue that the layout of the warships “limits her military potential” as also its power projection capabilities since it is simply a copy of its first carrier, Liaoning, which itself is a refurbished ship bought from Ukraine. The J-15s that it operates also imposes limitations on the kind of operations it can undertake. Nevertheless, PLA Navy is clearly on the way to becoming a more credible blue water navy and it warrants close attention from key Indo-Pacific nations including, India, the United States, Japan and Australia.

China’s Navy has traditionally remained weak on account of the excessive focus on China’s ground force. As such, it did not have an aircraft carrier and even lacked amphibious operations capabilities. But all this is changing. China has strengthened its ability to project sea power significantly in the last few years. The building of the naval base, Sanya, in Hainan was one such indicator. Sanya has the capacity to maintain a large fleet of surface warships, and as an underground base for submarines. The Sanya base gives China significant advantages because of its proximity to the South China Sea as well as the Malacca Straits.

China has given great importance to building its aircraft carriers. It sees the utility of a carrier both for achieving sea control and for sea denial goals. The PLA Navy acknowledges the importance of maintaining air superiority in future naval conflicts, for which large aircraft carrier are important. The best pilots are being selected for the air wing, and they are also expected to eventually command these ships.

The construction of the Shandong, displacing around 50,000 tons, and with a conventional propulsion system, appears to have begun in 2013. The carrier can reportedly “carry up to 24 Shenyang J-15 multirole fighter jets and a variant of the fourth-generation Sukhoi Su-33 twin-engines air superiority fighter, as well as around ten rotary wing aircraft including Changshe Z-18, Ka-31, or Harbin Z-9 helicopters.” Unlike the U.S. aircraft carriers that can carry up to 100 fighter jets, Shandong will be able to carry a total of only 32 aircrafts, as per senior PLAN officers.

China had procured its first aircraft carrier, Liaoning (originally the Varyag, and built for the Soviet navy) from Ukraine as scrap for $20 million, but it was eventually restored and entered service in 2012. A senior colonel and spokesman for the Ministry of National Defense, Geng Yansheng, said the carrier was to be “used for scientific research and training.” But the colonel also clearly outlined the necessity of an aircraft to protect China’s varied interests, giving some clue to future Chinese plans.

In November, on its ninth sea trial (since May 2018) to undertake equipment tests and personnel training, it sailed through the Taiwan Straits. Both of China’s aircraft carriers have a ramp to launch J-15 fighter aircraft, which is seen as the primary combat jet for the Chinese carrier battle group.

The exact composition of a Chinese carrier battle group is unknown, but some have suggested that a future Chinese Carrier Strike Group (CSG) could include Jiangkai-II-class (Type 054A) frigates, Luyang-III-class (Type 052D) destroyers, Renhai-class Type 055 destroyers, and a couple of Yuan-class (Type 039A) or Song-class (Type 039) submarines along with additional support vessels. There are also reports that both of China’s carriers could operate together, along with others (two Type 055 guided-missile destroyers; four Type 054 frigates; six guided-missile frigates, as well as one supply ship and three Type 093B nuclear submarines), to prevent u.s. or Japanese military assistance to Taiwan in case of a war.

The PLAN’s operational tempo is also increasing. A PLA naval formation led by its first carrier, Liaoning entered the Miyako Strait for the second time in June this year; the first such passage was in December 2016. Japan had then sent its surveillance vessels although an article by Xiakedao, the official WeChat account operated by the overseas edition of People’s Daily, called the Japanese action an overreaction and unnecessary, adding that “China’s aircraft carriers will routinely pass the Miyako Strait.” In addition to a possible Taiwan Straits scenario, experts foresee the use of the aircraft carriers “to stop US long-range bombers from taking off from a naval base in Guam.”

While the induction of China’s second aircraft carrier is a significant development, there are still issues that China will need to resolve in terms of training and operational experience in operating an aircraft carrier. There will also be issues of jointness to be sorted out with other combat units such as the amphibious troops, rocket forces and other service legs.

A more significant issue would be its ability to take on other traditional naval powers such as the United States and Japan. China’s two carrier battle group together would have only 30 J-15 fighter jets to take on U.S. forces in the area. And unlike the American aircraft carriers that use catapults, Shandong’s ski-jump configuration adds additional burdens, including how fast aircraft could be launched. China plans to address this issue in the next two aircraft carriers that it will build in the coming years. The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency in a January 2019 report on China’s military power had noted other limitations of the ski-jump configuration including its ability to “operate large, specialized support aircraft, such as an AEW [airborne early warning] aircraft.”

There are other weaknesses as well that China needs to address before it can take on more capable navies in the Indo-Pacific. But the fact remains that China’s progress so far has been impressive, and that point ought not to be lost even as we remain cognizant of Beijing’s limitations.

What’s in the Growing Russia-China-Iran Trilateral Convergence? - The Diplomat, 23 December 2019

Once again, I am lagging behind in posting my articles. I will try and rectify this in the new year.

On December 23, I published a short essay in The Diplomat on the recent Russia-China-Iran joint naval drills in the Indian Ocean. Potential security engagements among the three have spotlighted their increasing convergence.

While much of the focus in terms of minilateral alignments in the Asian region tends to be on those involving U.S. allies and partners, be it the Quad or U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral dynamics, there are other arrangements beyond this as well. Of particular note are the arrangements that have been forged by China and Russia over the past few years.

One of these is the China-Russia-Iran relationship. Like many other arrangements, this represents the outgrowth of the combination of existing links between the three countries and recent convergences due to various trends and developments, including growing opposition to the United States that has risen further under President Donald Trump. And it continues to attract headlines about other countries that could join as well, including Pakistan.

For the full essay, click here.



Spotlight on the arrangement has been growing in recent weeks with the three countries scheduled to hold their first joint naval drill in the Indian Ocean later this month. Iran’s semi-official Fars news agency reported that the commander of the Iranian Navy, Rear Admiral Hossein Khanzadi, has said that Iran will engage in a trilateral exercise called Marine Security Belt beginning on December 27. Khanzadi revealed that this is part of a broader naval collaboration between Iran and China, which includes also production of destroyers and submarines.

Details have been rather scarce on the engagement. Last week, while speaking to IRNA, Iran’s official news agency, Khanzadi had mentioned that the naval drill will take place in the northern Indian Ocean, although he did not then announce the date. And reports also suggest that both Tehran and Beijing are considering a “long term blueprint of military collaboration.” Confirming Russian participation, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said, “We, the People’s Republic of China, and Iran are preparing naval drills for fighting terrorists and pirates in this part of the Indian Ocean.” Commenting on the trilateral exercise, Lavrov stated on October 2 that the exercise will be undertaken to train their forces in anti-piracy and anti-terrorism efforts.

Irrespective of what is being said and not said publicly, the geopolitical underpinnings of the trilateral group are quite evident: all the three maintain a rather hostile relationship with the United States and have proven increasingly willing to take cooperative actions in the security realm to illustrate their own capabilities. While speaking to the Iranian Mehr News Agency earlier, Rear Admiral Khanzadi had hinted at the fact that a “joint wargame between several countries, whether on land, at sea or in the air, indicates a remarkable expansion of cooperation among them.”

But the strategic significance of this ought to be understood more broadly too. This is a region that has witnessed increasing military activity. The United States conducted a naval operation in Bahrain in November to safeguard shipping in the Persian Gulf waters, which has seen increasing tensions in recent times, and Washington also plans to initiate and lead an International Maritime Security Construct in the Gulf, with the participation of Australia, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the U.K. Other actors are also stepping in, with French Defense Minister Florence Parly saying in November that a European-led maritime surveillance initiative, stationed at the French naval base in Abu Dhabi, UAE, will be engaged in maintaining a watch on the Gulf waters.

The activities of Russia, China, and Iran on their own terms have also attracted interest. Russia has its own initiative, the Collective Security in the Persian Gulf, which is also backed by China. Meanwhile, Iran has plans to pursue a “Hormuz Peace Endeavor” called HOPE, with the Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Shamkhani saying that its own initiative would not include any foreign powers and that it will be a coalition of regional states (while Iran’s naval prowess thus far has been limited to its use of fast boats to harass and chase foreign naval vessels, which has been undertaken by the IRGC and not the actual navy, the Iranian Navy is gaining teeth with acquisition of new drones and other technologies).

Seen from this perspective, China, Iran, and Russia all have an incentive to use the trilateral naval exercise to showcase their growing alignment. From Iran’s perspective, for instance, it has directly said that the trilateral naval exercise is to send a strategic message that the three participating countries have “reached a meaningful strategic point in their relations, with regard to their shared and non-shared interests, and by non-shared I mean the respect we have for one another’s national interests.” China has been more cautious about formal statements, partly because Chinese security analysts say Beijing would not want “to be drawn into Middle East conflicts.”

In the backdrop of these heightened maritime engagements by different coalitions of powers, the China-Iran-Russia trilateral naval exercise will be watched with some concern. As mentioned previously, it is occurring in an area that has seen increased military engagement. Beyond that, for countries like India, there are concerns about additional partners, notably Pakistan, whose potential invitation has been the source of headlines with Rear Admiral Khanzadi mentioning that Islamabad was welcome.

The coming together of China, Iran, and Russia itself is a major strategic development, and the addition of countries like Pakistan into the mix increases the stakes. Irrespective of how things play out, one can expect continued attention to trilateral and quadrilateral configurations such as these that go beyond the ones usually talked about involving U.S. allies and partners.

What Does the New Counterterrorism Exercise Mean for the Quad? - The Diplomat, December 6, 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I looked at the recently concluded counter-terrorism exercise of the Quad. Certainly, the recent development again put the minilateral arrangement in the headlines.

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“Quad”) between the U.S., Japan, India and Australia has often been questioned about its purpose and capacity. For critics, other than occasionally irritating Beijing, the Quad did not appear to have much purpose. And, at times, even these expressions of occasional irritation from China had been sufficient to send one or the other Quad countries into a funk.

But in the last two years, the Quad has slowly become somewhat sturdier, with the level of interaction between the countries improving, and the members themselves becoming less skittish when Beijing criticizes the venture. Now, the Quad countries have taken a new step, holding a table-top counter-terrorism exercise together. What can we make of this?

For the full post, click here.



Details are skimpy. India has hosted the first counter-terrorism table-top exercise (CT-TTX) among the Quad countries in New Delhi on November 21-22. India’s National Investigation Agency (NIA), which hosted the TTX, is reported to have said the exercise is meant to assess and validate counter-terror mechanisms against a range of existing and emerging terrorist threats at both the regional and global levels.

At the most basic level, the CT-TTX is not surprising considering India’s concern about the issue. India’s own insufficient military capabilities are well-known, and New Delhi has been open to cooperation in this regard. This is clearly an important reason why India has shown willingness to tie up with the Quad on counter-terrorism.

The exercise was also aimed at sharing best practices in terms of preparedness, mitigation strategies and in developing coordinated strategies, and to expand the areas for strengthened cooperation among the four Quad countries. Seen from that perspective, the exercise would help highlight the interagency coordination issues within each of the countries and also bolster the multi-agency coordination between security and counter-terror agencies among the four countries.

The exercise is significant because this was the first concrete joint security initiative by the four countries. The TTX also reflected the shared resolve among the Quad countries in addressing a major challenge they all face. Importantly, though this was a security exercise, it did not target China. But still, it is a step up from the usual HA/DR type of exercises that many of these countries, especially India, prefers. The fact that the Quad has been upgraded to foreign ministerial platform is also an important indicator of the significance the four participating countries attach to the Quad.

That said, one should not exaggerate the significance of this development. The Quad’s revival and the carrying out of the exercise reconfirms the fact that the original concerns that led to the Quad were valid and getting more serious. But the level of commitment of different countries within the Quad has been suspect, and their mutual trust is still a work in progress.

India is no exception to this. On the one hand, India has been open to the Quad as one of several mechanisms that allows it to build on partnerships without entering into alliances, and China’s behavior and its hostility (despite the Chennai informal summit) towards India has pushed New Delhi to be less reluctant about the Quad. But on the other hand, for the time-being, India’s willingness to participate in the Quad is limited to testing out non-military alliance initiatives such as the CT-TTX to assess the possibilities and limitations.

2+2 Dialogue Will Further Cement India-Japan Strategic Relations - The Diplomat, 29 November 2019

Last week, I had a second piece published in The Diplomat, which focused on the 2+2 Dialogue between India and Japan that took place on 30 November. I argue that the dialogue has wider strategic implications beyond the bilateral relationship itself.

India and Japan are holding their inaugural 2+2 defense and foreign minister level dialogue on November 30, ahead of the annual summit meeting between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in December. While the dialogue will be heralded as yet another step that advances India-Japan bilateral relations, it also has broader implications as well.

For the full post, click here.



The decision to hold a ministerial level 2+2 dialogue was taken this summer during a telephone call between India’s new foreign minister, Dr. S. Jaishankar, and his Japanese counterpart, Taro Kono. The inaugural US-India 2+2 dialogue was held in September 2018.

The mechanism itself is quite significant. Japan is only the second country (after the United States) with which India has such a dialogue format. The India-Japan 2+2 dialogue is an endorsement of the special strategic partnership between New Delhi and Tokyo.

More broadly, the dialogue has been driven by the mutual desire to frame an Asia that is not dominated by a single country and to see the emergence of a multipolar Indo-Pacific that is free, open, and inclusive. India and Japan have both approached the emerging Asian strategic framework with that goal in mind and both want an inclusive approach in the region. Both see China’s approach in the region as being exclusivist. There is a clear clash between these two visions of the region.

The idea of such a 2+2 meeting was initiated during the summit meeting between Modi and Abe in Tokyo in October 2018. The joint statement following the summit meeting recognized the need for such a dialogue. This would be in addition to existing strategic dialogue formats such as the Annual Defense Ministerial Dialogue, Defense Policy Dialogue, the National Security Advisers’ Dialogue. Most recently, the India-Japan defense ministerial level dialogue held in September also acknowledged the importance of a 2+2 ministerial level strategic dialogue.

Similar, but lower level, India and Japan dialogues have gone on for close to a decade now. The two have had a 2+2 foreign and defense dialogue led by secretary level officers from 2010. This dialogue was established as per the Action Plan to Advance Security Cooperation agreed between the two countries in December 2009. Discussions on global commons including maritime, outer space, and cyber space have been key themes in this dialogue.

While peace, prosperity and stability in the Indo-Pacific will be key themes in the upcoming 2+2 ministerial level dialogue, Japan will also be making a big push to convince India to join the RCEP, the mega regional trade agreement of which Japan is a part. In discussions with me, Japanese analysts say that Tokyo wants India in RCEP to more effectively push back against China. But it remains unclear if India is willing to change its stance on the RCEP. This was discussed during the last Japan-India Foreign Minister’s Strategic Dialogue held in June this year.

With an eye on China, India and Japan are also trying to finalize the military logistics agreement called the acquisition and cross-servicing agreement (ACSA) at the 2+2 dialogue so that it can be signed during Abe’s visit to India in December. Such an agreement could expand the strategic reach and influence of both the militaries: Japan could gain access to Indian facilities in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and India could have access to Japan’s naval facility in Djibouti. India took more than a decade to finalize such an agreement with the United States, but now that it has been done once, New Delhi has found it less problematic to do others. It has now concluded such deals also with France and South Korea; talks for a similar deal with Australia are at an advanced stage.

Some of these themes were also mentioned at the 5th India-Japan 2+2 Dialogue held at the vice-ministerial level. The last such dialogue was held in June 2018 and was co-chaired by Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale and Defense Secretary Shri Sanjay Mitra on the Indian side and Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Takeo Mori and Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, Ro Manabe on the Japanese side. At that meeting, the two sides also discussed strategic infrastructure projects in third countries such as Sri Lanka as well as in India’s northeast (except in Arunachal Pradesh).

Defense relations between the Indian military and the Japanese Self Defense Forces are quite intense with all the different wings of the militaries engaged in joint exercises. These include the Dharma Guardian land exercise, the Shinyu Maitr air exercise, and the Japan-India Maritime Exercise. Areas that require further attention are defense trade and technology transfer.

One of the much-talked about cases is that of the sale of the ShinMaywa US-2 amphibious aircraft for the Indian Navy, but an agreement is yet to be concluded. India’s purchase of the aircraft could see enhancement of India’s capability mix in the context of the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) efforts, but it will also be a good addition to India’s recent maritime capability acquisitions including the P-8I maritime patrol aircraft and the potential acquisition of the Sea Guardian armed drone.

Incentivizing India to make progress on this acquisition, Japan has committed to manufacturing 30 percent of the aircraft in India and this could eventually help improve Indian defense manufacturing. Further, the two have established a working group to study the possibilities in Visual Simultaneous Localization and Mapping (SLAM) Based Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) Augmentation Technology for UGV/robotics.

Opportunities in the areas of technology collaboration is significant. Defense electronics is particularly important for India since New Delhi. India’s domestic defense electronic manufacturing segment is still at a nascent stage and it has to partner with its strategic partners in building a domestic capability base but also direct procurement of those capabilities in the interim.

Overall, the India-Japan ministerial level 2+2 strategic dialogue is an important initiative emphasizing the deep interest in both India and Japan to further strengthen their security and strategic engagements. The two countries have built a strong strategic partnership in the last decade. While China may have been a factor, building this relationship was easier because of the absence of any baggage, unlike, for instance, with the United States. But India and Japan also need to build a larger coalition if they are to balance China effectively.

What Will Rajapaksa’s Return Mean for India-Sri Lanka Relations? - The Diplomat, 27 November 2019

Last week, I wrote two pieces for the Diplomat. The first one, What Will Rajapaksa’s Return Mean for India-Sri Lanka Relations?, looked at how the new political leadership in Sri Lanka impact upon India-Sri Lanka relations.

The November 18 swearing in of Gotabaya Rajapaksa as the new president has brought the Rajapaksa family back into the political limelight in Sri Lanka. It has also spotlighted some of the potential security implications of their return to power.

As the defense secretary from November 2005 to January 2015, Rajapaksa was seen as a strong leader who put an end to the nearly 30-year-old civil war in the country. Once in office, Rajapaksa promptly chose his elder brother Mahinda Rajapaksa, former two-term president himself, as his prime minister.

For the full post, click here.



The return of the two Rajapaksas in the recent polls is not surprising against the backdrop of the bombings in Sri Lanka in April, which killed more than 250 people and injured more than 500. The Easter bombings in churches and luxury hotels in Colombo and elsewhere brought back fears of terrorism taking roots again in the island nation. The Easter bombings also brought a fresh wave of Sinhala nationalism and Islamophobia, which was evident in the recent elections.

India, the neighboring regional great power, is likely to be worried because the Rajapaksas are seen as being sympathetic to China. However, the new president has made repeated statements that his government would like Sri Lanka to be a “neutral country” and that “Sri Lanka won’t do anything that will harm India’s interests.” Gotabaya was also critical of the previous government giving Hambantota Port on a 99-year lease to China and said, “We have to renegotiate.” He went on to add that giving land as investment for developing a hotel or a commercial property was not a problem but “the strategically important, economically important harbor, giving that is not acceptable.”

While this rhetoric may be read as reassuring to some, it is too early to say with certainty how Gotabaya will balance India and China. As is the customary practice, the president will travel to New Delhi on November 29, making India his first foreign visit after assuming office. India has also been proactive on Sri Lanka, with India’s External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar being sent to meet with Gotabaya, with a personal invitation from Prime Minister Narendra Modi to visit India.

The anxieties about the Rajapaksas come from how their past behavior toward China is perceived in New Delhi, and they will not be easily quelled. Despite his current criticism of the Hambantota deal, Mahinda was the one who initiated the deal for developing Hambantota port in 2007 when he was president. The port also happens to be in his parliamentary constituency. While it should be noted that the port development offer was initially made to India and then handed to China, that has not affected the extent of Indian concern. Chinese nuclear submarines also made port visits to Colombo port in 2014, which caused great consternation in India.

More broadly, China’s deep pockets are evident in the number of economic and infrastructure projects in Sri Lanka, including investments in the Colombo International Financial Center, Colombo-Kandy highway, oil refineries, and a $1.4 billion port city next to the Colombo port. India has its own list of pending Sri Lankan development projects that it wants to be part of, including an LNG terminal in Kerawalapitiya near Colombo, a 50-100 MW solar power plant and development of an oil tank farm in the eastern district Trincomalee and the East Container Terminal at the Colombo port.

These concerns notwithstanding, there clearly has been an effort by both India and Sri Lanka to patch up their ties. After Mahinda’s defeat in the 2015 elections, Modi visited Sri Lanka in 2015, 2017, and June 2019, and, each time, Modi made it a point to meet Mahinda. Similarly, Modi also met him in September 2018 when Mahinda and his son visited India. On the Rajapaksas’ side too, there appears to be earnest interest in improving relations, at the very least due to the fact that Mahinda wants to create the perception that he is moving away from an earlier China tilt to equidistance between India and China.

The China question is only part of the recalibration that will be needed to get India-Sri Lanka relations on the right track. Indian interests in Sri Lanka are also driven by other important factors, including post-war reconciliation and respect for the dignity of the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka and its cultivation of ties in its immediate neighborhood and the wider Indian Ocean. As a result, New Delhi will be watching carefully how the new Rajapaksa government’s tenure plays out both at home and abroad in Sri Lanka.

But beyond what Sri Lanka does, India will also need to do its part as well. Rather than focusing on building the case against China, New Delhi must step up its efforts to show what it is for. India can never match Beijing’s economic wherewithal to make a difference to Colombo’s developmental requirements. But it can carve out a niche role in some areas and also partner smartly with likeminded strategic partners like Japan to make an economic and strategic difference in Sri Lanka.