Hu's Delhi Visit: BRICS and the Bilateral Dynamics

Here's an analysis of mine published on ORF website on the recent visit of Chinese President Hu Jintao to Delhi, perhaps his last visit as the president, for the BRICS Summit. However the focus of this article is to see if cooperation at the multilateral levels such as BRICS contributes to narrowing down the differences that exist at the bilateral level between India and China.

For the full article, click here.



Chinese President Hu Jintao was in Delhi for the fourth BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) Summit, possibly his last visit as the leader of China. BRICS appear to have made progress on the economic, trade and financial arena although it will be naïve to assume that it will make similar progress in the political and strategic arena. With Syria, Iran and developments in the West Asia being part of the Delhi Declaration, Mr. Hu is reported to have said that BRICS has begun to make gradual progress on global political issues as well. Rightly so, bilateral issues are not part of the mandate of the BRICS Summit. But it is unclear if cooperation at the multilateral levels such as BRICS contributes to narrowing down the differences that exist at the bilateral level between India and China.

The trend is not particularly reassuring. While India and China have enhanced their trade ties from a mere $ 5 bn a decade earlier to $ 75 bn in 2012, similar trend lines have not been witnessed in the political and strategic arena. Emphasis on economic matters from the Chinese side is quite understandable given that Beijing is on a lookout for newer markets in Asia as the West may no longer be the biggest economic partner for them. India's large market provides an alternative, but New Delhi should also exploit this to its benefit. There are a few issues that need to be addressed, including trade imbalance that is hugely in favour of China and lack of access to Chinese markets for Indian goods and services in the area of pharmaceuticals, agriculture and IT. India is understood to have raised these issues repeatedly with the Chinese side over the last few years with no satisfactory response.

On the political and strategic arena, it has not been easy to say the least. While there has been no untoward incident on the border or elsewhere, it can be best characterised as an uncertain calm. Mr. Hu made tall promises saying China has an "unswerving policy to adhere to the Sino-Indian friendship, deepen strategic cooperation and promote common development. … China is ready to work with the Indian side to seize opportunities, accelerate development, jointly cope with challenges and share the fruits of development to benefit the two peoples and make greater contributions to peace, stability and prosperity of Asia and the world at large." In return, Singh reiterated that India "has no intention to contain China and will not take part in any schemes aimed at containing China. India recognizes the Tibet Autonomous Region as part of China and will not allow Tibetans to pursue anti-China activities in India. He also expressed the hope to work with China to maintain peace and security on the borders and properly resolve border issues through friendly talks." While this is clearly an unobjectionable statement, it is noteworthy that China did not give any such assurances to India. New Delhi should have cashed in on an opportunity like this to gain similar assurances from Beijing as well.

On the sidelines of the BRICS Summit, Mr. Hu held separate meetings with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, discussing a range of issues, including bilateral issues on March 29, 2012. The two leaders also made the politically correct statements on bilateral ties while announcing 2012 as the "Year of India-China Friendship and Cooperation," with an intention to take bilateral ties to the next level, including making progress on strategic matters. The two leaders argued, among other issues, that there was a need for enhancing cooperation particularly in the fields of maritime and regional security. Anti-piracy operations and protection of SLOCS are ideal areas for India and China to cooperate if they have to make progress on the security and strategic front.

In addition, Mr. Hu laid out a five-point proposal to address India-China relations, including one on the border issue. The proposal says the two sides should handle their differences and work for peace and stability, while urging both to push forward border talks in the spirit of peace, friendship, equal consultation, mutual respect and mutual understanding and make good use of the working mechanism of consultation and coordination on border affairs so as to jointly safeguard peace and security on the borders. While the agenda appears comprehensive, this needs to be followed on the ground to make a difference to India-China strategic ties.

Having said that, it is not the border issue that remains at the crux of the problems between India and China. The bigger issue is to reach an understanding on their respective roles in the emerging Asian strategic architecture. It is India's growing role in Asian affairs and beyond and China's eternal desire to box India in South Asia that has been at odds in the recent years. Beijing's closer partnership with Islamabad and in fact with all of the neighbouring countries appears to have been motivated by the desire to balance India. Beijing's ongoing activities in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, or its changing policy on Jammu & Kashmir or the Chinese protests at the Indian troop movement in Sikkim (an otherwise a peaceful sector on the Line of Actual Control (LAC); Sikkim was recognised by China as part of India during Prime Minister Vajpayee's visit to Beijing in 2003) are not reassuring to India. These do reflect a tendency on the part of China to question the very territorial integrity of India.

It is likely that the simultaneous rise of four major powers in Asia (China, Japan, Russia, India) will lead to a period of uncertainty and newer frictions. The fact that except for India and Russia, all the other countries have had troubled history, including war, does not help ease the situation. However, these powers have to recognise that their wealth and prosperity will also depend on the health of bilateral ties with each of these Asian capitals.

India and China have to shoulder greater responsibility in this regard to ensure that they adopt more inclusive and cooperative approach in addressing each other's concerns. And no amount of multilateral level cooperation (BRICS, G-20, WTO) can diminish some of these vexed issues. The fact is also that the two countries have cooperated mostly at the Chinese insistence and where it benefits them and not necessarily in a global forum that is supportive of India. Beijing's less than supportive role at the NSG and its efforts to sabotage an ADB loan for India are one or two instances. Therefore, India has to become more pragmatic in understanding and leveraging multilateral platforms to further its own national interests while strengthening India-China bilateral ties.

Why the US Needs India's Air Force ... my take on US-India military ties ... in today's The Diplomat

Here's an article of mine on US-India military ties, arguing for greater engagement between the Indian Air Force and the US Air Force. This has been published today as the lead article in The Diplomat.

Until now, the flag-bearers of U.S.-Indian military cooperation have been the two countries’ navies, a point that was highlighted during the response to the 2005 tsunami and subsequent reconstruction operations. In contrast, while there have been some joint exercises between their two air forces, the rationale for air force-to-air force cooperation appears to be neither understood nor appreciated in either capital.



During his visit to India last November, U.S. President Barack Obama characterized relations with India as “one of the defining and indispensable partnerships of the 21st century.” Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, in turn, stated that India had “decided to accelerate the deepening of our ties and to work as equal partners in a strategic relationship that will positively and decisively influence world peace, stability and progress.” Arguing that cooperation extended to India’s immediate neighborhood, Singh said the two countries “have a shared vision of security, stability and prosperity in Asia based on an open and inclusive regional architecture.”

But if the bilateral relationship really as is important as the two leaders suggest, then there’s undoubtedly a need for greater strategic synergy. In particular, the two countries’ militaries need to understand each other better if they are to work together for regional and global peace.

Until now, the flag-bearers of U.S.-Indian military cooperation have been the two countries’ navies, a point that was highlighted during the response to the 2005 tsunami and subsequent reconstruction operations. In contrast, while there have been some joint exercises between their two air forces, the rationale for air force-to-air force cooperation appears to be neither understood nor appreciated in either capital.

Indian strategic planners seem to be in broad agreement with their U.S. counterparts in identifying the big strategic challenges in the Asia-Pacific region, yet New Delhi has been reluctant to develop joint approaches in addressing many of these challenges.

The hope is, of course, that even if India is hesitant now, that it may change its mind over the next decade. After all, India’s interests, and its incapacity to address the challenges it faces on its own, seem bound to drive it towards the United States and Asian partners such as Japan and Australia.

Certainly, former U.S. President George W. Bush saw India as a significant pole in Asia, and close ties with India as being in U.S. interests – something that the Obama administration also seems to have recognized. Such views have prompted the United States to develop more formal defense cooperation and to talk about India in terms reserved for U.S. allies (something that causes some discomfort in New Delhi).

The most frequently cited reason for Washington’s interest in India is as a balancer to China, but this view is more complicated than many assume. For a start, the United States has a stake in the ongoing Sino-Indian border dispute. Although the U.S. is yet to take a position on the broader boundary and territorial dispute between the two countries, it certainly wouldn’t be in the interests of the United States to see a conflict break out – and especially to see India lose face in a military confrontation. China decided to teach India a lesson in their brief war in 1962. If this were repeated today, though, the U.S. would also be adversely affected as India’s perceived value as a regional ally would be diminished. A Chinese victory would also raise the question in the minds of smaller states over what hope they have in standing up to China if the United States stood by and watched as a major ally such as India was picked on. Such worries would undoubtedly undermine the United States’ position in Asia, and make China’s neighbors more susceptible to coercion.

But it’s not just about the negatives – India’s airpower can help underpin U.S. Pacific forces indirectly. For a start, a strong Indian Air Force would likely prompt China to focus at least part of its air power away from the Pacific and on the Tibet region. In addition, the Indian Air Force could also tip the scales in the Indo-Pacific by reducing the burden on the U.S. Air Force and providing security in the global commons. For instance, with a single air refueling, India’s SU-30MKI’s combat radius can include either the Straits of Malacca or the Persian Gulf.

Of course, it’s an open question whether India is willing to take such proactive steps. But co-operating more with the United States will help India feel more comfortable with future joint operations.

The reality is that both countries’ air forces face common threats, meaning it would benefit both to share data on a more regular basis and plan joint responses to any problems. The Indian Air Force, for instance, faces threats in its Northeastern sector similar to those facing the United States in the Western Pacific, namely ballistic missiles, advanced integrated air defense systems (IADS), 4th and 5th generation fighters, and increasingly sophisticated Chinese air-to-air missile and electronic warfare capabilities. All these developments increasingly impinge on both India and the United States, and it makes sense for the two to boost co-operation and learn lessons from each other’s experiences in the region.

Similarly, given the growing trend of India procuring U.S. weapons and equipment, greater engagement between their air forces would be particularly beneficial. Joint operations on democracy promotion, humanitarian missions, post disaster management and reconstruction are all ideal areas for joint operations.

But for any of this to occur, India must first recognize the potential for it to become a net provider of constructive airpower in the Indian Ocean Region. If India’s procurement plans go as planned, it could have a modern air force that will be highly capable of anything from disaster relief and humanitarian assistance to providing lethal combat air support.

At the end of the day, if India wants to sit at the high table of international diplomacy, it should be prepared to shoulder greater responsibilities and shed its risk averse foreign policy. Ramping up its air force co-operation seems a good place to start.

Wen Jiabao Visit -- Expectations and Deliverables

Here's the link to an article of mine on the recent visit of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, looking at the potential areas that the Indian leadership is likely to take up with the visiting leader. For the full article, click here.

Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao is on a three-day visit to India against the backdrop of both increasing rivalry between the two Asian giants as well as opportunities for greater cooperation. This is manifested from time to time as both tension and cooperation, both at the bilateral and multilateral levels. Whether tension or cooperation predominates this visit will reveal a lot about the long-term prospect of this important bilateral relationship.



The two sides have improved their relations to a great extent in the last few years, particularly in the economic domain. The trade ties have grown from just US $ 1.99 billion in 1999 to nearly US $ 60 billion this year, but without seeming to have any positive impact on the political relationship. This article outlines the major concerns that New Delhi has. How they are addressed by the two sides will decide how this visit is judged.

For the Indian side, there are four key issues that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh will likely take up with Wen Jiabao. These are the opening of Chinese market for Indian goods; Chinese policy approach on Jammu & Kashmir, including that of the issuance of stapled visas; nuclear cooperation with Pakistan; and terrorism.

Opening up of the Chinese Market

India-China economic and commercial relations have improved tremendously in the last few years. Even while there is imbalance in the trade, this is one area that has continued to flourish without major hurdles. The trade deficit is hugely in favour of China. Another area of concern is that India continues to export mostly raw materials while we import manufactured products. This imbalance is an issue that needs to be addressed.

One major demand from the Indian side has been the opening up of the Chinese market for India. India has demanded opening of the market in three key sectors – pharmaceuticals, IT and agriculture. In spite of efforts by the Indian government and the private sector, there has been hardly any movement. India has a sizeable R&D and technological base in the area of pharmaceuticals and India has produced a variety of cheap and effective drugs for a number of diseases including AIDS. However, India has not been allowed to operate in the Chinese market. Similar has been the case in the areas of IT and agricultural products. This is another issue that the Indian leadership has to take up with China.

Chinese Policy on Jammu & Kashmir

China’s policy on Jammu and Kashmir has oscillated from one end of the spectrum to the other. From a policy of neutrality in the 1980s and 1990s, China has adopted a more active and partisan role today. China’s policy on J&K today represents a mix of aggressiveness and determination, emboldened by the rising politico, economic and military might of the nation. This change in its stance is partly contributed to by the fact that the US is a declining power and there are other power centres in the making, including that of New Delhi and Beijing. The Obama Administration, particularly in the first year of its administration, followed an extremely pro-China policy, adding to the confidence of Beijing. Because of this, China began to sense that it was an important power to reckon with, not just in the region, but even in global terms. Such confidence on the part of Beijing led to more aggressive behaviour in China’s dealing with all of its neighbours and even the United States. The number of maritime issues between the PLAN (PLA Navy) and the US Navy and conflicts involving Vietnam and Indonesia, and India on the land border, are reflective of China’s growing muscle and its willingness to flex its muscles. This new more interventionist policy on J&K appears to be an outgrowth of the US-China joint plan of action vis-a-vis South Asia. It appears to be an after-effect of the US-China Joint Statement in November 2009 for the two countries to jointly manage South Asia. While the issuance of stapled visas may not be directly linked to the changed policy on J&K, China has begun to make serious assertions that the Indian-controlled part of Kashmir is a disputed territory.

Nuclear Cooperation with Pakistan

Nuclear and missile cooperation in India’s neighbourhood has had long-lasting impact in the geopolitics of South Asia. China’s proliferation of nuclear weapons/technology along with its delivery vehicles has clearly altered the India-Pakistan military balance. While some analysts suggest that this is a thing of the past, the recent Chinese proposal to build additional nuclear plants in Pakistan indicates otherwise, in addition to being a clear violation of the international agreements that China is party to. China is seeking to ‘grandfather’ the current agreement into an earlier agreement for the supply of the nuclear reactors. The international community, including the UN and its associated bodies, appears to be unable to persuade China to desist from supplying these reactors. The US appears unable or unwilling to put the kind of pressure needed to stop Beijing from carrying out this arrangement.

Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and the issue of nuclear proliferation have continued to be major issues of concern for US, India and the global community at large. Earlier revelations about AQ Khan having assisted Libya, North Korea and Iran with materials related to uranium enrichment is neither forgotten nor can it be ruled out in the future. The US’s overlooking of Pakistan’s nuclear activities in the 1980s to achieve its Cold War objectives has led to these dangers in Pakistan today. If the US is unwilling to take strong measures against the latest Chinese proposal, the effects could be much more damaging not only for India, but for Pakistan, China and the US.

Terrorism

While India and China are “victims” of terror, the two countries differ drastically on the definitional aspects of terror. For India, terror has originated and continues to originate from Pakistan while China has refused to put the responsibility on Pakistan. The best illustration was the post-Mumbai terror attacks when the UN was to take action against the Pakistan-based terror groups for their role in the Mumbai attacks. China refused to see India’s or even the larger global community’s point of view on fixing the responsibility on Pakistan. China has to recognise that it cannot selectively fight Islamic terrorism only in Xinjiang.

While these are some of the issues that India should take up with the Chinese leadership, it will be naive to expect that China will give in on any of these issues. Wen Jiabao’s visit to India is more of a good will visit or a CBM (Confidence Building Measures) measure to cool the temperatures after the recent tensions on the border as well as the J&K issues. This visit is not expected to be a foreign policy success for either of the governments, from that limited perspective. However, the two countries will continue to be on an “engage” mode, since engagement is the mantra.

As far as China is concerned, Wen Jiabao’s trip is almost singularly driven by economic objectives, evident from the 400-member business delegation that is accompanying Wen Jiabao. China, particularly after the global financial crisis, is on a look-out for markets in Asia, and India offers the largest market. Therefore, China’s singular focus on economic issues is understandable, but India should not give into the Chinese demands without a quid pro quo.

As India pushes east, so China worries ....

Here's the link to a story on Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's Japan visit by Peter Brown. The story, quoting me, is appearing in tomorrow's Asia Times.

Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's trip to Japan in late October was a success, but not a complete success. Thanks to Japan's fundamentally pacifist worldview and rigid take on nuclear cooperation, the outcome was somewhat underwhelming.

For the full story, click here.



As India pushes east, so China worries
By Peter J Brown

Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's trip to Japan in late October was a success, but not a complete success. Thanks to Japan's fundamentally pacifist worldview and rigid take on nuclear cooperation, the outcome was somewhat underwhelming.

Real damage might have been done if Manmohan and Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan had decided to forego an annual summit they have held since 2005, rather than announce a comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) after making little headway in firming up strategic and civil nuclear cooperation issues during the annual cycle of discussions between the two countries.

"With a Strategic Partnership being declared - in 2006 - a Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation being issued, and an Action Plan related to the Joint Declaration thereafter being issued almost in successive years, expecting another deliverable of the magnitude of the previous ones to be pulled out of the hat - or turban - again this year is tantamount to placing an overly high threshold of expectation," said Sourabh Gupta, senior research associate at Samuels International Associates in Washington, DC.

Expectations matter, but above all else, this trip and its limited agenda might have been a strong indicator of the nature of a rapidly maturing relationship. There could be little doubt that, regardless of what other positive moves the meeting held for the bilateral relationship, the participants were pleased by the fact that approximately one quarter of the allotted time was devoted to the topic of how best to deal with China.

"Most of all, India wanted further Japanese foreign direct investment especially in infrastructure, and technological assistance on nuclear power plants, along with [some sign that they were] reaffirming their mistrust against China," said Yukie Yoshikawa, a senior research fellow at the Edwin O Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies in Washington DC.

In response to Japanese concerns that it has been slower than other countries to capitalize on the opportunities that India's rapidly growing economy presents, India was quite willing to make important concessions in the process.

"Japan fears it is already a late comer into the Indian market. Japan has been slow in signing a free-trade agreement with India, and some companies already investing in India, including Suzuki, were dying to have the EPA approved," said Yoshikawa. "The [Japanese government] should be very pleased by India's strategic decision to of drop agricultural products for Japan. India compromised with Japan to exclude rice, and wheat [as well as other products] from the EPA."

To Professor Kazuto Suzuki of Hokkaido University's School of Public Policy, the summit provided a positive reflection of the steady overall improvement in ties between the two nations.

"It was good meeting and there was a good advancement of the relationship - not the best though," Suzuki said.

Beijing was watching the proceedings closely because if both the establishment of an EPA and the conclusion of nuclear deal had taken place during Manmohan's visit, the impact on China would have been substantial. Especially so given that the heated showdown between Japan and China over the fishing boat seizure near disputed islands claimed by Japan, China and Taiwan is still simmering.

"From a Chinese point of view, these strengthening ties between Japan and India represent nothing less than an effort to contain China - something that has yet to be accomplished completely," said Suzuki, who added that the initiation of institutionalized military and security cooperation between India and Japan that has been underway since 2008 means that Japan and India have formed "a semi-alliance" which is reinforced "by regular 2+2 meetings and military cooperation at all levels".

Gupta poured some cold water on the notion that this series of bilateral discussions is gaining momentum at a rapid enough pace and in such a way that might cause Beijing to think seriously about taking decisive moves to counter this trend.

"Going forward, there might be grounds for creeping doubt as to how fast this bilateral relationship will proceed under the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) PMs, [former Japanese prime minister Yoshiro] Mori and [his successors], had been the decisive driving force behind Japan's new outreach to India - and each LDP PM's degree of emphasis on Indo-Japanese ties bore a relative correlation with his anti-China [or pro-China] inclinations. That dynamic is not readily apparent in the DPJ," said Gupta.

It is possible that the DPJ contains an invisible dividing line which seems generational when it comes to Japan's relations with India.
"The older generation including [former premier Yukio] Hatoyama, [former DPJ leader Ichiro] Ozawa particularly, and Kan - privately perhaps too - who take a more autonomist view of Japanese geopolitical strategy, had a place for India," said Gupta. "The younger generation including [Foreign Minister Seiji] Maehara .... [DPJ deputy secretary general Yukio] Edano .... even as they hold hawkish views on China, developed their worldviews at a time when India's image was at its poorest during the late 1970s to the early 1990s. Hence they are not altogether sold on the India strategic connection."

This younger group certainly does not dismiss its importance, but simply prefers to place more emphasis on building Japan's strategic ties with allies positioned closer to Japan.

"India is beneath the radar in their scheme of things. But this is all very tentative and preliminary, and time will tell how this dynamic within the DPJ plays out in terms of India-Japan relations in the coming years," said Gupta.

How India goes about cultivating its vital relationship with the 10 countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) will also affect its relationship with Japan.

"India's most common refrain on Asian security architecture issues is that it be 'open, balanced and inclusive'. For it to turn out to be such, India's obligation is to participate within its processes, engage actively with all stakeholders, carry its share of the burden, and not be an irritant in the mix,'' said Gupta, ''ASEAN is a key shareholder in this dynamic and for India, a gateway too to its East Asian destiny - hence the low key but utterly concentrated effort on New Delhi's part to get this relationship right."

Gupta described the signing of the ASEAN-India Free Trade Agreement last year as "a big deal", and the same is true of New Delhi's decision to invite President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of Indonesia, Southeast Asia's biggest economy, to be the honored guest at India's forthcoming annual Republic Day parade.

As part of its Look East policy, India sees these relationships as an important bridge to East Asia. ''A more robust economic engagement with Malaysia, ASEAN and Japan will provide strategic ballast down the line," said Gupta.

South Korea will certainly play an important role here and both Japan and India agree that better coordination is in order. They also zeroed in on what to do about Japanese allegations (denied by Beijing) that China is holding back on exports of the rare earth minerals that are a crucial ingredient for their hi-tech industries.

"It was significant that the two PM's mentioned an India-Japan dialog on Africa on foreign policy and security issues. We all know what has prompted such a dialog. Rare earths supply problems were also discussed along with potential cooperation in developing technologies to mitigate the problem," said Subrata Ghoshroy, a research associate at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Program in Science, Technology, and Society.

However, China has nothing whatsoever to do with the chronic differences affecting Tokyo and New Delhi on the nuclear front, where India and the United Stated last year pledged closer civilian nuclear cooperation.

"Japan was not enthusiastic about the US-India nuclear deal and gave it grudging support toward the end. Japan is also concerned about the status of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) as can be surmised from the joint vision statement issued during the Indian PM's visit," said Ghoshroy. "Singh did not directly mention India's stance on the CTBT and reiterated India's 'unilateral moratorium' on nuclear testing."

In the end, the only thing really holding up completion of the nuclear deal was the nuclear test clause.

"If an Indian test yields a nuclear explosion, then Japan would halt all cooperation with India," said Suzuki. "PM Singh did not commit to a halt in nuclear testing, but he mentioned that there will be no planned test for a moment. This is good enough for Japan."

Regarding the India-Japan nuclear cooperation agreement, it appears that there are still outstanding issues.

"It is interesting to note that India has speedily concluded a nuclear agreement with South Korea, while the Japan deal is on a sticky wicket," said Ghoshroy. "Unlike South Korea, France, or Russia with which India has easily concluded such deals, Japan does not sell reactors. It does not have an overwhelming economic driver behind the nuclear trade."

India cannot be pleased that Japan has been so slow to come aboard as a willing supporter of its nuclear program.

"There have been three rounds of negotiations and while there is appreciation of the Japanese concerns - Japan being the only victim of nuclear weapons - India has made it clear that it cannot become party to Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapon state," said Rajeswari Rajagopalan, senior fellow in security studies at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi. "There has been a slightly modified position on CTBT wherein the prime minister has stated India will consider signing the treaty provided the US and China ratify it. It appears that it will take several rounds of negotiations before the two sides can reach any compromise on this issue."

On the issue of nullifying the agreement if India carries out a nuclear test, New Delhi is not willing to make an exception in its terms and references for Japan alone.

"India has insisted that India will use the same terms and references as it did in its agreements with other countries - US, Russia, France and Canada," said Rajagopalan.

The national security dimension of this situation may not get overlooked entirely, but it is often downplayed by observers.

"The national security dimension will remain critical in India's negotiations not just with Washington, but with other capitals as well - Tokyo, Canberra, Paris or Moscow. It is indeed this national security dimension that has restrained India from accepting the conditions imposed by Tokyo," said Rajagopalan.

While these stubborn nuclear obstacles persist, there are strong imperatives for both India and Japan to cooperate not just economic and commercial issues, but more importantly on security issues, particularly those in the maritime realm, given the challenges that both New Delhi and Tokyo are facing.

"The Look East policy is an important component of India's foreign policy which is likely to acquire special significance in the coming years. Given the belligerent approach of China towards all of its neighbors including Japan, and Vietnam, India is likely to pursue the Look East policy with much more vigor to consolidate its ties with both Southeast Asian and Northeast Asian countries," said Rajagopalan.

The very fact that both India and Japan have kept up with the annual summit meetings is a testimony to the importance that each side attaches to the bilateral relationship despite the change in Japanese leadership along with the change in ruling parties.

"The inability to conclude the civil nuclear agreement may be a shortcoming, although these are issues that cannot be hammered out in one or two meetings. The fact that the two sides are still keen to continue negotiations to iron out their differences is a positive indicator," said Rajagopalan.

As Manmohan departed Tokyo and flew onto Malaysia and Vietnam, he could not have ignored Kan's declining approval ratings just as he cannot overlook or ignore the changing political winds which are now affecting United States President Barack Obama as Obama is about to show up on his doorstep.

In the case of Kan in particular, the situation surrounding Russia's activities on the islands due north of Japan was a topic that Manmohan would have avoided despite the fact that Russia and India are longtime partners.

Russia ignored Japan's protests much to Kan's displeasure. This did not help Kan's ratings at all.

And Kan cannot offer to sell India any Japanese weaponry, including submarines and electronic warfare gear, until the strict ban on the export of Japanese weapons is lifted. Besides, India and Russia are jointly building state-of-the-art missiles and new warplanes are appearing on the drawing board, while US defense contractors are eager to see their advanced aircraft parked aside India's runways. Perhaps painfully slow nuclear bargaining may be Kan's only option, hypothetically anyway.

While Kan and Obama have exerted their influence over India's future, Kan is not guaranteed at least two more years in office like Obama. And at the same time, Obama who has made a big deal out of his administration's endorsement of closer US ties to Asia and who has applied considerable energy to improved relations with India is no longer guaranteed a vote of confidence, nor is it a blank check from the US Congress.

And important members of his team including US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates who has held the line on US bases in Okinawa will soon be heading out the door. Some have already left.

As anti-Chinese sentiment in the halls of the US Congress is likely to intensify, and as it becomes more noticeable in the coming weeks, the challenge for Manmohan will be to harness this energy to India's and Japan's advantage - and at Pakistan's expense. Not doing so during Obama's upcoming state visit to India will simply be a matter of common sense and diplomatic courtesy.

That is, after all, a strategic plan that is sound and applicable only if Manmohan has concluded that stronger ties to the US under the current rules will benefit rather than hinder India over time.

Manmohan will soon sort this all out. In the meantime, he is signaling to China that Look East is alive and well.

US-India Deal Clouds Nuclear Summit

Here's a link to a story on India-US Nuclear Deal and the Nuclear Security Summit by Peter Brown that has quoted me. The story appeared today (April 13) in Asia Times Online.

For India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who was on Sunday tapped by US President Barack Obama for his first major one-on-one meeting at the sidelines of this week's Nuclear Security Summit in Washington DC, much has changed since his visit to the US capital last November.

The two-day summit, which is focusing on making atomic sites and materials safer from terrorists, comes after last week's release of the latest US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and the signing in Prague of the US-Russia START nuclear arms control treaty. In May, there is also the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference.



There are sub-plots to the US-India engagement, including the continuing dispute over Indian access to David Headley, the Mumbai terror suspect being tried in the US, relations with Pakistan and the situation in Afghanistan. Still, Singh's superb salesmanship is once again on display thanks to the US announcement in late March of a nuclear reprocessing agreement with India.

The deal will allow India to acquire spent nuclear fuel from the US, and as a result, places India in an elite group along with Japan and several European nations.

"At a time when overall relations have been under something of a cloud, the reprocessing agreement, and its timely completion, suggests that a bipartisan commitment at the highest levels of the US government on the single most consequential issue area in bilateral relations for New Delhi - high-technology trade - remains intact," said Sourabh Gupta, senior research associate at Samuels International Associates in Washington, DC.

This was billed as one of the expected outcomes of the broad "123 Agreement" - the name commonly used for the 2008 civilian US-India nuclear deal officially known as the US-India Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. But it has faced a barrage of criticism especially from domestic opponents in the US.

Unlike the new START treaty between Russia and the US, and the recent release of the NPR, the US-India deal has not captured everyone's attention as the curtain rises on the summit. Along with the summit's focus on the threat of nuclear terrorism, Iran and North Korea - though not officially on the agenda - are likely to feature heavily in Obama's talks with leaders.

In discussions with Chinese President Hu Jintao, Obama is likely try to cement China's commitment to pressuring Iran over its nuclear program through sanctions, as well as cool recent Sino-US tensions. The summit of 47 nations in Washington comes ahead of an alternative international nuclear disarmament conference in Tehran on April 17-18.

China has kept silent on the US-India nuclear reprocessing deal. The visit to China by India's Foreign Minister S M Krishna a fortnight ago may be one reason. China also advocates the right of all nations to pursue civilian nuclear programs and the peaceful uses of nuclear power in general. China probably prefers to mask its displeasure, since China will sit down with India again at the latest of the increasingly important BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) summits, to be held in Brasilia on April 16.

"From the day this agreement passed muster at the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in September 2008 - despite their non-constructive role in the NSG at the time, Beijing has known that this was a done deal,'' said Gupta, referring the US-India nuclear reprocessing agreement. ''To their credit though, they have thereafter chosen to pursue their interest in somewhat stabilizing the political relationship with New Delhi, rather than publicly nurse their grievances about an arrangement that became the capstone of the US-India bilateral partnership."

While Beijing would like the US and the international community to accord a similar set of civilian nuclear arrangements to Pakistan, that is not going to happen, Gupta said. ''And Beijing is not likely to facilitate such bilateral cooperation either to the extent that it calls into question its treaty and norm-based commitments to the international non-proliferation regime."

On the other hand, China has taken the opportunity to send a strong signal both to India and the US via its critique of the NPR, which China's views as deliberately distorting China's nuclear intentions at time when the US's strategy involves surrounding China with nations that have rapidly evolving nuclear capabilities of their own.

"It is publicly known that the US once had hundreds of nuclear warheads aimed at China. Even today, it has numerous naval vessels deployed carrying nuclear weapons that can be retrained on China swiftly," said an editorial in China's Global Times newspaper in early April. "In Asia, China is surrounded by countries that have signed nuclear pacts with the US. It is the US, not China, that should provide more transparency regarding its nuclear intentions." [1]

The reference to "nuclear pacts" applies to both India and Japan equally.

"I wouldn't be happy if I were [President Jintao], but China is also to blame for not blocking the original Nuclear Security Group waiver for India which was approved by consensus," said Miles Pomper, senior research associate at the California-based James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. "Still, I am not sure how much it will affect the tone of the summit, which is more focused officially on dealing with nuclear terrorism and, on the sidelines, on dealing with Iran."

India walks away the clear winner here. The Obama-Singh meeting further reinforces the perception that the US wants to highlight its strong relationship with India no matter how strong this relationship might be at present, especially in India's eyes.

"It is not the reprocessing capability right now that is the danger. India had sufficient capability to reprocess material in its existing unsafeguarded reactor facilities to build upon its stockpile," said Pomper. "It is what the agreement says about the willingness of the US to stand up to India, particularly when it comes the possibility of an Indian nuclear test such as one that clearly shows ability to develop a two-stage thermonuclear weapon. That is what I would worry about if I were China."

Pomper said the real problem with the deal is that it gives India a better deal in terms of reprocessing rights from the US than both Japan, which is a non-nuclear state, and Euratom, which is a mix of European nuclear and non-nuclear states.

"Not to mention those countries are closer allies to the US as well," said Pomper. "Those deals laid out explicit criteria under which the US could suspend the agreement. The most important of which that is in Euratom's [deal], for example, but is missing from the India deal is if the other party tests a nuclear device. This seems to open the door to further Indian nuclear tests. Also missing is a provision that it could be suspended in the case of a safeguards violation by Euratom and that was missing from this [agreement]."

Yes, there is a provision that if the agreement is suspended for more than six months, the US will have to enter into consultations on compensating India for its loss, too.

"For India, this is too good to be true, but US negotiators seem to have a congenital predisposition to giving away the store when they negotiate with India," said Pomper.

India is not changing any of its previously held positions with respect to nuclear issues as a result of signing this agreement. It will not be signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty anytime soon, for example. The same is true for the NPT.

Gupta emphasizes that the assurances that India has given here are contained "mainly within the understandings that were reached during negotiation of the umbrella 123 Agreement.

"Though the 123 Agreement, as read, leaves a degree of ambiguity as to what are the criteria for termination (so as to make ratification, then, of the deal palatable in both legislatures), a private communication from the State Department to then-chairman Lantos of the House Foreign Affairs Committee in January 2008 - and presumably known to the Indian side - explicitly lays out these criteria," said Gupta. "They are: detonation of a nuclear weapon; material violation of the 123 Agreement; or violation or termination by New Delhi of its IAEA-negotiated safeguard agreement. These are assurances communicated by India."

Furthermore, as part of the arrangement and procedures of the March 2010 agreement, New Delhi has provided written bilateral undertakings on end-user guarantees as well as non-diversion of nuclear materials.

"All overseas-supplied reactors, fuel, as well as facilities reprocessing such irradiated fuel are also to remain under IAEA safeguards. The [arrangement and procedures] also specifically list the number of facilities to be covered and the procedure for 'consultation visits' to such facilities by US officials," said Gupta.
India is very firm and relishes engagement in tough negotiations. These US visits may occur only every five years, for example. India makes no excuses, and retains its consistent hard-edged approach both in bilateral and multilateral forums.

"As far as the CTBT is concerned, our position is very well-known. It has been reiterated on a number of occasions. We are committed to a voluntary moratorium on nuclear explosive testing. That remains our position. That has been very clearly articulated to all our friends and partners," said India's Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao in response to a question at a press conference in New Delhi in early April.

India played trump card after trump card in this instance. The US wanted only a single reprocessing facility in India, but India prevailed after citing the 123 Agreement, and in the end, multiple reprocessing facilities were approved.

"According to the final agreement, the reprocessing of spent fuel is meant to be done at two dedicated stand-alone facilities, with India allowed to make additions and modifications without going back to the US for additional negotiations," said Rajeswari Rajagopalan, a senior fellow in security studies at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi. "In fact, India could take up the lead in setting up an international reprocessing center in India for the whole region. Such a facility could possibly aid Iran in getting reprocessed spent nuclear fuel for its civilian energy programs."

Iran will be a formal agenda item at the BRIC Summit for the first time. However, regardless of what does or does not happen in Brazil, the reprocessing agreement is behind schedule - and that it surfaced just before the Nuclear Security Summit is little more than a coincidence.

"The timing is not terrible, to start with. This agreement was meant to be concluded between India and the US way back in November 2009 during Singh's visit to Washington. However, the negotiations went on for several more months," said Rajagopalan. "It is up to the Obama administration to ably justify this to the Chinese leadership and the larger international community."

At a time when jobs are scarce and unemployment is high, the economic ramifications of this deal are not to be overlooked.

"This important step is part of the great, win-win narrative of the US-India global partnership, affirming the commitment of our two countries to realize the full potential of our landmark civil nuclear agreement [in 2008]," said US Ambassador to India Timothy Roemer. "These arrangements will help open the door for US firms in India's rapidly expanding energy sector, creating thousands of jobs for the citizens of both our countries. We applaud India's outstanding track record on non-proliferation issues, and we look forward to our continuing cooperation in this area." [2]

In addition, the US has watched as Russian and European companies have become more active in the India nuclear energy sector. While the final passage of India's Nuclear Liability Bill is still an obstacle, it is expected that differences will be ironed out.

"France and Russia have been more enthusiastic about working with India in its civilian nuclear energy sector. In fact, the India-Russian agreement signed during Prime Minister Putin's visit envisages building up 16 nuclear reactors in three different locations, of which six are to be finished by 2017," said Rajagopalan. "If the US does not get its act together, Russia and France will clearly have a head start. It is quite certain that commerce and big business are issues that the US will understand and accordingly tailor its policies. In fact, conclusion of this agreement facilitates early participation by US firms in India's rapidly expanding civil nuclear market."

The politics of job creation and politics of nuclear non-proliferation are two different things entirely. In this instance, India enjoys such a unique status that the lines are easily blurred when it comes to figuring out exactly where the US is heading.

"Reprocessing is the Holy Grail for non-proliferation advocates,'' said Subrata Ghoshroy, senior associate in the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. ''It is not such a bad idea as long as the facilities are under safeguards. Under the NPT, each nation has a right to technology for peaceful development of nuclear energy. So, we cannot deny specific technologies to countries. Now, it is true that India is not an NPT member state. So, it does not have that right. But, the US has branded India a 'responsible' nuclear state. So, how can we deny them this technology?"

By the way, India considers Iran to be a "responsible state" too in this regard.

"When we talk about nuclear security and the threat of nuclear terrorism, we are referring to it in a global context. All responsible members of the world community, international community, have a stake in ensuring that we have comprehensive nuclear security," said Rao in a recent news conference. "Iran is a country with which we have bilateral relations which go back many many years. It is a substantive relationship. We regard Iran as a very important country in the region and a country with which we have had, as I said, extensive bilateral relations and dialogue and cooperation. It is a responsible country."

As for the Russians, they benefit enormously in India from the inability of the US to establish and maintain firm policies.

"The Russians are not hampered by the liability issues as the US firms are. Russians are also cheap and they have maintained a long-standing relationship with the Indian [nuclear sector], when the US had sanctions on India. So, they do have a leg up," said Ghoshroy. "However, the Indians are interested in better technology, which the US could provide. The Russian presence continues to be significant, and as long as US equivocates perhaps of necessity between India and Pakistan, the Russian presence will continue."

As for the sense that things will simpler and less complicated as time moves along, well, there is little chance of that happening. The highway to nuclear energy nirvana features numerous large potholes.

"The Chinese also want reprocessing technology from the US. Pakistan may try to raise it, but it has lot on its plate given the continued controversy around the Khan network. It also wants a nuclear deal like India's," said Ghoshroy. "The main topics [at the Nuclear Security Summit] will be, of course, Iran and North Korea, which the administration wants and Israeli nukes, that both Israel and Obama do not want to discuss. Well, Netanyahu nixed that plan by not coming. The administration will also have a lot to defend about its new NPR."

Notes
1.) US nuclear review misreads China, Global Times, April 2010.
2. US - India Nuclear Deal, Voice of America, April 12, 2010
Peter J Brown is a freelance writer from Maine USA.

VOA Russian News Service on India-Russia Nuclear Cooperation

Here's the link to an article on India-Russia cooperation in the nuclear arena that quoted me. The article appeared on the official blogpage of the Voice Of America Russian News Service. The article appeared in Russian, although a web-based translation is pasted below. Original Russian version is also pasted below.



Russia and India are going to sign the contract about cooperation in the field of use of an atomic energy in the peace purposes. The Russian-Indian nuclear transaction provides guarantees of deliveries of the Russian nuclear fuel on the Indian atomic power stations and construction in India from 12 up to 16-ти power units for three atomic power stations. In July, 2005 the similar agreement has been concluded between India and the United States America (it refers to «123»). Within the limits of this contract, India has had an opportunity legally to get nuclear fuel in the international market and has agreed to admit the international inspectors on a part of the nuclear objects which are not having a military orientation.

At the same time, as marks Раджесфари Пиллаи Раджагопалан, the senior scientific employee of a department of researches in the field of safety from fund Observer Research Foundation (India), between the Russian-Indian and American-Indian contract is the important distinction: « the New agreement gives India right to process and make enrichment of nuclear fuel that does not provide the contract from the USA. Besides the contract 123 provides, that in case of approach of force-majeur circumstances India is obliged to return the USA the equipment and technologies, and also to remain without deliveries of nuclear fuel – in turn, Russia guarantees India uninterrupted deliveries of fuel for its reactors ».
The Indian expert reminds, that cooperation between Moscow and New Delhi in nuclear sphere occurs enough for a long time. So, in 2005 of the atomic power station in Тарапуре it has appeared on the verge of a stop, however Russia has agreed to put urgently 60 tons of uranium and crisis has been resolved.

Paul Podvig, the expert of the Center of the international safety and cooperation at Стэндфордском university (till 2004 it worked in the Center on studying problems of disarmament, power and ecology at Moskovsk physicotechnical institute) emphasizes, that « Russia always wished to guarantee to itself a share of the nuclear market of India. After as a result of achievement of the agreement between India, the USA and МАГАТЭ, a number of restrictions has been removed, Russia has started to act actively this direction. It not seems to me, that the Russian-Indian cooperation in nuclear sphere will damage to cooperation of Delhi and Washington, however it is obvious, that Russia (as well as France) will be the strong contender of Americans ».

Poppy Бергманн, the analyst of Washington research center Center for American Progress, approves, that Russia and India have entered into the mutually advantageous agreement which, among other things « reflects the status of India as growing world force ». Thus Бергманн doubts, that Russia will be capable to supersede the USA from the Indian nuclear market: « However this transaction shows, that India can use various variants of actions in this sphere and will be capable to borrow more a hard line on a number not resolved while questions ».

Nowadays we observe becoming India as one of world leaders in sphere of nuclear technologies. I shall remind, that this country has independently created the nuclear weapon and successfully makes nuclear reactors under own projects. Thus, India has not joined the Nonproliferation treaty of the nuclear weapon, that is had no legal access on the world market of corresponding technologies, materials and the equipment. A number of experts to which I talked, express extreme concern this fact – they are afraid, that successes of India in the long term can destroy a mode of non-distribution. Consequences of it can be the extremely serious.

What your opinion?
Comments
zazhigalkin
2009-12-08 06:50 pm UTC (link)
India - one of the largest countries of the world. In the long term it can become one of the largest economic powers of the world. I think India it is undoubtedly worthy introductions into nuclear club.
Other question, that membership in nuclear club, for all should be combined with the certain restrictions and the international control.

yaromirhladik
2009-12-08 07:18 pm UTC (link)
" The Indian expert reminds, that cooperation between Moscow and New Delhi in nuclear sphere occurs enough for a long time ".

Under the reference about "for a long time" anything is not present, but basically, it and so it is known. Cooperation with India has been connected, historically, with change of a position of China concerning the USSR. As the Chinese armies also "specified" border with India Delhi and has undertaken the certain steps.

After tragedy in Мумбае, in which Delhi has accused Pakistan, there was a concentration of the Indian armies, and Delhi some days changed.
Then Delhi has chosen a variant of different discussions, possibly, reckoning with presence in rear of friendly China. India cannot wage war on two fronts, and with Pakistan Delhi is necessary for dispute, at least, neutral China. India grants asylum to refugees from Tibet, also in India there is "headquarters" of the ñá½á®-llama, that Pekin considers for itself неприемлимым. Dispute on borders between India and China is not ended yet.

If to assume, that in the future Delhi it will be possible to achieve a neutrality of China concerning so назыаемого Халистана, both on borders, and concerning Tibet, and concerning policy of Delhi to Pakistan it is possible, theoretically, dispute between Delhi and Islamabad. As both countries nuclear such dispute could have unexpected consequences. But now the position of China concerning India, de facto, guarantees to Pakistan absence of such conflict.
yaromirhladik
2009-12-08 07:33 pm UTC (link)
China supported the Afghani resistance against the USSR, and concerning the Muslim population of India shows the arrangement and friendship, despite of own problems in Синцзяне, and is considered by the Muslim population of India, and also the Muslim population near to borders of India - in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and in " a zone of tribes ", неконтролирумой Islamabad, as the friend. In case of the conflict to Pakistan, India will face internal problems, and also with problems on borders. But all in due course varies, probably, that sometime, in the future, not only the Europe becomes Muslim, but is possible, and India becomes the Muslim country.

But all this - somewhere in the future, and for today "status quo" is kept, and all three neighbours - China, India, Pakistan - nuclear powers, therefore, that that " a Number of experts to which I talked, express extreme concern this fact – they are afraid, that successes of India in the long term can destroy a mode of non-distribution ", only lyrics. As use to say in the White House of the USA - it is necessary "real-politician". That, actually, also occurs in this region.
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http://community.livejournal.com/golos_ameriki/186053.html

alex_grigoryev ( alex_grigoryev) wrote in golos_ameriki,
@ 2009-12-08 12:42:00




Ядерная Индия
Россия и Индия собираются подписать договор о сотрудничестве в области использования атомной энергии в мирных целях. Российско-индийская ядерная сделка предусматривает гарантии поставок российского ядерного топлива на индийские АЭС и строительство в Индии от 12 до 16-ти энергоблоков для трех АЭС. В июле 2005 года схожее соглашение было заключено между Индией и Соединенными Штатами Америки (оно называется «123»). В рамках этого договора, Индия получила возможность легально приобретать ядерное топливо на международном рынке и согласилась допустить международных инспекторов на часть своих ядерных объектов, не имеющих военной направленности.

В то же время, как отмечает Раджесфари Пиллаи Раджагопалан, старший научный сотрудник отдела исследований в области безопасности из фонда Observer Research Foundation (Индия), между российско-индийским и американо-индийским договором есть важное различие: «Новое соглашение дает Индии право перерабатывать и производить обогащение ядерного топлива, чего не предусматривает договор с США. Кроме того, договор 123 предусматривает, что в случае наступления форс-мажорных обстоятельств Индия обязана вернуть США оборудование и технологии, а также остаться без поставок ядерного топлива – в свою очередь, Россия гарантирует Индии бесперебойные поставки топлива для ее реакторов».

Индийский эксперт напоминает, что сотрудничество между Москвой и Нью-Дели в ядерной сфере происходит достаточно давно. Так, в 2005 году АЭС в Тарапуре оказалась на грани остановки, однако Россия согласилась срочно поставить 60 тонн урана и кризис был разрешен.

Павел Подвиг, эксперт Центра международной безопасности и сотрудничества при Стэндфордском университете (до 2004 года он работал в Центре по изучению проблем разоружения, энергетики и экологии при Московском физико-техническом институте) подчеркивает, что «Россия всегда хотела гарантировать себе долю ядерного рынка Индии. После того, как в результате достижения соглашения между Индией, США и МАГАТЭ, ряд ограничений был снят, Россия начала активно действовать на этом направлении. Мне не кажется, что российско-индийское сотрудничество в ядерной сфере повредит сотрудничеству Дели и Вашингтона, однако очевидно, что Россия (как и Франция) будет серьезным конкурентом американцев».

Мак Бергманн, аналитик вашингтонского исследовательского центра Center for American Progress, утверждает, что Россия и Индия заключили взаимовыгодное соглашение, которое, кроме всего прочего «отражает статус Индии, как растущей мировой силы». При этом Бергманн сомневается, что Россия будет способна вытеснить США с индийского ядерного рынка: «Однако эта сделка демонстрирует, что Индия может использовать различные варианты действий в этой сфере и будет способна занимать более жесткую позицию по ряду неразрешенных пока вопросов».

Ныне мы наблюдаем становление Индии в качестве одного из мировых лидеров в сфере ядерных технологий. Я напомню, что эта страна самостоятельно создала ядерное оружие и успешно производит ядерные реакторы по собственным проектам. При этом, Индия не присоединилась к Договору о нераспространении ядерного оружия, то есть не имела легального доступа на мировой рынок соответствующих технологий, материалов и оборудования. Ряд экспертов, с которыми я беседовал, выражают крайнюю обеспокоенность этим фактом – они боятся, что успехи Индии в перспективе могут уничтожить режим нераспространения. Последствия этого могут быть крайне серьезными.

Каково Ваше мнение?


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(3 comments) - (Post a new comment)


zazhigalkin
2009-12-08 06:50 pm UTC (link)

Индия - одна из крупнейших стран мира. В перспективе она может стать одной из крупнейших экономических держав мира. Думаю Индия несомненно достойна вступления в ядерный клуб.
Другой вопрос, что членство в ядерном клубе, для всех должно сочетаться с определенными ограничениями и международным контролем.
(Reply to this)


yaromirhladik
2009-12-08 07:18 pm UTC (link)

"Индийский эксперт напоминает, что сотрудничество между Москвой и Нью-Дели в ядерной сфере происходит достаточно давно".

По ссылке насчет "давно" ничего нет, но в принципе, это и так известно. Сотрудничество с Индией связано было, исторически, с изменением позиции Китая в отношении СССР. Поскольку китайские войска также "уточняли" границу с Индией, то Дели и предпринял определенные шаги.

После трагедии в Мумбае, в которой Дели обвинил Пакистан, была концентрация индийских войск, и Дели несколько дней колебался.
Потом Дели выбрал вариант разных обсуждений, вероятно, считаясь с наличием в тылу дружественного Китая. Индия не сможет вести войну на два фронта, и для спора с Пакистаном Дели необходим, как минимум, нейтральный Китай. Индия предоставляет убежище беженцам из Тибета, также в Индии находится "штаб-квартира" Далай-ламы, что Пекин считает для себя неприемлимым. Спор по границам между Индией и Китаем пока не окончен.

Если предположить, что в будущем Дели удастся добиться нейтралитета Китая в отношении так назыаемого Халистана, и по границам, и по вопросам Тибета, и в отношении политики Дели к Пакистану, то возможен, теоретически, спор между Дели и Исламабадом. Поскольку обе страны ядерные, то такой спор мог бы иметь неожиданные последствия. Но в настоящее время позиция Китая в отношении Индии, де-факто, гарантирует Пакистану отсутствие такого конфликта.
(Reply to this)


yaromirhladik
2009-12-08 07:33 pm UTC (link)

Китай поддерживал афганское сопротивление против СССР, и в отношении мусульманского населения Индии демонстрирует свое расположение и дружбу, несмотря на собственные проблемы в Синцзяне, и рассматривается мусульманским населением Индии, а также мусульманским населением рядом с границами Индии - в Афганистане, Пакистане, и в "зоне племен", неконтролирумой Исламабадом, как друг. В случае конфликта с Пакистаном, Индия столкнется с внутренними проблемами, а также с проблемами на границах. Но все со временем меняется, возможно, что когда-нибудь, в будущем, не только Европа станет мусульманской, но возможно, и Индия станет мусульманской страной.

Но все это - где-то в будущем, а на сегодняшний день "статус-кво" сохраняется, и все три соседа - Китай, Индия, Пакистан - ядерные державы, поэтому, то что "Ряд экспертов, с которыми я беседовал, выражают крайнюю обеспокоенность этим фактом – они боятся, что успехи Индии в перспективе могут уничтожить режим нераспространения", всего лишь лирика. Как говаривают в Белом Доме США - нужна "реал-политик". Что, собственно, и происходит в этом регионе.
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