US-India Ties Amid the Eastern Ladakh Crisis and the Pandemic - The Diplomat's Asia Geopolitics Podcast, 29 July 2020

Earlier this week, I had a chat with Ankit Panda, Editor-at-Large at The Diplomat on US-India ties amid the Eastern Ladakh crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic, for the Diplomat's Asia Geopolitics podcast. In the podcast, we looked at how the US-India ties have evolved in the middle of the Sino-Indian border crisis in Ladakh crisis and the pandemic.

You can listen to The Diplomat’s Asia Geopolitics podcast on iTunes here; if you use Windows or Android, you can subscribe on Google Play here, or on Spotify here.

This podcast is a take-off from my latest column for The Diplomat's Asia Defense Blog, where I focused on the open and public support for India in its border conflcit with China. Unlike during the Doklam confrontation, this time around, there has been much larger visible and open US support for India. It is possible that this has the tacit approval of New Delhi, which would be one more indicator that the two sides are getting much more comfortable in their partnership.



I have a weekly column with the Asia Defense Blog of The Diplomat where I focus on a range of Asian strategic issues, including major power politics, nuclear security, outer space and global governance aspects. You can check out my articles here.

India-Russia Defense Ties Amid COVID-19 - The Diplomat, 01 May 2020

In my last week's column for The Diplomat, I looked at the state of India-Russia defence ties, amid Covid-19 pandemic. I argue that despite kind words, cooperation, and defense ties, there are longer term difficulties in the India-Russia relationship that are unlikely to be easy to resolve.

The pandemic appears not to have had much impact on India-Russia relations. The relationship was showing signs of strain even before to the pandemic, mainly because both countries are drifting toward different sides in the emerging competition between the United States and China. India’s concerns about China’s behavior have made it inch closer to the U.S. and the Indo-Pacific coalition. While increasing tensions between Russia and the West appear to be driving Moscow toward a deeper partnership with Beijing. Neither side seems particularly happy with the effect of these tendencies on their bilateral relations and both have tried to insulate their ties from these larger movements. The India-Russia relationship continues to be dependent on some level of residual diplomatic empathy toward each other. Beyond this, the arms transfer relationship is the primary driver and despite the pandemic this aspect continues apace.

For the full essay, click here.



The S-400 long-range air defense system is the most visible recent indicator of the arms transfer relationship. There have been some concerns about possible delays, but Indian Ambassador to Russia Bala Venkatesh Varma stated that there will be no significant delays in the supply of the S-400s. India is buying five batteries of the S-400 system in a deal worth more than $5 billion despite the threat of U.S. sanctions. That India went ahead with the system regardless of the threat of sanctions is an indicator of both India’s desire to maintain this aspect of its relationship with Russia but also India’s vulnerability to Pakistan’s missile forces. The S-400 is claimed to have some level of anti-ballistic capability.

In addition, Russia recently offered India three more Kilo-class submarines. These refurbished Kilos will join the nine other Kilo-class submarines in the Indian Navy. This should be welcome because India has just 15 submarines, according to the latest Military Balance published by the IISS, against a projected requirement of 24. India’s declining submarine fleet has been a concern especially as the Chinese PLA Navy gets more active in the waters around India.

Last month, India decided to purchase an additional 400 T-90S battle tanks from Russia, according to reports. These will join the more than 1,000 T-90S that India already has, part of India’s 3,500-strong Main Battle Tank inventory. With the exception of the 100-plus Arjun tanks, everything else in the inventory are Russian T-72s or T-90Ss, which is an indicator of the close historical Indo-Russian military relations.

But the relationship has not been without its hiccups. India was originally part of the next generation Su-57 fighter program but pulled out of the deal because of dissatisfaction with the jet’s performance and manufacturing quality. This highlights a problem that the defense relationship has, which is that Russia is falling behind in terms of weapons technology. More than a decade after the United States started operationally flying fifth generation combat aircraft, Russia has not been able to develop jets with comparable performance. This could mean that India will increasingly have to look elsewhere if it wants weapons with performance capabilities comparable to the top of the line platforms in the world. India’s purchase of the French Rafale fighter is just one indicator of this trend.

As regards the direct effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the bilateral relationship, Indian Foreign Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar has maintained contact with his counterparts in Russia as recently as last week. In a tweet, he said that he discussed a number of issues including the upcoming BRICS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting as well as developments in Afghanistan and cooperation in dealing with the coronavirus pandemic. Although this was part of a series of discussions that the foreign minister had with various counterparts including U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, it does indicate that the relationship is maintaining force. The virus is spreading rapidly in Russia — even Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin confirmed that he tested positive for the virus. The Indian prime minister lost no time in wishing his counterpart an early recovery and good health.

Both sides have also helped each other deal with the effects of the pandemic. Russia expressed its gratitude for India’s decision to supply key drugs to fight the pandemic, HCQ and paracetamol. Russia’s main defense export agency, Rosoboronexport also donated $2 million to the Indian prime minister’s special fund for fighting the pandemic, called the PM Cares Fund. The pandemic has affected the training of four Indian Air Force pilots who have been selected for India’s first manned space flight and were undergoing astronaut training at the Yuri Gagarin Research and Test Cosmonaut Training Center. Nevertheless, training is likely to continue after the various lockdowns end.

But despite the kind words, emergency cooperation, and the defense relationship, there are longer term difficulties in the India-Russia relationship that are unlikely to be easy to resolve. The pandemic has accelerated the competition between China and the region and that is likely to eventually add stress to the India-Russia relationship.

A New India-France Alliance? - The Diplomat, 03 September 2019

Earlier this week, I wrote for the Diplomat on the increasing convergence of interests between the two strategic partners, France and India.

Late last month, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi traveled to France for the annual bilateral summit which lasted from August 22-23. He was also invited by the French President Emmanuel Macron to the G-7 summit, which occurred from August 25- 26 at Biarritz, a reflection of the growing depth of the partnership between India and France.

The consolidation of this strategic partnership could not have come at a better time for New Delhi. India has just taken a major political gamble by removing the special status of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, a state that is the focus of a long dispute between India and Pakistan. But India and France are also coming closer because of other common interests, and because India is looking for more options when it comes to its international partners.

For the full essay, click here.



India’s decision on Kashmir created some diplomatic difficulties, with Pakistan demanding UN Security Council debate and China supporting that demand, putting in question the slowly warming ties between India and China. Russia’s position also raised some concerns in Delhi: Its support for India was lukewarm, with Russia clearly feeling squeezed between China (with which Russia has increasingly become closer) and India (its traditional friend). After Russia climbed on the fence and adopted a somewhat ambiguous stand, India needed to nurture its relationship with other important strategic partners such as France and the United States.

Despite India’s traditional discomfort with being an ally, Modi during his speech at UNESCO in Paris said, “Today in the 21st century, we talk of INFRA. I would like to say that for me it is IN+FRA, which means the alliance between India and France.”

Whether this play of words was important or not, India’s strategic engagements with France has grown by leaps and bounds. Backing India within the UN Security Council was the ultimate demonstration of France’s firm resolve to stand with India. Among the UN Security Council members, France has remained one of the steadiest partners of India in recent decades, a place that used to be reserved for the Soviet Union/ Russia in the past.

By contrast, UK-India ties have always been dodgy, given the old political baggage as well as the influence of the Pakistani diaspora in the UK. The UK’s inability or unwillingness to curb anti-India activities in the UK has always been a sore point in the relations. India’s other partners do not have any clout in forums like the UNSC. For example, though Germany has remained an important trading and even political partner to India, there is very little Berlin can do in platforms like the UNSC. And the less said about groups like the BRICS, the better.

All of this makes France’s strong support for India particularly welcome in New Delhi. France and India already have a fairly multifaceted relationship spanning multiple domains from defense, civil nuclear, and space, to climate change, clean energy, and urbanization. During Macron’s visit to India last year, the two countries signed 14 agreements covering these areas.

Their vision and plan of action for maritime security and outer space stand out as particularly important. With regard to maritime security (with a focus on the Indian Ocean), India and France have reiterated the importance of respecting international law by all states, in maintaining freedom of navigation and overflight, piracy, weapons and human trafficking, illegal fishing and smuggling. There can be little doubt who they are referring to.

The two countries also have a vision to use outer space assets in a proactive manner in developing maritime domain awareness in addition to focusing on areas of cooperation including high resolution earth observation, space domain and situational awareness, satellite navigation, space transportation, and human exploration of space. Strengthened space situational awareness and high-resolution earth observation imagery will have a significant impact in their ability to monitor the Indian Ocean maritime space.

In addition, the two countries also have a Joint Action Plan on Indian Ocean. Their joint plan envisages greater use of space assets to gain a more useful appreciation of the maritime environment that the two countries operate in and the two have pledged to strengthen information sharing on the emerging maritime dynamics in the Indian Ocean.

Indian Ocean dynamics have undergone major shifts since the Modi Government came into office in 2014. Making a significant departure from the erstwhile policy of opposing for extra-regional powers in the Indian Ocean, Modi asserted that “Indian Ocean Region is at the top of our policy priorities” and New Delhi has also made it clear that it will be working with all the friends in the region, especially those of the maritime neighbors and island states. Modi added that “collective action and cooperation will best advance peace and security in our maritime region,” a space that India extends to partners like France and the United States in ensuring a stable maritime order while strengthening their ability to respond to natural disasters.

France, of course, also remains a vital source of arms supply to India. The French Rafale fighter won India’s Medium Multi-role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) competition. Though India bought only about three dozen Rafale’s instead of the 126 originally envisaged, there are continuing rumors that India will buy additional ones. India is also a customer for the Scorpene submarines and a host of other items.

Clearly, the roiling of India’s strategic partnerships has increased France’s importance to New Delhi. France is likely to remain important to New Delhi for some time to come, irrespective of the chatter about the actual label that best applies to the growing ties between the two countries.

How Will Recent Tensions Impact India’s Tsentr 2019 Participation? - The Diplomat, 27 August 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I write on the multinational military exercise, Tsentr 2019. New Delhi’s expected involvement amid recent tensions with some other participants will make for interesting dynamics.

Russia is getting ready to host the 2019 edition of the Tsentr military exercises in the middle of September. The exercise is usually conducted by the Russian armed forces alone, but in a sign of its expansion, back in 2018, Russia invited China to join. The joint exercise ended up being of the biggest multinational military exercises ever, involving a total of about 300,000 troops.

This year, interestingly, Russia invited India to be part of this exercise. New Delhi had accepted the invitation and is expected to be participating. But the recent tensions between India and some of the other participants should make for an interesting dynamic at the event.

For the full post, click here.



Russia has invited a number of Central Asian countries as well as China to the exercise, in addition to India. But according to at least one report, in the Moscow Times, the exercise will include troops from Pakistan also, in addition to Russia, China, India, and four Central Asian Republics — Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. On the other hand, a report in an Indian newspaper has said that Pakistan will not be part of the 2019 edition of these exercises. A Chinese report on the upcoming exercise also did not mention Pakistan’s participation. Thus it is unclear whether Pakistan has been invited or whether it will take part.

According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, a total of 128,000 troops, more than 20,000 pieces of equipment, 600 aircraft, and up to 15 ships and support vessels will be participating in the upcoming military exercises. New Delhi, according to reports, plans to send 140 military personnel.

The exercise is to be divided into two modules, and will have both a defensive and offensive phase. The first phase of the exercise is to focus on counterterrorism operations, repelling air strikes, reconnaissance and search, and defensive actions whereas the second phase will involve managing troops during massive fire strikes and offensive operations involving simulated hostile forces. As per the Ministry of Defense, these exercises will take place in eight training grounds, including Totsky, Donguz, Adanak, Cherbarkulsky, Yurginsky, Aleysky, and two air defense sites at Ashuluk and Safakulevo.

New Delhi’s acceptance of the Russian invitation is not much of a surprise: India has been keen to demonstrate that its foreign policy continues to maintain a wide set of links. Russia, in particular, is an old strategic partner with which India continues to maintain strong military links. India continues to be deeply dependent on Russian arms in its military forces, and Moscow has been willing to transfer weapon systems such as the Akula-class nuclear-powered submarine (on lease) to India.

India also recently decided to purchase the S-400 long-range air defense missile system from Russia, despite the fact that the United States was very opposed to that purchase and knowing that buying the S-400 could potentially jeopardize any future Indian purchase of advanced American fighter planes such as the F-35. Though Washington is also an important partner for India, New Delhi was reluctant to give in to U.S. demands, especially considering the uncertainties of the Trump administration’s policies.

New Delhi would also not have had much objection to participating along with China in a joint exercise in Russia. India and China have conducted joint bilateral military exercises recently. India has been keen to improve relations with China after the Doklam confrontation in 2017, and Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping were supposed to hold a second “informal” summit in India, to follow up on the one held in Wuhan last year.

However, the recent Sino-Indian spat over India’s decision to withdraw the provisions of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution and New Delhi’s decision to make the Ladakh region a separate union territory to be administered directly from New Delhi has worsened relations. New Delhi was miffed at China’s active efforts at the UN Security Council to target India. It remains to be seen if this will have any impact on India’s participation in the Tsentr military exercise.

If Pakistan has been invited to the exercise, it will be yet another wrinkle, because Pakistan has vociferously objected to India’s Article 370 decision and it was Islamabad that took the issue to the UNSC. New Delhi will also likely see any Russian invitation to Pakistan to join the exercise as one more example of Moscow’s increasing closeness to Islamabad. New Delhi is already unhappy with Russia’s behavior at the UNSC; this will further deepen Indian unhappiness.

It is extremely unlikely that India will take any dramatic steps, such as withdrawing from the exercise. But Indian discomfort with Russia, which is already growing, is likely to worsen if a Pakistani contingent also shows up at the exercise.