Behind the Second Modi-Xi Informal Summit, the Wuhan Spirit Is Fraying - The Diplomat, 10 October 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I write on the second Modi-Xi informal summit scheduled to begin later in Mamallapuram today and conclude by tomorrow.

The second informal summit between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping is set to take place in Mamallapuram, a coastal town in south India from October 11-12. The meeting between the leaders of the two Asian giants will be closely watched, with consequences not only for their countries but the wider Indo-Pacific region and the world as well.

The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) made a formal announcement of the visit just a couple of days before the visit. The statement added that the agenda was discussing “issues of bilateral, regional and global importance and to exchange views on deepening India-China Closer Development Partnership.” The two sides appear to be setting expectations low, with good reason.

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Prior to the announcement, the Indian media was full of speculation that the summit could even be cancelled. Despite the Wuhan Summit in 2017 and the so-called “Wuhan spirit,” India-China relations have been characterized by a growing number of disputes.

The most serious of these, at least from Delhi’s perspective, is the strengthening Chinese support for Pakistan. Just days before the summit, the Chinese ambassador in Pakistan, Yao Jing, expressed strong support for Pakistan’s position on the Kashmir dispute, saying, “We are also working for Kashmiris to help them get their fundamental rights and justice. There should be a justified solution to the issue of Kashmir and China will stand by Pakistan for regional peace and stability.” This was a red flag for India and led to India lodging a strong protest with China and seeking clarification on what appears to be a change in Beijing’s stated stand on Jammu and Kashmir.

Beijing’s official stand has always been that Kashmir was a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan, left over from history, that needs to be resolved directly by the two countries. So, the change in China’s position was surprising and was seen by official New Delhi as an effort to interfere in India’s internal affairs. Moreover, this came after the strong Chinese support for Pakistan on Article 370 issue, when Beijing forced a UN Security Council discussion on the issue. China also took an unusually strong position on India effectively removing Article 370 (which had ensured local autonomy for the Indian state of Jammu Kashmir) and creating a separate Union Territory (a province directly ruled from New Delhi) in Ladakh. This was despite India’s foreign minister S. Jaishankar travelling to Beijing to explain that the Indian actions in Kashmir had no additional or negative or implication for the Sino-Indian border dispute.

After several strong statements on India by Chinese officials, there was a thawing of the tensions with a Chinese Foreign Ministry statement on October 8. While responding to a question, the Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson said, “China’s position on the issue of Kashmir is consistent and clear. We call on India and Pakistan to step up dialogue on disputes including the Kashmir issue to enhance mutual trust and improve relations. It serves the common interests of both India and Pakistan and represents the shared expectation of regional countries and the international community.” Earlier references to UN resolutions, which irritated India, was missing from this statement.

But the thaw, to the extent that it existed, was short-lived. Not only did China host a visit by the Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan just days before the Xi-Modi summit, the joint China-Pakistan press release also brought back language in reference to Kashmir that India had objected to, asking that the dispute be “resolved based on the UN Charter, relevant UN Security Council resolutions and bilateral agreements.”

Beijing, of course, has its complaints too. China had raised objections to the Indian military exercise Him-Vijay in Arunachal Pradesh, executed by the Indian Army’s 17 Corps. The Indian government is reported to have clarified that the ongoing exercise is part of the routine familiarization and orientation exercises and has nothing to with Xi’s visit to India.

This is not the first time that China has objected to military exercises or movements in Arunachal Pradesh. China has continued to maintain that Arunachal Pradesh is “southern Tibet” but India has always countered such statements by saying that Arunachal Pradesh is an integral part of India. Moreover, India had also participated in an elevated foreign minister-level meeting of the Quad countries in the sidelines of the UN General Assembly annual meeting, despite China’s objections to all such Quad meetings.

Clearly, Modi and Xi have a lot to discuss. But with new issues piling up, it is unclear if such ‘informal’ summits can do much to improve ties. Personal reassurances are unlikely to overcome growing real disagreements between the two sides, especially considering that the two sides do not seem to care very much to even hide their disagreements anymore.

Managing the AfPak Challenge in US-India Relations - The Diplomat, 9 August 2019

In my column for The Diplomat last week, I wrote on the AfPak challenge in US-India relations and both sides need to carefully manage this issue to avoid damaging the wider relationship, especially as it has other longer term strategic challenges to confront in the broader Asian strategic context.

Indo-U.S. relations have been running into rough weather recently. Trade problems, India’s decision to buy S-400 missiles from Russia, and differences over Iran have all taken a toll. Both sides are gamely working to ensure that these don’t do lasting damage, but a new issue – disagreements over the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and its consequences – now threatens to overload the agenda and potentially do serious damage, especially to their common interests in the Indo-Pacific.

It is not clear that their differences over AfPak can be entirely resolved but both sides can take efforts to limit the fallout from these disagreements before it is too late. This does require though that both New Delhi and Washington understand each other’s compulsions in AfPak and recognize that their common interests in the Indo-Pacific are more important.

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After almost two decades of fighting to keep the Taliban out, Washington is understandably exhausted. There is little hope that that the United States can win the war and even lesser hope that it can strengthen Afghan government forces sufficiently that they can contain the Taliban without American assistance. So, the choice the United States faces is to stay on for the foreseeable future or try and cut a deal with the Taliban to withdraw with a modicum of grace.

Added to this is President Trump’s domestic compulsion. Americans are weary of the war, and have been for some time. Barack Obama promised to get the United States out of Afghanistan but was unable to do so. President Trump, who came to power complaining of the costs of the United States’ over-commitments abroad is even more motivated. With the election campaign beginning, and the election itself fifteen months away, he appears intent on succeeding where his predecessor failed.

The key problem is that it is unlikely that the United States can withdraw from Afghanistan without Pakistan’s support and cooperation. Though the Taliban in Afghanistan is a diverse and a somewhat less than unified force, it does appear clear that Pakistan has sufficient control over them to ensure that no negotiations can take place without the good offices of Islamabad. Trump has been critical of Pakistani behavior in the past, and Washington in general, is well aware of the history of Pakistani duplicity.

Moreover, the Taliban’s commitments that they will not allow Afghanistan to be used for terrorist activities against the United States and the West is a laughable proposition. Once the United States withdraws, there is little that Washington can do to ensure that a Taliban government will live up to the promises they make. Nevertheless, these commitments are a useful fiction that provides cover for Washington to blame that they have withdrawn honorably.

If the United States’ imperative is understandable, so is India’s. If the Taliban come back to power in Afghanistan, there is little doubt that Islamabad will be able to use Afghan territory to, once again, base anti-India terrorists there. With India demonstrating that it now has the political willingness to strike terror camps in Pakistan, Pakistan’s incentive for exploiting Afghan territory is even greater.

Though India’s interests in preventing a Taliban takeover is clear, its options are limited. India appears to have done little to build up any specific source of support of proxies within Afghanistan, to give India any voice in the negotiations for the U.S. withdrawal. What this means is that while the Taliban might give at least some paper guarantee to the United States about non-use of its territory for international terrorism purposes, India cannot even expect that. New Delhi would prefer that the U.S. forces stay on in Afghanistan but that is not likely. And nobody gives much heed to India’s mantras like “Afghan-led, Afghan-owned” process.

A key question is how the disagreement between the United States and India on Afghanistan and Pakistan’s role in it can be managed. Washington and President Trump personally are not likely to look at any Indian efforts to slow down or sabotage the U.S. withdrawal very kindly. Equally, New Delhi is likely to be more than a bit peeved if the United States facilitates Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan, especially with Pakistan’s assistance. Thus, there is little doubt that when it comes to the AfPak, the Indian and American interests are directly contradictory.

What is worrying is the possibility that these disagreements will bleed into other areas and affect cooperation in critical areas, especially the Indo-Pacific. Though there are disagreements between India and the United States on how to balance China in the Indo-Pacific, these are relatively minor. But unhappiness over AfPak can raise issues of dependability about the other in both capitals. There are already increasing concerns in Washington about whether the United States was wise to bet on India; and in New Delhi, concerns about American dependability have never been far from the surface. It remains to be seen whether there is sufficient maturity on both sides to continue cooperating on one area while they have significant differences in another.