India's strategy in space is changing. Here's why - The World Economic Forum, 14 August 2019

After a gap of more than a year, I wrote a short essay for The World Economic Forum. In this essay, I focused on India's geopolitical strategy in space.

Half a century after humans first walked on the Moon, space is still as much about scientific discovery as it is about strategic competition.

As was the case during the Cold War, outer space is an arena of terrestrial geopolitics. We can see this in the increased impetus for competition in various achievements in outer space, such as Moon landings, Mars exploration and, more directly, in the creation of space forces in various countries – France being the latest to announce it intends to establish a space command to improve defence capabilities.

For the full essay, click here.



Yet, despite outer space being once again a field of power competition, there are also some differences from the Cold War years. First, and most significantly, there are many more countries and actors involved: in Asia itself, China, Japan and India are major spacefaring nations, and smaller players such as South Korea, Australia and Singapore are developing their own space programmes.

Added to the increase in countries is the entry of the private sector into space. A key difference in the new geopolitics of space is that both terrestrial competition – and its reflection in outer space – is now along multiple axes, rather than just the single U.S.-Soviet one.

Today, there is increasing power competition in Asia, particularly between China and its neighbours - India, Japan and Australia. Some of this is also reflected in outer space. As a corollary, we are also beginning to see greater cooperation between some countries in outer space, including India and Japan, both of which are concerned about the rise of China.

India also cooperates in space with the US, Russia and France. Much of the competition India has on land, on the other hand, is with China. Therefore, India has negligible cooperation with China in space, and equally, little competition with the other space actors.

A competitive chain reaction that (sometimes) reaches space

What occurs in space can be the result of a geopolitical chain reaction. For instance, consider the US-China-India relationship: China often takes action because of its strategic competition with the United States.

This has an impact on India, forcing India to respond. But India’s response to China has an effect on Pakistan, which then responds to India. This cascade can be seen on land, and at times, in space. For example, China’s first successful anti-satellite (ASAT) test in January 2007 was to demonstrate a catch-up effort with the United States. But once China tested its ASAT in 2007, India had little choice but to develop its own ASAT because of the need of deterrence.

But in the space arena, the competitive cascade does not travel all the way to Pakistan because Pakistan’s space programme is underdeveloped. While Pakistan has expended considerable national wealth in keeping pace with India in its nuclear and missile capabilities, it has not done so with regard to outer space.

On the other hand, there might be a security incentive for Pakistan to demonstrate that it also has an ASAT capability.

Pakistan could also develop other counterspace capabilities, including cyber and electronic means to target India’s space assets. While this remains speculative so far, the history of India-Pakistan competition suggests that this remains a possibility.

Evolution of strategy

India had long maintained a rather doctrinaire approach toward space security, emphasising the peaceful uses of outer space and opposing the weaponization and militarization of space. Thus, India had opposed the US Strategic Defense Initiative programme and other efforts to build ballistic missile defences, let alone deploying ASAT systems. The reasons for such an approach was fairly clear: India did not house these capabilities.

But by the early 2000s, India’s position had begun to change as Pakistan began acquiring long-range missiles. India felt the need to build ballistic missile defences, leading New Delhi to take a sympathetic view of the George W. Bush administration’s decision to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty in late 2001. By the end of the decade, as India’s own capabilities increased, it was clear that India was becoming more discriminating in its attitude towards space security.

China’s ASAT test in 2007 helped advance India’s process of revaluating its space strategy. India realised that its growing investments in outer space - until then largely civilian in nature - were now under threat from China’s new security capabilities. India also started thinking more about how to manage outer space for security purposes. As a result, India established a space cell under its Integrated Defence Headquarters shortly after China’s ASAT test.

In April 2019, India established the Defence Space Agency (DSA) as an interim measure to command the military’s space capabilities. All of this meant that India had to have a much more nuanced position than a blanket approach that opposed any militarization or weaponization of outer space.

However, the consequences of unbridled militarization and the weaponization of outer space has negative implications for India. Therefore, while India is pursuing a strategy that satisfies its own security interests, it still wants some international control on the militarization and weaponization of outer space.

A First: India to Launch First Simulated Space Warfare Exercise - The Diplomat, 12 June 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I write on the Indian government's plans to conduct the first simulated space warfare exercise called the IndSpaceEx in July. Reports of a tabletop wargame speak to India’s ongoing efforts to develop its space policy.

The Indian government appears to be getting ready to conduct a table-top war game called “IndSpaceEx” involving all stakeholders including the military and the scientific establishment. The reports of such a development, which come against the backdrop of other key developments pertaining to outer space including the demonstration of India’s anti-satellite (ASAT) capability and the establishment of the new tri-service Defence Space Agency (DSA), bear careful watching within the broader perspective of India’s space policy.



For India, space is a domain that has remained relatively peaceful for close to three decades, but is now changing because the nature of politics and competition in outer space is much more contested today. Terrestrial politics is casting a long and heavy shadow on outer space, and India could not have ignored these developments, of which China is just a part.

Along with the growing relevance of space to national security and conventional military operations, counter-space capabilities are also being developed in an effort to deny an adversary advantages by the use of space assets. The growth of counter-space capabilities including kinetic physical, non-kinetic physical, electronic, and cyber means has sparked a fresh competition in outer space.

The increasingly contested nature of space has been an impetus to India’s changing approach to outer space, moving from a purely civilian and peaceful approach to one where certain military characteristics are evident, conditioned by changing security realities. Militaries around the world have been emphasizing network centricity which in turn brings out the salience of space for Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance” (C4ISR), and as they have become more networked, they are also opening themselves up to more and more vulnerabilities, while anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons have also added to the prospects for destabilizing scenarios in outer space.

India’s ASAT demonstration earlier this year was important in validating its deterrence capability. Meanwhile, the establishment of the new tri-service Defence Space Agency (DSA), based in Bangalore, is an important institutional initiative that combines two key functions performed by the Defence Imagery Processing and Analysis Centre (DIPAC) in Delhi and the Defence Satellite Control Centre in Bhopal, representing the growing integration of India’s space capabilities.

Reports of the new wargame IndSpaceEx should be read as part of these wider developments. One of the reported goals of the IndSpaceEx, to be held towards the end of July under the Integrated Defence Staff of the Ministry of Defence, is to gain a better understanding of the current and emerging challenges in the space security domain.

Another reason the wargame is also being undertaken to have a better appreciation of the capabilities that India must develop in order to protect its assets and secure its national interests. India has been growing mindful of the growing number of threats in outer space, both natural and man-made ones. While the global space competition between the key spacefaring powers is a well-known reality, New Delhi has worries about the counter-space capabilities in China’s inventory.

Such wargames are not uncommon. Indeed, think-tanks and governments in all the major spacefaring countries have conducted table-top and simulation exercises to understand space security crisis dynamics, major vulnerabilities and capability gaps during conflict. These could then feed into policy making. For instance, among the think-tank community in the outer space domain, the Secure World Foundation and the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (both based in the United States) as well as the Observer Research Foundation have engaged in several such exercises.

These exercises were done to understand crisis dynamics including decision-making processes, the attainment of national objectives, the changing nature of warfare, and the influence and impact of emerging technologies. Even when these exercises were played with a space security focus, the results have been revealing. For instance, the ORF simulation exercise (SIMEX) conducted over three years has seen remarkable conclusions. Still, states have resisted carrying out attacks on outer space assets due to the fear of escalation.

The Indian government’s proposed war gaming exercise appears to have a slightly narrower agenda in terms of understanding the vulnerabilities and the gaps in India’s space security and identifying areas for India to develop and strengthen in terms of technological capabilities in order to establish effective deterrence capabilities. China has been the single most important factor shaping India’s approach to space. The growing sophistication of its military space program, including the recent launch of a rocket from a ship, is significant.

Clearly, efforts like the IndSpaceEx are important to determine the degree of the space security challenges India faces and to develop appropriate measures for effective deterrence. But India must step up its efforts to develop global rules and norms about such challenges and threats. While India must continue working towards all-encompassing legally-binding instruments such as the Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), the rising specter of threats means that more pragmatic and feasible measures should also be attempted because these could see more broad-based support among states. Having demonstrated its ASAT capability, India is in an ideal place to demonstrate its global governance credentials.

What Does the Rise of Asia’s Space Forces Mean? - The Diplomat, June 4, 2019

A few days ago, I published a piece in The Diplomat understanding the implications of new space commands being established by key space powers.

While U.S. President Donald Trump’s release of Space Policy Directive-4 in February that enables the establishment of the U.S. Space Force received much focus in the way of headlines, this was hardly the first time that a military has set up a special branch for space operations. Indeed, there is a need to focus much more on what the significance of these moves means for Asian security and the implications of efforts to create space commands and forces.

For the full essay, click here.



First, the place to start is to acknowledge that several countries are establishing such special units. The U.S. space force is only the latest and so others are doing it as well. China established the Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) in 2015, integrating the PLA space, cyber and electronic warfare capabilities, a key institutional innovation. Russia made similar institutional innovations with the Russian Space Forces in 2011 as part of the Russian Aerospace Defense Forces meant for military space-related activities. India, similarly, appears also to be on the way to creating such a special space command.

Second, it is important to keep in mind that even though it sounds like a fighting force, the space force is mostly aimed to bring about greater integration of functions and the better coordination among different agencies involved. There is a need to pay greater attention to the details of these bureaucratic changes and innovations.

Third, it is necessary to be clear about what the details are in public policy discourse because alarmism can be negative too. The creation of space forces and commands does not necessarily mean we are on the cusp of states engaging in combat in outer space. We should be realistic about the limited nature of these efforts to date, even though we should not ignore development possibilities that may be more oriented toward actual combat in the future. The point is that we still have time to head off such dangerous developments.

Fourth, it is important to understand the varying rationales behind decisions to create these forces. For instance, the U.S. Space Force can be seen as a result of the increasingly worsening security situation and a consequence of the great power politics. Outer space was largely unaffected by terrestrial geopolitics for the first several decades of the space age, but in the last decade, this has changed. There are greater insecurities today and this has an impact on outer space too. We cannot ignore the political realities that are driving these developments, because they partly influence what we can do about it.

Fifth, we need to be clear about the dangers that stem from these developments. One danger is that more and more countries will follow this path and establish specialized space commands. As space begins to assume a more active role in the security and military operations including conventional ones, countries would seek greater coordination of their efforts and will end up establishing these specialized commands. The need for greater synergy in space activities is understandable, especially as outer space exploitation gets more important to welfare on the ground. But such coordination can also be possibly done by civilian agencies rather than military ones. We need to develop alternate models that do not ignore the need for greater coordination and synergy within governments, but without suggesting it can only be done under military commands.

A real danger is if this were to lead to a security dilemma between countries in outer space that spurs further development of space commands and forces. This is a danger especially because these new efforts are being led by military forces. The demonstration effect of some powers doing it, and the uncertainty of why they are doing it, will force others to imitate them. Even if no side wants it, we could end up having an arms race in outer space because of this. We should examine how this outcome can be prevented.

Sixth, we then need to look at a range of measures that can help us address these dangers. Greater dialogue and transparency can help, especially since these efforts are being driven by the need for greater coordination rather than the need to engage in military combat. Greater transparency and openness are the only possible solutions given the overall international security scenario and the nature of great power politics. Especially given that there might be an actual, understandable reason for setting up specialized coordination agencies, greater transparency might help avoid misunderstanding between the great powers.

Also, early effort is necessary to prevent more states from creating such space forces. It may still be possible to get some basic understanding between powers about what are the do’s and don’ts in creating such forces and commands. For example, to the extent that these are being driven by the need for greater national coordination, states could agree to put these efforts under civilian rather than military agencies. This could ensure that this effort at greater coordination does not get militarized.

All this is not to minimize the challenges posed by the growing security attention to outer space. But it is to suggest that for all the alarmism we have seen, there might still be time to head off a new security problem related to outer space. That requires greater attention to this problem, avoiding alarmism about space forces, and understanding and accepting the need for greater coordination within state agencies while at the same time creating some rules and norms to ensure that these efforts do not become militarized. Such a balanced approach can help us maximize the opportunities and minimize the challenges in this area in the coming years.