Will the End of the INF Treaty Start an Arms Race? - The Diplomat, 1 August 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I write on the global impact of the end of the INF Treaty, "Will the End of the INF Treaty Start an Arms Race?." I argue that the end of INF will have strategic implications well beyond Russia and the United States.

On August 2, the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), a bilateral arms control treaty originally signed between the United States and the Soviet Union (now Russia), will end. U.S. President Donald Trump had announced the U.S. withdrawal from the Treaty six months back, and the withdrawal period is about to end.

While the focus of the INF Treaty itself was on the United States and Russia, is likely to have a much broader impact than just between the two countries. The INF Treaty was seen as having the ability to bring about a semblance of stability much beyond Washington and Moscow. Now there are growing concerns that this will give rise to a new arms race.

For the full essay, click here.



The 1987 INF Treaty saw the United States and the Soviet Union agree to remove an entire class of weapons – nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, including Soviet SS-20s and the U.S. ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) and Pershing II ballistic missiles. Based on the commitments made in the treaty, the two countries destroyed a total of 2,692 short-, medium-, and intermediate-range missiles by June 1, 1991, the treaty implementation deadline. This is the only nuclear arms control treaty that eliminated an entire class of existing weapons.

The Trump announcement of the U.S. intent to leave the treaty came about after repeated reports of Russian breaches of its INF commitments. The Russian breaches are not new. The complaints had been around under the Obama administration, for instance, when Russia developed a new cruise missile, the 9M729 (NATO name: SSC-8). NATO has also remained concerned about the treaty breaches. In fact, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg stated that “the ‘ongoing Russian violation’ was the only reason the 1987 treaty was under threat.”

Russia of course denied that they were violating any commitment made under the INF Treaty. A senior Russian official is reported to have said that it is not in violation of any commitment and that the missile 9M729 is within the INF range limit of 500 kilometers. In fact, a Russian commander, General Mikhail Matveyevsky has reportedly stated that its maximum flight range is 480 km.

There are concerns within the United States and outside about the impact of the treaty withdrawal. U.S. Senator Bob Menendez (a Democrat from New Jersey), the ranking member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has said that withdrawing without a follow-on treaty taking the place of the INF is a recipe for an arms race. Menendez argues that “Russia will clearly spend money on updating and amplifying its weapons systems.”

Yes, Russia might respond by building more INF-range missiles. But it is important to identify another key reason for the U.S. walkout from the treaty — China. One key problem facing the INF Treaty has been the development and deployment of a large number of missiles by China, which is not a member of the treaty and therefore not bound by its terms. That has had the effect of changing the military balance in East Asia and beyond. In fact, in October last year, Trump had said, “We’ll have to develop those weapons, unless Russia comes to us, and China comes to us, and they all come to us and they say ‘let’s really get smart and let’s none of us develop those weapons.’ If Russia’s doing it, and if China’s doing it, and we’re adhering to the agreement, that’s unacceptable.”

There is substance to all of this. A recent U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Report detailing the Chinese missile inventory highlights that it has “more than 2,000 ballistic and cruise missiles, approximately 95 percent of which, according to US officials, would violate the INF Treaty if China were a signatory.” So, there are genuine security concerns that have driven the U.S. withdrawal, which will also mean that any future arms control initiative can get off the ground under the Trump administration only if China actively participates in it.

China remains concerned about the ending of the INF Treaty. Their worries stem from the fact that this could lead to the United States deploying conventional ground-launched missiles in East Asia, which could further force China to increase its own inventory. Experts warn that with the United States becoming free to now deploy INF-range missiles in Asia, “the development of Chinese missiles is likely to rapidly accelerate.” But as long as China continues its unimpeded development of missiles, the United States, Russia, and even India might be compelled to build up their own inventories, which points to the possibility of a budding arms race.

Japan, which will also be affected by such an arms race, had suggested a multilateral successor to the INF, but China is categorical that it will not be party to such initiatives. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying, said that the INF “is a bilateral deal between Russia and the United States. If the agreement becomes multilateral, this will influence a whole range of complex political, military, and legal issues…. The Chinese side does not give its consent.” As for suggestions on a possible trilateral agreement involving the U.S., Russia and China, Beijing was once again firm in saying no. China is reported to have said that “the premise and basis for trilateral arms control negotiations do not exist at all, and China will never participate in them.”

To be sure, this might just be an initial bargaining tactic. But if not, a new post-INF arms race may be in the offing, this time encompassing Asia too. That will have implications for the wider Indo-Pacific region, and developments in this regard will be critical to watch.

my Shangri-La Dialogue Remarks

This was my second time at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue which is Asia's premier defence summit, a unique meeting of ministers and delegates from over 50 countries. 2017 was my first appearance at this premier Dialogue and I had contributed an essay on India's evolving strategic response to China which appeared in the IISS' Regional Security Assessment 2017.

This year, the keynote address was delivered by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. This was a much-awaited one, particularly because of the general low-key and irregular participation from the Indian establishment.

This time around, the IISS organised an inaugural female leaders panel to talk about the strategic implications of new technology on the security dynamics in the Indo-Pacific. It was a terrific panel featuring Australian Minister of Defence Ms. Marise Payne, Canadian Deputy Minister of Defence Ms. Jody Thomas and CEO of Boeing Defence, Space and Security Ms. Leanne Caret and ably chaired by the IISS’ Deputy Director General Dr. Kori Schake. My brief was to look at the nuclear and space advancements and competition in the Asia Pacific, and also the strategic competition between India and China in the Asia Pacific as it relates to these two domains.

Here is the synopsis of my remarks.

Asia is already rife with mistrust, rivalry, competition and both nuclear and space domains are beginning to see a fresh phase of competition. This is a reflection of the larger geopolitical competition in the Asia Pacific and beyond. While there are several factors that have driven this competition, China’s rise has been most consequential. The rise of China and the strategic uncertainties it has created has necessitated countries like India, US, Japan, Australia and other like-minded countries to come together, though this is still at a nascent stage. The augmentation of nuclear and space capabilities will only accentuate the already existing tensions.

I outlined two sets of concerns each with regard to nuclear and space technologies. On the nuclear front, the key concern is potentially the inability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime to deal with the many challenges which present with serious problems for strategic stability. One is the development of hypersonic weapons. A key problem here is that such weapons can increase the potential for surprise attacks, because of the difficulty of detecting and countering them. This could lead to a destabilizing arms race spiral between key great powers in the region, all of whom are working on developing these weapons. An additional problem is that hypersonic weapons potentially erode the line between conventional and nuclear weapons, which will also increase instability. Another evolving technology is BMD, which also has similar problems.

Coming to outer space issues, two issues stand out. There is a growing intensity of competition which is partially due to the increasing number of commercial players and partially due to underlying geopolitical tensions. Outer space has become one more area of the strategic competition on Earth, as seen during the Cold War. This means that the race to return to the moon, as well as to explore the moon and asteroids for mining and resource extraction, are likely to intensify in the coming years. Two, the number of countries using space assets to step up their military capabilities and national security functions has gone up. Also, the fact that states are looking at space utilization for conventional military operations as against the use for strategic operations in the earlier decades, has added a new dimension.

Over and above, automation, machine learning and AI bring in new dynamics to security in the Asia-Pacific.

Finally, I took a couple of minutes to speak about the strategic competition primarily between India and China in the nuclear and space arenas. India’s nuclear weapons programme has been evolving at a slow but steady pace, and it can be expected to continue expanding in both quantity and quality. Like in space and other areas, much of this expansion is driven by the need to build adequate deterrent capacity against China. It is estimated that India currently has around 100 nuclear warheads, of which only half are strategic missiles. But most of India’s long-range missiles are not sufficiently long enough to cover all of China unless they are deployed in northern India. This is true of both the land-based and submarine-based missiles. This means that India will continue developing its capabilities for the near- to long-term but this could trigger negative reactions from China on the one side, and from Pakistan from the other.

However, it must be noted that India is at least a couple of generations behind China and India is not in competition with China in numerical terms but the need to develop certain capabilities and capacities as a deterrent against China will continue. In the space sector, demonstration of China’s military space capabilities, including ASATs, is driving the militarization of India’s space program. This will propel further competition between these two powers.


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Space should be playground for humanity’s dreams, not new battlefield

Here's a short essay of mine on the global governance of outer space published by the Global Times on October 09, 2013. As two of the established space powers in Asia, India and China, have a responsibility in framing the evolving rules by rectifying loopholes. Legally binding mechanisms are ideal and desirable. However, the prospect of consensus among major powers in identifying challenges and introducing solutions seems distant.

Given these difficulties, India and China could start working toward common definitions of responsible behavior and greater transparency measures among major powers.

For full post, click here.

With the growing dependence on outer space assets for socioeconomic, developmental and military purposes, the number of players in outer space is growing rapidly. There are more than 60 such operators, including non-state actors, in this domain.

India and China, as two of the established space powers in Asia, have a responsibility in framing the evolving rules by rectifying loopholes.

Legally binding mechanisms are ideal and desirable. However, the prospect of consensus among major powers in identifying challenges and introducing solutions seems distant.

Given these difficulties, India and China could start working toward common definitions of responsible behavior and greater transparency measures among major powers.

A new regime should be guided by three key objectives: the security of outer space, order and stability, and sustainability. Most nations accept and acknowledge these objectives, at least rhetorically.

India and China face several common challenges. Operationally, these include space traffic management, overcrowding of satellites and debris in outer space. The debris increases the potential of collision with currently viable assets.

For example this May, the only Ecuadorian satellite, Pegasus, collided with Russian space debris and on August 28, it was officially declared "lost." The UN Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee predicted that space debris, unless tackled aggressively, will have grave consequences over the next 200 years.

The ongoing militarization of space is a concern. Several countries are using space assets for military functions, developing anti-satellite capabilities and offensive uses for space assets, and are making the threat of weaponization and a new arms race imminent.

With this congestion, the need for cooperative rules and regulation cannot be overemphasized, possibly through an institution similar to the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

Unregulated cooperation will only heighten insecurities at multiple levels. This explains the inadequacy of the current regime which has been hobbled by political differences and precluded a new cooperative architecture.

Consequently, different countries have been pursuing tangential solutions. The West has by and large favored Transparency and Confidence Building Measures (TCBMs) as a means to develop norms of responsible behavior in order to ensure safe, secure and continued access to space. While Russia accepts TCBMs, it has joined hands with Beijing to propose a draft treaty preventing the placement of weapons in outer space.

Similarly, a resolution on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) was passed by the UN General Assembly in 1981, but the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva is yet to have a productive session on PAROS.

The UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) is another mechanism to develop cooperative measures in outer space. India too has been active in writing new rules. With a consistent policy against the weaponization of space, it has been active in forums like the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and the CD.

Even as it insists on working out a legally binding mechanism, it is pragmatic enough to recognize the need to start with a normative exercise and gradually move to legal measures.

Space, as a true global commons, must be protected for safe, secure and uninterrupted access. India and China, along with other spacefaring powers, must therefore utilize every opportunity to push for developing norms of responsible behavior, including strengthening measures in the area of active debris removal and on-orbit satellite servicing.

These two early space powers should take on an active role in bridging the gap between the West and the rest in formulating new rules including the Space Code of Conduct and should not allow a few Western countries to monopolize the process, given the huge financial stakes involved.

UNIDIR annual space conference, "Space Security Conference 2013: Enhancing confidence, securing space stability" in Geneva, April 02-03, 2013

Recently, I was at the UNIDIR's annual space security conference titled, "Space Security Conference 2013: Enhancing confidence, securing space stability,"held at UN Headquarters, Geneva, on April 02-03, 2013. The annual space conference of the UNIDIR has become a signature event given the high level participation of all the different stakeholders. I was speaking on space security dialogues and how to ensure widespread representation.

My talk and the PPT are available online now.



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China's Stealth Fighter: Implications of the J-20

Here's the link to an article of mine on the recent test flight of the Chinese fifth generation fighter aircraft, J-20. The article published by ORF can be found here.

The PLAAF (PLA Air Force) conducted the test flight of its new generation stealth fighter J-20 on January 11, 2011, just days before US Defence Secretary Robert Gates landed in Beijing on a mission to repair the bilateral defence ties. The timing of the test flight was curious. Was this itself a message for the US as also the rest of the world? Or is this another demonstration of the lack of coordination at the highest levels of the Chinese government?



J-20 will rival for the latest US stealth fighter - the F-22 Raptor. Russia is also in the process of developing one - the Sukhoi T-50 that made its flight test in January 2010 - although it is going to be another decade before it gets inducted into service. The fact that China has been able to develop the J-20 prototype demonstrates the ability of the PLA to make steady progress in an area where it is otherwise considered weak.

Having said that, it remains to be seen as to how good the new aircraft is. Comparing it with the F-22 or the Russian T-50 is going to be mere speculation. Whether it actually makes it into the fifth generation category or not is also an issue. It will depend on the kind of avionics & communication gear, sensor performance and low radar reflectivity, speed, how advanced it is in terms of the composite material used and a variety of other parameters. But it should be borne in mind that China has been encountering serious problems as far as developing jet engines are concerned. They have not been able to produce a good engine indigenously even for their fourth generation aircrafts.

Several unofficial Chinese and foreign defence-related websites have published pictures of the J-20 prototype doing high-speed taxi test, a step closer to being readied for actual flights. The J-20 has been presumably developed at the Chengdu Aircraft Design Institute,1 although there has been no concrete evidence of such a system being developed until these pictures popped up. While the Chinese authorities have not commented upon the new aircraft, General He Weirong, deputy head of PLAAF had stated in 2009 that China was readying to do the test flight of its first stealth fighter and that it would be operationalised in "eight or 10 years."2

Aviation experts and China watchers have said that the photos seem genuine. Gareth Jennings of the Jane's Defence Weekly noted that since "the nose wheel is off the ground in one picture suggest[ing] that this was a high-speed taxi test." He added that "all the talk we've heard is that this could happen some time the next few weeks".

There are also doubts about whether the technology has been developed indigenously and if not, where they got the technology from. Xu Yongling, one of the top test pilots stated that the J-20 "is a masterpiece of China's technological innovation."3 He added that the jet has advanced supersonic cruise capabilities.

There have been several reports suggesting that US technology that is the foundation for the new fighter. In January 2011, an Indian-American engineer (who worked at the Northrop Grumman, where he worked from 1968 to 1986) was sentenced 32 years imprisonment for selling military secrets to China. Noshir S Gowadia who called himself a father of the technology that protects the B-2 stealth bomber from heat-seeking missiles was originally arrested by the FBI in 2005.4

A second potential source would have been the US F-117 Nighthawk stealth fighter, the world's first operational stealth fighter, which was shot down by a Serbian anti-aircraft missile during the Kosovo War in 1999. The US hardly took any step to obtain the wreckage of the downed F-117 and several critical elements appear to have made its way into the Chinese hands. In fact, a RAND study titled, Friction and Operational Problems, notes that the US did not go about destroying the wreckage as the site attracted large number of people including government officials and journalists.. General John M Loh, a former commander of Tactical Air Command said, "I'm surprised we didn't bomb it, because the standing procedure has always been that when you lose something of real or perceived value - in this case real technology, stealth - you destroy it."5 The report stated that the initial thinking within the military was to destroy the wreckage but they were forced to reconsider "because they could not have located it quickly enough to attack it before it was surrounded by civilians and the media." It said, "For the record, it should be noted that USAF F-15Es were immediately put on alert to destroy the wreckage with AGM-130s after the F-117 downing was confirmed, but by the time the wreckage location could be positively determined, CNN was on the scene and collateral damage issues precluded the attack."6An Aviation Week and Space Technology report on September 27, 1999 noted that while Moscow obtained some parts from the wreckage, a significant size of the airframe found its way into China.7

Admiral Davor Domazet-Loso, who was the head of the Croatian military during the Kosovo War, stated, "At the time, our intelligence reports told of Chinese agents crisscrossing the region where the F-117 disintegrated, buying up parts of the plane from local farmers. We believe the Chinese used those materials to gain an insight into secret stealth technologies … and to reverse-engineer them."8

The US has played down the Chinese stealth achievement. The Pentagon spokesman Col. David Lapan suggested that while the Chinese are working on a fifth generation fighter, the progress has been uneven.9 Another spokesman Geoff Morrell was sceptical about the stealth capabilities of the new aircraft.10 Although the US has known of the Chinese stealth aircraft, they have given different estimates as to when such a system would be ready: from 2018 to 2025.

The new Chinese fighter appears to be modelled around the F-22, a heavy twin-engine fighter about the same size as that of Lockheed's F-22. F-35, which has currently gone into the production mode, is a single engine fighter aircraft, smaller in comparison to the F-22. There have been speculations as to which one the J-20 will be modelled around and the pictures now suggest that it is closer in appearance to that of the F-22. Some reports suggest that J-20 is possibly and larger and heavier than the Russia T-50 or the US F-22.11 The large size indicates the ability to carry heavy weapon load as well as the long range of the aircraft.

The US, which has stopped the production of the expensive F-22 Raptor, preferring the cheaper F-35, may now be confronted with a new rival. Given the size of the new stealth fighter, as mentioned before, it appears closer to the F-22 and therefore the Chinese test-flight of the J-20 will likely trigger some re-thinking within the US defence community. F-22 is far superior to the F-35 and the Pentagon may be forced to re-start the production, which was halted in 2009 after the originally produced 187 were given to the US Air Force. Although both are of the current generation, the F-22 is clearly a superior fighter that ensures air superiority whereas F-35 is intended primarily as a ground attack aircraft. One such analyst commented that there could be a new consensus developing for "the resurrection of the F-22."12

There are important implications for Asian countries that look at these developments with wariness. Japan, for one, has been arguing for an F-22 Raptor but had been asked by the US to settle for F-35. Analysts in Washington have argued that exporting F-22 stealth fighters could potentially impede the "strategically important Sino-US relations." Accordingly, Japan is believed to be developing its own stealth fighter, called Shinshin, meaning the heart of God. Japan had allocated about 8.5 billion yen in 2010 for the purpose. Japan plans to spend a total of a total of 39.4 billion yen for the fighter programme until the fiscal year 2015.13

It remains to be seen as to how India will respond to this latest development. New Delhi has already tied up with Moscow for the joint design and development of a fifth generation fighter aircraft and the Indian Air Force plans to induct into service 300 of them by 2017-18.14 Meanwhile, South Korea plans to speed up its procurement of an advanced fleet of stealth fighters, ready for induction anywhere between 2016 and 2020. The EADS Eurofighter jets, Lockheed F-35 and the Boeing F-15 are in the fray for the Korean order.15

Whether the J-20 matches the F-22 or not, the Chinese flight-test has spot-lighted the spiralling arms race in Asia and beyond.

(Dr. Rajeswari Rajagopalan is a Senior Fellow at the Institute of Security Studies, Observer Research Foundation)
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1Reports in 2002 (Jane's Defence Weekly and New Scientist) talked about Shenyang Aircraft Corporation being selected for heading the R&D for the new fighter. An article later in Military Technology in 2006 brought out three designs - J-12 and J-14 by Shenyang Aircraft Corporation and J-13 by Chengdu Aircraft Corporation. For more details see, "China's 5th Generation Stealth Fighter Programme," Asian Defence News, October 12, 2010, available at http://asian-defence.blogspot.com/2010/10/chinas-5th-generation-stealth-fighter.html.
2Jeremy Page, "A Chinese Stealth Challenge," The Wall Street Journal, January 05, 2001, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703808704576061674166905408.html.
3Press Trust of India, "China Denies Stealing US Stealth Technology," Hindustan Times, January 26, 2011, available at http://www.hindustantimes.com/China-denies-stealing-US-stealth-technology/Article1-654833.aspx.
4The B-2 is a strategic, long-range stealth bomber capable of flying more than 6,000 miles without stopping for refuelling and has a carrying capacity of 40,000 pounds of conventional or nuclear weapons. For details on the espionage case, see Arun Kumar, "NRI Engineer of B-2 Bomber Gets 32 Years for Selling Secrets to China," NRI Internet, January 25, 2011, available at http://www.nriinternet.com/NRI_terrorist/USA/Noshir_Gowadia/Index.htm; and "Former B-2 Engineer Convicted of Selling US Secrets," New York Times, Associated Press, August 11, 2010, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C03EFDA1639F932A2575BC0A9669D8B63.
5Vago Muradian, "Stealth Compromised by Not Destroying F-117 Wreckage," Defense
6Daily, April 2, 1999, cited in Benjamin S Lambeth, NATO's Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment, (RAND: Santa Monica, 2001), p. 119.
7Benjamin S Lambeth, NATO's Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment, (RAND: Santa Monica, 2001), pp. 119-20.
8Cited in Peter Lee, "The Tearful Origins of China's Stealth," Asia Times Online, January 29, 2011, available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/MA29Ad01.html. This account goes onto greater details as to how China took away critical components from the wreckage site. It said, "The navigation system, fuselage fragments with the Stealth coating, and high temperature nozzle components of the engine were spirited into the basement of the Chinese Embassy. Unfortunately, according to this story, there was a locator beacon inside the INU powered by a battery and, before the Chinese could discover and disable it, the US military was alerted to the location of the F-117 fragments and executed the [Chinese embassy] bombing."
9"Chinese Stealth Fighter Jet May Use US Technology," The Guardian (UK), Associated Press, January 23, 2011, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/23/china-stealth-fighter-us-technology.
10Jeremy Page, "A Chinese Stealth Challenge," The Wall Street Journal, January 05, 2001, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703808704576061674166905408.html.
11Tony Capaccio, "Pentagon Still Learning China Stealth Jet Details, Morrell Says," Bloomberg, January 26, 2011, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-26/pentagon-still-learning-china-stealth-jet-details-morrell-says.html.
12Reports suggest that the J-20 is about 75 ft long with a wingspan of 45 ft and weighs around 80,000 lb, without any external aid, indicating large size fuel tank. For details see, "China 'Leaks' Sneak Peek of its First Stealth Aircraft Going for A Test Run," Daily Mail, January 06, 2011, available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1344115/J-20-stealth-fighter-China-leaks-sneak-peek-latest-aircraft-test-run.html.
13Tony Capaccio, "Pentagon Still Learning China Stealth Jet Details, Morrell Says," Bloomberg, January 26, 2011, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-26/pentagon-still-learning-china-stealth-jet-details-morrell-says.html.
14For details see, Kosuke Takahashi, "Japan Frets over the US's F-22s," Asia Times, February 05, 2009, available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/KB05Dh01.html; Dennis Sevakis, "Killing the F-22," American Thinker, April 11, 2009, available at http://www.americanthinker.com/2009/04/killing_the_f22.html.
15The idea of the joint production of the fifth generation fighter aircraft was reached in 2007 and the agreement was signed during the visit of President Dmitry Medvedev to New Delhi in December 2010. The fighter aircraft is jointly being developed by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited from India and the Sukhoi Design Bureau and Rosoboronexport from Russia.
16For details see, "S Korea to Speed Up Combat Fighter Purchase - Yonhap," Reuters, January 29, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/30/korea-defence-fighter-idUSTOE70T00720110130.