China's New Aircraft Carrier and How Does It Affect India?

Here's the link to an article of mine on the new Chinese aircraft carrier published by ORF.

China's ability for air and sea power projection in its neighbourhood is significant and growing, and its first aircraft carrier is another indicator. The carrier would provide China the ability to project its power even farther.



Earlier this month, the PLA Navy (PLAN) began the sea trials of its first aircraft carrier, the refurbished Varyag. Senior Colonel Li Xiaoyan, a member of China's first warship academy class in 1987, is set to command the ship while three other officers have been appointed as Deputy Captains. Besides there are seven other senior officers who have reportedly undergone training at the Guangzhou Naval Academy since 2008 and dispatched to Varyag in December 2010. Li has been chosen as the commander given that he is one of the first who could both pilot aircraft and sail warships.

While details are still awaited, a picture
available of the aircraft carrier also does not reveal much. However, it seems in line with what Can Weidong of the PLA Navy's Academic Research Institute had said, that it will be a "conventionally powered medium-sized carrier that would be equipped with Chinese engines, aircraft, radar and other hardware."

What is likely to be the utility of aircraft carrier to China? Does it enhance Chinese security significantly? And, how does the Varyag impact upon Indian interests or the larger Asian security framework?

Varyag, a Soviet-era carrier not very old, relative to other carriers, was bought from Ukraine in 1998 and underwent serious rework and refitting at a shipyard in Dalian in Liaoning Province. While there was no doubt that China will have its own aircraft carrier, the world has gone wrong in their assessments as far as the timeline was concerned. Many of the western assessments had calculated that Beijing will have its first carrier by 2012 or so. However, today the aircraft carrier is only undergoing initial sea trials, possibly checking the engines (it is not clear yet whether it uses the gas turbine, steam turbine or marine diesel engine. China does not yet have indigenous gas or steam turbine production capabilities and it is not believed to have procured these engines from foreign sources.), navigation equipment, electronics fire control and maintenance operations. But they are a long way away from carrying fighter jets. It is no surprise because no aircraft carrier carries planes on such early trials. It will be years before they have a carrier battle group comprising a consolidated group of frigates, destroyers, submarines and other accessories.

What does an aircraft carrier mean for China? Aircraft carriers have significant utility in enforcing sea control and sea denial strategies given the importance of air power superiority in combat, especially for power projection purposes. Having an aircraft carrier in its armoury does not mean much as yet and China is years away from being capable of even effective sea denial strategy in the East Asian region. However, as a rising power, China will possess such capabilities and more in the future. If there are no serious hitches, the PLAN plans to induct the carrier into service by October 2012, though this sounds ambitious.

China's plans to induct an aircraft carrier is in perfect alignment with the assertive naval posturing that it has been displaying vis a vis its neighbours in the recent years - be it the East China Sea or the South China Sea. In fact, aircraft carrier would provide Beijing with what it apparently sees as the coercive means for enforcing its claims in these two seas. Reportedly, a Chinese defence ministry-run website made it clear to say that the carrier should handle territorial disputes as well. A PLA Daily article too noted that in a theatre like the South China Sea, the strategic manoeuvre that is possible with a carrier would provide them the ability to apply significant air-to-ground firepower during military missions, while not being affected by geographical restrictions. They in fact see the aircraft carrier as a "mobile maritime airport." Chinese strategists believe that such kind of "deterrent" abilities would be important in defending the high seas as well as the coastal waters.

The timing is curious too. They flight-tested their stealth fighter during the US Defence Secretary's visit; and this time they decided to conduct the aircraft carrier sea trials around the same time as US Vice President Joe Biden's visit. It is unclear if this is a coincidence or a signal to the US.

What does the Chinese aircraft carrier mean for India and other neighbours? In the first place, it would induce caution in other maritime powers in the region, particularly India, US and Japan. China's submarine force already has produced this effect on these powers; the aircraft carrier would compound it.

As for the Southeast Asian countries, the Chinese aircraft carrier would be a display of power and prestige. In fact, a PLA Daily article said that the aircraft carrier has far greater political significance than military significance. This is particularly important given that until a few years back, the PLAN was the weakest wing of the Chinese military. But this has changed now with greater attention in favour of the naval and air wing of the military. China believes that aircraft carriers are important if they want to be able to control the air and have effective presence in areas that may be away from its territorial limits. Display of power and prestige is important both for the internal and external audiences.

Analysts have talked about China's ability to conduct anti-submarine warfare against Indian nuclear submarines although it is too early to judge this yet. However, China's ability for air and sea power projection in its neighbourhood is significant and growing, and the aircraft carrier is another indicator. The carrier would provide China the ability to project its power even farther. China has already begun anti-piracy operations off the waters of Somalia and refuelling in the Karachi port. An aircraft carrier would provide them far greater options in the near future.

Chinese Defence White Paper: An Initial Assessment

Here's the link to an article of mine published by ORF on the just released Chinese Defence White Paper.

China's defence White Paper, titled China's National Defense in 2010, the seventh in the series, was published on March 31, 2011. Does the White Paper bring out anything new? The answer may be a "No" given that it has continued reiterating the same positions on all of these issues. Because of criticism of lack of transparency on security issues, China has decided to come out with these white papers but unfortunately it sheds no new light on the PLA, its objectives or the military modernization. While it remains an important CBM measure, the suspicions about the long term intentions of Beijing can be hardly wished away with the publication of these white papers. The White Paper is essentially what the Chinese want the world to believe what they are doing. Therefore, if China is serious about reducing the regional suspicion about its rise, it has to do something more meaningful.



Underlying the fact that the momentum for economic globalization and multi-polar world are irreversible, the White Paper identifies a few challenges as it outlines its security environment. The "intermittent tension" on the Korean Peninsula and the unraveling security scenario in Afghanistan are seen as major concerns, and the White Paper argues that the Asia-Pacific security has become "more intricate and volatile." Occasional disputes and flare-ups over undemarcated territorial issues and maritime rights have been mentioned as issues contributing to the volatile situation in the Asia-Pacific though thereis no mention of the recent incidents at sea, fuelled by Chinese naval actions.2 The presence of external powers in China's extended neighbourhood - the US and its strengthened regional partnerships -is an issue for Beijing. However, China claims that it is still in "the period of important strategic opportunities for its development," and therefore the idea of cooperating with major traditional powers and new emerging powers, along with good neighbourly relationship, is seen as something Beijing must continue with for mutual benefits. While acknowledging relations with the United States as significant and as a stabilizing tool, Beijing does not mince its words in criticizing Washington for its alliance-kind of relationship, particularly the military sales to the region.

Describing its national defense policy as purely defensive, the White Paper sets out four critical tasks for its armed forces: safeguarding national sovereignty, security and interests of national development; maintaining social harmony and stability; accelerating the modernization of national defense and the armed forces; and maintaining world peace and stability. It further details its strategy as adhering to "the principles of independence and self-defense by the whole nation" and is essentially for maintaining the territorial integrity of its land border, territorial sea and air defenses. China has also begun to emphasize on MOOTW (Military Operations Other Than War), again a theme that began with the last defense White Paper. Beijing argues that there is an increased role for its armed forces on a range of missions, from disaster management missions to riot control to search and rescue operations given the penetrating nature of non-traditional security threats faced by Asia today.

On the modernization of national defense capabilities, the White Paper argues that the PLA is modernizing its forces and equipment "with mechanization as the foundation and informationization as the driving force, while making extensive use of its achievements in information technology, and stepping up the composite and integrated development of mechanization and informationization." Talking of PLA modernization, it emphasizes shifting from a "manpower-intensive to a technology-intensive model." The document mentions the formation of new types of combat forces,without divulging much detail. There is also the modernization of the artillery forces - with the introduction of new types of radar, command information systems, and medium- and high-altitude ground-to-air missiles- for undertaking important military maneuvers - "to carry out precision operations with integrated reconnaissance, control, strike and assessment capabilities." In addition, the PLA Army aviation wing has made significant changes to its role and function - moving away from being a support arm to being a main-battle assault force. Air power has been given a lot of emphasis evident from the upgradation undertaken in its armed helicopters, transport and service helicopters, thereby making marked differences in its ability to move and support infantry forces, force projection as well as extending support role in various missions.

There has been marked progress on the naval front as well. Introduction of new submarines, frigates, aircraft and large support vessels in support of China's offshore defense strategy or "Far Sea Defense Strategy" as stated by Rear Adm. Zhang Huachen, deputy commander of the East Sea Fleet in April last year.3 Accordingly, PLA Navy plans construction of new support bases in order to strengthen the shore-based support system while complementing the deployment of forces and development of weaponry and equipment. This suggests the future intentions of the Navy to project power beyond the immediate neighbourhood.

However, the most significant pronouncement has been regarding the role of the PLA Air Force - to meet "the strategic requirements of conducting both offensive and defensive operations." The Air Force is projected to have important roles in the coming years that emphasizes "air strikes, air and missile defense, and strategic projection," while improving its "leadership and command system for an informationized, networked base support system."Similarly, it has been training on various scenarios involving extensive electromagnetic environment, recognizing the importance of these in future warfare scenarios. Similarly, there has been major push for modernizing its Second Artillery Force with an objective of sharpening their capabilities for "rapid reaction, penetration, precision strike, damage infliction, protection, and survivability, while steadily enhancing its capabilities in strategic deterrence and defensive operations."

A great deal of emphasis has been placed on the need to accelerate the development of new and high-tech weaponry and equipment for undertaking the above-mentioned missions and goals. Accordingly, it has strengthened "the retrofitting and management of existing equipment, and promoting the composite development of mechanized and informationized weaponry and equipment."

Additionally, the White Paper discusses defence expenditure and bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Such cooperation involves a range of issues from joint military exercises and training to strengthening cooperation as a Confidence Building Measure (CBM). Confidence building measures are also discussed for maintaining social stability and non-proliferation and arms control issues.

China in Indian Ocean Region

Here's a link to an article by Peter Brown on what China is actually doing in terms of extending its influence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), and how India and the US are likely to react, that has qouted me extensively. The story appeared in (October 22, 2009) the Asia Times Online.

India learned to live with Chinese merchant ships in the Indian Ocean region long ago, and even the Chinese vessel seized by pirates this week was bound for India from South Africa. And yet, India is taking stock of the presence of Chinese naval vessels in the Indian Ocean region. This development will constitute a major headache for India as it unfolds - something altogether new and unsettling.



Three Chinese PLA Navy (PLAN) vessels do not make a fleet, but they do make a statement. By sending them to patrol off the coast of Somalia as part of the multinational force, in effect, China simply is saying to India," We're back."

Just as it has done on India's northern border, where the number of reported border incursions doubled to almost 300 from 2007 to 2008, China has undertaken a series of actions in the Indian Ocean region which may not be as menacing or confrontational as what has been underway along India's northern border, but it suggests a shift in attitude in Beijing. In the process, these not-so-subtle naval moves by China are proving to be far more than mere distractions in New Delhi.

"For the first time ever in the western IOR [Indian Ocean region], India has set up a listening post in Madagascar - a high-tech monitoring station in northern Madagascar. This station is of great significance given its proximity to [the port of] Gwadar [in Pakistan] as well as the Chinese increasing [their] presence in the western IOR. Unlike in other countries of the region, China has not made much headway in Madagascar," said Dr Rajeswari Rajagopalan, senior fellow in security studies at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi.

"The Chinese were quick to note how their lack of a maritime capacity to engage in disaster relief and rescue during the 2004 tsunami also redounded in the formation of an ad hoc maritime alliance between the US, Japan, Australia and India to its detriment," said Sourabh Gupta, senior research associate at Samuels International Associates, Inc in Washington, DC.

"By appropriating capabilities in this disaster assistance and humanitarian relief area as well as participating in global stakeholder activities such as the Somalia anti-piracy mission, the PLAN seems to have cottoned on to a convenient vehicle for regional and 'out of area' naval activity - non-traditional security missions - without setting off alarm bells."

Beijing's resource-based diplomacy is emerging as a major challenge not only for the US - in the Indian Ocean region and elsewhere - but for other major players in Asia as well, including India.

"Energy security and hunger for other natural resources are the primary motivating factors besides gaining strategic foothold in the IOR. The region has about 40% of the world's oil and gas reserves and additionally the locus of several important sea lines of communication [SLOCs, or the primary maritime routes between ports]. Constraining India's growth aspirations and limiting its potential in the South Asian region continue to be underlying objectives in Chinese policies in several countries in the IOR such as Sri Lanka, Maldives and Pakistan," said Rajagopalan.

Gwadar in Pakistan, Hambantota in Sri Lanka and Marao in the Maldives along with another seaport site - or two - in Myanmar now serve as the nucleus for China's so-called "string of pearls" strategy. Gwadar in particular offers China a base of naval operations close to major energy transportation routes from the Persian Gulf, according to Rajagopalan.

"While many of the Chinese moves [in the Indian Ocean region] may not be overtly confrontational, they do create potential for tension between India and China, Japan and China and so on. Beijing has consolidated its relations with almost all of the IOR countries in the last few years," said Rajagopalan. "For example, President Hu Jintao's recent visits to Mauritius and Seychelles were about establishing a firm strategic foothold in these IOR states. Mauritius is particularly important, given its proximity to Diego Garcia and the US military presence there."

Despite much talk of this "string of pearls" strategy in the Indian Ocean region, Gupta sees no compelling evidence of PLAN basing activities as yet beyond port development activities in Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Myanmar.

"Indeed, the recently retired top Indian foreign policy bureaucrat - Shiv Shankar Menon - pointed this fact out very recently. Of course, the apprehension persists that some of the maritime security dilemmas that prevail in East and Southeast Asia will gravitate to the IOR and compound tensions," said Gupta.

Chinese shipping companies have maintained port operations on the Panama Canal and even in Long Beach, California, for years, but while this trend is disconcerting, it does not translate into any immediate overt military presence or decisive strategic advantage. It does, however, enable China to conduct naval intelligence, economic espionage and other related covert activities more easily.

Gupta emphasizes that while China is raising the temperature in the Indian Ocean region a notch, observers should avoid distorting or exaggerating the scope of China's naval activities there.

"Their naval forces are heading 'out of area' for the first time in many centuries and, paired with the poor communications skills of the Chinese military, there are concerns within the region. But when compared to the PLA Navy's [PLAN's] situation and activities in East and Southeast Asia - active maritime territorial disputes; snooping in territorial waters; tangling with US vessels in exclusive economic zones [EEZs] - the PLAN's current IOR activities are relatively benign," said Gupta.

Chinese naval strategists subscribe to the view that naval power is truly a representation of a country's comprehensive power. China cannot attain greatness without being a full-fledged seafaring power, and yet, "The Chinese do swimmingly free-riding on the back of US underwriting of the global commons," said Gupta.

Meanwhile, any reading of the tea leaves on the Southeast Asian side of the Indian Ocean region is difficult indeed.

"Some of the Southeast countries which are littoral states in the Indian Ocean region also have been watchful of the increasing competition in the region. Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand are becoming more aware of the consequences of a potential major power conflict in the region and are becoming parties to various regional and sub-regional groupings to mitigate the regional tensions," said Rajagopalan.

Singapore and Thailand, for instance, are already squaring off over the long-discussed Kra Canal, which would provide a direct link between the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean - bypassing the Straits of Malacca through which an estimated 80% of China's oil now flows.

"China is a new enthusiastic partner [and a big potential investor in this instance]. However, Singapore and the US remain opposed to the idea, for different reasons. The US opposition has to do with the fact that it will enable China to develop a much stronger influence in the region. This is a concern shared by countries like India and Japan as well," said Rajagopalan.

If angered, certain of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations' (ASEAN's) 10 countries could have an immediate adverse impact on China's naval operations, quickly sealing off the Indian Ocean region.

"ASEAN, because of its proximity as well as its South China Sea disputes with the PRC [People's Republic of China], has an especially lucid window to Chinese naval practices. It has the inclination and the will to invite US forces to bottle-up the Chinese navy in its own backyard if it was deemed to be acting mischievously," said Gupta.

As for the role of former US bases in ASEAN nations, especially Subic Bay in the the Philippines - once the site of a large US Navy base along with a US Air Force base until the end of the Cold War - in support of Indian Ocean region military operations, any return to Subic Bay by US military forces in large numbers now seems farfetched.

"Already, given the perennial controversy that surrounds the Okinawa bases, a return of US personnel in large numbers to any Southeast Asian base - short of outright Chinese regional aggression or provocation - is likely be seen as an unwelcome throwback to the past," said Gupta. "Given the recently agreed-upon realignment of forces in Japan and additional forward positioning there of some command functions as well as the availability of Guam, I think a Subic Bay redeployment in this day and age of beyond-the-horizon capabilities is superfluous."

Gupta recommends that if there are US needs beyond Japan and Guam, they are probably best attained through joint pre-positioning sites, similar to what exists in Singapore, "with additional contingency access to host-nation facilities, but with only a skeletal American permanent presence on site".

In addition to engaging in an extensive schedule of joint exercises and training, Singapore's level of cooperation with the US serves as a model here. It offers the US vital logistical infrastructure, including aircraft carrier dry-dock facilities, and pre-positioning of US equipment, among other things.

For years to come, the US will remain the dominant player in the Indian Ocean region, while "India is likely to pick up some of the slack in the future and be a reliable defender of regional maritime responsibilities. In its own theater, Australia already is projected to commit greater naval assets, too," said Gupta.

On the other hand, greater Asian economic interests might prove to be a powerful and quite unexpected catalyst for change in the Indian Ocean region.

"After all, in a significant way, the Chinese economic interest in the security and stewardship of SLOCs is synonymous with India's as well as its ASEAN and East Asian partners. Hence, cooperative great power initiatives including China to safeguard the maritime commons and limit their mutual competitive tendencies within a broader framework of cooperation is not beyond the realm of possibility," said Gupta.

Losing the Indian Ocean region as a sphere of influence is not an option for India under any circumstance. Sharing it is another matter entirely and India would have to be far more trusting of China than it is now for such a scheme to float.

Regardless, India cannot afford to become so narrowly focused on China's blue-water aspirations because India has urgent coastal protection concerns as well. The terror attack on the city of Mumbai last November demonstrated that India's coastline is quite unprotected - the militants arrived by sea.

"One must reflect on the fact that India's lone aircraft carrier provided no defense against the Mumbai attackers who after all infiltrated by sea from [the Pakistani port city of] Karachi. Big ticket items and strategic deterrence and power projection notwithstanding, it is coastal defenses and the unsexy business of strengthening coast guard capabilities that is the crying need of the hour," said Gupta.

Among other things, India still has considerable time to further develop and deploy land-based naval aviation assets in a multi-layered defensive posture using a forward-thinking approach. While borrowing certain elements from the system that was deployed by the Russians to counter US carrier groups in the western Pacific might make sense, the door is also open to a greater role for unmanned aerial vehicles both for maintaining maritime domain awareness and engaging in force projection.

India has room for "helicopter carriers" - both for defensive purposes and rapid response to disasters throughout the Indian Ocean region - such as those that Japan has been building lately and India has new space assets including a new ocean surveillance satellite at its disposal.

India has much to sort out. Its reluctance to join the anti-piracy mission off Somalia, and its attachment to big carriers with all their inherent littoral vulnerabilities, might be easily explained, but agility and quick maneuvers count as well when the chips are down. China may go on winning points and gaining some ground in the Indian Ocean region, but India sits right in the middle of it, and that geopolitical reality will not turn with the tide.

"The US is likely to play a greater role in the region, given the developments of the past few years. Its military presence in Diego Garcia is likely to be augmented in the coming years for several reasons, including the China factor," said Rajagopalan. "Additionally, it might be important for countries like India and the US, as key players in the IOR, to strengthen their maritime cooperation. Such cooperation could also involve other states such as Japan, Australia and Singapore."